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[1 - Introduction] 
 
1.1 - Exorcising Cartesianism 
 
In modern philosophy of cognition, the Cartesian schema has long been the 
dominant way of characterizing the role of the mind. The notion of a mind 
that is, at least in principle, separable from the body because it is an entirely 
different kind of entity, is firmly embedded in everyday parlance, but even in 
philosophical and psychological theories that are proclaimed to have done 
away with Cartesianism, some rudiments of the old schema sometimes 
remain. 
 
These Cartesian rudiments often take the form of what Ryle (1949) called a 
'category mistake', in which a term from one logico-linguistic category is 
incorrectly applied to something that would require the application of a term 
from a wholly different category. An example of an error of this kind would 
be a case in which a capacity or activity of the agent as a whole is 
somehow attributed to something 'inside the head', be it a brain region or a 
particular functional state. Bennett and Hacker (2003), for instance, provide 
a lengthy critique of such cases. In their book, neuroscientific models in 
which the brain (or a specific brain region) is claimed to 'see' and 'hear' 
most obviously fall prey to the charge of hidden Cartesianism, but few today 
hold such views explicitly. However, even more subtle formulations 
involving, for instance, neural correlates of aspects of visual scenes being 
identified as representations of those aspects that need to be processed 
neurally, are picked apart and criticized as harbouring old Cartesian 
rudiments in a more or less implicit fashion. Whatever can be said about the 
validity of the arguments developed by Bennet and HackerNOTE 1, their 
inclination towards doing away with these old theoretical impediments is 
shared by many others, some of whom will be mentioned below. 
 
The main bulwark of Cartesianism in the modern era is cognitivism, which 
can be characterised by mentioning three central hypotheses: (1) 
representations, internal states that stand in for or symbolise external 
states, are the constituents of mental phenomena; (2) the syntaxis (form) 
rather than semantic content of these representations is most significant; (3) 
it is possible to specify the rules that govern the form-based transformations 
of representations into other representations. The most important Cartesian 
aspect of cognitivism involves the idea that cognition is to be thought of as a 
kind of symbol manipulation that takes place somewhere in the brain, 
irrespective of the precise physical instantiation of these symbols. 
 
This is the basic picture that underlies the computer-metaphor of the mind: 
cognition is, in essence, the manipulation of language-like symbols 
governed by explicit rules. One of the main proponents of this kind of 
thinking about the mind is Jerry Fodor (1975). 
 
In recent years, the discontent with the Cartesian and/or cognitivistic picture 
of the relationship between mind and body - and in fact the idea that there is 
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to be talk of a relationship at all - has grown considerably, coinciding with 
and feeding off the groundswell of theories proclaiming that mind and body 
are in actuality an inseparable unity. These theories of embodied cognition 
state that explaining the mind requires taking into account the way in which 
that mind controls the body, and how the properties of that body in turn 
enable and/or constrain the activities of the mind. Expanding upon this 
notion, many maintain that cognition is also embedded, meaning that 
properties of the environment (i.e. factors external to the organism) are 
relevant to the explanation of cognitive processes as well. In a particular 
theory of embodied and embedded cognition, these two factors might be 
attributed varying weight, their most radical implementation yielding the idea 
that cognition is behaviour (almost resembling 'good old' philosophical 
behaviourism - Thelen et al. (2001) defend a theory - to be discussed in 
section 3.2 - that is like this, in a way, attempting to abolish any and all need 
for talk of representations), or that external processes form an integral 
component of cognitive processes (Clark's [1997] scaffolding, McCulloch's 
[2003] phenomenal externalism). 
 
This variance in the weights of theory components contributes to the fact 
that it is not always clear what 'embodiment' and 'embeddedness' are 
supposed to mean (Ziemke, 2003). In reality, 'embodied and embedded 
cognition' is not so much a coherent theory as it is a collection of closely 
(and sometimes not so closely) related approaches to explaining cognition.  
 
For any particular flavour of theory about embodied/embedded cognition, 
the kinds of problems that are addressed, the contributing disciplines, as 
well as the kinds of theories viewed as inspirational might all be selected 
from a rather wide range of possibilities. This adds to the impression that 
'the embodied/embedded cognition paradigm' constitutes a grab-bag of 
approaches rather than a fully realised, consistent and coherent theory: this 
'paradigm' lies at a nexus of neuroscience, cognitive psychology, dynamical 
systems theory and philosophy of cognition. In it, we see approaches that 
are anti-Cartesian, anti-computationalist (Clark, 1997), pro-ecological, often 
pro-J.J.Gibson (see Gibson, 1979; Varela et al., 1991), and dynamical (Port 
and Van Gelder, 1995; Thelen et al., 2001). We see attempts to integrate 
knowledge from phenomenological traditions, often Merleau-Ponty 
(Thompson, 2007) and/or Heidegger (Clark, 1997), and sometimes 
inspiration is sought from Aristotle (Juarrero, 1999), possibly the pre-
Socratics, and even Buddhism (Varela et al. 1991). 
 
1.2 - Varieties of E( i )C 
 
I would suggest that part of the reason why the 'embodied and embedded 
cognition'-paradigm is a somewhat muddled and fractured field of research, 
lies in the fact that there are several elements in addition to 'embodiment' 
and 'embeddedness' which can be included in this kind of approach to 
characterising the mind and cognition. Which elements should be adhered 
to - and in which way - can vary considerably, depending on who you ask, 
yet they can all be grouped in roughly the same 'subsection' of the field of 
 11 
theories about the mind. Quite conveniently - or perhaps confusingly, 
depending on your inclination - each of these elements can be referred to 
by a term starting with the letter 'e'. I propose the notation 'E( i )C' as a more 
inclusive and neutral way to refer to what, so far, has been dubbed the 
'embodied and embedded cognition'-approach, with 'i' as a placeholder for 
any combination of the theory-components listed below. 
 
Varieties of E( i )C 
 
-Embodied Cognition 
Notation: E( B )C 
 
'Embodiment' might take on a meaning as deflated as mere perceptual 
grounding (Gärdenfors 2000, pg 160-161, where he quotes Jackendoff 
1983): what we think and feel is informed by perceptual input, hence 
whatever we mean by our expressions has, at some point, been run 
through a throng of perceptual filters, i.e. has been influenced by the way 
our body (including the perceptual subsystems) functions. A more 
substantial conception of 'embodiment' can involve claims such as those 
made by Damasio (1999): processes involved in realizing basic bodily 
awareness, proprioception and emotional responses are also constitutive of 
the processes that realise cognition, crucially including off-line cognitive 
processing. Jesse Prinz' (2002) concept empiricism (see section 10.3) is a 
theory which falls in this general category: according to Prinz, the properties 
of the body's sensory organs and the properties of concepts are intimately 
linked. 
 
-Embedded Cognition 
NotationNOTE 2: E( S )C  
 
'Embeddedness' can refer to a lot of things, but the main idea is that an 
agent is to be understood in relation to his environment. One way to flesh 
out this idea is by referring to J.J. Gibson's (1979) 'affordances', where the 
properties of (some relevant part of) the environment and the capabilities of 
the agent conspire to define a range of possibilities for action. Some of the 
theoretical flavours that characterise this range border on enactive cognition 
(see below), when the way in which the agent acts in this environment is 
taken into account; other varieties blend into extended cognition (also 
below), as the definition of what constitutes a mind is modified in such a 
way that the mind's boundaries extend beyond the agent's skin, and into 
what would count as 'the environment' in other theories. 
 
-Extended Cognition 
Notation: E( X )C 
 
Claiming cognition, or the mind as such, is 'extended', is to say that at least 
some mental processes utilise extradermal artifacts and processes in such 
a way that they should be claimed to form a proper part of the mental 
proceedings. For Clark's (1997) notion 'scaffolding', which refers to activities 
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at a fairly innocuous end of this spectrum - e.g. using bits of paper to 
scribble on while performing calculations, which would mean that these 
scribblings support mental activity -, a case can be made to classify it under 
the 'embedded' header. However, the stronger claim of objects actually 
becoming part of an agent's cognitive processes is also possible (Clark and 
Chalmers 1998): imagine a chronic amnesiac who uses a notepad the way 
'normal' people use their memory. In such cases, the mind is said to 'leak 
out of the skull', and into the environment. For some supporters of this 
position (e.g. Clark and Chalmers), this is less of a metaphor than one 
might think. 
 
-Enactive CognitionNOTE 3 
Notation: E( A )C 
 
The central tenet of 'enactivism' (Varela et al. 1991) is that cognition should 
be understood in terms of an interaction-process of body and world. An 
agent does not have a belief in the same way he can have blue eyes or 
curly hair; rather, having a belief means acting out whatever this belief 
implies in a minded interplay with the world. This principle applies to 
sensorimotor activity in particular: seeing, for instance, is not a passive 
information-processing procedure, but it is a specific mode of interaction 
with the environment (O'Regan and Noë 2001, Noë 2004). An important 
driving force behind this view is the explicit notion that representation 
cannot and should not be invoked to explain most (and some would say all) 
forms of cognition-involving action. 
 
Some dynamicist approaches (i.e. DST-C, the application of dynamical 
systems theory to cognition) might be characterised as supporting enaction: 
the distinctive claim of Port and Van Gelder (1995), for instance, is that the 
study of cognition is essentially about the kind of activity an agent exhibits 
over time. That is, an agent has a history, and any cognitive process that he 
might exhibit is crucially interwoven with what he does, how he does it, and 
also with the ways in which these acts are shaped by and leave their traces 
on his environment. 
 
An additional rider that might be added to the 'enactivist' component is that 
action can be meaningful to a particular agent, in a particular niche: colour 
vision - used for detecting prey or food, for instance - can be understood in 
terms of an agent's interaction with certain features of his niche, and this 
interaction dynamic is the way it is because of practical, meaningful, 
evolutionarily significant reasons (Thompson 1995). As such, enactivism is 
often closely related to the theories of J.J. Gibson (1979) (see also section 
8.2). 
 
-Encultured CognitionNOTE 4 
Notation: E( C )C 
 
An agent can also be 'encultured', referring to the immersion in a particular 
socio-cultural context. Such a context has its own rules and regulations that 
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set it apart from the less layered, less abstract and less symbol-centered 
(but certainly no less dynamic) ecological context covered by the 
'embedded' tag. This immersion is the kind of agent-to-world-dynamic 
studied by cultural anthropologists, and similar to what sociologists have 
dubbed 'socialization': it is that part of the agent's environment chiefly 
formed by other people, their behaviour, and the meaningful symbols 
(speech, text, complex signs and signals) they create. An important 
regulating dynamic by which the agent can cohabitate with other agents 
involves learning how to interpret these cues, and the continuing adaptation 
to new variations on these themes. 
 
Different combinations of these E( i )C-components are possible. 
Furthermore, each of the components above allows some variance in the 
kind of ontology it prescribes or implies regarding the mind. For instance, 
Clark, Chalmers, Gärdenfors and others who pledge adhesion to at least 
some of these components, subscribe to fairly robust ontological 
commitments about the mind, whereas J.J. Gibson and dynamicists such as 
Thelen promote a somewhat 'deflationary' view of cognition, abolishing as 
much internal processing as possible, and pushing what is left to the agent's 
sensorimotor periphery. 
 
Another example: some of the classic Continental philosophers - e.g. 
Merleau-Ponty - might be described as adhering to E( B, S, A )C, stressing, as 
they do, the primacy of the body, environment and action; the same goes 
for J.J. Gibson. However, a case can be made for the claim that despite 
these decidedly non-trivial similarities, Gibson subscribes to notions about 
representation and phenomenology that differ from those held by Merleau-
Ponty. That is, Gibson exorcises them, whereas Merleau-Ponty, despite his 
anti-cognitivist (i.e. anti-Cartesian) leanings, still operates within an 
opposition between the conscious subject and the perceived object, at least 
in his earlier writings. 
 
All signs point to the conclusion that the philosophers and scientists working 
on theories of embodied/embedded cognition are still in the middle of 
founding this new paradigm, and with it they intend to assimilate the best of 
a number of relevant philosophical and psychological traditions, while 
discarding those elements that have proven to be ineffective. The one thing 
that binds together this multitextured patchwork of approaches, is the aim to 
offer an alternative to the classic theories of cognition, Cartesian dualism 
and computationalism in particular. So it might make sense to speak of the 
'embodied/embedded cognition'-inclination (rather than paradigm), this 
inclination resulting in a somewhat non-homogeneous array of research 
programmes, bound together by a common 'enemy'NOTE 5. Here, some 
clean-up and structure is needed to streamline the efforts in this burgeoning 
field. 
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1.3 - Central Question 
 
To provide some of that structure is the purpose of this book. The main 
focus of this book involves a proposal to help theories of 
embodied/embedded cognition account for actual thinking - cognition, by 
providing the first piece of that puzzle: a theory of concepts. There is a 
respectable number of successful embodied/embedded models and 
experiments involving rather basic cognitive or proto-cognitive processes, 
but few of them manage to provide the tools with which to understand 
'higher' forms of cognition in an embodied and embedded context. 
 
Clark (1997), for instance, introduces the cockroach as the new 
paradigmatic example of cognitive behaviour. He uses the distributed 
character of the mechanisms responsible for controlling the cockroach's 
actions to underscore the idea that the brain should be conceptualised as 
an embodied controller, thereby replacing the old computer-metaphor of the 
mind prevalent in computationalism (including the idea of mental operations 
as centralised symbol processing). Clark's coackroach-example (as well as 
the majority of the other examples, anecdotes and vignettes he uses) yields 
a very effective heuristic tool, and it certainly helps redefine the kinds of 
theories that are needed to account for basic sensorimotor interaction with 
the world, but it says little about the kind of cognition involved in thinking, 
writing a novel, composing music, playing chess and any of a million other 
activities involving higher cognition - even having a discussion with a 
colleague can be understood in a way that involves, but is quite definitely 
not exhausted by, basic embodied processes. I am certain that Clark knows 
this, as he discusses the useful notion 'representation-hungry problems' 
(see also section 7.4), but the impression remains that, after Clark has said 
and done all he planned to, there is still more to be said about the more 
highly developed activities of the mind. 
 
Similar remarks can be made about the field of dynamical systems theory 
as applied to cognition. Thelen et al. (2001) build a solid case in support of 
a theory of (some aspects of) cognition that does not require internal 
representation (of the computationalist/cognitivist kind). However, their 
model does not address higher cognitionNOTE 6. As such, the model does 
constitute an important first step towards a dynamicist theory of cognition, 
but it does not yet address cognition as we understand it in everyday 
parlance. Of course, part of the 'embodied/embedded'-project is geared 
towards changing exactly this outdated paradigm of cognition, and 
psychology and the philosophy of cognition are likely to become healthier 
disciplines because of such changes, but this new paradigm does not offer 
a snug fit: there is quite a bit of room left in the mind (metaphorically 
speaking, obviously) that is not covered by this new vernacular. 
 
Another example: Bermudez (1998) addresses the role of basic 
sensorimotor processes for self-consciousness, but these processes are all 
held to have their greatest influence at the sub- or non-conceptual level. 
Certainly nonconceptual content (inasmuch as there can be talk of 'content' 
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here, see Hutto, 2007, and chapter 7 of this book) is relevant to agentive 
action involving higher cognition, but it does not tell the whole story. Much 
of the work done by Gallagher (e.g. 2005), Damasio (e.g. 1999) and others 
in related fields, however valuable it may be, also focuses on rather low-
level sensorimotor processes, with limited relevance for higher cognition. 
 
As a final mention, Thompson (2007) features a noteworthy attempt at 
correlating phenomenology and neuroscience from the enactive perspective 
(extrapolated from e.g. Varela et al (1991), Noë (2004)), and his project 
could, if developed further, have very interesting and significant 
consequences for my own approach, but for now it too lacks a sustained 
address of the problems of fitting higher cognition into the embodied and 
embedded cognition paradigm. 
 
All the projects mentioned are important and valuable in that they foster 
awareness of the inadequacy of the old (i.e. cognitivistic) ways of 
conceptualising the mind. However, more than a few of these theories 
involving embodied and embedded cognition shortchange the mental. In 
their drive to define cognition in terms of fairly basic sensorimotor 
processes, combined with the abolition of as much internal representation 
as can be mustered, the inventors of these theories generate a 
characterization of the mind which does not appear to include a clear notion 
of what to do with higher cognition. In this book, I intend to offer a few 
suggestions on how we might be able to make some headway on this 
difficult terrain, with the explicit intent of presenting a model that is 
compatible with these promising lines of research on 'lower' forms of 
cognition. 
 
In essence, I will provide an embodied and embedded theory of concepts - 
or, more precisely, of the concept 'concept'. This is useful because 
'embodiment/embeddedness' and 'concepts' appear to be notions that are 
difficult to reconcile. That is, concepts are traditionally thought of as 
important building blocks of mental events or entities, and accounts along 
these lines usually reside squarely within the old paradigms. Thinking of 
concepts as components of thoughts feels quite natural if you define 
thoughts as complex symbolic representations, somehow occurring in the 
brain: a possible theory is then that concepts are more basic symbols that 
those complex symbolic states are composed of, and they can be combined 
in ways that adhere to specific language-like rules. Analytic functionalism, 
which does not endorse the symbol-based account of computationalism as 
sketched above, has well-developed ideas about concepts in terms of 
representations and representational structures as well. However, most 
embodied and embedded theories of cognition define mental terms in non-
classical ways, for instance by involving extramental properties in their 
explanations of cognitive processes, often even by discarding the classical 
varieties of representations altogether. 
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The problem then is: what status should we award the concept 'concept' 
once we accept a theory which does away with these standard accounts of 
cognition and/or mental representation? So this is my central question: 
 
[Central Question] How can we understand the concept 'concept' in an 
E( i )C-appropriate fashion? 
 
Hence, my intent is to explain the concept 'concept' in a way that fits with 
ideas about embodied and embedded cognition: this book's main focus is to 
provide a set of tools with which to specify what a 'concept' is, given the 
epistemological and ontological implications of theories of embodied and 
embedded cognition. 
 
Towards that end, I will construct a model called the 'Radicality Manifold', 
which is intended to be a framework that describes concepts in an E( i )C-
appropriate fashion. The central idea will be to acknowledge the relevance 
of bodily influences as well as influences from the physical and social 
environment; collectively, these influences realize concept-involving 
behaviour. As such, I hope this book is a first, tiny step: an empirically 
informed conceptual analysis yielding constraints on a model of perceptuo-
cognitive agent-world interaction, with the explicit intent to include 
perception, socio-cultural interaction and higher cognition. 
 
The end result will be an E( i )C-appropriate theory of what concepts are, and 
I believe the model will be flexible enough for the various flavours of E( i )C 
to adapt it towards their own ends. However, my own focus wil be mostly 
enactivistic (E( A )C): the basis of the model (Thelen et al.'s (2001) dynamic 
movement planning field), Evan Thompson's theory of colour perception 
(which I use to expand Thelen et al.'s model) and the basic concept 
definition I utilise (which is ability-based) all fit in that general corner of  
E( i )C. However, I will also incorporate a (very particular) notion of 
representation into the model, which is something most enactivists might be 
less enthused about. 
 
The reason for this latter inclusion is the following: an important set of 
constraints, forming a kind of push-pull system of two opposing forces, 
concerns phenomenology and representation. These two notions do a lot of 
work in many classical theories, and are sometimes excorcised by 
embodied/embedded theorists. However, they appear very useful, and 
possibly essential, to accounts of higher cognition: phenomenology is about 
essential features of human experience, and representation figures heavily 
in theories about higher cognition. So, it seems a cautious handling of these 
two issues is in order; the issue is complicated because of the kind of use I 
wish to make of these notions. On the one hand, I want the model to be 
developed in this book to be phenomenally appropriate - that is, there 
needs to be a useful role to perform for phenomenal judgments - and this 
implies the necessity of at least some modicum of internalism. On the other 
hand, I am convinced that the warnings, voiced by followers of Gibson 
(1979), against excessive use of representations in theories about 
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cognition, hold at least some water - and this inclination exerts an anti-
internalist force. Representation will receive attention in chapter 7; some 
modest clues about the role of phenomenology will be given in sections 6.6, 
6.9 and 10.4. 
 
1.4 - The Book's Structure 
 
The main steps I will take throughout this book in order to reach the 
specified goal (an E( i )C-appropriate theory of concepts) are the following. I 
will start with discussing the main theories about concepts, and establishing 
that they are insufficient as theories of concepts for various reasons (in 
sections 2.2-2.4). Following this discussion, I will introduce a successful 
proponent of the E( i )C-approach, more specifically the E( A )C-approach, 
which involves a model by Thelen et al. (2001) already mentioned above: it 
applies dynamical systems theory to cognition. However, a shortcoming of 
this model is that it merely describes (rather than explains) cognition-
involving behaviour. 
 
To make the step from behaviour and basic sensorimotor situatedness to 
concepts, we need clues about how the two hang together. To do this, I 
utilise the phenomenon 'colour' as a case study. Why pick 'colour'? And why 
spend so much time on it? I have two reasons for this. 
 
I picked the colour case because in it, many of the most important themes 
of philosophy of mind are represented: given the many different processes 
involved in generating colour vision, the study of colour can be said to 
contain a microverse of the philosophy of cognition. Various issues in the 
philosophy of colour, and the various positions available within it, concern 
agentive action and interaction, mental states and phenomenology, social 
influences and microphysical processes, computational representation and 
embodied and embedded perception and action. That is, both in terms of 
the theories that are invoked to explain aspects of it, as well as the kinds of 
processes and properties that are involved in actually perceiving colour, the 
phenomenon of colour is a peculiar kind of in-between, frustratingly slippery 
in a conceptual sense, but exceedingly intriguing and useful as a test-case 
in the philosophy of cognition. Furthermore, colour vision is almost never 
merely perception, but almost always also involves decisions, and 
behaviour based on such decisions (involving whether fruit of a particular 
colour is safe to eat, or whether an object of a particular colour and visual 
texture is a dangerous predator or not, or whether a light of a particular 
colour means 'walk across the street' or 'wait for other traffic to pass', and 
so on). Because the sensorimotor contingencies of colour vision are fairly 
well researched, and because the connection to these higher-order 
processes is so natural, the case of colour vision is a good one to try and 
use in my own project. 
 
The second reason, and this is perhaps the most important one, concerns 
my conviction that some of the solutions to persistent problems that have 
been constructed within the colour case, are applicable to the broader issue 
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of E( i )C, or allow for a smooth and coherent extrapolation. I will discuss two 
complex controversies from the philosophy of colour vision, as I believe the 
solutions I will arrive at regarding the problems in question will provide me 
with the tools I need to construct an E( i )C-appropriate theory of concepts. 
More specifically: in chapter 4, I will first address the controversy 
surrounding basic colour terms: is the structure of colour words in the 
language one speaks relevant to the way in which those colours are 
actually perceived? Relativists say yes, universalists say no. My suggestion 
will be that an intermediate position regarding the linguistics of colour is the 
way to go, accentuating the claim that embodied and embedded perception 
and cognition take place in a convergence zone of many different influences 
and forces, and no black-or-white solutions are available. This discussion 
will address the way in which an agent is embodied and embedded in his 
socio-cultural environment. The main problem to be solved then will be to 
provide the proper context (situatedness) for colour cognition. Theories of 
ecological colour provide exactly that ecological niche-based information. 
That is, next I will compare and contrast Evan Thompson's E( A )C-
compatible, ecological theory on colour perception with Roger Shepard's 
computationally inclined account; my conclusion will be that a true relational 
(rather than either subjectivist or objectivist) and E( i )C-appropriate theory 
will need to take cues from both these theories. This particular discussion 
will address the way in which an agent is embodied and embedded in his 
physical environment. Hence together, the ecological and linguistic 
discussions describe the full range of embodiment and (physical and social) 
embeddedness of agents, at least inasmuch as colour is involved. 
 
As a very substantial and significant bonus, the account of colour 
categorization that I will distill from the universalism-versus-relativism 
debate (in section 4.3), forms the backbone of my theory on concepts 
(chapter 6 and on).  First, the case of colour perception will be used to 
illustrate the notion of a 'complex concept'; second, I will discuss 
'Superposition Theory of Complex Concepts' (SToCC), a theory that strives 
to provide an appropriate characterisation of this type of concept, and 
resembles aspects of (but crucially differs from) Prototype and Theory 
theories regarding concepts; third, I wish to argue in favour of the idea that 
many more important concepts are complex in this way; and finally, I will 
introduce the Radicality Manifold, a model which generalises SToCC for 
concepts in general. 
 
This theory of concepts, combined with the work on describing behaviour 
from Thelen et al.'s use of dynamical systems theory (section 3.2), will be 
refined and expanded to include various forms of embodied and embedded 
concepts (chapter 6 and on). This process of refinement will include a 
discussion about how representation - an important component of 
cognitivistic theories - might be used in E( i )C-appropriate theories. 
 
The evaluation of SToCC and the Radicality Manifold framework will occur 
in chapter 10, by comparing it to a series of existing theories of concepts, 
most notably the 'conceptual spaces'-theory by Peter Gärdenfors (2000) 
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and 'proxytype theory' by Jesse Prinz (2002). This final chapter will also 
contain a concrete application of my theory of embodied and embedded 
concepts, when I use it to analyse concept-based early childhood 
education.  
 
A project like this could fill a library, or at the very least a rather portly book, 
so obviously it will not be possible to afford all the problems and theories 
the space and attention they require in this not-so-portly book. Above all, 
the ideas to be presented in what follows are intended to spark other ideas, 
and they should be read as a cursory overview of the humble beginnings of 
a theory about higher cognition in an embodied and embedded context. 
 
In essence, the model to be developed is intended to generate an epistemic 
claim. It offers a suggestion on how to relate important data-domains (i.e. 
involving concepts, behaviour, biomechanical properties and environmental 
affordances) to eachother. This book is merely a sketch, a provisional and 
hypothetical framework resulting from philosophical analysis, that might 
have empirical consequences. The result will be a new model - a new 
metaphor, in a way - to talk about concepts within an E( i )C framework. 
 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
 
[SUMMARY of chapter 1 AND PREVIEW] 
 
The classical, 'Cartesian' way of thinking about cognition - of the mind being 
an entitity that has properties which set it apart from physical entities - is 
losing popularity amongst philosophers and psychologists. An important 
associated view is 'cognitivism', which involves the claim that cognition is to 
be defined in terms of internal, often representational processes. 
 
An alternative view is 'embodied, embedded cognition', which suggests that 
a mental state is to be defined in relation to many relevant extramental 
properties, properties of the agent's body and affordances of his 
environment in particular. There are various flavours of embodied, 
embedded cognition: 
*Embodied (cognition crucially involves bodily processes; notation: E( B )C); 
*Embedded (cognition involves interacting with an environment; 
notation: E( S )C); 
*Enactive (cognition is an active, dynamic, behaviour-based process; 
notation: E( A )C); 
*Extended (processes in the environment form part of the cognitive process; 
notation: E( X )C); 
*Encultured (cognition depends on cultural processes for support; notation: 
E( C )C). 
General notation for 'embodied, embedded, etcetera'-theories: E( i )C 
 
An important component of many theories of cognition is a theory of 
concepts. This book is intended to provide a way of thinking about concepts 
that fits in with theories of embodied, embedded, enactive, extended and/or 
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encultured cognition. So this is this book's central question: How can we 
understand the concept 'concept' in an E( i )C-appropriate fashion? This 
is an interesting project because 'concepts' as building blocks of thoughts 
are relatively easy to integrate into a cognitivistic story about cognition - for 
instance, if thoughts are symbolic structures, concepts can be more basic 
iterations of such symbols -, but it is much less obvious how to think of 
concepts within E( i )C theories. The main focus of the theory to be 
developed in this book is enactive (E( A )C). One of the main problems then 
becomes that many E( i )C theories are quite successful in explaining basic 
sensorimotor agent-environment interaction, but are less adept at 
accounting for actual thinking, which is where many cognitivistic theories 
and their ideas about concepts are most effective. 
 
Chapter 2 will discuss several standard theories about concepts, and their 
problems. Chapter 3 will introduce a useful, E( A )C theory to describe fairly 
basic cognition-involving behaviour: Thelen, Schöner, Scheier and Smith's 
(2001) dynamical movement planning field. Chapter 4 is about colour 
perception, because in that field of study there are models available which 
suggest a connection between an agent's basic sensorimotor contingencies 
(the way in which the properties of his retina and the subsequent neural 
processing help him make distinctions between colours) and more 
advanced colour-related behaviour (for instance in terms of the cultural 
significance of certain hues, all the way up to scientific concepts about what 
colour itself is). The goal of this book is to adapt this connection - i.e. 
between basic sensorimotor properties which inform dynamic behavioural 
profiles on the one hand, and more advanced colour-related behaviour on 
the other - into an E( i )C-apropriate theory of concepts in general. 
 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
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[2 - Introduction to concepts] 
 
2.1 - General Properties of Concepts 
 
The first step towards a theory of concepts is to provide a general definition 
that tells us what a 'concept' is. I will have the explicit goal of formulating 
this definition in terminology compatible with theories of embodied and 
embedded cognition. The first half of this first step is already quite a task, 
for there is little agreement about what a concept is, what it should be able 
to do, or what kinds of explanations are to be possible because of it. 
Georges Rey (1994) advances the thesis that there have been a number of 
quasi-successful attempts at determining what kind of a thing a concept is, 
but none of them have been able to offer a coherent response to any and all 
scrutiny. The concluding paragraph of his text offers a clear overview of the 
problem-space, and it deserves to be quoted in full: 
 
"We might summarise the present situation with regard to candidates for 
'concepts' that have been discussed here as follows: there is the token 
representation in the mind or brain of an agent, types of which are shared 
by different agents. These representations could be words, images, 
definitions, or 'prototypes' that play specific inferential roles in an agent's 
cognitive system and stand in certain causal and covariant relations to 
phenomena in the world. By virtue of these facts, such representations 
become associated with an extension in this world, possibly an intension 
that determines an extension in all possible worlds, and possibly a property 
that all objects in all such extensions have in common. Which of these 
(italicized) entities one selects to be concepts depends on the explanatory 
work one wants concepts to perform. Unfortunately, there is as yet little 
agreement on precisely what that work might be." (Rey 1994, pg. 192) 
 
As this quote demonstrates, there is little agreement about what concepts 
are in an ontological sense. It is, however, possible to make some 
suggestions about what kinds of abilities are associated with having 
concepts. It is possible to claim that such abilities contain three important 
aspects: (1) recall of the past, (2) conceptual categorization and (3) 
inductive generalization. 
 
(1) - Recall of the past: An important aspect of a conceptual ability involves 
being able to act and react to an object or situation in a way that transcends 
the non-reflective immediacy of contextualised interaction. In other words: 
having a concept means being able to remember certain key facts or 
regularities about whatever the concept is of, which means that in such a 
case one tends to act and react differently than creatures without (or with 
significantly fewer) mnemonic capacities, who respond in ways that lie 
closer to the push-pull character of direct sensorimotor interaction. 
 
However, it is important to make a distinction here, to pull apart (at least 
conceptually) the notions conceptual ability and the concept-involving ability 
recall of the past. The ability to remember (information about) the past is a 
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different kind of ability than knowing how to perform a particular (bodily) 
task. The former involves declarative memory, whereas the latter involves 
procedural memory. Declarative knowledge, or knowing-that, requires a 
certain level of conceptualization, being to some extent an abstraction that 
transcends the specific context in which it was learnt. Procedural knowledge 
is much more context-bound, being a partly or wholly intuitive, non-
conscious knowing-how, that cannot (and usually need not) be made 
explicit except by simply performing the action in question. I want to claim 
that declarative memory (as the recall of declarative knowledge) can only 
occur as an extension of a substrate of embodied procedural recall-abilities, 
but that does mean that the former is an ability over and above a mere 
tendency towards certain patterns of sensorimotor agent-environment 
interaction: it involves the structured and in some sense decisive re-
occurrence of such patterns. 
 
Mandler (2007) notes that children as young as nine months are capable of 
remembering reliably how to work a particular toy after only having been 
shown what to do 24 hours prior; even some six-month-olds could 
remember what they were shown the day before. Carver and Bauer (1999) 
report many of the ten-month-old children they tested were capable of 
remembering a novel sequence of two actions a full month after witnessing 
a demonstration. Mandler’s (2007) conclusion is that mnemonic abilities - 
hence, a primitive form of that particular component of 'adult' conceptual 
abilities - appear around six months of age, and have usually developed 
into a workable skill around ten months. 
 
(2) - Conceptual categorization: An aspect of conceptual ability is the 
classification of objects in taxonomic structures. Understanding that cats, 
dogs, eagles and ants are all animals, and that animals are to be 
differentiated from (say) machines, hence having a grasp of the relations in 
which specific objects stand in different organizational structures, will 
influence the behaviour one unfolds in relation to those objects. In 
experiments carried out by Mandler (2007), even seven-month-old children 
were capable of differentiating between cars and planes. Contrary to 
popular belief, basic-level concepts (e.g. tables and chairs) were not the 
first ones to be formed - rather, superordinate categories (e.g. furniture) 
emerged first, with even children of eleven months failing to show further 
differentiation for this particular example (i.e. furniture), and only 
distinguishing dogs from cats in the animal paradigm; more detailed 
distinction abilities had not yet formed. 
 
(3) - Inductive generalization: another important component or aspect of 
conceptual ability involves being able to use particular sets of criteria, 
causing objects to be grouped together or distinguished in ways that 
diverge from standard categorization based on visually detectable features. 
That is, having a concept of something means, at least in part, being able to 
act or react in relation to that object based on knowledge about non-obvious 
features or context-dependent interpretation of such features. Such features 
include, for instance, an object’s function (forks and dinner plates look 
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rather different but are both meant to assist in eating), or its origin (the 
ceiling painting of the Sistine Chapel and the Piéta in St. Peter’s Basilica 
were both made by Michelangelo), habitual location (bars of soap and 
razors are both usually found in the bathroom), biographical relevance (i.e. 
based on idiosyncratic associations derived from some past experience, for 
instance the first encounter with said object, or the way in which the agent 
learnt about the concept) or some other property that somehow pertains to 
what people might call the hidden ‘essence’ of the object (caterpillars and 
butterflies belong to the same biological cycle). 
 
Over the centuries, there have been several theories about what kinds of 
things concepts are, given the tasks they were supposed to perform, such 
as the ones above. The purpose of this book is to provide an account of 
concepts that is compatible with E( i )C, and that is capable of dealing with 
problems that plague other theories of concepts. Therefore I will first 
discuss three standard theories of conceptual structure: the classical theory, 
prototype theory and theory theory. 
 
2.2 - The Classical Theory of Concepts 
 
It is possible to summarise the central tenet of the Classical Theory (CT) of 
concepts as follows: 
 
"Most concepts (esp. lexical concepts) are structured mental 
representations that encode a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
their application, if possible, in sensory or perceptual terms."  (Laurence and 
Margolis, 1999) 
 
In its strong, empiricist form, CT suggests it should be possible to reduce a 
complex concept to a collection of simpler concepts, eventually 
decomposing all the way down to the kinds of purely sensory terms that 
would occur in the 'observation sentences' or 'protocol sentences' the 
Logical Positivists wished to found knowledge on. An example of a 
somewhat weaker form of CT states that some irreducible, primitive 
concept-components might represent functional, social or cultural features - 
the demand that every concept ultimately reduces to nothing but sensory 
features is dropped. 
 
The categorization of objects as falling under a specific concept in CT 
occurs by tallying the observable features of the object, and cross-checking 
it with the list of necessary and sufficient features associated with a given 
concept: for instance, an object is categorised as a rabbit just in case it is a 
smallish, furry animal that hops along and has elongated ears, a bushy tail, 
pronounced front teeth, etcetera. 
 
A more careful look reveals several problems for CT (Laurence and 
Margolis 1999); I will highlight four of them. The first problem, and a rather 
serious one at that, is that for the vast majority of concepts, it is extremely 
difficult and perhaps even impossible to provide definitions in terms of an 
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exhaustive list of properties and features some concept is supposed to 
contain. In other words: concepts, in the majority of cases, do not have the 
kind of definitional structure CT needs them to have. 
 
Another problem CT must face involves the possibilitie for dissociation 
between concept possession and the correctness of concept use. CT is a 
descriptivist theory about concepts, stating that to know a concept is to 
know its meaning and referents. The main argument against this kind of 
account is the idea that one can be wrong about what kinds of things a 
specific concept picks out, even though one can still possess that concept. 
For instance, superstitious beliefs about the origins of some illness do not 
negate the possibility of actually having the concept of that illness: the very 
possibility of saying those superstitious beliefs fail to pick out the real (i.e. 
modern, scientifically validated) cause of the illness presupposes the notion 
that, despite these different explanatory accounts, the antiquated and 
modern concepts of the illness are one and the same. 
 
CT has difficulties accounting for the fact that a fair number of concepts are 
decidedly fuzzy. On CT, it should, in principle, be possible to determine 
category membership for some exemplar unambiguously, because each 
concept is supposed to cover a sufficient and necessary set of defining 
features. However, many objects disallow such a problem-free 
classification: for instance, Laurence and Margolis (1999) note it is not 
immediately obvious whether a carpet is a piece of furniture or not. 
 
The final counter against CT I shall mention concerns socalled 'typicality 
effects'. CT does not have the resources to explain why some examples 
would be judged more typical of a given category than other examples – 
this critique is due to the proponents of Prototype Theory (to be discussed 
next), where the explanatory potential regarding typicality effects is an 
important selling point. 
 
2.3 - Prototype Theory of concepts 
 
The Prototype Theory of concepts (PT) was developed by Eleanor Rosch 
and her associates (e.g Rosch 1978), and was intended to provide answers 
to the problems that haunted CT. From the many different flavours of PT, 
the following core idea emerges: 
 
"(...) most concepts - including most lexical concepts - are complex 
representations whose structure encodes a statistical analysis of the 
properties their members tend to have." (Laurence and Margolis (1999), pg. 
27) 
 
This notion allows for the fact that some things may be better examples of a 
particular category than others. This phenomenon can be explained by the 
idea that some concept's ascription to a given object is not a matter of that 
object possessing all the necessary features included in the concept (as per 
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CT), but merely possessing a sufficient number of them, and sufficiently 
many important ones. As Laurence and Margolis put it: 
 
"(...) if BIRD is composed of such features as FLIES, SINGS, NESTS IN TREES, 
LAYS EGGS and so on, then on the Prototype theory, robins are in the 
extension of BIRD because they tend to have all of the corresponding 
properties: robins fly, they lay eggs, etc. However, BIRD also applies to 
ostriches because even though ostriches don't have all of these properties, 
they have enough of them." (Laurence and Margolis (1999), pg. 27, 28) 
 
PT improves upon CT by being able to deal with some of the counter-
arguments we described earlier. For instance, PT circumvents the first 
problem for CT mentioned above (that it is impossible to provide an 
exhaustive list of features) by acknowledging that concepts do not have the 
'classical' definitional structure. 
 
The main advantage offered by Prototype Theory is its elegant account of 
categorization, which in its general form is cast in terms of similarity 
judgments of a category representation and an exemplar representation. If 
the balance of weighted feature matches and differences exceeds a 
particular threshold value, membership of the exemplar is assured. The 
most typical members of a particular category will obtain the highest relative 
scores - hence, Prototype Theory naturally accomodates typicality effects 
(i.e. a robin is usually considered to be a better example of the concept 
'bird' than a penguin). Prototype theory uses fuzzy set theory to 
characterise these typicality effects, and the behaviour of categories thus 
structured under conceptual combinationNOTE 7. 
 
Despite its considerable advantages, PT also needs to face a number of 
problems. For instance, Armstrong, Gleitman and Gleitman (1983) suggest 
there is a methodological problem in the way PT suggests we make the 
step from typicality effects for concepts to a more general theory about 
prototype structure. Even though something either is or is not an even 
number, and all of the test subjects consulted by Armstrong et al. agreed 
that the well-defined category EVEN NUMBERS is not graded, still there 
proved to be a tendency amongst them to consider 8 to be a better example 
of an even number than 34. This would mean that PT would have to explain 
how typicality judgments, apparently, are not (or not always) about degrees 
of membership (after all, technically there should not be a difference in 
membership status between 8 and 34, yet the test subjects state 
otherwise). However, it is exactly this linkage (between typicality effects and 
prototype structure) that the supporters of PT wish to employ to establish 
assertions about the prototypical structure of the concept in question. 
 
Another problem for PT is that the kinds of features that can come to be 
encoded in prototype representations of some concept do not necessarily 
pick out the concept's correct extension. Armstrong et al. (1983) note that a 
three-legged, tame, toothless, albino tiger is still a tiger (despite not 
possessing many of the properties thought by most people to be 
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characteristic of tigers), whereas a very convincing toy tiger (which might 
possess many of the appearance-based properties associated with the 
concept 'tiger') is not actually a tiger. As with CT, the problem is that 
possession and application of a concept can be out of synch with what the 
theory (PT in this case) says the concept is supposed to be. 
 
There are two additional, and more serious problems that can arise for PT: 
(1) for a large number of concepts, test subjects fail to isolate any 
typicalities (the so-called 'missing prototypes'-problem), and (2) attempts to 
combine graded extensions run into serious problems. Both these issues 
will be discussed more extensively in section 6.11.2, as I attempt to explain 
how my own theory, despite its similarities to PT, is able to circumvent 
these problems. 
 
2.4 - Theory Theory of Concepts 
 
The central notion of the Theory Theory of concepts (TT) is as follows: 
 
"Concepts are representations whose structure consists in their relations to 
other concepts as specified by a mental theory" (Laurence and Margolis 
1999, pg. 47) 
 
Hence the criterion for subsumption of some object under a specific concept 
is not due to some intrinsic list of concept features, which is the case for the 
CT and PT, but rather is determined by the mental theory that someone 
might employ to explain what the concept is. As with the theory theory of 
mind, this 'theory' need not be an explicit scientific account, but can include 
a variety of knowledge-informed, more or less implicit categorization 
tendencies. 
 
One of the advantages of TT cited by Laurence and Margolis is that this 
idea accomodates widespread views about psychological essentialism, i.e. 
that often judgments of category membership are not really about an object 
possessing a sufficient number of relevant properties, but rather that the 
object has a specific underlying nature or essence, which might be hidden. 
Consequently, someone who possesses a concept need not be aware of all 
the details of the underlying theory, but rather be disposed to the use of a 
so-called 'essence placeholder'. The main advantage of this strategy is that 
it makes epistemological sense: it comprises the intuition that objects that 
look similar probably share other, hidden features, and relatively often such 
an assumption turns out to be correct. 
 
There are two main lines of criticism that can be directed against TT. The 
first underscores the problem that the aforementioned essence 
placeholders are too sketchy, that the lack of represented information (most 
test-subjects fail to give a clear account of what this essence consists of) 
disallows the concept in question to pick out an extension in a proper way. 
A related problematic issue for TT consists in the assertion that people 
might represent incorrect information as part of their essence placeholder. 
 27 
In this case, too, the concept as it is held by someone might fail to pick out 
the correct extension. The second argument against TT involves the 
question how a concept can stay invariant despite changes in belief. In 
other words: how can people with different theories still be said to possess 
the same concept? Laurence and Margolis (1999) claim that, as yet, few 
coherent answers are forthcoming. 
 
2.5 - Desiderata on a Theory of Concepts 
 
The discussion in the sections above shows that the most prominent kinds 
of concept theories fail to account for certain key features of concepts. 
Obviously, we need a new theory, but which criteria should such a theory 
meet? The easy answer is that it should be able to deal with the problems, 
described above, that plague the existing theories. Explicit attention to the 
problems of the standard concept theories mentioned above, and the ways 
in which I feel my own theory can solve such problems, will be given in 
section 6.11. In a more general sense, Jesse Prinz suggests a good list of 
workable criteria at the beginning of his book on concepts (2002): 
 
Scope: a successful theory of concepts should be able to explain a rather 
diverse range of concepts: phenomenal feels, formal notions, natural kinds, 
and so on. 
 
Intentional content: concepts stand in for or refer to entities, processes 
and/or states-of-affairs in the world: the concept 'dog' is about actual dogs 
 
Cognitive content: Prinz suggests that concepts need to have something 
like a Fregean Sinn (sense) apart from their Bedeutung (reference). That is, 
apart from their intentional content (the ability to refer to external entities), 
there needs to be some additional content-type - cognitive content - based 
upon which coreferential but psychologically distinct concepts can be 
individuated. Along these lines, Prinz suggests that concepts should be 
individuated through reference to both external entities and other concepts. 
 
Acquisition: a theory will need to be able to account for the acquisition of 
concepts, in an empirically adequate manner. That is, a philosophical theory 
of concepts should be compatible with at least some account of the 
evolution of concepts and concept learning. 
 
Categorization: a specific concept usually refers to objects that belong to a 
specific category. A proper theory of concepts should explain how such 
categories are formed, and how objects are recognised as belonging in one 
group and not another. 
 
Compositionality: concepts can be combined to form more complex 
concepts - a theory should be able to account for this generativity of 
concepts. The content of the individual concepts and the content (both 
intentional and cognitive) of the more complex concept-components should 
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be related according to a compact suite of combination rules. This feature 
will help to explain the systematicity of thought. 
 
Publicity: concepts can be shared by different agents, and can be used by 
one agent at different times. For different people to understand eachother, 
both intentional content and cognitive content should be sharable. 
 
At the end of this book, in section 10.5, I will evaluate my own theory of 
concepts (to be developed in the pages to come) by determining to what 
extent it either meets these criteria, or makes a different tenable suggestion. 
Other tools I will use to test my theory of concepts include answers to the 
criticism on standard theories, as described above (in section 6.11), 
comparisons to somewhat similar theories (sections 10.2 and 10.3) and a 
description of a concrete application of my theory (section 10.4). 
 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
 
[SUMMARY of chapter 2 AND PREVIEW] 
 
It is highly difficult to provide a good definition of what a concept actually is: 
candidates are, amongst others, mental representations and abilities. Basic 
components of conceptual abilities are recall of the past, conceptual 
categorization and inductive generalization 
 
The standard accounts of concepts discussed in this chapter are:  
-Classical theory (a concept is a representation which encodes necessary 
and sufficient properties of an object); 
-Prototype theory (a concept is a representation which encodes properties 
of objects in a graded fashion); 
-Theory theory (conceptual structure is determined by a mental theory). 
All these theories were explained to be insufficient for several reasons. 
 
A proper theory of concepts should allow concepts to have appropriate 
scope, it should be able to explain how concepts can have intentional 
content and cognitive content, how concept acquisition occurs, how it can 
be that concepts allow for categorization, how simple concepts can be 
combined into more complex concepts (compositionality), and how it is 
possible for different people to hold the same concepts (publicity). 
 
In chapter 3, the first steps will be taken towards an E( i )C-appropriate 
theory of concepts, using a dynamical movement planning field as a 
description of basic sensorimotor behaviour. 
 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
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[3 - Embodied Dynamics] 
 
3.1 - The First Step: Enactive Cognition? 
 
In order to formulate a coherent E( i )C-appropriate theory of concepts, I will 
first take a look at an existing E( A )C-approach to cognition - cognition-
infused behaviour, to be exact. 
 
An important body of criticism on cognitivist/computational theories of 
cognition is to be found in the enactivist tradition; Varela et al. (1991) is a 
formative publication of this theoretical perspective, as is O'Regan and Noë 
(2001). Thompson (1995a,b) develops an enactivist theory of colour 
perception, and this account will play a large role in the pages to come. 
That is, later (in section 4.5), I will attempt to demonstrate that some ideas 
encased in the ecological theory of colour perception developed by Roger 
Shepard, offer interesting additions to Evan Thompson's E( A )C-approach to 
colour perception. The claim will be that Shepard's specific approach, which 
happens to be computational, highlights the need to take into account 
certain structural aspects of the agent-environment interaction-dynamic. 
More specifically, his model contains a description of the interplay between 
the properties of an agent's perceptual system (including the properties of 
the phenomenal structuredness generated in perception) and certain 
structural invariants of the optic array. Regardless of the computational 
details of the model or the ontological status awarded to its components, 
the explicit linkage of what I want to call affordances of environment and 
agent comprises an important lesson for the E( A )C-inclined to take into 
account. And much later, in section 7.2, I will visit Hutto (2006, 2007) for a 
critique that states that many enactivist theories are not enactivistic enough. 
I will not agree with everything Hutto says, but I will use his criticism to 
sharpen my own theory about E( i )C. 
 
3.2 - Modeling the Dynamics of Behaviour 
 
As a first suggestion on how to describe behaviour, I will devote a fair 
amount of space to discussing the dynamic movement planning field model 
by Thelen et al. (2001)NOTE 8, some aspects of which will help in the 
construction of my own theory (the Radicality Manifold, which is intended as 
an explanatory template for E( i )C-related phenomena). The idea is that 
Thelen et al.'s model provides a way to describe behaviour in an E( i )C-
congruent fashion, but that its explanatory power is curtailed because it, as 
it stands, merely applies to a fairly basic cognitive phenomenon, and 
because it goes too far in downplaying the role of psychology (i.e. of 
accounts actually involving 'the mind') in providing valid explanations. Part 
of the work towards constructing the Radicality Manifold-model involves 
adapting Thelen et al.'s model in a way that corrects these shortcomings. 
 
Thelen et al.'s (2001) model is a fairly successful application of the tools of 
dynamical systems theoryNOTE 9 (DST) to a problem involving a cognitive 
process (DST-C) - in this case, the ‘A-not-B error’. The ‘A-not-B error’ was 
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observed and described by Piaget, and involves a fairly common 
behavioural quirk of children between the ages of 7 and 12 months, who, 
after successfully retrieving a hidden toy from location A, persist in reaching 
towards that location even after witnessing the toy being hidden at location 
B. Traditional explanations are cast in terms of poorly developed object 
representations in the children making this error, but the model Thelen et al. 
propose does away with internal representation altogether, and is intended 
to yield novel predictions. In this model, tasks like perceiving, planning and 
remembering, typically described in predominantly mental terms, are 
effectively absorbed into the mathematical tools used to describe the 
movementsNOTE 10. This method of description underlines the idea that 
cognition and bodily action are inextricably linked: cognition is embodied, 
and is to be understood in dynamical termsNOTE 11. 
 
As an explicitly stated goal, Thelen and colleagues strive to abolish theories 
about cognition and action that involve internal representation: 
 
"Our message is: if we can understand this particular infant task and its 
myriad contextual variations in terms of coupled dynamic processes, then 
the same kind of analysis can be applied to any task at any age. If we can 
show that "knowing" cannot be separated from perceiving, acting, and 
remembering, then these processes are always linked. There is no time and 
no task when such dynamics cease and some other mode of processing 
kicks in. Body and world remain ceaselessly melded together." (Thelen et 
al., 2001, p. 2) 
 
Thelen at al. appear to suggest that if their model is successful in describing 
the child’s behaviour and in yielding new and improved predictions and 
explanations, this would provide a kind of proof by way of demonstration 
that many theses involved in E( a )C are coherent, i.e. that many (or possibly 
all) cognitive processes are to be understood in terms of embodied, 
sensorimotor interaction dynamics with the environment (enaction). They 
forge an explicit commitment to the thesis, present in most forms of  E( A )C, 
that internal representation is much less important in the explanation of 
cognition than cognitivist theories suppose - in fact, they say we can do 
without reference to internal representation. 
 
It deserves to be noted that their claim that embodied dynamics is always 
involved in cognition, i.e. that 'there is no time and task when such 
dynamics cease', does not necessitate the conclusion they wish to support, 
namely that no other mode of processing could ever play a role. Part of my 
suggestion will be that representation (and sometimes even symbolic 
representation!), does have a role to play, but that these mental phenomena 
should be understood as limit cases of a spectrum that also comprises the 
basic E( i )C dynamics they concern themselves with. In brief, I agree with 
the fact they afford embodied dynamics a central spot in explanations of 
cognition, but I contest the suggestion that their approach would be capable 
of telling the whole story. 
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The development of this suggestion will have to wait, because first I will 
take a brief look at the model itselfNOTE 12. The model contains several 
essential elementsNOTE 13: 
 
(1) the relative ambiguity of the task input: the lids of the hiding locations 
look identical; 
 
(2) the relative strength of specific input: a brightly coloured toy or a cookie 
is more interesting to a child than a blandly coloured toy; 
 
(3) there is an enforced delay between the task input and the onset of the 
child’s action, but obviously the dynamics of the processes contributing to 
the child’s actions are not paused during that time: things continue to 
happen; 
 
(4) the A-not-B error arises in the act of reaching; 
 
(5) the motor memory of the initial (successful) reach towards location A 
influences the subsequent tasks; 
 
(6) children grow out of making the A-not-B error: one hypothesis is that 
changes in one or more of the relevant parameters contribute to this 
development. 
 
Going against the grain of prior explanations, Thelen et al. hypothesize that 
the A-not-B-error does not arise due to an inability to access or utilise the 
proper internal representation mechanisms, but rather should be analysed 
in terms of the outcome of ‘a motor planning process that is part of a 
dynamic perception-action loop’ (2001, p. 11). As a generalisation of the six 
elements described above, four theses are claimed to hold, and these form 
the foundation of the model of the A-not-B-error they construct. Quoting: 
 
"(1) actions are planned in movement parameter space; (2) the plans are 
continuous and graded in nature; (3) plans evolve under continuous 
perceptual influence of both task and cue; (4) the system has history." 
(Thelen et al., 2001) 
 
At the core of the actual model lies a continuous movement planning field 
(see figure 2): a mathematical model which simulates the behaviour of the 
child. One of the two regions in the field spiking beyond a certain threshold 
value specifies the child’s reaching for either A or B. A super-threshold 
spike, specifying a reach, must build up over a period of time.  
 
Figure 1 shows three different activation scenarios of this movement 
planning field: [I] shows how the activation exceeds the threshold value for 
a reach towards location B, [II] shows low activation levels across the entire 
field, hence there is no reach, and [III] does show heightened activation in 
some region of the field, but it is sub-threshold, hence insufficient to effect a 
reach. 
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[Figure 1: movement planning field used by Thelen et al. (2001)] 
 
Previous states of the system influence the current dynamics: the input to 
the system has three components, and concerns not only information about 
(1) the task structure and (2) specific input nudging the system towards 
either A or B, but also (3) the memory of earlier attempts to reach for the 
toy. These three types of input are sources of bias to the field. The task 
input specifies the layout of the task space (for instance, the location of the 
two hiding wells - say, two compartments in a box - , the colour and 
dimensions of that box, and so on), which is usually invariant throughout a 
single trial. The specific input concerns the attention-demanding acts of the 
experimenter; that is, the measure in which attention is drawn towards the 
toy (for instance by waving it around, or tapping it on the edge of the box 
with the hiding wells). The memory input is crucial, for knowledge about 
previous reaches influences the system’s performance, not only affecting 
the probability of reaching towards A or B after the experimenter’s cue, but 
also affecting spontaneous reaches. The model’s performance here is 
congruent with experimental observations of children exhibiting the A-not-B 
error. 
 
A central feature is that the field exhibits cooperativity: to help generate a 
single response with complex input, regions of the field that lie close 
together are mutually stimulatory, while inhibiting more distant activation. In 
simulating the A-not-B-error with the model, parameter values were chosen 
to help the model reflect the real system performance (i.e. the actual 
behaviour of a child attempting to perform the task). Many of these values 
were held constant throughout simulations (to reflect, for instance, the 
invariance of the task field). Three factors were varied, and thus influenced 
the model’s behaviour: (1) the specific input (either A or B); (2) a parameter 
expressing asymmetry in the task arrangement (whether one target, A or B, 
was significantly more interesting than the other, for instance a dull-
coloured toy vs. a brightly coloured one); and (3) the cooperativity level of 
 33 
the movement planning field (with a choice of two values, to express either 
a cooperative or non-cooperative regime). The resulting output of the model 
specifies a reach towards either A or B; a model of arm motor control is not 
included, and Thelen et al. suspect the specifics of such a model used 
could have a nontrivial influence on the behaviour of the system as a whole, 
but as an approximation, they assume the current model as it stands is 
sufficient to help them prove their point (contra ‘cognitivism’, and the use it 
makes of internal representations). 
 
The model incorporates a few novel elements. The cooperativity of the field, 
for instance, is a crucial parameter, and apparently one that is expected to 
do a lot of the work in yielding the appropriately realistic simulation of the A-
not-B-error. In several simulation trials, the difference between non-
cooperativity and cooperativity of the movement planning field meant the 
difference between a notable lack of self-sustaining activation, and the 
emergence of strong, threshold-exceeding peaks, respectively. The 
difference between these two parameter settings is supposed to explain 
why younger children make the A-not-B-error, whereas older children do 
not: as the children grow older and more experienced in interacting with the 
world, the cooperativity of their movement planning field (which can be used 
to model their behaviour) improves. Another novel aspect of the model is 
the role of memory: rather than a store of knowledge to be accessed in a 
comparison of representations (of the memory and current input), or 
whatever other representational story one would wish to devise, memory is 
implicit in the dynamics of the movement planning field. 
 
3.3 - Dynamics Deconstructed 
 
I am quite sympathetic to Thelen et al.'s endeavour, and I agree that their 
model is successful, but only up to a certain point. Thelen et al. state that a 
simulation of various (measured) experimental results with their model does 
indeed demonstrate that the kind of dynamics captured by the model 
resembles the dynamics of the real system in several significant ways. One 
pertinent question then is: what is the status of this 'movement planning 
field'? And: what kind of predictions is this model supposed to generate, and 
how robust and specific can these be expected to be? One source of initial 
scepsis can be that the precision requirements do not appear to be very 
high: the model's output is a sequence of A or B choices, which only needs 
a general similarity to the real system’s dynamics (due to the large influence 
of noise and general probabilistic inclination of subjects in the task 
described) to be considered appropriate. 
 
But it is possible to develop a somewhat more substantial critique of the 
model: Thelen et al. do some of that work themselves. These are the 
limitations they understand their model to have: 
 
(1) it captures the real system’s behaviour, but the way it, its components or 
its dynamics are supposed to map onto or be related to the biology and 
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neurophysiology of the child in any other than the most general of fashions 
is not specified in any substantial way; 
 
(2) it is incomplete, for it is not linked to an appropriate model of the child’s 
reaching dynamics, i.e. the particular shape of the arm- and hand-motion 
executed by the child. Because of the stress Thelen et al. place on the 
embodied character of cognition, such an additional model’s properties can 
have a profound effect on the functioning of the coupled system; 
 
(3) the A-not-B-task involves actions geared towards both location and 
object identity (a child does not reach to a location in itself, but to an object 
at a specific location). The model is a simplification, since its output only 
allows one parameter dimension, namely location (either A or B); 
 
(4) it only involves static visual targets, and does not incorporate movement, 
or, for instance, auditory stimuli. 
 
These are, indeed, weak spots in the model, or at least marks of 
incompleteness, and the authors are practicing good science by conceding 
to their existence themselves. The most pressing concern from my 
perspective (i.e. in the light of the theory that I wish to develop) is the strong 
intuition that weakness (1) can be expanded with another element: their 
model does not offer any room to do justice to the idea that a good 
explanation of cognitive phenomena, especially more complex ones, often 
requires reference to mental states (such as beliefs and desires), for 
instance to help provide the appropriate justification - i.e. reasons - for 
certain actions. Perhaps explanations of the low-level actions involved in 
the A-not-B-error are indeed better off without excessive reliance on 
psychological processes (understood in terms of internal, possibly 
representational processing), but for more advanced action sequences, I 
would suggest that blocking out any and all possibility of referring to the 
mind behind the motion equates throwing out the child with the bath water. 
 
My own suggestion on how to handle this issue will follow later - introducing 
and developing this suggestion is the one of the main goals of this book, 
after all -, but first a closer look at the problems of Thelen et al.'s model is 
warranted. Some of these problems are addressed in the peer 
commentaries to Thelen et al.’s target article. These commentaries are, for 
the most part, positive about the potential of the model and the 
improvements over the earlier iterations (e.g. as described in Thelen and 
Smith 1994), but often critical of details. 
 
Markman (2001), for instance, says that the relevance of this kind of 
modeling to other, more complex kinds of cognitive behaviour is yet to be 
demonstrated. Furthermore, and this is a much more serious problem, it is 
as yet unclear how this particular embodied, non-representational use of 
DST-C on its own (i.e. as a methodology and associated ontology severed 
from related and potentially helpful disciplines such as connectionism) could 
yield psychological explanations rather than merely descriptions of 
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behaviour - this comment amounts to the accusation that Thelen et al.'s 
model is good old behaviourism in a new form, also raised by Eliasmith 
(1995, 2003), and is echoed in various flavours by Pelphrey and Reznick 
(2001) and Sophian (2001). Appropriate though it is, it should be noted this 
particular counterargument was more forceful against Thelen and Smith’s 
less sophisticated work of the mid-1990s (e.g. Thelen and Smith 1994, 
Thelen 1995), so this particular research programme does appear to 
contain the momentum which might allow people working in this paradigm 
to meet this criticism sometime in the future. However, a lot of work still 
remains to be done, and my own model to be developed later in this book 
can be seen as a small contribution towards that end. 
 
An additional problem is that there is a hint of circularity in Thelen et al.’s 
dismissal of the importance of representation - a hypothesis that is a 
cornerstone of their brand of DST-C: 
 
"The model accomplishes all this without invoking constructs of ‘‘object 
representation,’’ or other knowledge structures. Rather, the infants’ behavior 
of ‘‘knowing’’ or ‘‘not-knowing’’ to go to the ‘‘correct’’ target is emergent from 
the complex and interacting processes of looking, reaching, and 
remembering integrated within a motor decision field." (Thelen et al. 2001) 
 
I have no quarrel whatsoever with the thesis that ‘knowing’ and ‘doing’ are 
intimately connected: I am quite convinced that it is true. However, the 
authors might be overextending their model’s potency by making internal 
representation a factor of practically no significance whatsoever. Via their a 
priori adherence to a particular notion of E( i )C (one that I would 
characterise as closely allied to E( A )C), this assertion was an assumption - 
if it is supposed to be a ‘conclusion’ to be derived from the simulations 
involving the model, this should not come as a surprise. This is because by 
design, the model depicts only the behaviourist aspects of the real system, 
and says little about the cognitive underpinnings of the movement-
dynamics, nor does it rule out object representation or somesuch variety of 
internal processing as a byproduct of the embodied dynamics, or even as a 
mechanism that exerts a modicum of control. Thelen et al. disqualify 
representations as components of their explanation by stipulation, and rely 
on the success of their model to scaffold the thesis that even if one were to 
invoke representations, they would do no relevant work. 
 
However, if this is how the model is supposed to work, here's the rub: the 
model mainly presents an after-the-fact description of behaviour rather than 
an explanation, except perhaps in the most abstract of forms: the relevant 
factors and parameters are explicitly chosen to have the model resemble 
behaviour that has already been observed. The case for the causal 
impotence of representation would have to come from the explanatory 
success of the model, but that is where the results are somewhat meager. 
Or, to reiterate an important qualifier (the red thread of this commentary) to 
this statement: I believe a 'representation-light' approach to low-level 
activities such as being engaged in falling prey to the A-not-B-error is 
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probably the right tack to take, and the success that the model does exhibit 
is sufficient to cement this belief, but this strategy does not suffice for more 
complex cognition-involving behaviour. 
 
Mark Latash (2001), in his peer commentary to Thelen et al.’s 2001 target 
article, makes a similar point. Latash notes that the strong anti-dualism of 
Thelen et al.’s model and underlying theory ‘explains’ away all forms of 
mental activity per se in favour of their embodied account. However, this 
renders their model unable to account for some data. Latash found that in 
experiments where subjects were asked to practice the unnatural task of 
mirror writing, subjects would feel as if their hand refused to cooperate, a 
situation analogous to the uncooperative field setting of the Thelen et al. 
model that was intended to simulate the behaviour of infants prone to 
making the A-not-B-error. Uncoupling bodily and visual feedback from the 
mental guidance of the task at hand would often help overcome the 
impasse situations in the mirror-writing tasks, suggesting that in 
complicated cases, for instance requiring novel decisions or crisis 
management, something else is necessary to complement Thelen et al.’s 
scheme defining knowing in terms of perceiving, moving and remembering. 
To keep Thelen et al.’s model from being nothing more than a 
straightforward stimulus-response-description, some reference needs to be 
made to internal processing - imagination, perhaps. Still, Thelen et al. claim 
that there is no internal representation of significance. Later, when I turn to 
the ideas of Andy Clark concerning 'representation-hungry problems', this 
topic will be explored further (see section 7.4). 
 
As a final issue with Thelen et al.'s model I wish to mention, Eliasmith 
(1995, 2003) accuses DST-C of adhering to views closely allied with 
behaviourism, and this criticism still applies. In this case, the a priori 
adherence to a fairly orthodox version of E( A )C professed by the authors 
plays such a major role, that it prohibits the abstract nature of the 
mathematics of DST from being translated into a more concrete account of 
cognition. It should be noted that, despite leaving the distinct impression it 
ultimately falls short, the model constructed in Thelen et al. (2001) does 
present a significant improvement over, for instance, the work of Thelen and 
co-workers in the mid-1990s, and the continuing evolution of the work in this 
field holds promise for the future. 
 
3.4 - Newton's Curse 
 
I would like to claim that the moral we should take home from this 
discussion is that Thelen et al.'s intriguing way of attempting to provide 
explanations of cognition (or cognition-involving behaviour) in terms of 
embodied dynamics and enaction can get us reasonably far, but not nearly 
far enough. To revisit one of my earlier comments (from section 1.3): I think 
something more is needed to allow explanations of more complex cognitive 
processes - actual 'thinking', rather than fairly basic sensorimotor interaction 
of agent and environment, however complex those interactions can already 
be. I do believe that Thelen et al.'s model is rich enough to serve as a 
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template for a more comprehensive model - my own 'Radicality Manifold' 
(RM) is an attempt to cash in on that potential. The RM is intended as an 
explanatory template for E( i )C in general, offering an overview of the 
components which are supposed to co-constitute a proper explanation of 
cognition in that sense, and the kinds of relations that are realised in the 
interaction between those components. This is the model that I intend to 
develop throughout this book, and Thelen at al.'s model to account for the 
dynamics of cognition-involving behaviour is a good starting point. 
 
But first I wish to clarify the direction that I feel we should take, if Thelen et 
al.'s DST-C is to be understood as a jumping-off point. One of the central 
tenets of E( i )C is that many properties of agents cannot be understood via 
microphysical reduction, nor can they be characterised properly if divorced 
from their context. As a result of these tenets, E( i )C (especially E( A )C and 
the related DST-C) presupposes an account of causality that is problematic, 
or at the very least divergent from the traditional scientific norm. Rather than 
a sequential ordering of neatly delineated cause-and-effect pairs, many  
E( i )C-approaches suppose that we should understand systems, or at least 
living systems, in terms of a circular interaction dynamic of properties and 
processes at different spatial and temporal scales (see also section 9.3). 
 
The contributions of Galileo and Newton to physics seriously depleted our 
ability to understand the organic whole of a living system, the kind of causal 
dynamics it is immersed in, and the methods by which that dynamics is to 
be described and explained. Despite Isaac Newton's monumental 
achievements, and his undeniable status as one of the greatest minds ever 
to grace humanity, I will be ever-so-slightly blasphemous and call this 
problem Newton's Curse. In broad terms, I understand this to mean the 
following: the problems associated with the tendency to extrapolate an 
ontology from an abstract, structure-based metaphysics. 
 
This problem has much older roots - it might even be possible to trace it 
back to the success of the early 'sciences' of the ancient Greek scholars: 
mathematics, logic and philosophy. The success of the first two of these 
disciplines' focus on form and structure, rather than content, and the 
predilection of the third for a thoroughly rational (rather than perceptual) 
approach to reality stunted the proper emergence of what we currently 
understand to be empirical science. In all three cases, empirical data was 
considered to be of much lesser importance than introspective research 
methods. Despite modest empiricist beginnings with Aristotle, and a 
stronger empiricist turn from the seventeenth century onward (Bacon, 
Hobbes, Locke, Hume), this broadly rationalist inclination remained of 
utmost importance, up until today (at least in folk-physics). 
 
Some of the earliest proponents of this view were probably Pythagoras, with 
his mathematics-based ontology of the universe, and Democritus, whose 
efforts were geared towards reconciling the philosophies of Heraclitus and 
Parmenides. Heraclitus claimed that reality is in constant flux, and any and 
all understanding we might hope to appeal to are merely temporary 
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coagulations of this ongoing transformational process: 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at was to posit the existence of unchanging atoms in ever-changing 
configurations. Furthermore, he intended the processes by which these 
configurations occur to be wholly deterministic: one state, out of necessity, 
would lead to the next. 
 
Consequently, Democritus claimed that empirical data only exists as 
secondary qualities: whatever we perceive to be hot, or sweet, or of a 
particular colour, is only so by convention. Our senses cannot provide us 
with an accurate portrayal of what the world is really like, hence whatever 
knowledge we gain from perceiving is knowledge of a lesser kind; the real 
structure of reality can only be probed via our faculty of reason. 
 
Democritus' achievement is highly impressive, especially considering how 
well the major themes from his philosophy - reduction and the 
epiphenomenalism of macrophysics and sensory properties, plus the 
primacy of reason - align with the conceptualisation of reality as it emerged 
much later from the era of the scientific revolution, from the contributions of 
Galileo, Newton and Descartes, in particular. 
 
Despite the similarities of the Newtonian view with this classical theory, a lot 
of nuance of ancient Greek philosophy was lost. Juarrero (1999) notes that 
of Aristotle's four causes (material, formal, efficient and final), efficient 
cause has become most prominent in what could be characterised as the 
Newtonian orthodoxy, and which is still a major component of folk-physical 
beliefs. That is, the only kind of causality that is utilised in naive physical 
theories is 'billiard-ball causality', the kind involving objects bumping into 
eachother and transferring force and impulse. This aligns with, or might be 
co-constituted by, the deep-seated conviction that everything we see 
around us is nothing more than a collection of microphysical entities - 
something like Democritus' atoms. 
 
The Newtonian view underscores this conviction, conceptualising causal 
primacy in terms of a reduction of wholes to parts, where the wholes are 
causally impotent epiphenomena, i.e. merely aggregates of microphysical 
constituents. Note how this view is still common today, i.e. as exemplified 
by Jaegwon Kim's (e.g. 1998) theories on supervenience. Block's (2003) 
objection to this view - that it runs the risk of 'causal drainage', of 
macrophysical powers being mere epiphenomena of constellations of 
powers contributed by microphysical realisers - uncovers the problem quite 
nicely. 
 
This reductionistic view has the unpleasant side-effect (unpleasant at least 
for E( i )C-supporters) of demoting relational properties of macrophysical 
entities to the status of secondary qualities. I will show (in chapter 4), an  
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E( A )C-based critique of standard theories about colour involves exactly the 
claim that colours are actually relational, while the orthodox, Lockean view 
brands them secondary qualities of objects. 
 
Galileo fostered the hypothesis that, for many practical intents and 
purposes, there was little harm in ignoring contextual effects, such as 
atmospheric friction for falling objects. Where the influence of the 
environment could not be ignored, a serious problem emerged: modeling 
the properties of the environment of some particle would require modeling 
the parallel states of all other particles, and this simply could (and can) not 
be done. 
 
Newton proposed a rather clever solution: he conceptualised the influence 
of the environment on a particle in terms of that particle's change of state, 
under influence of some force. Chemero and Turvey (2006) note that this is 
part of a vast explanatorily reductive manoeuvre, encapsulated in Newton's 
second lawNOTE 14 F(x, ) = m . This manoeuvre includes a reduction of the 
number of variables describing a particle's state from (potentially) infinity to 
two (position x at time t, and velocity , collectively specifying the particle's 
phase). The effects of the environment are defined to be proportional to the 
particle's acceleration , and modulated by the particle's mass. 
 
This clever solution did have a number of complicating consequences, 
amongst them being the proclivity to model causal processes of systems in 
terms of a sequence of state transitions, and positing as non-entailed those 
influences that are of an origin external to the modeled system. 
 
The former point, combined with atomism, has the peculiar consequence of 
supporting an ontology in which time is, in principle, reversibleNOTE 15. This 
suggests that the diachronic properties of systems as defended in (for 
instance) E( A )C require a non-Newtonian viewpoint - that is, explaining such 
properties requires a different conception of causality (see section 9.3). The 
latter consequence of Newton's clever solution as described above can be 
read as a negation of the E( S )C-component of the general E( i )C-inclination: 
situatedness (embeddedness) is not of explicit influence on what a 
particle/entity/agent is to be defined as being. 
 
Descartes' viewpoint fits into this perspective quite readily by defining the 
world and its inhabitants in materialistic, atomistic terms, and then coming 
to the conclusion that this simply will not do when describing human beings: 
there should be something other than the body that is nonetheless essential 
to man... and that, according to Descartes, is the immaterial soul. The 
motion of the material body has material causes, but, barring awkward 
'solutions' involving the pineal gland as the locus of matter-to-mind 
interaction, Descartes has to claim that the workings of the immaterial mind 
can only be self-caused, in virtue of it having free will (Juarrero 1999). 
 
When one adopts the Newtonian account, including atomism and 
determinism, one runs into major problems when Cartesian substance 
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dualism is discarded, especially when this is done half-heartedly. That is, 
the success of the Newton-inspired sciences promulgated a view of reality 
with no clear place for the intuitions of many concerning the properties of 
the human mind (e.g. the ideas developed in phenomenology), and the 
problems of this view were compounded by the conviction that the mind 
does need to be accounted for in a manner congruent with those intuitions. 
One aspect of this odd confluence of Newtonianism and Cartesianism 
includes the idea of the mind as an entity, property or process that 
somehow plays by its own rules, and because of that idiosyncratic character 
requires representations as the internal effects of external causes, as stand-
ins for those distal processes. 
 
The formal methods of description of the Newtonian account can be 
recognised in a related approach to explaining the mind: computationalism. 
Mental processes are described in terms of functional properties and 
regularities - a particular mental state has the function of being an 
intermediary between an input state and an output state. Where Newton 
describes material processes in terms of sequences of a phase state of 
some particle (plus an environmental force) entailing a particular other 
state, the computational approach to the mind depicts functional state 
transitions as transformations of symbolic structures in accordance with 
certain rules into other such structures. 
 
These Newtonian/Cartesian implications are examples of a style of 
conceptualising the mind that is most vehemently opposed by supporters of 
E( i )C. In this light, it might count as odd that DST-C, which I classified as an 
endeavour closely related to E( A )C, uses Newton's differential calculus as a 
base component of its models (see section 3.3). I believe that DST-C has 
the resources to defuse at least some aspects of Newton's curse, but 
certain other problems still remain. 
 
First, the positive differences: DST-C promotes the claim that standard 
computationalist approaches consistently fail in accounting for the temporal 
dimension. DST-C is intended to bring diachronicity back to the forefront, by 
claiming that the dynamics of a dynamic system depend, to a large extent, 
upon the history of the system (Van Gelder and Port, 1995). Furthermore, 
DST-C (and with it virtually all variants of E( i )C) is decidedly holistic, 
supporting, as noted above, an account of causality that involves parts and 
wholes, and the properties connected to those parts and wholes, interacting 
with eachother in complex ways. 
 
However, I believe that for DST-C, Newton's Curse, broadly conceived, still 
remains. That is, the models of DST-C still exhibit the tendency to 
extrapolate a qualitative ontology from an abstractly quantitative 
metaphysics. Using such models as descriptions and tools for prediction is 
a valuable excercise in itself, but the question becomes: can these models 
answer not only how-, but also why-questions? Or, to put this differently, is 
it warranted to have a DST-C model provide a description of a system's 
dynamics, and suppose that that quantitative description constitutes a 
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qualitative explanation? I do believe that DST-C, and especially carefully-
wrought models such as the one by Thelen et al. (2001), can help us travel 
at least part of the distance, but many questions remain. A more focused bit 
of criticism, ancillary to the main point, is one of the problems specific to 
Thelen et al.'s (2001) model of the A-not-B-error: what is the h-parameter? 
It is fine to consider it an abstract component of a model that provides a 
structural description of the system's behaviour, but, given the importance 
afforded to it by the authors, what does it explain? 
 
My suggestion is that the holistic descriptions of behaviour of DST-C, and 
many forms of E( i )C, leave a lot unsaid that needs to be investigated. Part 
of the reason for this book is to fill in some of those blanks. 
 
3.5 - Previewing The Radicality Manifold: Interacting Domains 
 
The most useful aspect of Thelen at al.'s brand of DST-C to my own project 
is the fact it offers a way to provide E( i )C-compatible descriptions of 
behaviour, via their movement planning field. It will be my contention that 
we need to integrate additional kinds of processes and properties into the 
model in a more explicit sense if we are to explain cognition instead of 
merely describing behaviour. 
 
Via the discussion of the ecology of colour perception (in section 4.5), I will 
investigate what the balance between the physical properties of the agent's 
body (e.g. the specifications of his retinal receptors) on the one hand, and 
the physical properties of his characteristic niche (the environment) on the 
other needs to be like to enable successful colour-based interaction 
(involving both perception and cognition) of the agent with that environment. 
My analysis of the linguistic categorization of perceptual colour space (in 
section 4.3) will yield a clearer idea of how the biomechanical properties of 
the agent interact with or are influenced by socioculturally shaped 
environmental structures (e.g. the way in which a specific language 
encodes colour categories). Then, it will prove to be a relatively intuitive 
step from linguistic categories to conceptual categories, and concepts 
proper. 
 
Hence, following this trajectory along these theories as outlined will yield 
specifications of all the domains that are of interest in accounting for E( i )C: 
DST-C gives us a handy description of behaviour, the ecology of colour 
teaches us about distal and proximal physical properties, the linguistics of 
colour adds the sociocultural domain, and opens up an avenue towards an 
analysis of concepts, the 'vehicles' of higher cognition. 
 
I suggest that properties and processes that can be described in terms of 
these separate domains collectively realise the behaviour (action, cognition 
and locution) of an embodied and embedded agent. The 'Radicality 
Manifold'-model I will develop later in this book will conceptualise these 
domains as spaces as extrapolations of Thelen et al.'s dynamical 
movement planning field, each of the processes or properties in these 
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spaces offering affordances to other processes, i.e. one process or property 
constraining or enabling one or more other processes. I realise that this 
sounds awfully vague and abstract at this stage; but then again, so do some 
of the usual desciptions and explanations that are offered by other 
supporters of E( i )C. I would like to ask the reader to bear with me for the 
duration of this journey; after a set-up via the philosophy of colour 
perception, I intend to cash out my promises by delivering my theories of 
embodied/embedded concepts and cognition in the second half of the book 
(chapter 6 and onwards). 
 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
 
[SUMMARY of chapter 3 AND PREVIEW] 
 
Using the tools of Dynamical Systems Theory, Thelen et al. (2001) have 
constructed a dynamical movement planning field, a model which 
expresses activity that is congruent with the basic behavioural choices 
made by young children when they fall prey to the A-not-B-error. This model 
is enactive in character, abolishing internal representation in its explanation 
of this minded behaviour. In chapter 7, I will take a closer look at an 
important related problem: the status of representation. 
 
One of the problems of Thelen et al.'s model is that it pays little attention to 
more advanced cognition. Hence, this model offers a basic description of  
E( i )C behaviour in terms of a field-based model; an important task to be 
carried out in this book will be to expand and adapt that model for an 
explanation of concept-involving behaviour (see chapter 8 for the way in 
which this behaviour-based model is integrated into a broader E( i )C model). 
This adaptation will also help sidestep Newton's curse, which is the 
tendency to ignore contextual effects when extrapolating quantitative 
methodology into qualitative ontology. That is, the 'Radicality Manifold'-
model to be developed throughout this book will provide a more elaborate 
account of the interaction of agent, physical world, social world, and 
concepts as a way to describe agentive behaviour. This expansion is multi-
layered: 
(1) expansion of the description of physical/ecological embeddedness; 
(2) expansion into social embeddedness; 
(3) a more dedicated description of the structure of this field (expanded into 
a higher-dimensional space), as pertaining to a description of concepts. 
 
Hence, in the chapters to come, this expansion will occur in stages: the first 
clues about sensorimotor situatedness (agent-physical world interaction), 
and social situatedness will be provided in chapter 4, when these interaction 
modes as pertaining to colour perception are discussed. The idea here is 
that in theories of colour perception, there has been much attention for the 
ways in which basic sensorimotor contingencies help guide and inform 
more complex behaviour. Clues about the properties of this space 
extrapolated from this colour-focused approach will be given in chapters 5 
and 6. 
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[4 - Agent-Environment Interaction: Ecology and Language of Colour] 
 
4.1 - Two Sets of Theories 
 
In the sections to follow, I will compare and contrast two sets of theories, to 
try and lay the foundation of an E( i )C-appropriate account of concepts. The 
first set of theories (to be discussed in section 4.3) concerns the linguistic 
anthropology of colour, and my attempt to synthesize a workable account 
from the comparison of the universalistic and relativistic camps that 
emerged in the wake of the publication of Berlin and Kay (1969); this 
discussion will contribute a sense of socio-cultural interaction (i.e. 
enculturedness, social concepts) to my own endeavour. The second set of 
theories to be compared (in section 4.5), the ecological colour perception 
theories of Evan Thompson and Roger Shepard, mainly concerns the topic 
of agent-environment interaction (i.e. embodiment, embeddedness and 
enaction). I will modify and utilise many of the ideas present in this account 
of colour perception and phenomenology, because it represents the 
interlocking and interacting of many abilities, properties and processes that 
are also highly relevant to an account of concepts, and presents this 
interaction in a way that makes it an ideal, compact case study in 
preparation of a more comprehensive theory about E( i )C: perceptually 
guided interaction (i.e. enaction) of an embodied agent with its physical 
environment (i.e. embeddedness), as well as conceptually guided 
interaction of an embodied and embedded agent with other agents (i.e. 
enculturedness). 
 
There is one thing about the focus of the upcoming discussion that is 
absolutely essential to mention in advance. In the following sections, there 
will be clues about the content of the concept 'colour' - that is, I will develop 
certain ideas about what the scientific concept 'colour' is supposed to mean. 
While that is an interesting and worthwhile line of investigation on its own, 
the main purpose of this discussion is to derive from that discussion claims 
about the structural properties of concepts as such, i.e. what the properties 
of the concept 'concept' are. The phenomenon colour offers a good vehicle 
for such a line of investigation, because, firstly, both the embodied (an 
agent's sensorimotor contingencies) and embedded (the situatedness of an 
agent in his ecological and his social niche) aspects of said phenomenon 
have been well-investigated. Secondly, colour perception is almost never 
merely sensorimotor interaction: many colour-involving behaviour also 
involves more advanced judgments about the world. In other words: the 
way 'up' from basic perception towards concepts and cognition is 
comparatively easily made in examples involving colour. In that sense, the 
case study in this section and the next is as much about 'colour cognition' 
as it is about colour perception. Lastly, the rich discussion about the 
properties of phenomenal and/or linguistic colour space (see section 4.3 in 
particular) provides interesting clues about the structural properties of 
concepts which, as has been mentioned before, is intended to provide an 
addition to the dynamical field-based description of behaviour courtesy of 
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Thelen et al. (2001). The end result will be a new way of speaking about 
concepts and their properties, which is the goal of this whole excercise. 
 
4.2 - Colour Phenomenology: The Received View 
 
The received view of colour perception includes, as a significant 
component, the views of Ewald Hering. In his 'Grundzüge der Lehre vom 
Lichtsinn' (1920), Hering presented a phenomenological account of colour 
vision, claiming there are four primary chromatic hues: red, green, blue and 
yellow. Each of these is pure and unitary, whereas other chromatic colours 
can be introspectively understood to be an intermediary between two of 
these four, or some mixture. Orange, purple, chartreuse (yellow-green) and 
turquoise (blue-green) are secondary colours. Furthermore, he noted there 
appear to be certain constraints on the kinds of colour mixtures or 
combinations we can perceive: red and yellow or green and blue can 
peacefully coexist, but a combination or co-manifestation of red and green 
(as in a reddish green), or yellow and blue (as in a yellowish blue) appear 
impossible. Hering hypothesized (but was unable to prove at that time) that 
these opponency relations of the two pairs red vs. green and yellow vs. blue 
were somehow generated by some neural process. 
 
At first glance, Hering's conclusions and knowledge glanced from 
investigations into the anatomy of the eye appeared contradictory: the 
human retina contains three types of cone receptors (i.e. humans are 
'trichromats'), each most sensitive to a particular wavelength band. One 
cone type's pigment was shown to maximally absorb light with a wavelength 
of 445 nm, the second exhibited maximum absorption at 535 nm, the third 
at 570 nm. Intially dubbed 'blue', 'green' and 'red' cones, respectively, the 
failure to match the absorption maxima with the mean wavelengths of the 
actual colours mentioned prompted the adoption of a new convention 
designating the cone types 'S' (short wave), 'M' (middle wave) and 'L' (long 
wave). 
 
In the nineteenth century, it was supposed colour sensations were 
generated by adding responses from the various cone types. However, if 
that were the case, the output at the retinal level would not differentiate 
between stimulus intensity and wavelength. Individual cones are not able to 
specify a particular colour sensation: a particular receptor will not be able to 
distinguish between a light at some specified intensity and wavelength and 
a light at double the intensity of a different wavelength for which this 
receptor is half as sensitive. Adding the response curves for more than one 
type of receptor will not help to alleviate this discrimination problem - one of 
the hindrances is that the cone types each respond to a fairly broad band of 
wavelengths, and these ranges show considerable overlap for the three 
cone types. 
 
The step from three cone types to four chromatic colours in two opponent 
relations (and an additional achromatic opponency, black vs. white) 
appeared difficult to make. However, experiments conducted in the 1950s 
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by Leo Hurvich and Dorothea Jameson appeared to quantitatively 
corroborate Hering's qualitative theory. Test subjects were given a light 
stimulus, and were asked to find the hue of a second light that would 
'cancel' the hue of the first light. Phenomena corroborating Hering's 
opponency relations were indeed foundNOTE 16. 
 
From this project a theory emerged that accomodated both the trichromacy 
of the retina and the four-hue opponency at the phenomenal level. Central 
to this theory, which in its general form (there is dissent at the micro-level) 
has become the received view, is the notion that retinal responses are not 
added, but compared. If the differences in receptor output are calculated, it 
turns out the discriminatory potential of the system is greatly enhanced - the 
response to a higher intensity at some wavelength no longer suffices to 
'simulate' any response to a different wavelength. 
 
These comparisons are initially established by a simple opponency-type 
mechanism in the neurons directly involved in the initial stages of retinal 
receptor response processing. These neurons enhance the differences 
between the signals by responding in some way (say, enhancing the signal) 
to stimulation of the centre of their receptive field (some region of the retina 
they receive and process signals from), but responding in a directly 
opposite fashion to the same kind of stimulation of the edges of their 
receptive field. Of these neurons, the 'on-cells' react excititory to stimuli 
reaching the centre of a receptive field, and inhibitory to the same stimuli at 
the edges of their receptive fields, while the 'off-cells' exhibit the opposite 
behaviour, responding positively to the removal of a particular stimulus from 
their receptive centre. As such, these neurons embody a spatially 
antagonistic 'push-pull'-system (Thompson, 1995) responding to 
fluctuations in the light stimuli, causing the visual system as a whole to 
exhibit sensitivity to contrasts rather than absolute intensities. 
 
Visual neurons which integrate signals from different cone types generate a 
similar phenomenon, but now in the spectral domain, sensitising the visual 
system to differences between wavelengths. These single opponent 
neurons have been found in all organisms with colour vision. Double 
opponent neurons can compare the outputs of single opponent neurons by 
exhibiting opponent responses to different cone types (say, excitation by 
signals from L-cones but inhibition from M cones in the centre of its 
receptive field, and the inverse reaction at the edges of the receptive field), 
and as such will generate maximum output in areas exhibiting great colour 
contrast. 
 
Hardin (1988/1993) provides one version of the abstract model coding the 
performance of functionally defined chromatic and achromatic channels, as 
a quantification of opponency theory. There are three (functionally defined) 
channels (depicted in figure 2): the chromatic red-green and yellow-blue 
channels, and the achromatic black-white channel, each defined by specific 
additions and/or subtractions of the signals received from each of the three 
retinal receptor types S, M and L. 
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[Figure 2: A schematic depiction of quantitative opponent theory, adapted 
from Hardin (1988/1993, pg. 34)] 
 
If '0' is understood to be the neural base rate (the activity at rest, resulting in 
the 'colour signal' dubbed 'brain gray'), Hardin specifies the output of the 
system might be catalogued as follows: 
 
(L + M): achromatic channel 
 (L + M) > 0 --> whiteness 
 (L + M) < 0 --> blackness 
(L - M): red-green channel 
 (L - M) > 0 --> redness 
 (L - M) < 0 --> greenness 
(L + M) - S: yellow-blue channel 
 (L + M) - S > 0 --> yellowness 
 (L + M) - S < 0 --> blueness 
 
The simple addition of signals from L and M receptors does not result in 
spectral opponency, and only codes changes in light intensity. It bears 
repeating these 'channels' are defined in functional terms - specifiying the 
exact realisation of these opponent processes is a matter of 
neurophysiological investigation, and most likely a very complex affair 
involving many different types of neurons and neural processes. 
 
The phenomenal properties of opponent primary hues might be derived 
from this model (although in an experimental setting, the procedure is 
usually the other way around, with, for instance, Hurvich and Jameson's 
hue cancellation tasks providing the initial data). The performance of each 
channel (red-green or yellow-blue) might be expressed as a curve in a 
graph plotting wavelength in nanometres (x-axis) against the relative visual 
response, expressing the absorption spectra of the various receptor types 
relative to eachother (i.e. as processed by the neural channels), and recast 
against a logarithmic scale (y-axis). Figure 3 shows these curves. 
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[Figure 3: Relative response functions for the opponent 'colour channels' 
and the achromatic channel] 
 
Depicted this way it becomes easy to see why, for instance, red and green 
cannot co-exist at the same time at the same location (on some object's 
surface): if the red-green channel descends beneath the zero rate (the 
positive or negative character of some reponse merely signifying a 
particular attribution of coefficients, convenient within the model but 
ultimately arbitrary) for some part of the wavelength range, the resultant 
signal will specify a green-experience devoid of redness - other parts of the 
spectrum will result in a red-experience-specifying signal from that channel. 
Similarly, the yellow-blue channel will generate a yellow-signal if the curve 
rises above the zero rate, a blue signal if it dips below. Where the curve for 
one of the chromatic channels crosses the zero rate level (i.e. takes on the 
value 0), the only chromatic information provided comes from the other 
channel - either curve spans the entire visible spectrum. The achromatic 
channel is only specified by the whiteness response, since a blackness 
response can only be generated by contrast, for instance in perceiving a 
dimly lit spot surrounded by a region of high illumination. The saturation of a 
particular hue is specified as the ratio of the chromatic response to the sum 
of the chromatic and achromatic responses. 
 
There are several different systems available to classify colours, but one of 
the most ubiquitous is the Munsell system (or systems based on the one 
developed by Munsell). The Munsell system organises basic characteristics 
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of the full range of colours of surfaces on three scales hue, value and 
chroma (the names Munsell himself specified), in a manner that lines up 
with the opponent structure as specified by the received view concerning 
colour phenomenology as described so far. 
 
On this combined account, it is claimed that all perceived colours can be 
defined in terms of three parameters: hue (red, green, yellow, blue, purple 
or some intermediary), lightness (the measure of light reflection, ranging 
from ideal black - no reflection - to ideal white - maximum reflection) and 
saturation (the measure of distance from the gray of some lightness value, 
which embodies zero saturation). This results in a three-dimensional 
depiction of the way the various colour shades are related to eachother 
(expressing, for instance, the regularities that emerge in colour 
categorization tasks), called perceptual colour space (see figure 4). 
 
 
[Figure 4: perceptual colour space] 
 
Representing the three determinants of colour in three-dimensional space, 
lightness defines the vertical axis with black (0) at the nadir and white (10) 
at the zenith; hue is defined orthogonal to lightness along the perimeter of a 
colour circle divided into ten regions (red (R), red/yellow (RY), yellow (Y), 
yellow/green (YG), green (G), green/blue (GB), blue (B), blue/purple (BP), 
purple (P), purple/red (PR)) with each region divided into ten steps; 
saturation is a measure of distance from the origin (the achromatic centre, 
halfway between black and white and of neutral hue) divided into twenty 
steps. On each dimension, the distance between steps is intended to 
represent equal perceptual difference in normal daylight, in a neutral (i.e. 
gray to white) environment. Since not all hues are represented at all levels 
of saturation or lightness (most typical yellows are of relatively high 
lightness but low saturation, whereas most typical reds are of relatively low 
lightness but high saturation), the resultant three-dimensional structure is 
not a perfect sphere. The Munsell notation specifies a colour by giving the 
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appropriate values for each of the three scales thus: [hue] 
[lightness]/[saturation]. 7GB 4/6, for example, identifies a shade of 
turquoise. 
 
4.3 - Sociocultural Situatedness: The Linguistical Anthropology of Colour 
 
In linguistics and anthropology, there have been discussions about the way 
perceptual colour space has been used to characterise human colour 
perception, and in particular, how people from different cultures carve up 
this space with colour terms. The term 'red' would indicate a particular 
region in perceptual colour space, with the best example of red forming the 
focal point of that broader region of red and reddish shades; the same for 
'yellow', 'green', 'blue' and so on. 
 
Berlin and Kay (1969) stated that languages can be ordered in accordance 
with the number of basic colour terms they contain, in the following 
evolutionary sequence: 
 
[white / black] < [red] < [green / yellow] < [blue] < [brown] < [purple / pink / 
orange / gray]. 
 
So, this sequence depicts the evolutionary order of the lexical segmentation 
of perceptual colour space. This means that the most primitive languages, 
in terms of colour lexicon, will only have two colour words, with English 
glosses 'white' and 'black'. If a language has a somewhat more complex 
lexicon with three basic colour terms, the third word will always be a term 
denoting red, for an even more complex language the fourth term will deote 
either green or yellow, and so on. 
 
For their experiments, Berlin and Kay used a two-dimensional array of 
colour chips of varying hue and lightness, all at the maximum available 
saturation - this was basically (some subsection of) the peel of the complete 
three-dimensional structure depicted above. The sometimes-utilised 
Farnsworth-Munsell array also portrays colours of varying hues and 
lightness, but at a much lower level of saturation. 
 
Kay (1975) provided the following refinement of the evolutionary sequence: 
 
Stage I:[WHITE and BLACK] --> Stage II:[RED] --> Stage IIIa/IV:[GRUE > 
yellow] or Stage IIIb/IV:[yellow > GRUE] --> Stage V:[green and blue] --> 
Stage VI:[brown] --> Stage VII:[purple, pink, gray and/or orange]. 
 
'Grue' is a combined green/blue category. Berlin and Kay state that the 
colour perception of humans from all cultures is structured in the same way, 
i.e. that the respective colour regions' foci lie at the same general locations 
in perceptual colour space, and that the differences in colour language 
across cultures have little to no influence on actual colour perception. This 
claim amounts to a rejection of the so-called Sapir-Whorf thesis regarding 
the categorization of perceptual colour space. The Sapir-Whorf thesis is a 
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notorious theoretical claim, expressing the idea that there is a co-
dependency of language, thought and culture. In other words, the thesis 
says an agent's socio-cultural environment is of (at least non-trivial) 
influence on his cognitive (and also perceptual) processes. Berlin and Kay 
defend a universalism regarding the biological structure involved in 
generating colour experience: they say that despite differences in colour 
language, colour experience (including the structure of perceptual colour 
space depicted above) is the same for all humans, because they share the 
same sensory processing mechanisms. 
 
Apart from a great deal of critical acclaim, rising to a point of revered 
prominence in that the theories professed by and built upon the work of 
Berlin and Kay have grown to be the received view on this crossroads of 
linguistics, neurophysiology, philosophy and anthropology, there is a 
reasonably strong undertow evoked by critics dismissing the universalist 
tradition's central tenets. John Lucy (1992) develops a sustained critique of 
the research of Berlin and Kay, and one of his most important ideas 
concerns the artificial nature of said research. That is, he charges Berlin 
and Kay with the accusation that their approach to colour language is 
decontextualised: any references to the socio-cultural context or the natural 
way of functioning of colour language are avoided. 
 
This decontextualisation occurs in three ways: 
-(1) due to the methodological secession employed towards studying colour 
terms in abstracta, a failure to properly assess the grammatical properties 
of colour words disables a clear view on the structural divergences of the 
various languages studied. 
-(2) a similar abstraction is achieved in the perceptual domain: colour is 
studied as a perceptual primitive, its connections to any habitually co-
occurring experiential or environmental features severed. Any natural 
synchrony between a colour and some property of whatever it is colours are 
thought to be a significant feature of in a particular language community, 
even cross-cultural regularities of such a kind, will not be found. 
-(3) any semantical features of colour words are reduced to mere 
denotation by asking test subjects to do no more than link a 
decontextualised hue stimulus to a basic colour term. 
 
Summarising: the very idea Berlin and Kay attempted to investigate, the 
Sapir-Whorf thesis, predicts an influence of the language one uses on the 
way one interprets reality, how one constructs a conceptual world-view. 
However, in much colour term research, this broad thesis was constrained 
to one merely involving the processing of decontextualised perceptual 
information. Lucy's suggestion is, then, that Berlin and Kay's research did 
not discount the Sapir-Whorf-thesis because their experimental setup was 
such that any supporting evidence could never be found: the cultural-
linguistic context that forms the very core of the thesis had been abstracted 
away. Lucy supports the opposite position: he is a relativist concerning the 
influence of language on colour experience. That is, he states that when 
your colour language is different, your colour experience is also different. 
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One clue that this can be so is that in many cultures, terms that can be (and 
often are, for instance by Berlin and Kay, 1969) given English colour words 
as glosses, are actually words that refer to much more than merely colour 
shades. A telling example, derived from Lucy (1997), states that Hanunóo 
(Philippines) colour words exhibit a wide referential range not restricted to 
mere hue-name correlations, or even to typical colour/utility connotations 
(as have been found in, for instance, certain African tribal languages, where 
some colour terms refer explicitly to cattle colours). In their colour language, 
Hanunóo speakers use four basic colour terms: lagti' (light), bi:ru (dark), 
rara' (dry) and latuy (wet), with English glosses - attributed by Berlin and 
Kay - white, black, red and green, respectively. However, the Hanunóo not 
only encode colorimetric information such as oppositions between light and 
dark, but also between dry and wet, or deep/unfading/desirable and 
pale/colourless/weak. All this additional referential information is not 
captured by the English glosses. This means that for the Hanunóo, and 
many other linguistic communities, words denoting colour-relevant 
information are necessarily linked to other properties. 
 
Criticism like this has resulted in a rejection, by some, of the strong claim 
that the evolutionary order of colour term acquisition presented by Berlin 
and Kay is a universally occurring structure: the multi-referentiality of colour 
words between different languages and cultures means that the order in 
which colour words are learned depends on many contextual (i.e. 
environmental, socio-linguistic) factors apart from neuro-physiological 
structure. As a very general indication of evolution, the Berlin and Kay 
sequence might offer some useful suggestions, but many aberrant cases 
(such as the Hanunóo example described above) and the inordinate focus 
on abstract colour terms render this part of Berlin and Kay's thesis less 
universally applicable. 
 
However, the psychophysical model described above (in section 4.2) is a 
fairly straightforward case of functionalistic reduction: the apparent conflict 
of a three-receptor retina with the phenomenal four-hue opponency is 
recast in functionalistic terms, after which an attempt at providing a 
neurophysiological description of the structure specified is carried out, 
yielding the desired physicalistic/universalistic explanation of the 
categorization of perceptual colour space. There have been some mildly 
successful steps towards completing this reduction, but not enough 
headway has been made to warrant proclaiming the operation an 
unqualified success. In brief: the three-way explanatory gap between the 
neurophysiological, phenomenal and linguistic levels remains. However, it 
does appear possible to isolate regularities on each of those levels. 
 
Some of those regularities are uncovered by Kimberly Jameson and Roy G. 
D'AndradeNOTE 17. They defend an interesting hypotheses in their 'It's not 
really red, green, yellow, blue: an inquiry into perceptual color space' 
(1997). They claim irregularities in perceptual colour space facilitate its 
progressive compartmentalisation that turns out to line up fairly neatly with 
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Berlin and Kay's evolutionary sequence. And this can explain why red, 
green, yellow and blue appear to have obtained a special status, despite 
the fact there are difficulties in actually lining up the Hering-style opponency 
intuition with the available physiological data. 
 
The Munsell-type three-dimensional colour solid (see section 4.2) is a 
structure quite unlike a perfect sphere, with protrusions at places where the 
saturation for particular hues can be specified at much higher levels (in the 
case of red, for instance), and indentations at places where saturation 
levels are unavailable beyond relatively low values (in the case of yellow). 
Because of these irregularities, distances between foci are not uniform. If 
the most primitive lexical segmentation of colour space has been made by 
separating colours into dark/cool and light/warm categories, the most 
informative additional term that might be acquired specifies RED, which has 
a focus farthest away from the regions specified by the intial two categories. 
The fourth most informative colour word to be acquired would be either 
yellow or blue, followed by green, purple, pink, orange, brown and gray (as 
determined by distance computations carried out by Boynton and Olsen 
(1987)). The evolutionary order thus generated does not diverge widely 
from the findings of the World Color SurveyNOTE 18, claim Jameson and 
D'Andrade. 
 
If the above is coherent, the classical four-hue opponency account nor the 
three dimensional phenomenological model are appropriate in the form they 
are usually presented in, even on phenomenological grounds. Despite this, 
Jameson and D'Andrade do wish to accept the theoretical outlines of the 
three-dimensional phenomenal colour space and opponency, and merely 
suggest a different (and somewhat more complex) account of basic hues 
and their phenomenal properties. Specifically, they wish to deny the four-
hue model and propose a five-hue segmentation. Still, jugments of similarity 
between Munsell colours will yield a particular structure in three-
dimensional color manifold (of hue, brightness and saturation). The 
perceived spacing of hues, if one attempts to account for a wide variety of 
deviant experimental observational results, will indeed yield a non-Euclidian 
structure, but this will at least locally exhibit normal Euclidian metric 
properties - there is a substantial center region that exhibits high regularity. 
 
The account provided by Jameson and D'Andrade, stating three-
dimensional phenomenal colour space should incorporate a fifth hue 
category, compares reasonably favourably to Kay's (1975) modifications to 
Berlin and Kay (1969), in which he attempted to account for some 
discrepancies of the original theory with data found by Rosch (1972). As 
explained above, Jameson and D'Andrade suggested a process of colour 
lexicon expansion in which the most informative colour term (in terms of 
distance from the colour words already in use) would be the most logical 
next choice. In his (1975), Kay embraced the relevance of socio-cultural 
influences on the acquisition - by individual speakers or social subgroups - 
of colour terms beyond those utilised in a language residing at a particular 
evolutionary stage. 
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However, the causes for the universality of colour terms as such appear to 
be somewhat different from those present in the (opponency/physiology-
based) model proposed by Kay and McDaniel (1978), in the sense that the 
modification of perceptual colour space (by including purple as a fifth axis-
defining hue) necessitates an additional step in the explanatory chain from 
neuronal response categories to colour space lexicalisation. It remains to be 
seen to what extent socio-cultural factors might influence this additional 
step, involving the distance-based compartmentalisation of colour space as 
described above - it does not appear far-fetched to suppose a dominant 
colour in some ecological niche might be named earlier by this 
environment's inhabitants than some evolutionarily prior colour, despite a 
greater perceptual distance, merely because the informational potential of 
lexicalising that environmentally significant colour overrides strictly 
phenomenological considerations. 
 
Despite the convergence with the claim by noted critics of Berlin and Kay, 
Saunders and Van Brakel (1997) that the categorization of colour space is 
not determined solely by phenomenal and neurophysiological factors, the 
above does yield the view that there are some non-trivial constraints on 
colour categorization - there appears to be some logic to the way the colour 
space can be incrementally lexicalised. Hubey (1997), examines various 
algebraic and geometric analyses of colour space and language, and 
reaches a similar conclusion. 
 
In an idealised three-dimensional vector-space depiction of the 
interrelatedness of colours according to the Commission Internationale de 
l’Eclairage (CIE) diagram, the tristimulus colours red, green and blue form 
the nodes in a triangular plane orthogonal to the black-white axis. Black has 
coordinates '000' (i.e. resides at the origin), white '111', red '001', green 
'010' and blue '100'. Red, green and blue are the additive primaries (each 
reside on an axis of the vector space), the multiplicative (or subtractive) 
primaries are yellow (011), cyan (110) and magenta (101). 
 
Representing the foci of Berlin and Kay's basic colour terms unveils an 
interesting phenomenon: the distribution is asymmetric in the sense that the 
majority of them appear to reside near the red and green nodes. Adapting 
for the heightened sensitivity of the human visual system for these high-
saturation hues would entail extending the red and green axes accordingly. 
With the vector space thus modified the scenario suggested by Jameson 
and D'Andrade is corroborated: after the division of colour space via the 
lexicalisation of black and white, red (the longest wavelength, to which the 
visual system is more sensitive) is farthest away from either, thus is the 
prime candidate for intial hue lexicalisation. After this, there is a choice 
between either green or blue - green wins out, once more because the 
human visual system favours the longer wavelengths. The prominence of 
yellow at this stage might be due to its abundance in nature (the fall leaves, 
or dry grass); after yellow, blue is lexicalised. The largest 'open' region still 
remaining resides in the red section of colour space, which is probably why 
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most of the additional colour terms pick out hues near the red node - gray 
(along the black-white axis, at the center) and purple (nearer blue) are the 
exceptions. 
 
It deserves noting that in the model above, there is a fairly elegant account 
of opponency, as well as a satisfying explanation for the status of yellow as 
a unique hue, despite it not being an additive primary. These two 
explanations are related, and have to do with averaging effects. Just like the 
addition of all three primaries will yield 111, i.e. white, averaging red and 
green will yield not reddish green, but yellow. Yellow is the only 
multiplicative primary that stands out as a unique hue, whereas magenta 
and cyan do not - this is due to the relative wavelength-wise proximity of red 
and green, addition resulting in a much higher, amplified peak at the yellow 
wavelength than when, red and blue are added. The red and blue 
wavelength ranges are further apart and as such show much less overlap, 
resulting in a saddle node at magenta perceived as a mixture of red and 
blue. 
 
Whether the hue foci themselves buttress the above-mentioned process of 
progressive segmentation of the colour space, or a sequence of 
increasingly fine-tuned delineations of broad categories as suggested by 
Roberson, Davidoff and Davies (2000) cannot be stated with any 
semblance of certainty at this point. A claim that does appear at least 
tenable, and which I would indeed wish to defend, is that socio-cultural and 
linguistic factors might have a non-trivial influence on the way this process 
bears out. 
 
So, socio-cultural influences (linguistic ones in particular) are not to be 
ignored in explaining the acquisition of an appropriate colour sense - but 
neither are biogenetic factors. The intuition is that both the human 
neurophysiological make-up, and their socio-cultural embeddedness (chiefly 
via linguistic interaction) exert non-trivial influence on the way one's 
behaviour regarding colour is given shape. 
 
There are certain constraints on the range of options open to human beings 
in constructing methods, customs and intra-culturally dispersed habits that 
help achieve some goal (such as establishing a shared colour lexicon). 
Sociocultural peculiarities, assumed to be of at least some influence on 
colour categorization, may explain moderate differences between colour 
language between cultures, but this does not automatically negate any and 
all laws describing some universal order - there is little dispute that the 
biological composition of the colour vision system and the performance 
characteristics are generally the same (discounting deficiencies) in all 
humans - but said order might find different expressions in various cultural 
contexts. 
 
So it seems that the accounts involving opponent hues and the three-
dimensional characterisation of colour space (defined by hue, saturation 
and brightness) do not tell the complete story - the contextual information 
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encapsulated in the broad referential range of many language's colour 
terms cannot be cast aside as callously as Berlin and Kay's basicness 
criteria would have us do - but it does tell at least part of it. The success of 
the Hurvich and D. Jameson cancellation experiments (see section 4.2) and 
the kinds of opponency found in various types of neural cells suggest that at 
certain physiological as well as phenomenal levels, some kind of 
opponency is indeed occurent. However, an accurate account will in all 
likelihood be rather more complex than the model currently in wide use. 
 
Despite the fact that the psychophysical model of colour perception is 
incomplete (the E( i )C-appropriate context is mostly missing), I suggest that 
the basic idea behind the model as a way of structuring a subclass of 
behavioural responses as a result of the embodied processing of stimuli is 
sound. For instance, it is possible to develop a similar account of 
perceptions in other modalities. The possible spectrum of perceived 
sounds, for instance, can be defined in terms of the parameters amplitude, 
pitch and compactness (Jakobson and Halle, 1956), like so: 
 
((Dimension))  (sound)  : (colour) 
total energy - amplitude : brightness 
frequency - pitch  : hue 
purity  - compactness : saturation 
 
The developmental sequence Jakobson and Halle uncovered for sound is 
ontogenetic, referring to the increasing sophistication of phonological 
distinctions as infants develop, whereas the colour sequence Berlin and 
Kay's theory yields is phylogenetic: an evolutionary scale (which, it needs to 
be noted, is of cultural rather than biological inclination). 
 
In both the case of phonological development and the evolution of colour 
space categorization, the initial stage contains two categories: the first 
uttering of an infant is /pa/, uniting the contrasting diffuse stop /p/ (closest to 
silence; minimal energy) and open vowel /a/ (loudest; highest energy); in 
the case of colour, black (minimal energy/brightness) and white (highest 
energy/brightness) are the two initial categories. 
 
The first colour term to be acquired after this in both sound and colour 
consists of an exploration of the frequency dimension, and in both cases in 
the low end of the energy spectrum: whereas /p/ exhibits low tonality at low 
loudness, the acquisition of /t/ exhibits high tonality, but still at low loudness. 
In the case of colour, the low-brightness hue RED joins with BLACK to 
contrast with WHITE on the brightness scale, but joins with WHITE to 
contrast with BLACK on the hue scale. 
 
Hence, both sound and colour exhibit a increasing sophistication in 
categorising phenomenal space as the child (for sound) or the culture (for 
colour) 'matures'. Berlin and Kay briefly hypothesize that colour language 
might have foundations similar to syntax and phonology, namely that some 
'species-specific bio-morphological structure' (Berlin and Kay 1969, pg. 109) 
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determines the particular evolutionary order that was found. These 
parametrizations - of colour in terms of hue, brightness and saturation, and 
sound in terms of amplitude, pitch and compactness - yield a series of 
perceptual spaces.  
 
4.4 - Towards Contextualised Concepts 
 
Now I can offer a somewhat more concrete answer to the question why I 
discuss colour, when I should be talking about concepts. This idea of 
perceptual spaces is why: I will use them to develop the idea of conceptual 
spaces, to put a bit more meat on the bones of a Thelen et al.-based, E( i )C-
appropriate theory of concepts. In order to prepare for a more detailed 
specification of the properties of such spaces, chapter 5 explores the 
properties of the aforementioned perceptual spaces, focusing on the case 
of colour space. After that, a more general account of conceptual spaces 
will be built from that colour-related prototype. 
 
But first, as stated above, there is one major issue that needs to be 
stressed: Lucy's worry that an account such as the one above is highly 
decontextualised. In other words: the universalism of the received view 
needs a little relativist tweaking. A prudent move to address this issue 
would be to state that both universalists and relativists have some 
suggestions of value to make: the properties of the the human sensory 
organs and influences from an agent's specific socio-cultural and linguistic 
environment collectively specify said agent's colour-related behaviour. 
 
However, one aspect is still missing from this description: the influence of 
the physical environment. Enactivism (E( A )C) offers the tools to specify the 
role of that particular aspect: as was said in section 1.2, enactivism 
attempts to define cognition and perception in terms of the ways in which an 
agent interacts with his environment. Evan Thompson, one of the main 
defenders of enactivism, provides such a story for colour perception. I will 
show that this interaction involves a co-attunement of agent and 
environment in a way that can, in part, be described in terms of the 
'conceptual spaces'-account hinted at above. I will use clues about 
ecological theories of colour perception, to be described in the next 
sections, to get a clearer picture of the character of that co-attunement. 
Furthermore, my own project of constructing an E( i )C-appropriate account 
of concepts will contain descriptions of a contextualised, rather than a 
decontextualised, apprehension of concepts - the basic mistake made by 
Berlin and Kay as described by Lucy is the one that I will have the explicit 
goal of avoiding. 
 
4.5 - Physical Situatedness: The Ecology of Colour 
 
4.5.1 - Colour Enactivism 
 
Evan Thompson (in Thompson, Palacios, Varela 1992, as well as 
Thompson 1995a, 1995b, 2000) argues for a relational account of colour 
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perception, with significant influences from ecology. The biological function 
of colour vision, he claims, is not to retrieve information about any single 
type of physical structure (for instance the microphysical surface structure 
of an object, with specific colour reflectance properties), but rather to help 
guide an organism's actions in his specific ecological niche. This implies 
that colour is not a property to be found either in or on the perceived object, 
nor in the perceiver’s mind, but a fundamentally context-dependent action-
guiding principle, i.e. something that emerges in the relation between 
organism and environment. 
 
Thompson explicitly constructs his argumentation in support of his own 
ecological approach to colour vision as a response to the constraints of 
what he feels is the cul-de-sac in which the regular colour theories now find 
themselves. Explanations of the processes yielding colour vision in the 
received view, which Thompson says trace back to Locke, customarily 
involve the following components: 
 
(1) the physical structure of the object, anchouring the disposition of said 
object to reflect light of a particular kind; 
(2) the composition and properties of the light, and its disposition to affect 
the perceiver’s senses in a specific way; 
(3) the perceiver’s colour sensations, which are explained by processes 
involving the two components above. 
 
Such a basic structure, Thompson claims, underlies both the modern 
subjectivist and objectivist theories of colour - the subjectivist will claim 
colour is to be identified with some aspect of the perceiver’s sensation, 
whereas the objectivist will wish to define colour in terms of properties of the 
distal object. Whatever component is accentuated, Thompson says the 
overarching framework of the received view is one expressing a 
representationalist inclination. 
 
Thompson isolates the tension between objectivism and subjectivism about 
colour to be (one of) the main philosophical problem(s) pertaining to colour 
vision. Within the basic model described above (object, perceived to be 
coloured + light + subject, doing the perceiving), there is a lack of 
consensus about which component deserves ontological primacy. The two 
extremes of what is a continuum containing many different intermediate 
positions, are objectivism and subjectivism. 
 
-objectivism: colour is a property of objects, for instance surface spectral 
reflectanceNOTE 19. This position is defended by Alex Byrne and David 
Hilbert: 'physicalism - reflectance physicalism, in particular - has the 
resources to deal with common objections, and can be smoothly integrated 
with much empirical work' (Byrne and Hilbert 2003) 
 
-subjectivism: colour is an aspect of or generated in a perceiver's 
experience. A rather specific version of this position (eliminativist 
reductionism) is held by C.L. Hardin: 'We are to be eliminativists with 
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respect to color as a property of objects, but reductivists with respect to 
color experiences' (Hardin 1988) 
 
The problem is that neither objectivist theories, such as physicalism or 
dispositionalism, nor subjectivist theories are capable of telling the whole 
story about what colour isNOTE 20. Rather, each of the various positions 
appears to possess part of the puzzle: they each have their own subsection 
of what colour appears to be that they can explain best, but each position 
also has major shortcomings outside of their privileged explanatory region. 
 
Evan Thompson's alternate suggestion is to construct an enactivist (i.e.  
E( A )C), relational, ecological theory about colour. His theory is ecological 
because it attempts to explain colour as an aspect of the way a person 
stands in specific relations to his environment, and he intends this to be an 
attempt to progress beyond the objectivism-versus-subjectivism-debate. 
Thompson's very general (and hardly controversial) initial hypothesis about 
colour is, that: 
 
'color vision generates a relatively stable set of perceptual categories that 
can facilitate object identification and guide behaviour accordingly' 
(Thompson 2000). 
 
At the core of his way of finding a theory that can both align with this 
general guideline and transcend the standard objectivism vs. subjectivism 
dichotomy, Thompson's approach contains the thesis that colour is a 
relational property:  
 
'The basic thesis of the ecological view is that colours are properties that 
depend on both colour perceivers and their environments. Colours are not 
intrinsic to objects in the physical world (computational objectivism) or to 
neural processes in the visual system (neurophysiological subjectivism); 
rather, they are properties of the world taken in relation to the perceiver. 
Thus on the question of whether colours are intrinsic properties or relational 
properties, I side with the received view that they are relational. But unlike 
the received view, the relational position that I shall defend is distinctly 
ecological in the sense pioneered by the psychologist J. J. Gibson.' 
(Thompson 1995a, p. 177) 
 
The relational approach that Thompson supports is not new, and in fact 
exhibits close resemblance to standard dispositionalism (the object has a 
disposition to cause a colour experience of a particular kind in a suitable 
perceiver). As the quote above shows, Thompson adds the clause that an 
ontological account of colour should also be ecological. 
 
The term 'ecological' the way Thompson uses it has been imbued with 
meaning comprised of three elements: (1) Gibson's ecological vision, (2) 
comparative biology and (3) naturalism. 
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(1) Gibson's ecological vision: Thompson’s moderate dismissal of the 
theories of colour of the received view - which in some way, shape or form 
involve the internal representation of some external state of affairs - is 
grounded in his enactive approach to cognition, a relational and action-
oriented conceptual inclination with firm roots in J.J. Gibson’s ‘Ecological 
Approach To Visual Perception’ (1979). 
 
The basic argument Gibson develops contains the notion that a 
representationalist view of human cognition is inadequate - that is, a static 
abstraction in which a subject perceives (some aspect of) an object and 
forms an internal representation of said object after which a strategy might 
be devised to utilise or avoid this object, fundamentally misconceives the 
dynamic character of the agent/world-interaction. The perception of 
something in the environment is direct and unmediated, and in its very 
essence geared towards existing in the coherence of possibilities and 
constraints instantiated in the ecological dynamic. Perception, on this 
account, is not in its basic form a stationary affair, but occurs in ambient or 
even ambulatory situations in which the way the environment appears 
changes constantly, and the knowledge distilled from this dynamic 
converges on invariant-extraction, the awareness of constants and their 
interrelatedness from the ambient optic array. 
 
A central concept coined by Gibson is 'affordance'NOTE 21, that constellation 
of possibilities for action evoked by an object or organism in its coherence 
with the perceiver. A tree, to a bird, would offer the affordances of a source 
of fruit to eat, a place to build a nest, a place to hide from larger birds that 
might prey on it, and so on, while the same tree would posit to a human the 
affordance of shade from the sun, or fuel for his fires, and perhaps also fruit 
to assuage his hunger. Perception, then, is not simply the passive reception 
of sensory stimuli, but the active appraisal of possibilities for action - the 
world is not a Cartesian res extensa filled with extended things one might 
decide to use or not, but the layout of the environment and everything in it 
are already significant to the perceiver. This means some type of inference 
towards an apprension of usefulness from the impressions the perceiver 
collects is not needed - this is exactly the kind of internal representation 
Gibson argues against. 
  
So, representationalism, according to Gibson's approach, fails to provide an 
adequate account of perceptual processes due to the fact it requires 
information coming from the objects to be modified, for instance by ‘filling-in’ 
mechanisms contained within the sensory system. Here, there is an 
explanatory gap between the physics of the object and the physiology of the 
perceiver. 
 
Direct perception, in contrast, merely posits a resonance of the sensory 
apparatus with information provided by the distal object, thereby avoiding 
addition or subtraction of information by the perceiver’s senses. In 
Gibsonian theories, speaking of an explanatory gap between physiology 
and psychology is rendered erroneous akin to commiting a category 
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mistake. For his ecological account, Thompson tones down this result 
somewhat, but it does provide at least some of the thrust of his argument 
(which will be summarised below). 
 
However, this latter gap does again pose a problem for the 
representationalist, and this schism is possibly bigger than the physics – 
physiology divide: at some point, there is supposed to be a transformation 
from a physical and objective stimulus into a mental and subjective percept, 
and this change involves the attribution of meaning to intrinsically 
meaningless signals. In the theory of direct perception, an affordance (as 
the ecological object of an organism’s perception) simply is defined as 
intrinsically expressing meaning and utility for that organism. 
 
Summarising, the Gibsonian component of Thompson's theory of colour 
states there is a co-attunement of animal and environment. The animal is 
understood to be an active explorer rather than a decontextualised 
stimulus-receptor, and the world is not merely a space filled with objects, 
but a lived-in environment. This means that Thompson's theory of colour 
perception aligns most explicitly with theories involving situatedness (colour 
emerges due to the interaction of animal and world, and their respective 
properties) and enaction (colour perception is an active process of 
exploration). 
 
Fodor and Pylyshyn (1981), interpret the ecological theory of perception as 
wishing to offer a theory not just of perception as such, but of cognitive 
processes in general (which would be a factor of importance in the 
interaction with affordances). They claim that, by its inordinate focus on 
perception, Gibson's project woefully underestimates the importance of 
constructing a representation-free theory of intentionality (the context in 
which the affordances would be illuminated, at the very least in the case of 
human perception) if one wishes to do away with representation as a factor 
in cognition. After all, they say, perceiving simpliciter is an extensional 
relation, whereas cognitive relations - seeing as, for instance - is intentional, 
and, on the standard account, as such requires some measure of mental 
representation to perform the interpretation-task. One can see an object, 
but this is a rather different state to be in than seeing said object as 
signifying this or that, or this object being in possession of some property or 
other, to an important extent because such a relation is dependent on one's 
idiosyncratic array of background knowledge, concerns, needs and wishes 
at a particular moment. Fodor and Pylyshyn wish to deny that the directness 
of perception extends to an apprehension of affordances, and stress the 
need for active (cognitive, representational) analysis involving intentionality 
in such cases. They do not claim it would be impossible to develop a theory 
of intentionality in which representation would be absent, they merely note 
Gibson does not offer a solution to the problem, which renders his theory 
incomplete, at the very least, and possibly fundamentally flawed in its 
overwhelming allocation of importance to the process of perception in itself. 
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Gibson would be able to object that on his account, perception cannot be 
severed from the action in which it is embedded - on the contrary, 
perception is defined as perceptually guided activity. Thompson explicitly 
endorses this view, on which it is claimed an organism does not merely 
perceive, after which this input is transferred to some internal processing 
unit, but acts and reacts (displays perceptuomotor adjustments) in a 
dynamic dance with his environment. This entails perception is something 
that does not take place in the brain, but a process that is instantiated in the 
organism as a whole, in the interplay of physical processes of perception 
and correlating movement, yielding a shift in vantage point from which a 
different array of possible perceptions emerges, necessitating some 
muscular response, and so on. 
 
(2) comparative biology: Thompson's theory of colour is intended to apply 
not merely to humans, but to all livings being who can guide their behaviour 
based on chromatic perception. Because members of other species might 
have different types of eyes which are sensitive to other wavelength ranges 
than the human eye, or they might use their kind of colour vision to detect 
different properties of the distal scene than humans, this has consequences 
for the kind of property 'colour' can be claimed to be. 
 
(3) naturalism: with his ecological account of colour, Thompson strives to 
capitalise upon the advantages afforded by the Gibsonian viewpoint (a 
bridge across the subject-object gap), but resting on a decidedly naturalistic 
foundation – that is, incorporating the latest knowledge gained in the 
relevant scientific fields. Therefore, he explicitly enlists the aid of scientific 
data from fields as diverse as neurophysiology, ethology, phenomenology 
and computational vision. With these tools, he hopes to transcend the 
subjective / objective-tension of the received view. 
 
4.5.2 - The Evolutionary Adaptation to Illuminant Invariants 
 
One of Evan Thompson's targets (in particular in Thompson 1995a and 
1995b) is Roger Shepard, and his ecologically inspired theory pertaining to 
colour vision. This is interesting: Shepard, calls his theory about colour 
'ecological', just like Thompson, but still they appear to suggest two 
diametrically opposed accounts of what colour is supposed to be. That is, 
Shepard suggests a computational approach, which is exactly the kind of 
view Thompson argues against. One objective of this section is to compare 
these two views. 
 
But before that, I will offer a brief description of Shepard's ideas. Over the 
course of decades, Shepard has built a case for the co-evolution of animal 
and certain structural aspects of the environment, to yield what he calls 
'perceptual-cognitive universals' (Shepard 1987, 2001). In the case of 
colour, his main claim is that, over the course of evolution, the chromatic 
vision system has become attuned to large-scale invariants in the optic 
array. Using the Linear Models FrameworkNOTE 22 for support, he says 
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(human) trichromacy is a reflection of the three degrees of freedom of 
terrestrial illumination. 
 
In broad terms, the account of colour vision which can be said to underlie 
Shepard's theory about the perceptual organisation of colours is the 
following: colour vision serves to gather stable and accurate information 
about the environment based on the chromatic composition of the light 
despite changes in luminance, and this information may be used to guide 
behaviour. If you deconstruct this description, you see all the familiar 
components of the received view as Thompson described it: there's a 
coloured object and a perceiving subject, the colour of the object provides 
information to the organism, and that information makes a behavioural 
difference (a food-coloured patch is something we might want to approach, 
a predator-coloured patch is not). An essential additional thesis is that the 
re-identification of some object based on colour requires an animal to 
exhibit some kind of colour constancy. 
 
Computationalist approaches to explaining colour vision understand colour 
constancy to be a central feature of colour vision: it is the ability to identify 
some object as having a particular colour under a wide variety of 
illumination conditions (despite the light reflected by, say, a white object 
under a red lamp being essentially the same as a red[-dish] object under a 
white lamp). In functional terms, the purpose of colour vision would be to 
extract some invariant from the perceived scene - the physical structure 
identified to be that invariant is the object’s surface spectral reflectance (see 
figure 5). 
 
 
[Figure 5: Computational model of Colour Constancy (elimination of the 
effects of ambient light from the retinal input yields an estimate of the 
object's Surface Spectral Reflectance)] 
 
 63 
The problem of explaining how the visual system would accomplish such a 
feat is the 'inverse optics'-problem. Thompson et al. (1992) describe the 
problem in its general form as: ‘the recovery of what are taken to be 
objective attributes of three-dimensional scenes from ambiguous two-
dimensional projections‘. 
 
In the case of colour vision, the problem takes the following form: "Because 
the retinal activity from a given point hopelessly confounds the illumination 
with the reflectance properties of surfaces, the core problem is to 
disentangle these variables and assign colours that correlate with surface 
properties. (...) In the case of color vision, the problem is to discard the 
source illuminant E and retain the invariant spectral reflectances ! of object 
surfaces given only the retinal activity S" (Thompson et al. 1992). 
 
Historically, an important strategy utilised in computational approaches to 
this underconstrained problem is to introduce constraints - in the case of 
colour vision, the main strategy is to use low-dimensional models of light 
and reflectances. An application of this idea is the aforementioned Linear 
Models Framework (LMF) - the basics of this model are described in 
Wandell (1989). His central thesis is that both ambient light and an object’s 
SSR can be described by linear models containing the weighted sums of a 
very limited number of basis functions (as explained in note 22). 
 
With the spectral sensitivities of the chromatic receptors (for humans, the 
three types of cones), it is possible to formulate a reasonably simple 
equation expressing photoreceptor response as related to the distal surface 
properties and the illumination. A weighted sum of a limited number of basis 
functions suffices to describe all relevant variations of naturally occuring 
illuminants and SSR’s - perfect colour constancy can be achieved if the 
number of degrees of freedom of the reflectance equals the number of 
sensor types minus 1. 
 
The basic setup for which this model attempts to specify the appropriate 
relations in terms of equations, consists of the components ambient lighting, 
an object with a specific SSR and the perceiver with specific chromatic 
receptor sensitivities. What the model needs to find is an estimate of the 
object’s reflectance properties. 
 
Maloney (1992) claims that if certain assumptions are satisfied, LMF's 
algorithms will result in predictions of the object's surface properties, i.e. 
exhibit (perfect) colour constancy: any variations in ambient lighting 
conditions are 'filtered out' to yield information about the object's chromatic 
surface properties. One of the most important of these assumptions is that 
the number of receptor types is at least one greater than the number of 
degrees of freedom of the surface reflectance: there should not be more 
unknown variables than measurements (sensor types), so if the ambient 
lighting is one unknown, the human (trichromatic) visual system will be able 
to uniquely recover SSRs (i.e. exhibit perfect colour constancy) in situations 
with at most two degrees of freedom. This way, LMF enables specification 
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of the kinds of situations in which colour constancy is achieved by a 
particular perceptual system, and if it is not, what kind of non-constancy is 
occurrent. The range of cases in which constancy is occurrent for a given 
system can include greatly divergent sets of lighting, reflectance types and 
(perceived) colours. This range is said to comprise the collection of 
privileged environments of lighting conditions and surfaces for said visual 
system. 
 
LMF was introduced in Maloney and Wandell (1986). Their justification for 
the assumption daylight has three degrees of freedom was derived from 
Judd, MacAdam and Wyszecki (1964). In this article, Judd and associates 
attempted to demonstrate that a satisfyingly accurate estimate of the 
spectral power distribution of daylight can be provided by the linear 
weighted sum of a limited number of basis functions (as few as three). The 
basis functions are orthogonal, meaning they represent independent 
degrees of freedom of the light; and the order in which the basis functions 
are derived corresponds to their proportionate contribution to the overall 
variability of the light. 
  
From examining daylight measurements from various parts of the world, 
they found that the first most common basis function is the yellow-blue 
variation, corresponding to variations in cloudiness and ratio of direct 
sunlight. The second basis function expressed a pink-green variation, the 
variation corresponding to the water vapour content of the atmosphere. 
They determined the scalar multiples necessary to match these basis 
functions with a number of correlated colour temperatures, and found that 
three basis functions with the appropriate multiplicative factors offered a 
surprisingly good fit to spectral distributions that had been measured 
directly. 
 
There have been many research projects to provide additional empirical 
justification of these claims regarding the structural components of daylight. 
These projects endeavour to ascertain what those structural components - if 
there are in fact any - might be. Wachtler, Lee and Sejnowski (2001) and 
Lee, Wachtler and Sejnowski (2002) describe such a projectNOTE 23, 
suggesting post-receptoral opponent processing is a highly efficient way to 
encode chromatic information, results that are compatible with the theses 
Shepard endorses. 
 
Some additional physiological support for the claims made so far (about the 
'filtering' of light in such a way that its structural components can, on some 
functional level, be distinguished) can be found in Van Hateren and Van der 
Schaaf (1998). In this paper it is suggested that if the function of simple 
cells (in macaque primary visual cortex) is to dissolve the linear 
superposition of signals that comprise an image into its independent 
component parts, certain properties of those cells should align with 
statistical properties of the environmentNOTE 24. 
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The central role of colour constancy in accounts such as the one described 
above has been criticised by several commentators, who claim that human 
colour constancy is decidedly poor (see e.g. Reeves, 1992). However, 
much of this counterevidence relies on tests involving test subject 
performance measurements with randomly chosen lighting conditions. 
Maloney therefore counters that finding results that indicate colour 
constancy for humans lies (significantly) below optimal levels in such 
experiments is not surprising: even if some visual system were to instantiate 
an LMF-type algorithm (and therefore exhibit perfect colour constancy 
across a particular range), randomly picking lighting and reflectance 
conditions to test that system's ability to achieve colour constancy is not 
likely to uncover the contours of its privileged environment, and will 
probably yield the conclusion that the system is not colour constant at all, or 
perhaps only approximately so in some cases. Compare an alien scientist 
using randomly picked wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation to 
determine whether a human test specimen can detect these. The band of 
visible light (for a human) is narrow, compared to the totality of possible 
wavelengths, so if the alien uses the entire electromagnetic spectrum to 
pick random samples from, the experiments are not likely to yield the 
information that for the 400 nm to 700 nm range, humans perform relatively 
well. 
 
Shepard assumes that the LMF-model provides an appropriately close 
approximation of the process that yields colour constancy, and uses it to 
buttress his claims about the evolutionary basis for the properties of colour 
vision (Shepard, 1992a). He says the human visual system is able to 
recover reflectance and thereby achieve colour constancy (obviously within 
particular limits) because in evolution the trivariance of said system has 
adapted to the three degrees of freedom of terrestrial light. These three 
dimensions are light-dark (mid-day sunlight vs. moonless night or deep 
shade), red-green (light direct from the low sun, rich in long-wavelengths vs. 
said light-type as filtered by water-vapour-rich atmosphere) and yellow-blue 
(Rayleigh-scattering; light poor in short wavelengths in direct solar 
illumination vs. light rich in short wavelengths if object is blocked from direct 
sunlight but light scattered by clear sky falls on it). These three 'axes' are 
found to line up with those of perceptual colour space, which contains 
exactly the light-dark, red-green and blue-yellow opponencies (see section 
3.2 for a more elaborate explanation of opponency). 
 
All this provides some empirical support for Shepard's assertions, or at least 
for their tenor; the precision of fit of perceptual opponent axes and the 
degrees of freedom of daylight are a matter of some controversy. However, 
additional clues are to be found in the report of Delahunt and Brainard 
(2003) on their own experiments (which is in the same line of research as 
Judd et al. (1964)): 
 
"The primary purpose of the experiments reported here was to assess 
whether the visual system’s adjustment to changes in illuminant (relative to 
a neutral illuminant) depends on the color direction of the illuminant change. 
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This question is of interest, since an analysis of the distribution of natural 
daylights indicates that some illuminant changes are much more likely to 
occur than others." (Delahunt and Brainard, 2003) 
 
This is where we would need to locate the relevance of the claims Shepard 
makes: the components of typical daylight, the degrees of freedom of 
daylight corresponding to the three basis functions, are axes along which 
illuminant changes are most likely to occur. A visual system evolving to 
achieve the best results in such an environment would, in all likelihood, 
operate in such a way that its output space mirrors said three-dimensional 
structure. The suggestion that this is the default state does not preclude the 
possibility that some (or even many) species acquire additional 
representational dimensionsNOTE 25. 
 
4.5.3 - The Ecological Hybrid Theory? 
 
My suggestion is that Thompson and Shepard do not exclude eachother, 
but rather complement eachother quite nicely, yielding a hybrid theory of 
sorts. The way to elucidate this claim is by focusing on the function of colour 
vision. Both computational objectivists (such as Shepard) and Thompson 
speak of ‘the function’ of colour vision. Thompson says: 
 
"I argue that the biological function of colour vision is not to detect surface 
reflectance, but to provide a set of perceptual categories that can apply to 
objects in a stable way in a variety of conditions. Comparative research 
indicates that both the perceptual categories and the distal stimuli will differ 
according to the animal and its visual ecology; therefore externalism and 
objectivism must be rejected." (Thompson1995b) 
 
Shepard, on the contrary, would say that it is the function of the visual 
system to extract information about chromatic invariants from the distal 
scene. There is a deep-rooted ambiguity in the concept 'function' which 
feeds this conflict. However, I will argue that the two ways in which Shepard 
and Thompson understand and develop their notion of the function of colour 
vision can be complementary rather than mutually exclusive. I will maintain 
that these two accounts need eachother, that their dialectic might yield a 
better theory. 
 
Wouters (2004) describes how Mayr (1961) engendered the opinion that 
(evolutionary) biology is to be distinguished from the other natural sciences 
based on its predilection and unique ability to ask and answer the ‘why’-
questions. On this view, one of those other natural sciences (i.e. the ones 
merely asking the ‘how’-questions) is functional biology, described as a 
reductionist discipline borrowing heavily from physics and chemistry. 
 
‘How’-questions are answered by providing a mechanical description of 
some process, betraying a reductionist inclination amongst those who use 
this approach. ‘Why’-questions are typically answered by reconstructing the 
chain of events of evolutionary history. 
 67 
 
Pertaining to the function of colour vision, Thompson and Shepard fall on 
opposite sides of the ambiguity associated with the term 'function', and I 
claim that a great deal of the tension between these two evolutionary 
accounts of colour vision is due to this difference in interpretation. 
Thompson asks the biological/evolutionary 'why'-question, whereas 
Shepard asks the physical/evolutionary 'how'-question.  
 
It does not make sense to ask the ‘why’-question about lifeless physical 
objects (they do not acquire their characteristics through a selection 
history), and this is exactly Thompson's main point: as part of his Gibsonian 
inclination, he will claim it will not do to view a perceiving animal as nothing 
more than a physical object. However, there is nothing wrong with 
maintaining the physical perspective as part of a theory. Thompson should 
concede on this point, considering his naturalism: apart from the physical 
perspective deserving a part in a finalised ecological theory of colour, it 
makes sense to use the knowledge of physics as a methodological tool. In 
the end, the location of the label 'colour' might be a matter of convention, 
and in that decision-process, the pragmatics of the physical viewpoint might 
be a crucial factor, even if we shy away from scientific realism and merely 
adopt an instrumentalist perspective. 
 
But now I am moving too fast. Returning to Thompson, it is possible to see 
that he reaches a similar (though weaker) conclusion at the end of his 
(1995b), when he redefines colour constancy (he suggests a category 
constancy rather than hue constancy), and claims that this way, the 
constancy phenomenon does play a major role in colour vision, and should 
be important to any theory of colour: 
 
"I have argued that colour vision does not represent the world; rather, it 
presents the world to the animal by categorizing physically disparate stimuli 
into perceptual equivalence classes. Clearly such categorization is useful 
for the animal and so can reasonably be expected to play numerous further 
biological and ecological roles. (...) In any case, whether it is due to natural 
selection and/or other types of evolutionary factors, colour constancy in the 
sense discussed here figures largely in human colour vision and probably 
does so in the visual ecology of other colour-seeing animals." 
  
Note the use of the term 'biological role' – this is not a neutral composite 
term, as Wouters' (2004) definition demonstrates: 
 
"The biological role of an item or activity is the way in which it contributes to 
an activity or capacity of a larger system." (Wouters 2004) 
 
Unpacking this concept, he specifies an overview of the kinds of questions 
habitually asked in organismal biology. He says that an item or behavioural 
pattern's function is defined in terms of... 
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"(1) the form and activity of that item or behavior (description) 
(2) its biological roles,  
(3) the causes and underlying mechanisms resulting in the performance of 
those roles (Tinbergen's 'causation'),  
(4) the biological value of that item or behavior having the character it has 
and of the performance of that role (Tinbergen's 'survival value'),  
(5) the development of that item or behavior in the course of the ontogeny 
(Tinbergen's 'ontogeny'),  
(6) the origin and modification of that item or behavior in the course of the 
evolution (Tinbergen's 'evolution')." (Wouters 2004) 
 
My suggestion is that for colour, answers to these question-domains will 
look like this: 
 
(1*) a description of the visual system in physiological and neurological 
terms; 
(2*) a behavioural explanation: how does the organism use colour vision?; 
(3*) by what mechanism does the visual system perform the function 
belonging to its role as specified under (2*)? There are two kinds: 
explanations in terms of cause and in terms of mechanism. 
(3*a) causal: reconstructing the causal chain of stimuli and 
 responses; 
(3*b) mechanistic: describing the functioning of the whole in terms 
 of its parts; 
(4*) specification of the survival utility of colour vision: 
(4*a) why is it useful for an organism to possess colour vision? 
(4*b) additional question: why is it useful to have that particular kind 
 of colour vision - say, tetrachromacy as opposed to trichromacy?; 
(5*) a description of the ontogenetic development of the visual system; 
(6*) a description of the phylogenetic evolution of the visual system. 
 
The Linear Models Framework provides a functional answer to (1*). 
Shepard does this by first suggesting the hypothesis that LMF is capable of 
providing an answer to (3*a) (e.g. describing the mechanism involved in 
colour constancy), and based on this answer he tries to find answers to 
(4*b) (an organism has become attuned to large-scale invariants in the optic 
array; for humans, this would help explain their trichromacy) and perhaps 
the first steps towards an answer to (6*) (by pointing out ecological 
contraints to the evolution of the visual system, in terms of the degrees of 
freedom of terrestrial light). 
 
Thompson, rather, starts out at (2*), by wondering what the ecological 
function of colour vision might be for a wide variety of species, and he 
answers that question by stating an animal should exhibit behaviourally 
relevant colour category constancy. The Comparative Hypothesis can then 
be a natural response to the great variety of answers to (3*b) in different 
animals (even if only because of divergent retinal dimensionality across 
humans), which enables Thompson to formulate a response to the more 
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general (4*a), for instance by referring to the work of Mollon (see section 
3.6.3), in a sense coming full circle to (2*). 
 
It is clear Shepard and Thompson are asking and answering different (sub-) 
questions concerning the function and functioning of colour vision. 
Therefore, it is not surprising their accounts appear to diverge on a number 
of essential issues. However, it is quite interesting to see how together they 
cover almost the entire spectrum of possible questions about the function of 
colour vision: as explained above, Shepard's theory touches upon (1*), 
(3*a), (4*b) and (6*), whereas Thompson's account concerns (2*), (3*b) and 
(4*a). 
 
If we take a look at the different meanings of ‘function’, we see a similar 
division of labour as the one highlighted above. Wouters (2003) 
distinguishes four kinds of function: 
 
"(1) function as activity (function1), (2) function as biological role (function2), 
(3) function as biological advantage (function3), and (4) function as selected 
effect (function4). Function1 (activity) refers to what an item does by itself; 
function2 (biological role) refers to the contribution of an item or activity to a 
complex activity or capacity of an organism; function3 (biological advantage) 
refers to the value for the organism of an item having a certain character 
rather than another; function4 (function as selected effect) refers to the way 
in which a trait acquired and maintained its current share in the population." 
 
Applying these distinctions to the colour case, we can see that Shepard 
defines (4) in terms of his answer to (1): (human) trichromacy was selected 
for in evolution because it offered sufficiently reliable colour constancy in 
the face of the specific structure of environmental illumination. Thompson 
focuses on (2) by posing (3) as a question with a deeply relativistic answer: 
the fact that different animals in different niches can possess different kinds 
of colour vision has certain implications for the role that colour can be said 
to play in an animal's interaction with its environment. 
 
The above shows that the range of the kinds of questions of one 
complements the range of the other’s investigation into the subject matter in 
a rather interesting fashion. The first thing we still need to do is to 
demonstrate how Shepard’s functionalist line of reasoning could be relevant 
to a question of ecological role - if this can be done, the two approaches 
could possibly be seen to coagulate into a useful hybrid theory. 
 
Once more taking a look at Wouters (2004), he argues that functional 
biology, with its descriptions of the workings of organs and other biological 
components, is not un-biological in the way evolutionary biologists might 
claim it is (which would be because of its reductionism). Rather, the 
functional investigative path allows us to understand the contributions of the 
various organs to the organism’s life state - that is, the functioning of the 
parts in the context of their contributions to the continued existence of the 
organism as a whole. 
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If we look at the four interpretations of the notion ‘function’ again and parse 
them in terms relevant to the issue of ecological colour, Shepard’s answer 
to (1), understood as an explanation of the contributions of the animal's 
various subsystems (the chromatic aspect of the visual system, in this case) 
to the organism's life state, might yield the basis of an answer to (2). In 
other words, if we use a functionalistic answer to the question ‘how does 
colour vision work?’, we might construct the theoretical and methodological 
framework with which to look for an answer to the question ‘why does 
organism X have a colour vision system of type Y?’. 
 
To understand how this entanglement of the accounts of Shepard and 
Thompson might come about, we need to return to the quote used at the 
beginning of this section: 
 
"I argue that the biological function of colour vision is not to detect surface 
reflectance, but to provide a set of perceptual categories that can apply to 
objects in a stable way in a variety of conditions. Comparative research 
indicates that both the perceptual categories and the distal stimuli will differ 
according to the animal and its visual ecology; therefore externalism and 
objectivism must be rejected." (Thompson1995b) 
 
Thompson advocates a kind of colour category constancy here. Now, this 
acceptance of constancy is in itself already an interesting cross-pollination 
with what computational objectivists are attempting to do. But, there is 
more. 
 
Thompson’s Gibsonian inclination might have serious consequences for 
what he means by ‘stimuli’ in the above quote. If Thompson understands 
the stimulus to be detected as an affordance (which his insistence on colour 
categories as modes of presentation rather than the computational 
objectivist’s representation (1995b) does suggest), this would have a 
serious consequence. Such a choice by Thompson will fail to help him 
discredit the possibility that the actual mechanism that yields the chromatic 
experience utilises SSR (or the related notion 'productance', as suggested 
by Byrne and Hilbert, 2005) and colour constancy. This point once more 
rests on the ambiguity of the notion ‘function’, and how Thompson asks a 
very specific and one-sided question, for which Shepard provides the 
(equally one-sided!) counterpart. Therefore, it might be the case a story like 
Thompson's actually needs a story like Shepard's for a complete story 
about colour vision, and vice versa.  
 
4.6 - Towards Colour Concepts 
 
I have taken quite a bit of time to make a very important point. I wanted to 
show how properties of the agent and properties of the environment are 
fundamentally entangled - co-attuned - to collectively yield colour-
discriminating behaviour. Objective properties of the environment (e.g. the 
structure of terrestrial illumination) and objective properties of the agent 
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(e.g. his retinal dimensionality), together with the way these properties 
relate to eachother via the agent's actions, are all essential to a complex 
interaction dynamic of affordances and effectivities. 
 
Expanding upon the classification into various domains hinted at in section 
3.5, one way to depict this interrelatedness of agent and world is in the 
following, simple diagram: 
 
 [Figure 6: interrelatedness of agent and physical world] 
 
That is, the biomechanical properties of the agent as they change over time 
(dM/dt), in interaction with physical properties of the environment as they 
change over time (dP/dt), can, at some level of detail, be described as 
behaviour (i.e. the change of behavioural patterns over time, dB/dt). This 
behavioural description can be expressed in terms of a behavioural space, 
as a higher-dimensional version of the movement planning field utilised by 
Thelen et al. (2001). The discussion about ecological colour perception can 
be understood as an attempt to provide a qualitative specification of how 
these agent-properties and physical environment-properties hang together, 
at least in the case of colour perception. 
 
However, certain rather important aspects are missing from the ecological 
story about colour perception. One essential factor that does not appear to 
fit into the ecological story is the socio-cultural structure we are immersed 
in. This is odd, because from an enactivist perspective, or even from a 
broadly E( i )C viewpoint, it would appear prudent to include such things as 
language and social structure in the suite of meaningful scaffolds which (at 
least human) agents help co-constitute, and by which they are influenced in 
a profound manner. In other words, my claim is that a theory of E( i )C 
cannot afford to remain silent about the affordance-effectivityNOTE 26 push-
pull-system involving socio-cultural practices of which each human agent is 
a part, and which does not, at first glance, appear to be fundamentally 
different from the affordance-effectivity push-pull-system involving agentive 
and environmental properties (at least in structural terms). The discussion 
about socio-linguistic influences on colour phenomenology (in section 4.3) 
provides clues to solve the other half of the puzzle. 
 
That is, the ecologically inclined theories of Thompson and Shepard on 
colour perception contribute to an E( i )C-appropriate characterisation of 
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agent-environment interaction (at least to the extent that this interaction 
involves colour, but I assume the general case is appropriately analogous). 
The idea in section 4.5 was to demonstrate how properties of the animal are 
attuned to properties of the external world, hence how both these sets of 
properties collectively yield the animal's colour-perception-based interaction 
dynamic with its surroundings. This is exactly the point of figure 6, depicted 
above. 
 
On the other hand, the ideas to be derived from the discussion about colour 
language and culture involve the co-attunement of agent and socio-cultural 
environment. Depicted in a diagram like the one above, this looks as 
follows: 
 
 [Figure 7: interrelatedness of agent and social world] 
 
That is, the biomechanical properties of the agent as they change over time 
(dM/dt), in interaction with socio-culturally determined properties of the 
environment as they change over time (dS/dt), can, at some level of detail, 
be described as behaviour (i.e. the change of behavioural patterns over 
time, dB/dt). This behavioural description can be expressed in terms of a 
behavioural space, as a higher-dimensional version of the movement 
planning field utilised by Thelen et al. (2001). Section 4.3 can be 
understood as an attempt to provide a qualitative specification of how these 
agent-properties and social environment-properties hang together, at least 
in the case of colour perception. Chapter five below will contain a more 
elaborate exploration of the factors depicted in this schema. 
 
There is a very important point to be made about the idea that the 
Thompson/Shepard-hybrid and the theories involving the linguistic 
anthropology of colour are to fit together: Thompson's Gibsonian inclination 
in particular suggests a very specific role for the notion that phenomenal 
colour space has a structure. This structure should be understood not as a 
representational structure of the cognitivist kind (i.e. an internal 
representation of external events), but as an expression of behavioural 
responses ('B' in the schemata above) to environmental prompts ('P'), 
based on a particular physiological tendency ('M'; e.g. the ways in which the 
visual system worksNOTE 27) plus sociocultural constraints ('S'; e.g. the fact 
that linguistic rules or social customs force behaviour in a particular 
direction). The status of 'representation' in E( i )C-based descriptions of this 
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kind will be discussed in chapter 7; for now, the main idea to take away 
from this discussion is that the integration of talk of 'phenomenal structure' 
into the theory of concepts I am currently building need not imply 
cognitivism. 
 
The basic idea developed in the past chapter aligns, in some sense, with 
George Lakoff's description of what he understands 'colour' to be: 
 
"Color categories result from the world plus human biology plus a cognitive 
mechanism that has some characteristics of fuzzy set theory plus a culture 
specific choice of which basic color categories there are" (Lakoff 1987) 
 
Apart from certain aspects of this claim that I take issue with ('cognitive 
mechanism' and 'fuzzy set theory' in particular - see chapter 7 about the 
former, sections 6.11.2 about the latter point), the main problem with the 
'explanation' in this quote is its profound opacity: it sounds great, but what 
does it mean? The comparison of the ideas of Thompson and Shepard 
above provided a few clues about the 'the world plus human biology' bit, the 
discussion about culture-centric colour language involved topics is in line 
with Lakoff's 'cognitive mechanism' and 'culture specific choice'. 
 
There is still some work to be done to determine what these ideas, leading 
to the subsequent discussion of what this might signify for a cognition-
based agent-environment interaction dynamic (rather than 'merely' 
perception-based, as in the foregoing). The next chapter will be devoted to 
providing a more detailed description of the structure and development of 
colour space, in a way that is useful to the subsequent expansion of this 
idea into a theory about concepts. 
 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
 
[SUMMARY of chapter 4 AND PREVIEW] 
 
The standard account of colour perception involves a phenomenal structure 
that is defined in three dimensions (brightness, saturation and hue), as 
derived from behavioural responses to environmental prompts, and 
informed by the properties of the human retina and the subsequent neural 
processing of chromatic stimuli. This behavioural manifestation includes a 
cultural and linguistic aspect: different languages do not contain the same 
number of basic colour terms, despite the universality of the neural 
substrate. Critics of this received view, often supporters of linguistic 
relativism, tend to draw attention to the fact that this view is guilty of severe 
decontextualisation: in several 'primitive' cultures, the basic colour words 
which express basic colour categories are not neutral labels, but rather 
include many other semantic aspects. That is, there are sociocultural 
environmental influences in play as well. 
 
Based on these considerations, I defend an intermediate position which 
underlines the importance of both a pan-species neurophysiologically-
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based tendency towards certain categorizations and the importance of 
sociocultural influences. This view suggests that there is a connection 
between basic sensorimotor contingencies and higher-order sociocultural 
regularities. That is: that basic three-dimensional phenomenal structure 
which describes the behavioural responses as informed by 
neurophysiological properties should be expanded to include more complex 
behavioural responses as informed by sociocultural properties. 
 
If these ideas are combined with the dynamical movement planning field as 
a description of basic enactive behaviour from chapter 3, this yields the first 
notion of a more complex behavioural space, which in the chapters to come 
will be described more extensively, and transformed into a conceptual 
space. 
 
But first: there is a third influential realm of properties, apart from the 
neurophysiological (body-based) and sociocultural (social environment-
based) properties mentioned above: physical environmental properties. In 
this past chapter, we have seen that a promising enactive account of colour 
perception (the one by Evan Thompson) can be augmented with an 
ecological theory of colour perception which focuses on the idea that there 
is a congruence of a perceiving agent's retinal properties and environmental 
regularities, namely the chromatic structure of the optic array (Roger 
Shepard's view). This idea suggests that there is a mutual attunement - of 
agent and environment - which helps determine the agent's perceptual and 
behavioural possibilities. This agent-physical environment-interaction can 
be combined with the agent-social environment interaction (both of which 
depend to an important extent on the agent's embodied properties), to 
provide a fairly well-rounded description of the structure of the agent's  
E( i )C-related behaviour. 
 
That is: the enactive/situatedness-notion itself suggests the relevance of 
social (in addition to ecological/environmental) affordances in explaining the 
behaviour of an agent; the universalist linguistic account of 'colour-cognition' 
runs the risk of decontextualisation, so a moderate relativism (the 
involvement of sociocultural factors to ameliorate the body-based properties 
of the agent) is needed. Both of these approaches combined cover the 
entirety of the agent-environment interaction dynamic. In chapter 5, the 
properties of the basic colour space will be explored further, in preparation 
of the introduction of conceptual space in chapter 6. 
 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
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[5 - The Structure of Concepts] 
 
5.1 - Progressive Segmentation Of Colour Space 
 
In the coming sections, I will describe ideas by Kimberly Jameson about the 
structure of phenomenal colour space, and the ways in which this structure 
can develop to accomodate changes in a person's linguistic apprehension 
of colours. These ideas will help characterise the interaction of an agent 
with his socially constructed environment - the second component (after the 
interrelatedness of agent and physical world, depicted in figure 6, section 
4.6) of the full E( i )C-appropriate story about an agent's interaction with his 
environment. After this, in chapter 6 and on, I will use these ideas to 
develop a more general story about the properties of conceptual space. 
 
In an earlier section (4.3), I offered a description of the ideas of Berlin and 
Kay (1969) concerning the linguistic categorization of perceptual colour 
space. Their claim was that the influence of language and culture on colour 
perception was minimal: the locations of the hue foci in perceptual space 
are determined by physiology, and are roughly the same for all 'normal' 
humans. In essence, they can be said to claim that the Sapir-Whorf-thesis 
(which predicts the transformation of thought by linguistic structure) is 
incorrect. 
 
Opponents of this view (e.g. Saunders and Van Brakel, 1997) tend to 
accept the Sapir-Whorf-thesis, and one of the important points entered into 
the discussion on the basis of this adherence is that in many primitive 
languages, colour words are not user- and context-neutral in the way that 
English colour terms are.  
 
Recall (from section 4.3) that for the Hanunóo, and many other linguistic 
communities, words denoting colour-relevant information are necessarily 
linked to other properties - Hanunóo not only encode colorimetric 
information such as oppositions between light and dark, but also between 
dry and wet, or deep/unfading/desirable and pale/colourless/weak. If we 
were to depict this in a perceptual colour space, this would mean the 
expansion of that three-dimensional model with additional dimensions (in 
order to depict the parameters that specify the properties linked to such 
multireferential colour terms), to capture the semantic linkages and content-
ascriptions these people makeNOTE 28. 
 
This expansion of perceptual space with non-perceptual (or not-necessarily-
perceptual) properties can serve as a first step towards constructing a 
conceptual space: a topological, multidimensional space that depicts the 
concepts an agent possessesNOTE 29. This conceptual space will form an 
important component of my theory about concepts. I intend this theory to be 
E( i )C-compatible, and because (in classical cognitivist theories) concepts 
are considered to be the building blocks of thought (that is, including, or 
perhaps especially, 'higher' cognition), I submit my theory will also be, in 
some sense, a theory about higher cognition in an E( i )C framework. 
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Towards that end, this chapter will be dedicated to finding a proper theory of 
perceptual (and conceptual) space categorization. I will base such an 
account, in part, on Kimberly Jameson's 'Interpoint Distance Model-
Framework'. 
 
Jameson (2005) proposes to use, defined in order of prominence, a 
compound lightness - saturation - hue criterion as a basis of colour space 
segmentation, and she shows how a colour space segmentation 
mechanism can produce universal linguistic categorization tendencies 
despite differing psychophysical dimensionalities (for instance, di- or 
tetrachromatic humans). 
 
5.2 - The Interpoint Distance Model 
 
In her 2003 manuscript "Culture and Cognition: What is Universal about the 
Representation of Color Experience?", Kimberly Jameson describes a more 
evolved account of the ideas presented in her 1997 article together with 
Roy D'Andrade (see section 4.3 for a discussion). 
 
Her Interpoint Distance Model (IDM) framework involves a suite of 
mechanisms she claims to be involved in the cultural-linguistic 
segmentation of perceptual colour space. Her goal is to clarify the complex 
entanglement of the colour-related aspects of culture, cognition, language 
and neural processing. As an interesting side note, one that cements the 
relevance of this model to my own account, my goal in this book is the 
same, only in a broader context: I wish to clarify the complex entanglement 
of culture, cognition, language and biomechanical processes, within an E( i 
)C context. 
 
Jameson's account adheres to three premises: 
 
(1) the segmentation process is not fueled or determined by just hue 
salience; 
 
(2) regarding the determinants of phenomenal colour space, hue is not even 
the primary factor; instead, the lexical encoding occurs according to the 
ordered sequence [a] brightness, [b] saturation [c] hue; 
 
(3) cultural, linguistic and additional environmental factors may exert 
influence on the colour space segmentation evolution. 
 
The first thing to note about Jameson's approach is that she appears to 
start out at the default universalist position, stressing the importance of a 
particular organisation of perceptual space (per point (2) above, she claims 
hue is not the primary aspect, but there is a particular structure in place), 
and then adds a relationalist spin. 
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The second interesting aspect of IDM is the kind of argument provided in 
favour of point (3). This argumentation kicks off with the claim that the 
influence of variations in retinal sensory dimensionality (see section 4.1) 
should not be underestimated. Apart from the familiar brands of dichromacy 
(yielding what we call 'colour-blindness'), and aberrant versions of 
trichromacy (where the sensitivity spectra of one or more of the cones might 
stray from the norm), Jameson claims as much as 20% of Caucasian 
females might be retinal tetrachromats, or exhibit the genetic potential 
towards such increased receptor-dimensionality. This would mean that the 
people in which said potential is actually realised might be able to discern 
more colours than average trichromats, although this would be contingent 
upon the specifics of the post-retinal processing in these individuals. 
 
Now, if these variations in perceptual dimensionality can occur intra-
culturally, the question regarding the significant inter-cultural agreement on 
the linguistic segmentation of colour space (as defended by the 
universalists in the tradition of Berlin and Kay) presents itself once more 
with unprecedented force. 
 
Jameson theorises that the structure of our colour language exerts a 
converging force upon the relation between colour perceptions and colour 
terms in these anomalous colour perceivers. Despite the fact tetrachromats 
might be able to discern certain colour shades, they do not possess the 
words to label these novel perceptions. That is, because they are forced to 
live in a world geared towards trichromatic perceivers, with as a determining 
feature a trichromacy-based colour language, they have devised cognitive 
procedures to map their higher-dimensional colour perceptual space onto 
the coarser-grained linguistic structure of the trichromats. A similar strategy 
might be employed by other anomalous perceivers (such as dichromats), 
who would need to project their differently-structured perceptual space onto 
trichromatic linguistic space, with the use of an intermediate cognitive layer. 
 
The point to take note of here, which embodies the explanatory shift 
Jameson suggests is the component of her model that does the work, is the 
distinction between, on the one hand, the formation of a specific culture's 
colour lexicon, and, on the other hand, the way in which individuals within 
that culture use that lexicon. The latter aspect would then include the 
perception-to-lexicon-transformations already mentioned, as an expression 
of the dynamic linkage between these perceptual and lexical levels. 
 
Let us now take a closer look at the way Jameson uses the IDM framework 
to explain the processes of progressive segmentation of perceptual colour 
space. On pages 29-31 of her article, she proceeds to list a number of 
principles which her IDM framework proposes. Principle (1) is: 
 
"1. The cognitive dimensions (ordered by importance) Lightness, Saturation, 
and Hue are primitives in both individual and cultural color representations. 
However, Lightness and Saturation are of paramount importance in the 
initial stages of a culture’s color naming system." (Jameson 2005) 
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Jameson claims that the empirical data provided in support is compelling: at 
the very least, brightness is a factor of great importance in the early stages 
of evolutionary colour space categorization. Arguments in support of 
saturation as an independent contributing factor are less powerful: it turns 
out to be the case many test subjects find it difficult to uncouple brightness 
from saturation. 
 
Principle (2): 
 
"2. Cultural color naming systems and categories develop through 
successive partitioning of an idealized normative color appearance space 
on the basis of the dimensions given in (1). Category partitions in such 
cultural systems strive to satisfy two equally important goals: optimization of 
polar symmetry and category-area uniformity and balance relative to the 
cognitive dimensions in (1), and responsiveness to socio-cultural-
environmental pressures such as demands for representational specificity 
of color, demands for a non-idiosyncratic (or normative) color information 
code, and compatibility with existing ethno-linguistic structures. The 
implementation of principles (1) and (2) results in a color naming system 
that is effective for the communication needs of the users of the system." 
(Jameson 2005) 
 
This is the notion that surfaced in the 1997 article Jameson co-authored 
with Roy D'Andrade (see section 4.3). The basic idea is that every 
subsequent segmentation iteration within that three-dimensional perceptual 
colour space should result in a new colour name that is most informative to 
the speaker in his particular environment and socio-cultural embeddedness. 
As a general rule, the colour name (identifying some brightness / saturation 
/ hue-focus) that is furthest away from the colour foci already named will 
possess the greatest informative value; this procedure will yield something 
resembling the familiar evolutionary colour name sequence (Berlin and Kay 
1969, Kay and McDaniel 1978). However, external constraints might favour 
the expedited naming of a different colour focus, e.g. a prevalence of green 
over yellow in a forest environment might cause the green focus to be 
lexicalised before the yellow focus. 
 
Jameson provides some additional details concerning this colour space 
segmentation strategy in principle (3): 
 
"3. Individual color naming systems and categories first arise through 
learning a culturally normative naming system and its relation to one’s 
individual (personal) perceptual color appearance representation. The 
individual’s perceptual color representation is related to the culture’s color 
naming system through a color naming-function (Alvarado and Jameson 
2002). Over an individual’s lifespan a personal naming-function evolves 
(e.g., new category labels are learned), which relates the culture’s 
normative naming system to the individual’s perceptual representation." 
(Jameson 2005) 
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This principle contains an essential point, which I would like to emphasize a 
little more than Jameson does to underline how IDM stays away from 
orthodox cultural relativism. Here, I propose we listen to Don Dedrick 
(1997), who stresses the importance of the perceptual saliencies of hue foci 
as a pregiven structure for the cognitive / linguistic schema to latch on to. 
These saliencies are, to an important extent, physiologically determined. 
 
There is room for idiosyncratic variation on this account: true human (full-
blown perceptual, not just retinal) tetrachromatsNOTE 30, if they exist, will 
obviously diverge from the norm, as will dichromats. Also, there is no 
objection to slight variations of the exact location in colour space of hue foci 
from one regular trichromat to the next, whatever the cause of this could be 
(to the extent that it depends on the person's physiology). The point is that, 
for every individual, there are facts of the matter about the role his 
physiological makeup plays in which colour shades are considered good 
exemplars of a specific category, and which are not. 
 
This will not cause IDM to devolve into the familiar universalist account, for 
there is still a highly significant role to play for non-physiologically 
determined factors: language, culture and idiosyncratic preferences can 
also exert their influence. This means that a person's cognitive processes 
work in tandem with the performance characteristics determined by the 
individual's physiology. 
 
An important addition to the IDM framework that I will develop (in particular 
in chapter 6) involves an extrapolation of perceptual space with conceptual 
space, and this expansion should offer more room for the inclusion of socio-
cultural, linguistic (and so on) factors, and a more substantial account of the 
differentiation of perceptual space-based colour names according to the 
various environmental constraints a speaker is subject to. An important 
modification of mine of Jameson's model will be the suggestion of a model 
or mechanism that achieves the same explanatory goals, but without the 
need for explanations in terms of ubiquitous and overt cognitive processing 
- i.e. an account of conceptual space-dynamics that is congruent with E( i )C. 
 
But for now, I shall continue with a discussion of Jameson's ideas. She 
claims the three principles discussed above yield a number of important 
consequences. Consequence (1) states: 
 
"1. Because lexical categories are progressively assigned in ways that tend 
to maximize information content and minimize label-to-exemplar 
confusability in communications between members of a culture, the naming 
system developed will necessarily depend on the range of colors available, 
extent of each color represented, and the ordering properties (discrete or 
continuous) of the stimulus space to be named. These features may differ, 
as when belonging to two natural environments (tropical versus desert), and 
will differ between two scientific color-order systems (Munsell versus CIE). 
IDM theory suggests that a space with a non-regular distribution of items 
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across categories (e.g., an unusual space with a large yellow stimulus 
region, compared to a much smaller red region) will be named in a manner 
that accounts for the color region ‘bumps’ in the space (Jameson & 
D’Andrade 1997) regardless of whether it is a manufactured stimulus space 
or a natural environmental color space." (Jameson 2005) 
 
These remarks serve to define the colour space to be segmented. There is 
a hint of environment-dependent differentiation between different flavours of 
colour space here: there would be room, within the IDM framework, to 
incorporate the perceptual colour spaces of people with physiological 
adaptations to various environments, with its own spectral arrays: consider, 
for instance, the adaptation of yellow-tinted lenses found amongst some 
humans living in areas of the world with brighter-than-average sunlight. 
Their perceptual colour space would certainly differ from the norm, as it 
would have the colour region bumps and indentations referred to in the 
quote above at places where people from less sunny locales would not. In 
particular, such people would be less sensitive to differences between blue 
and green (Hardin 1988/1993, pg. 167). Note that 'normal' perceptual colour 
space already has an irregular space in most universalist accounts. 
 
Therefore, this kind of variation is likely to be limited enough to fall within 
the range of 'allowed' cases for a quasi-universalist account, where it can 
still be maintained that there is, for every individual, a fact of the matter 
about how his colour perception system processes incoming stimuli, 
resulting in a particular colour saliency structure (which I dub the 
'neurophysiological yield')NOTE 31. Considering the likelihood that the 
variance in colour spaces across individuals worldwide is expected to be 
fairly narrow (a largely convergent genetic base will result in overwhelming 
percentages of trichromatic subjects), combined with the convergent forces 
of a shared trichromacy-based linguistic encoding scheme (the prominence 
of which Jameson herself stresses - see above), the acceptance of this 
slight possible differentiation in colour space flavours does not in and of 
itself do any major damage to the universalist's theory. 
 
However, consequence (2) presents a more powerful case for the inclusion 
of relativist aspects into a proper account of colour space segmentation: 
 
"2. Category regions, and interim category best exemplars, change as a 
culture’s color naming system develops and successively defines new 
category partitions. Category focals thus shift and as a result are salient 
only as a function of the unfolding of the partitioning process." (Jameson 
2005) 
 
This suggestion is closely akin to Bernard Harrison's point about the 
embeddedness of colour naming practices in a wider linguistic relational 
webNOTE 32. Now, according to the modification of IDM that I wish to develop, 
focal shifts are caused by cultural-linguistic transformations, but the allowed 
deviation of each of these is constrained by the characteristics of the 
underlying physiological system. It does not seem likely that, for example, 
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the force of linguistic change in a given culture with a constant majority of 
regular trichromats would be such that the green focus would venture into 
the domain of perceptual red. The advent of overwhelming numbers of 
functional tetrachromats (or dichromats, or anything other than plain 
trichromats), to such an extent that the majority of the population would 
come to consist of these mutations, might change this situation. In this 
case, most people would no longer consider the familiar colour language to 
be sufficiently correct, and the linguistic schema would be modified to reflect 
these physiological changes. However, such a shift does not appear to be 
on the verge of occurring. 
 
"3. Because the constraints of principles (1) and (2) above are universal 
across cultures, the evolution of color naming systems will converge 
somewhat, producing general features of color naming that are universal 
across cultures." (Jameson 2005) 
 
This sounds plausible, and aligns with what I have been claiming. However, 
it might be the case that the (relative) universality of colour categorization 
as demonstrated by vast amounts of empirical data will not be sufficiently 
secure based on Jameson's principles (1) and (2). She describes these 
principles as (mostly) cognitive strategies, and while similarities in human 
behaviour (and the universal constraints encountered in the environment) 
independent of cultural descent will undoubtably contribute to the 
similarities in colour lexicalisation across cultures, the emphasis placed on 
intra-cultural differences (for instance, in terms of environment, or colour 
ordering system used) under consequence (1) suggests something else is 
needed. An alternative suggestion is to play up the universalist aspect of 
the theory, i.e. by stating that - for humans, obviously - physiological 
similarities can close much of the gap, and help explain the (relative) pan-
species universality of colour categorization. The vast majority of the world's 
population is trichromatic, exhibits behaviour consistent with opponency 
theory (i.e. if tested with the Hurvich/D. Jameson method; see section 4.1), 
and so on, and these facts should play a large role in explaining the 
convergence of empirical data gathered across the world. 
 
An important question, relevant to this particular issue (i.e. of a mainly 
physiology-based convergence of colour spaces), which arises, is: is 
tetrachromacy really as widespread as Jameson suggests? The litmus test 
would be whether these supposed tetrachromats are able to watch 
television and see 'normal' colours. No amount of cognitive processing 
aimed towards linguistic convergence (e.g. the four-to-three-dimensional 
mapping Jameson suggests for tetrachromats in a trichromatic world) will 
help a tetrachromat see what we see when we watch television. 
 
Still, Jameson wishes to maintain this cross-dimensional mapping will 
suffice to smooth over any practical (i.e. communication-based) differences 
between humans of various retinal dimensionalities (at the very least for 
dichromats in a trichromatic world), as per consequences (4): 
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"4. Even though color appearance representations for individuals from the 
same culture may differ, the individuals can share and effectively use a 
normative color naming system." (Jameson 2005) 
 
... and (5): 
 
"5. Individual color naming can reflect differences in personal color 
appearance representations (e.g., different category foci can be found 
across individuals; see the collected work of MacLaury), yet social practices 
of ‘linguistic charity’ (Putnam 1988) permit some variability in individual 
color naming and perhaps expect it from the probabilistic features of the 
gradient stimulus space (c.f., Kay & MacDaniel 1978)." (Jameson 2003) 
 
These two consequences express the normalising effect of partaking in a 
shared socio-linguistic community: ideas pertaining to the appropriate 
application of a word will, across speakers, tend to converge over time, 
simply because if a word is used in an unconventional manner, the speaker 
will fail to get the response he expected or desired. This is the extent to 
which I would wish to support Jameson's notion of cross-dimensional-
mapping: as it is, as yet, rather unlikely that there are many operational 
human tetrachromats, for now the apparent success of these strategies of 
cognitive convergence for perceptual colour space across cultures and 
linguistic communities is based, for the most important part, on the 
similarities in neurophysiological yield. Hence Jameson's cross-dimensional 
mapping should be understood as a general form of the more specific 
same-dimensional, language-to-language mapping (for each individual 
ranging over a shared similarly-structured perceptual space). 
 
Differences in colour-related physiology between persons, compounded by 
idiosyncratic naming practices will, for the most part, be smoothed over by 
the linguistic convergence mechanism described under consequence (4). 
Any differences still left after that will probably fail to result in an opulence of  
practical problems: obviously, tasks in which the best example of a 
particular colour are to be picked out do not arise very often in everyday life. 
Usually, general agreement about the lexical coding appropriate to a 
specific colour is sufficient: the lack of consensus pertaining to the exact 
degree of similarity to a hue focus is vastly less important than the fact we 
all know to use colour word X when confronted with perceptual stimulus 
falling somewhere within (fuzzily bounded) range Y. In many potentially 
problematic cases, the words used (i.e. greenish blue, salmon-coloured) are 
unspecific enough to veil any occurent idiosyncratic perceptual variation. 
 
However, the mechanism of cross-dimensional mapping Jameson suggests 
will become more relevant in the case of conceptual space; this notion is to 
return in chapter 6. 
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Jameson's Consequence (6): 
 
"6. Although the cultural development of a color naming system evolves 
category partitions by following the principles stated in (2) above, it may 
undergo successive re-partitioning in response to social pressures. (For 
example, a need to now differentiate blue and green separately from a 
previously defined GRUE category)."  (Jameson 2005) 
 
One of the anti-universalist points of criticism provided by Saunders (1992), 
was that colour names in some cultures tend to be linked, semantically, with 
specific objects, organisms, substances or cultural practices. I made a 
similar point in section 4.3, based on suggestions by John Lucy. It is 
conceivable that Jameson's account would leave some room to deal with 
such cases, up to a point (as per Jameson's consequences (2), (4) and (5), 
and (6) immediately above). Hence, Saunders' more specific criticism that 
westernised abstract colour words are inappropriate as glosses for many 
colour terms used in more 'primitive' cultures is much less compelling when 
directed against Jameson's account than it is against orthodox universalism: 
IDM explicitly incorporates the possibility (and even probability) that the 
referential range of colour terms differs between individuals. All this does 
not change the important physiological similarities (in terms of their colour 
perception system) across humans everywhere.  
 
However, both in Jameson's conception of IDM and in the emphasis-shift 
currently defended, the perceptually salient hues are not the be-all end-all 
of colour lexicalisation - the cognitive and conceptual levels incorporate 
cultural-linguistic influences. This means that perhaps consequence (6) of 
IDM described above could offer a way to incorporate the linkages 
Saunders highlights, since IDM acknowledges that influences from outside 
the strict confines of the colour domain as such can be highly significant.  
 
So Jameson can incorporate the contributions of environmental pressures 
in what constitutes maximised saliency in the evolutionary order of colour 
space segmentation: e.g. a choice to encode either yellow or green after 
red might not depend solely on the choice between chromatic or lightness 
information increase (or saturation, or optimal category size), but perhaps 
on environmental properties (ubiquity of either yellow or green foliage, 
making one or the other a more practical choice to have a word for). Hence, 
a specific colour that is overwhelmingly prevalent in some linguistic group's 
environment, and/or linked to a highly significant object or custom in the 
group's culture, might be classified in its own colour category much sooner 
than the evolutionary stage of the language in question would suggest. 
 
The final entry in Jameson's list of consequences, (7): 
 
"7. When differentiation on the basis of lightness and saturation has been 
optimized, successive repartitioning will proceed using principles in (2) and 
Hue in novel category formation." (Jameson 2005) 
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This is, in essence, what MacLaury (1997) claims: for lower-stage cultures, 
brightness might be the dominant categorization paradigm, but as both 
society itself and the partitioning of colour space used grow more complex, 
using hue categories emerges as a more efficient strategy. 
 
This might also imply an explanation for the error Berlin and Kay (1969) 
have been chastised for making: for colour space segmentations in Western 
languages, hue is indeed the primary determinant for colour foci. However, 
if we follow Jameson and MacLaury on this point, utilising this criterion to 
backwards-engineer the evolutionary order for the linguistic segmentation of 
perceptual colour space, one is in danger of misrepresenting, to some 
extent, the particulars of colour perception and naming in the more 
'primitive' cultures, who do not utilise hue the way speakers of (say) English, 
or Dutch or German do. 
 
The IDM framework can account for much of the data, and offers sufficient 
explanatory 'heft'. However, from the discussion of the various principles 
and consequences above, I feel it is obvious I need to make some 
modifications to make this account work. 
 
The first step is to attach greater importance to the relative universality of 
neurophysiology of human colour system. The exception-cases Jameson 
mentions are not necessarily a factor of overwhelming influence. For 
instance, the percentage of tetrachromats is likely to be much smaller than 
her claim of up to 20% - the television-counter-argument mentioned under 
the discussion of consequence (3) above would have to be met in a 
convincing manner to substantiate such high estimates. 
 
Another problem for Jameson's account is the problem of covariance, often 
even practical indistinguishability of the lightness and saturation 
dimensions. Recall that Jameson emphasizes the important causal role of 
both the brightness and saturation dimensions in colour categorization. A 
problem with this idea is that it is notoriously difficult to separate these two 
factors in regular perception tasks, something Jameson (2005) herself 
acknowledges. However, Jameson argues that certain phenomena, for 
example the occurrence of the ‘GRUE'-category, are more easily explained 
if variations in lightness rather than hue are utilised as providing a 
classification impetus.The lumping together of green and blue in a single 
category by speakers in early stages of the evolutionary colour 
categorization sequence can be explained if, for those people, the 
similarities of lightness and saturation of these two colours are thought to be 
more significant than the difference in hue. Yellow, for instance, can be 
easily distinguished from blue and green in terms of lightness and 
saturation, and would, if the lightness and saturation criterion were to be 
used, be a likelier candidate to be placed in its own category in an early 
stage. 
 
This is a fairly compelling line of reasoning, and parallels arguments offered 
by MacLaury (1997), who suggests the brightness (what Jameson calls 
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'lightness') and hue sequences will merge at some point in the evolutionary 
development of a language's colour vernacular. However, this argument 
does not need the potentially problematic separation of causal contributions 
of the brightness and saturation dimensions, and works quite well if only 
brightness is used. 
 
This concession does not, on its own, imply that humans from 'primitive' 
cultures perceive colour differently (i.e. that their neurophysiological yield 
would be different), merely that in their physical and socio-cultural 
environment, colour space segmentation based on lightness results in more 
informative colour names. The salience of classifications along the hue 
dimension appears greater to cultures with a more sophisticated or complex 
colour vernacular (in terms of the position within the evolutionary 
sequence), and overseeing the totality of colour space it appears that 
differences in hue are more easily classifiable, with if needed amplifications 
of distinctions by referring to brightness and saturation. So the shifting 
prominence of lightness and hue as the segmentation of perceptual colour 
space progresses does not invalidate the universalist thesis of a shared, 
pan-species neurophysiological substrate. 
 
A shortcoming of IDM which will become relevant later is that it makes 
reasonably heavy use of cognitive representations. Jameson distinguishes: 
 
"(1) individual perceptual representations (e.g., discrimination based); (2) 
individual cognitive representations (e.g., matching and tolerance based); 
and (3) a shared cultural representation (e.g., color lexicon based)." 
(Jameson 2005, page 31) 
 
Jameson suggests that the mappings between these layered 
representations requires an additional cognitive layer, as a translation 
algorithm between the various domains. My suggestion, to be substantiated 
in chapter 7, would be that representation category (1), and at least part of 
(2) need not be representations in the cognitivist, computational sense. In 
accordance with Evan Thompson's Gibsonian inclination (see section 4.5), 
my suggestion will be that for those cases we can make do with 
ontologically less presumptuous entities. In chapter 7, I will offer an E( i )C-
compatible redefinition of the notion 'representation'. 
 
5.3 - Synthesis 
 
In the previous section, we saw that Kimberly Jameson provides us with a 
plausible characterisation of the progressive perceptuo-linguistic 
segmentation of colour space, in the form of her Interpoint Distance Model. 
Earlier, for instance section 4.5, it was suggested that we should adopt a 
theory that is a bit more subtle: categorization, both the linguistic type as 
applied to perceptual space, and concept formation, consists of an 
interaction of biomechanical (possibly innate) and environmental properties.  
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What might be innate (and, as such, underlying and structuring perceptual 
colour space), is the propensity of biological systems (agents) to develop, in 
interaction with the environment (with a particular illuminant distribution - 
see section 4.5), what I like to call a specific neurophysiological yield. This 
structure of saliencies is - at least in part - genetic in origin, but note that 
this does not imply the claim that the structure of percepual space for colour 
is exactly the same for all individuals in all cultures, as (the charicature of) 
an orthodox universalist might wish to claim. It is reasonably 
uncontroversial, however, that for the vast majority of humanity, the 
possible variation in idiosyncratic neurophysiological yields is limited to a 
narrow band. That is, it is likely that any ‘normal’ neurophysiological yield is 
sufficiently similar to another to enable language to yield a 'cognitive 
convergence zone': within a single language community, perceptual 
saliency structures do not vary to such an extent that talk about ‘red’ or 
‘green’ cannot be intersubjective. In other words, any translation 
mechanism to smooth out occurrent differences in equi-dimensional cases 
(which Jameson suggests for trans-dimensional mapping scenarios - see 
previous section) is likely to be fairly low-key, since there is limited need for 
such translations. One reason for this is that colour language does not cut 
perceptual space nearly as finely as would be necessary to make most 
perceptual differences apparent in everyday interaction. Any occurrent 
cultural differences can be explained as differences in interpretation 
overlying a perception base that is largely convergent across members of 
various cultures, and these divergences (that are nonetheless non-trivial) 
constitute a more natural playing field for cognitive activity. 
 
Cognition does have a role to play, mainly in the socio-cultural arena. For 
Jameson, colour categorization is both perceptual and cognitive, but one 
point of criticism about Jameson's IDM can be that it unjustly downplays the 
role of physiologically determined perceptual saliences of specific colour 
exemplars in favour of the hypothetical possibility of widespread 
divergences in chromatic receptor dimensionality. Still, a major advantage 
of allowing the influence of the cognitive domain into a quasi-universalist 
account of colour categorisaton, would be that the cultural dimension 
Saunders (1992) emphasizes might be incorporated as well. She noted for 
some cultures, colour words do not exist in abstracta, but rather were 
always linked to culturally significant objects, plants, animals, and so on. If 
the cognitive processing layer is added, as Jameson suggests, cases of 
(say) a tetrachromat asking herself how a variety of colours she gets to 
distinguish might fit into that single category that is used by the majority, 
could perhaps fairly easily be generalised into an account where there is 
room for a semantic cross-pollination of a specific shade of green, the plant 
that has that particular colour, and the word used to refer to the plant and/or 
the colour and/or the cultural use of the plant. 
 
In chapter 6 and beyond, I will develop an account about the relation of 
perception and cognition (or rather, an account of cognition and concepts 
as an aspect of an agent-environment perception-action dynamic) that will 
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be compatible with the muted Gibsonianism in my treatment of E( i )C, e.g. 
as evident in Thompson's enactivist/ecological colour theory.  
 
I wish to claim that E( i )C necessitates acknowledging all modifying 
influences - be they body-based, environmental, cultural, and even 
cognitive. The inclusion of this latter aspect (cognition) need not take the 
form of a conscious processing of information that is in itself user-neutral 
(which would be anti-Gibsonian): in line with the theory of affordances, the 
animal can already be predisposed to process the incoming data in a 
specific way, according to its needs and the way it is embedded in the 
environment. So, while an animal might not possess linguistic 
categorization abilities, its specific being-in-its-environment, including those 
features of that environment it is instinctually inclined towards utilising or 
avoiding, embodies a primitive version of the suite of constraints upon 
colour vision not intrinsic to the physiological vision system itself that, in the 
case of humans, gives rise to highly complex cultural structures, language 
included. 
 
Returning, for the moment, to the colour language case (as a less complex 
example for the kind of scheme necessary to explain concepts in E( i )C-
terms), my suggestion is (as stated before) to stake out a middle ground 
between universalism and relativism about the colour-centric interaction of 
agent and socio-cultural environment. This is not unlike the way I developed 
a hybrid account from the opposition between Thompson and Shepard 
concerning the colour-centric interaction of agent and physical environment.  
 
For the socio-cultural case, I claim that, despite variations in external 
influences (environmental, socio-cultural, linguistic, and so on), an 
appropriate theory should be able to account for the fact there are also 
substantial similarities between individuals humans within and across 
cultures. 
 
This dynamic of divergence and convergence might be explained by the 
following theses: 
 
(1) the need to categorise itself is a practice enforced by the complexity of 
an agent's embeddedness in and his interaction with his physical 
environment; 
(2) the specific character of categorization is: 
(2.1) in some ways universal across cultures by virtue of the fact 
 that: 
(2.1.1) all humans possess similar neurophysiological visual 
 systems; 
(2.1.2) members of those various cultures, despite their 
differences, might run into very similar problems (limitations 
and potentialities having to do with the way the human body 
reacts to specific circumstances, for instance), which 
categorization strategies are designed to help solve; 
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(2.2) in part communal, but culturally specific by virtue of shared 
 language and customs  amongst members of a culture; 
(2.2.1) this can help shape a 'categorization-convergence 
zone' for neurophysiologically divergent subjects: 
(2.2.1.1) in intra-cultural cases in the form of a 
translation-mechanism on the subpersonal level, to 
smooth out any occurrent differences in 
perceptually equi-dimensional cases (e.g. similar to 
what Jameson suggests for trans-dimensional 
mapping scenarios); 
(2.2.1.2) in inter-language or inter-cultural cases in 
a more overt, at least initially conscious linguistic 
and/or cultural translation mechanism (e.g. 
<English> ‘red’ = <German> ‘rot’ = <Dutch> ‘rood’). 
 
Based on these theses, I can now make good on my claim (from chapter 4) 
that a good theory of perceptual colour space segmentation should take 
cues from both the relativist and universalist traditions. Finding that middle 
ground between universalism and relativism entails claiming that both pan-
species physiological properties and contextual influences (physical and 
socio-cultural) are of relevance. This means that the following components 
contribute to a context-dependent dynamic of constraints and enablings, 
yielding a specific colour-involving relation of an agent with his environment: 
 
(1) the neurophysiological yield: the structure of hue / brightness / saturation 
saliencies determined by the properties of the physico-sensory substratum 
(which involves the interrelation of the physical processes producing the 
stimulus, and the neurophysiological mechanisms that process the 
stimulus); 
 
(2) environmental prominence (e.g. there will be more pressure on an 
organism to devise a proper categorization scheme for various flavours of 
green if the difference between those shades is important to its continued 
survival); 
 
(3) socio-cultural prominence (as an addition to / modulation of 
environmental prominence; e.g. the use of artifacts or agricultural products 
of a specific hue might be significant in a religious ritual, which might imbue 
the associated colour names and concepts with a meaning related to the 
ritual, and/or anchour the associated colour name at a position in the hue 
name acquisition hierarchy that diverges from the one in the standard Berlin 
and Kay evolutionary sequence). Socio-cultural prominence includes 
linguistic encoding saliency: properties of the language itself might influence 
category and/or concept formation; perhaps I can call these Sapir-Whorf-
effects. 
 
Compared to the general scheme of physical/ecological situatedness 
presented in section 4.5, the discussion above adds other influential factors. 
In particular, we have seen that convention (socio-cultural prominence) 
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influences the ways in which physiological properties (the 
neurophysiological yield) contribute to a specific kind of colour-related 
behaviour. In a schema already shown (by way of a preview) in section 4.6, 
this looks as follows: 
 
 [Figure 8: interrelatedness of agent and social world] 
 
To repeat the description given then, this diagram depicts the following: the 
biomechanical properties of the agent as they change over time (dM/dt), in 
interaction with socio-culturally determined properties of the environment as 
they change over time (dS/dt), can, at some level of detail, be described as 
behaviour (i.e. the change of behavioural patterns over time, dB/dt). This 
behavioural description can be expressed in terms of a behavioural space, 
as a higher-dimensional version of the movement planning field utilised by 
Thelen et al. (2001). This past chapter can be understood as an attempt to 
provide a more detailed qualitative specification of how these agent-
properties and social environment-properties hang together, at least in the 
case of colour perception, expanding upon the ideas about colour language 
in section 4.3. 
 
In chapter 8, these two schemata will be combined into a schema depicting 
certain properties of concepts as defined in an E( i )C-appropriate fashion. In 
the description above, we can already see the additional element that will 
be added: 'environmental prominence' will be accounted for in terms of the 
properties of the physical environment. 
 
Based on ideas about the linguistic categorization of perceptual colour 
space described above, I will continue with an account of concepts, as well 
as cognition in general, but compatible with E( i )C - this will include ideas 
about conceptual space as a spectrum ranging from base physiology all the 
way 'up' to abstract cognition. 
 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
 
[SUMMARY of chapter 5 AND PREVIEW] 
 
Based on the ideas of Kimberly Jameson, this chapter provided a more 
detailed exploration of the progressive segmentation of colour space. 
Starting from the most basic dark vs. light distinction, the distribution of 
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neurophysiologically defined colour saliencies in interaction with 
sociocultural demands determines the sequence of the most informative 
colour space segmentations. That is, the way in which colours are named 
and conceptualised occurs under influence of both ecological/environmental 
and socio-cultural factors (i.e. the prominence of coloured objects in, 
respectively, ecological niche and sociocultural practice). 
 
In line with this, the example of the Hanunóo of the Phillippines - their colour 
words have complex non-hue correlations - suggests that the three-
dimensional phenomenal colour space of the received view of colour 
perception should be expanded with additional semantic connections 
(where a colour concept denotes not just a hue, but also, for instance, a 
particular object or ritual, with their associated meanings); this is the first 
step towards a proper conceptual space as a higher-dimensional version of 
perceptual space. 
 
Jameson's Interpoint Distance Model prepares the way for an account of 
conceptual space segmentation, involving cross-dimensional mapping as a 
mechanism to relate complex segmentations to more basic structures (and 
the other way around - see also section 6.9 as this idea is linked to George 
Lakoff's ideas about metaphor-based concept development), and more in 
general the interplay of the agent's body-based, social-environmental and 
physical environmental properties. 
 
In chapter 6, a more detailed account of concepts as behavioural 
dispositions to fit in with this 'conceptual space'-idea will be developed; in 
chapter 7 and beyond the interrelatedness of conceptual space (C-space) 
with M-, S- and P-space (respectively: bodily properties, sociocultural 
environmental properties and physical environmental properties) will be 
explored. 
 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
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[6 - Superposition Theory of Complex Concepts] 
 
6.1 - The 'Colour' Concept 
 
In the sections to follow, I will formulate a theory of concepts, traditionally 
the basic buildings blocks of thought processes. More specifically, I will start 
by suggesting a model to account for a specific complex concept, namely 
the concept of 'colour', that can be generalised to a model of concepts 
proper. This model, in turn, forms the initial building block of the 'Radicality 
Manifold'-model I take to fulfill the promise made in the introduction to this 
book: it will help position concepts within the embodied and embedded 
cognition paradigm. Recall, from my remark in section 4.1, that the real 
focus of this book is to develop an insight into the concept 'concept', not 
necessarily into scientific concepts, even though the current discussion will 
contribute ideas about (the components of) the scientific concept 'colour'. 
  
The main problem with providing a straightforward ontology associated with 
the concept 'colour', is that the colour vision process cuts through several 
different domains of scientific investigation. The properties of coloured 
objects, as well as the electromagnetic radiation that is indispensible to the 
whole process (i.e. light), is best described using theories of (micro-) 
physics, which in this case will include quantum mechanics and optics (see 
e.g. Nassau, 2001). The sensory processing involved in colour perception 
can be described by neurophysiological theories, but also in terms of 
psychophysical models (see e.g. Hardin, 1988). The problem is that the 
claims of the theories associated with sensory processing are not 
necessarily expressible in terms of the theories that are most appropriate to 
describe the (physical) properties of coloured objects; the realm of colour 
perception comprises even more of such domains governed by mutually 
irreducible explanatory strategies.  
 
With a concept that has so many different uses and applications, the kind of 
work you want the concept to do determines much of its content. Recall the 
claim, made above, that the phenomenon of 'colour' cuts across various 
disciplines and theories; this implies that the kinds of questions that one 
asks, i.e. the practical goals and purposes of (scientific) inquiry, determine 
what kind of explanatory framework (theory) needs to be utilised. Each 
relevant theory, then, has its own way of specifying how to characterize 
colour, and each of these specifications exerts its own force on what colour 
as an abstract notion would have to mean (if this abstraction is at all 
possible within the framework in question). 
 
Here are some examples of disciplines that are relevant to explaining 
(certain aspects of) the concept 'colour', followed by examples of the kinds 
of phenomena or properties that have been suggested as candidates for 
ontological identification and/or the kind of role that 'colour' would occupy in 
each of these disciplines. 
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-Physics: colour is a microphysical structure, or a feature of light that is 
constituted by properties of electromagnetic radiation; 
-Linguistic Anthropology: colour is a socioculturally relevant perceptual 
feature, that is imbued with relevance and meaning in a partly contingent, 
culturally determined fashion; 
-Phenomenology: colour involves qualia; 
-Psychophysics: colour is a structured percept, with propreties that 
depend, to an important extent, on the properties of the neurophysiological 
structures involved in processing visual stimuli; 
-Neurophysiology: colour is input or informationNOTE 33 that needs to be 
processed; 
-Everyday parlance: colour is an object property with certain informational 
propertiesNOTE 34. 
 
The problem is as follows: it is difficult to see how something can be defined 
as a physical structure, a meaningful perceptual feature, a phenomenal 
'feel', an information-bearing signal and several other things all at once, 
without a significant loss in contextually relevant information. Despite this 
great variance in context-related applications, the everyday use of 'colour' 
as a phenomenally indexed object property appears unproblematic, and 
that is somewhat puzzling. 
 
6.2 - Complex Concepts: Preliminaries 
 
To account for the features of the concept 'colour' as described above, I 
submit that colour is a complex concept. This means that there is a tension 
between the apparent singular meaning of the concept as it is naively used 
in normal language, and the wide array of possible actual meanings that is 
revealed when the concept is called upon to account for some phenomenon 
falling within its application-domainNOTE 35. That is, when the general 
concept 'colour' is applied in a specific context, it starts to mean something 
subtly different, for instance what the scientific discipline involved in 
explaining phenomena in that particular context prescribes that 'colour' 
should mean. Such a contextualization of 'colour' involves hiding several 
other possible applications of 'colour' - several other subconcepts - from 
view. 
 
It still pays to view 'colour' as a single concept, at a low level of detail 
anyway, because of the apparent ease of switching between subconcepts, 
each appropriate in its own domain of application. When we speak of colour 
in a phenomenal context, it usually does not appear to be too big a stretch 
to consider talk about colour in a physical context as talk belonging to the 
same concept, despite the incommensurability of the theories associated 
with each domain. So we have one concept, 'colour', which comprises a 
collection of different subconcepts, each with its own practical application 
(namely as specified by a particular theory or practice; see figure 9). 
 
A complicating factor is that the ontology of the phenomenon is usually 
determined (or at least investigated) on these 'subconceptual' levels, hence 
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the structures and contents of the theories associated with the subconcepts 
are very influential in the way concepts are defined, understood and used. 
This results in the odd situation that there are different ontologies 
associated with what, in everyday parlance, appears to be a perfectly 
straightforwardly definable property ("'Colour' is that property right there on 
the object!"). 
 
In brief, the idea of a complex concept implies that there is not merely a 
peaceful division of labour between the various subconcepts, but that there 
are incommensurable stories intended to refer to or somehow subsume 
under the same notion - see figure 9. In the case of colour, this would be 
the notion of a phenomenally indexed object property. 
 
 
[Figure 9: various subconcepts of the naive concept 'colour'] 
 
I wish to contend that colour is not the only concept that displays this 
structure - in fact, there might actually be many complex concepts: good 
examples are 'information' (which could refer to semantics, syntax, signals 
or stimuli, and any one of a wide array of socio-cultural variations on these 
themes) and 'time' (experienced time has rather different properties than 
time in physics, and even within physics there are different possible 
ontologies, e.g. absolute/substantivalist vs. relational - see e.g. Rynasiewicz 
(1996)). Whether there are many or relatively few complex concepts does 
not actually matter all that much: what matters is that at least some 
important, salient, widely used concepts have this property, because that is 
enough for it to be a phenomenon that theories about concepts will have to 
be able to account for. The theory about concepts to be described in the 
next section, Superposition Theory of Complex Concepts, will actually be a 
theory about concepts in general, which will include complex concepts as a 
special case. 
 
The most important criterion for a concept to be complex is that the various 
definitions of the overarching concept should not be merely metaphorical 
variations on a single theme. For instance, a case can be made for the idea 
that the pain I might feel due to an unrequited love can be thought of as a 
metaphorical extension of the kind of pain I can feel in my arm. In contrast, 
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a concept is complex if the properties associated with its various 
subconcepts perform distinct, mutually irreducible roles. This is the case if 
these subconcepts are to be explicated in terms of the vernacular provided 
by different, irreconcilable theories. This is why 'water', for instance, is not a 
complex concept, even though there are different ways of using the word 
that do not automatically evoke the same content: chemists, ship engineers 
or athletes on a hot summer day can seem to mean rather different things if 
they speak of 'water', but it appears likely that all of the properties of the 
substance in question (e.g. having a particular boiling point under certain 
atmospheric conditions, the power to facilitate buoyancy or the power to 
quench thirst) that are relevant to each of these categories of water-users 
can quite comfortably be explained by referring to the chemical properties of 
the H2O-molecule, and the physical properties of aggregates of theseNOTE 36. 
 
But when a concept is complex, its complexity is usually due to the 
fragmentation of science, and/or the (to some extent parallel) fragmentation 
of everyday parlance. As such, the existence of complex concepts exposes 
the holes in the fabric of our understanding and description (scientific or 
otherwise) of the world - holes in want of a patch, or an entirely new cloth. 
Still, this predilection towards multi-denotational ascription does appear to 
be part and parcel of some and perhaps even much of our concept-use, 
meaning that any theory of concepts should be able to explain how we do 
so, and why this is the case. 
 
Despite the fact that not all concepts might be complex in the sense 
explained above, there is another important consequence to be gleaned 
here, especially in light of the discussion of previous chapters. Complex 
concepts are context-dependent to a very high degree, but the E( i )C-
focused discussion of behaviour and perception so far suggests that 
concepts and cognition in general are context-dependent, in the sense that 
their structure and content is informed by bodily, social-environmental and 
physical-environmental properties. The sections to come are dedicated to 
describing what kind of a conceptual structure is implemented because of 
those influences. 
 
6.3 - An E( i )C-approach to Concepts 
 
As we have seen (in chapter 2), most theories define concepts as building 
blocks of thoughts, with a particular internal structure and content, attribute 
to them an important role in acts of categorization, and might invoke them to 
explain the systematicity and productivity of thought. In other words, 
concepts are mostly or almost entirely entities that need to be defined in 
terms of cognitive processes: concepts are mental entities. 
 
In E( i )C-theories, the lines between cognition and action are blurred. Bodily 
action is not necessarily controlled by cognitive processing, but might be 
structured, to an important extent, by bodily dynamics; cognition is 
influenced by (subconscious) sensorimotor processes, which depend 
crucially on properties of the body and the perceptual system; and cognition 
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can utilise aspects of the environment to support its own developmental 
dynamics. This means that in E( i )C, the kinds of processes that would 
require (or can be described in terms of) cognition, need not be exclusively 
mental - that is, if 'mental' is defined as in the head or the mind, and not (at 
least in part) constituted by the dynamics of the body and/or the 
environment. 
  
Now, the standard claim about concepts, namely that they are 'constituents 
of thoughts', is somewhat opaque. It should be possible to make some 
headway on devising an E( i )C-approach to concepts by making the link 
between concepts and the network of bodily, cognitive and behavioural 
processes, and the environmental properties and processes that these are 
situated in, a bit more explicit. One way of doing this is saying that having a 
concept is to be defined in terms of achievement, of being able to do 
something, of expressing a particular level of expertise in a specific context. 
This means a concept is no longer a mental entity in the classic sense (i.e. 
non-physical), but it can still be part of a cognitive process if the definition of 
the term 'cognitive' changes in accordance with the paradigm shift the  
E( i )C-approach as a whole represents: a concept is still a constituent of 
thoughts, but what 'thoughts' means has changed. 
 
In this sense, my suggestion is that a theory of concepts should take a 
broadly Wittgensteinian tack. That is, in line with the inclinations of the  
E( i )C-approach in general, and more in particular the E( A )C-approach, 
cognition, in its essence, should be understood to involve body-based and 
environmentally situated activity, rather than stacks of representational 
layers all the way down to the level of basic mental processing. However, it 
is important to note that I do not intend to get rid of representations 
altogether: the very essence of the accounts of concepts and cognition to 
be developed in the pages to follow rests on the notion that the usual E( i )C-
approaches fail to account for higher cognition, and in a nontrivial subset of 
the cases that E( i )C cannot account for, things like Andy Clark's (1997) 
'representation-hungry problems' are in play. However, this use of 
representation turns it into what can be called an additional layer of abstract 
processing that, in some agents, is added to a more fundamental, E( i )C-
style process of concept-involving behaviour. Furthermore, the notion 
'representation' itself will be subject to some scrutiny, in chapter 7 in 
particular. 
 
Given all this, it is possible to formulate the following general E( i )C-
definition of what it means to have a concept: 
 
having a concept A of some object/process/state of affairs O means being 
able to act in an appropriate manner, given the possibilities P for and 
constraints on action CA that O represents, and given additional contextual 
constraints CC. 
 
Most of the components of the definition above - 'object/process/state of 
affairs', 'being able to act in an appropriate manner', 'possibilities for and 
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contraints on action', 'contextual constraints' - allow for a fairly natural 
specification in embodied and embedded terms; at the very least, they 
depict processes and entities that derive their properties at least in part from 
the position they occupy within a broader context, and the model to be 
developed in the remainder of this book will investigate what that position 
and its context are like. 
 
I would imagine the 'appropriateness'-criterion in the provisional definition 
above raises the greatest number of eyebrows. As a brief preview of 
discussions to come, it can be said that this normative aspect is defined (to 
an important extent) by the web of social affordances constituted by the 
actions of conspecifics, in addition to the physical norms laid down in the 
'regular' affordances (possibilities for agent-to-object interaction; see 
sections 4.5 and 8.2). 
 
The components mentioned in the definition above carve out the content of 
the concept 'concept' collectively, and this content so far remains as an 
unknown waiting to be filled in. A provisional description of 'concept' that I 
believe will fit is the following: 
 
a concept is a structured behavioural* disposition of an embodied and 
embedded agent. 
 
It should be noted that, in this corollary, 'behaviour*' should be understood 
to include not only bodily action, but also locution and cognition. The idea 
here is that concept possession can be expressed in many ways, of which 
linguistic description provides important, but merely partial coverage. This 
all means that talk of 'having a concept' as if it were an independently 
describable entity is profligate; 'activating' a concept-as-disposition consists 
in 'activating' a capacity, which translates directly to 'acting'.  
 
However, if concepts are defined or identified in terms of action, or 
dispositions for action, and the criterium 'efficiency' is included in the 
definition, that means that it is possible for an agent to be more or less 
adept at implementing conceptual knowledge and abilities, and this is, at 
least in part, a function of the conceptual content that is availableNOTE 37. To 
put this another way, it should be possible, at least in principle, to specify a 
spectrum or hierarchy of concepts. The 'efficiency'-criterium of concept-
informed action can be understood in different ways, and these different 
criteria yield different hierarchies, but one way is to parse efficiency in terms 
of notions that skew the balance towards the kinds of (cognitive) abilities 
humans are comparatively good at, such as creativity, versatility and 
adaptability. If this is done, one possible way to construct this hierarchy is to 
have it range from the most basic action- and perception-based concepts 
(or concept-like abilities and dispositions) at the bottom, up to high 
cognition, including abstract thought and creative imagination. 
 
This way, conceptual ability is measured in terms of cognitive capacity, and 
of course this yields the somewhat familiar line along which agents of all 
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kinds can be grouped, with primitive animals near the bottom, and dolphins, 
chimpanzees and humans near the top. Because this is just one way of 
organizing this hierarchy - other ways of defining 'efficiency' are likely to 
result in rather different rankings, with humans nowhere near the top of the 
heap - I would argue against attaching too much importance to it. However, 
I would like to argue that this particular organization, ranging from basic 
sensorimotor abilities all the way up to high cognition, does offer an 
appropriate template for the organization and functioning of the human 
conceptual system. SToCC, and the model of E( i )C to be developed on the 
foundations formed by SToCC, will make some use of this idea; 
furthermore, the claims involving the structuredness of the 'colour'-concept 
(and other complex concepts) presented in sections 6.1 and 6.2, will also be 
integrated into this account. 
 
But first: to introduce the idea of this spectrum of dispositions, of which our 
familiar ideas of what concepts are (and who has them) form a limit case 
(namely, the upper limit), is to present a theory that, in some sense, yields a 
deflationary view of conceptsNOTE 38. In lower regions of this spectrum, there 
might be abilities and dispositions that are concept-like, but not actually 
concepts themselves if we understand 'concept' to require consciousness 
and higher cognitive abilities (including the capacity for language). 
However, SToCC will imply that the familiar kinds concepts (i.e. as they are 
used by humans, involving mostly linguistic categorizational abilities) do not 
form a clearly demarcated island in the ocean of non-conceptual 
processing, but that there is a smooth continuity between these high-end 
concepts and the lower-end somatic abilities and dispositionsNOTE 39. SToCC 
makes a claim that is stronger still: many of the 'higher' concepts depend on 
lower concepts, and are often partly constituted by them. How this can be 
the case will become clear in the sections to followNOTE 40. 
 
Another way in which the current suggestion can be seen as a deflationary 
account of concepts, is more radical. That is, it would even be possible to 
go so far as to say that in acquiring concepts or judging whether someone 
else has the same concept we do, the relevant process does not involve 
copying and comparing concepts as such, but copying and comparing 
behavioural profiles that we can use as indicators of concept possession. 
This would mean that the term 'concept' is merely an abstract description of 
certain structural elements of a disposition towards a particular behavioural 
profile. In other words, a 'concept' (in general) is nothing in and of itself, but 
an abstract description of a concrete act, or disposition towards it. 
 
It might seem as if this view defines concepts merely in external, perhaps 
almost behaviouristic terms, thus ignoring the essential internal aspects of 
concepts and concept possession: at the very least, having a concept also 
means having specific knowledge, right? I can assure the reader that these 
aspects will not be forgotten; see the remainder of this chapter for more 
about the way SToCC views the content and interrelatedness of concepts, 
sections 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8 in particular. 
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It is at this point that I wish to add a critical note about the concept 'concept'. 
There appears to be a tension between two opposing forces, each pulling 
the definition of 'concept' in its own direction. On one side, we have 
language, which allows us to apply neat, clear-cut labels to all kinds of 
objects, processes and abstracta; a strong enough emphasis on this pole 
will make us think of concepts as transparent, uniquely referential 
categorizations of the world. On the other side, we have the everyday hustle 
and bustle in which concepts function, which is a complicated dynamic of 
processes and forces; emphasis on this pole will make us see that concepts 
are overwhelmingly multiply realizable, not only in terms of the idiosyncracy 
involved in the specification of a concept's internal structure, but also in 
terms of the multitude of available variations (intrapersonal as well as 
interpersonal) in behavioural patterns that can bring about a particular goal, 
hence can be linked to a single concept (or close-knit group of related 
concepts). Let's call the situation that results from the presence of these two 
opposing forces the inherent instability of the 'concept'-concept. 
 
From this idea we can extract an important implication: a theory of concepts 
will have to be able to address the issue of how we can speak sensibly of 
two people possessing the same concept in the face of this multiple 
realizability. Recall that this was one of Prinz' desiderata on a theory of 
concepts (see section 2.5). The unifying force of language is one possible 
explanation that is available, but a more detailed description of the 
mechanism at work here, or possibly suggestions for an additional 
explanatory mechanism, will be most welcome. SToCC will offer a few 
suggestions of that kind, including mechanisms involving 'conceptual 
enslavement' (see section 6.7) and 'granularity' (see section 6.8). 
 
6.4 - Conceptual Space 
 
Central to StoCC is the notion of 'conceptual space'NOTE 41. This is a 
metaphorical notion, and it is introduced here as an extrapolation of the 
perceptual space used in, for instance, the received view about colour 
perception as described in section 4.1. Conceptual Space involves the idea 
that concepts as behavioural dispositions are structured in a particular way, 
namely according the individual concepts' inferred accounts. That is, an 
important part of having a concept involves being able to exhibit some kind 
of behaviour or provide some kind of explanation that is accepted by others 
as instantiating the appropriate kind of justification for that particular use of 
that concept, and this justification occurs along inferential lines. Conceptual 
space is a metaphorical way of understanding the interrelatedness of 
concepts that results from these justificatory connections. See section 6.6 
for a more elaborate explanation - the point I wish to make now is that at the 
foundation, such justifications often depend on the biological particulars of 
our embodied, embedded interaction with our environment. 
 
From the discussion in chapters 4 and 5 about the specifics of colour-
centric embodied and embedded agent-environment interaction, we can 
take away a notion of what the internal dynamics of conceptual space could 
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be like. That is, there are important connections between the basic 
perceptual topology (e.g. the fact my eyes and brain are configured in such 
a way that I consider a particular shade of red 'the best' red) and higher-
order semantic contents (e.g. my predilection to classify objects based on 
their colour, and the behavioural consequences this has, for instance in 
front of a traffic light). 
 
This idea aligns quite nicely with that of a spectrum of concept-dispositions, 
as introduced above (in section 6.1), as well as the idea of the lower end of 
that spectrum blending in smoothly with the perceptual / somatic / 
nonconceptual realm: perceptual space acts as the basis of this proto-
conceptual space, and an increase in complexity is, in principle, quite easily 
expressed by an increase in dimensionality, with each of the additional 
dimensions (or coherent set thereof) expressing some property with which 
to specify some concept. 
 
For now, the basic claim is that the idea of 'conceptual space' entails that it 
is possible to define a space that comprises the conceptual complexity 
spectrum, and is ultimately rooted in basic sensorimotor activity. This 
should be enough, at least for the moment; however, in sections 6.9 and 
6.10, I will say more about the structure of conceptual space, and the way in 
which its 'higher' reaches depend on/relate to the basic sensorimotor level, 
and to the various aspects of the agent-environment interaction dynamic. 
Before these hypotheses can be given, more about the properties of 
conceptual space, and the concept-user's embeddedness in the 
environment (described in terms of a broader structure called the Radicality 
Manifold), needs to be said. 
 
Towards that end, I will devote the subsections to follow to highlighting 
some properties of conceptual space. In particular, I will explain how 
complex concepts fit into this framework, namely via an internal structure of 
concepts, subconcepts and conceptual superposition (section 6.5), what 
role inference plays in determining the structure of conceptual space 
(section 6.6), that some aspects of concepts, enslavers, are more important 
than others (section 6.7), how granularity is an operator relating conceptual 
space to the agent's context of action (section 6.8), how the evolution of 
concepts might come about, for instance via conceptual splitting (sections 
6.9 and 6.10). 
 
6.5 - Conceptual Superposition 
 
In section 6.1, I provided a (non-exhaustive) list with different versions of 
the concept 'colour' (as used in physics, linguistic anthropology, 
phenomenology, psychophysics, neurophysiology and everyday parlance), 
and argued, on the basis of that list, that the concept in question should be 
thought of as complex. Still, in everyday parlance, we do not appear to 
encounter many problems in using the single notion 'colour' to stand in for 
much more detailed accounts, even though some of those detailed 
accounts appear to denote entities or properties that cannot be captured in 
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terms of the kinds of explanations and descriptons that are provided by 
other relevant accounts. 
 
To capture this property of a complex concept - a singular concept at the 
everyday 'level' that breaks apart into a variety of mutually incompatible 
accounts if placed under scrutiny (see section 6.1) - I want to introduce the 
theoretical description conceptual superposition. 
 
What the idea of conceptual superposition says, in essence, is that at least 
some concepts as they are used in everyday parlance cannot be given a 
straightforward explication or definition - that they, in fact, yield mutually 
exclusive inferences, depending on the context in which they are supposed 
to apply.  
 
The notion conceptual superposition is meant to invoke association with 
quantum superposition, which denotes the possibility that an object 
possesses two (or more) values for a particular unmeasured variable at the 
same time (e.g. the energy of an elementary particle). The moment this 
particular value is measured, the particle's wave function collapses into a 
determinate value. The depiction of this property occurs in terms of the 
addition of state vectors, and this method of description, plus the 
occurrence of wave function collapse, offers a good (at least metaphorical) 
fit with the property of a complex concept. 
 
That is, first: SToCC promotes the idea of concepts as collectively 
specifying a 'conceptual space', which affords a description of concept 
properties and contents in terms of a vector space (at least in principle). 
And second: SToCC claims that in its naive, everyday form, a complex 
concept is a singular notion, a conceptual superposition that consists of the 
addition of several higher-grained but mutually exclusive subconcepts. 
When this concept is placed under scrutiny, it is applied in a specific field, or 
someone or something demands of us in some way that we articulate what 
we mean by this naive concept - i.e. the concept's properties are 'measured' 
-, the superposed concept breaks apart and reduces to a particular 
subconcept, that is tailored to the context in which it is supposed to do its 
work, but might no longer apply to different contexts of use, where other 
subconcepts of the superposed concept are relevant. 
 
For instance, if a particular industrial application requires determining 
whether some object is light or dark under certain, precisely specified 
lighting conditions, the subconcept of 'colour' utilised here will probably be 
defined in terms of the wavelengths of radiation within the visible spectrum 
emitted or reflected by the object, because that is the kind of feature a 
machine to perform the above-described task is likely to measure. Picking 
this definition of colour means putting aside (at least for the moment) other 
aspects of the 'colour'-concept, such as the socio-linguistic and 
phenomenological aspects. 
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One way of making the introduction of superposition as a step in the 
development of a theory of concepts somewhat more tractable is by 
exploring this property in terms of non-functionalizability. 
 
David Lewis (1972) offers a formal account of the definition of theoretical 
terms, which can include terms denoting mental states. As such, his article 
was one of the formative contributions towards the theory in philosophy of 
mind called analytic functionalism. I do not plan to discuss or defend Lewis' 
analytic functionalism in a detailed fashion, but functionalizability (or the 
impossibility thereof) is a useful notion in the current context. 
 
This is a cursory description of how Lewis develops his idea: suppose we 
are uncertain about the ontology that underlies a particular state (or process 
or entity), but we do have a body of peripheral knowledge, that collectively 
specifies a particular role for that state to perform. Lewis suggests we 
recast the story about this state as a conjunctive sentence, composed of T-
terms (theoretical terms, the terms to be defined and explained) and O-
terms (other terms; old, familiar knowledge, e.g. folk-psychology, in the 
case of a story about mental terms). 
 
The T-terms denote roles, the properties of those roles are specified by the 
O-terms, and the realizers occupy those roles. That is, real-world entities, if 
in fact the story is true about these (and only these) entities, are said to 
(uniquely) realize the theory. If a story is incorrect on a detail, this would 
imply there are no realizers to be found to occupy the role specified by the 
(incorrect) theory. However, in that case the (incorrect) story is nearly 
realized. - the T-terms name the components of a near-realization of the 
corrected form of the story (i.e. as it should have been told). 
 
As said above, if the states to be explained are mental states, Lewis 
suggests we take folk-psychological statements as O-terms, and form a 
conjunction of them, to specify (more or less implicitly) the kinds of roles 
mental terms are supposed to play, hence what they should be defined to 
be, in terms of our everyday way of speaking about them. More explicit 
definitions of T-terms (mental states, in this case) are formed by formulating 
the causal relations in which mental states stand. If we find out what kind of 
phenomenon performs the appropriate role, given that set of causal 
relations, we will know what the mental state in question is. 
 
If we wish to explain what a particular concept means, we can do at least 
part of that work by developing Lewis' scenario in the opposite direction. 
That is, we can specify the kind of role(s) a concept plays by localising it in 
a network of implications and inferences - we can reconstruct the concept's 
relevant subregion of conceptual space (see below, section 6.6). 
 
The most distinguishing feature of the naive colour concept (and, as I would 
want to claim, every other complex concept) is that it resists exactly this 
kind of a manoeuvre: a complete list of truths associated with this concept 
will contain contradictions and incompatibilities. The claim is that for a 
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complex concept, it is impossible to find a realizer, or even near-realizer, for 
the suite of O-terms that exists about it. In other words: what is 'it', then? 
Recall the list of colour-subconcepts given in the previous section: they can 
not all be true of the same phenomenon or entity at the same time, yet 
when we use the everyday concept of colour, it somehow affords smooth 
inference to any of the subconcepts mentioned - in some peculiar way, we 
are comfortable with using a single (superposed) concept as a placeholder 
for that wide array of mutually exclusive subconcepts. 
 
It might be possible to provide at least part of the explanation why this is the 
case. The idea that a superposed concept should still be treated as a single 
concept, despite the incompatibilities between its subconcepts, depends on 
two criteria: 
 
(1) Etymological: the presence of a unitary notion or concept as the 
historical origin of the suite of subconcepts, which was refined and fractured 
in a process of conceptual splitting (see section 6.10 for  more on this); 
 
(2) Practical: the ease and familiarity with which we can switch between 
using the various subconcepts, and still have the strong intuition that we are 
talking about the same thing. 
 
These switches between superposed concept and subconcept, or between 
subconcepts, is governed by the concept's internal structure. This structure 
is determined by a given (sub-)concept's inferred account. 
 
6.6 - Inferred Accounts and Narratives 
 
Recall once more that in section 6.1, the complexity of the concept 'colour' 
was illustrated by a list of descriptions of the ways in which various scientific 
disciplines explain and define colour. This implies that a particular concept, 
or the subconcepts belonging to a particular superposed concept, can be 
specified in terms of its associated theory. So in order to define what we 
might mean with the subconcept 'physical colour', we could try to formulate 
a description in terms of the laws, definitions, relations and regularities 
made available by physics, i.e. surface spectral reflectance, electron-photon 
interactions, energy bands, and the other concepts and theories that 
describe the physics of colour (Nassau, 2001). Of course, each of the 
concepts used in these theories has a structure of its own, and can be 
explained in terms of other theories (possibly more basic ones, in a 
mereological sense), which are likely to imply still other theories, and so on. 
 
Picking this method to define concepts would imply two things. First, it is 
possible to specify a layered structure of conceptual space; the 'superposed 
concept to subconcept'-transition is but the first step in a long chain of ever 
more fine-grained, basic definitions. In addition to these vertical 
connections, there are likely to be many other kinds of connections as well: 
some concepts might be linked to (i.e. play a role in constituting or 
explaining) several different other concepts simultaneously. This results in a 
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layered, web-like structure for conceptual space, with specific regions 
denoting a particular concept usedNOTE 42. Each region (concept) has a 
structure, and at a higher level of detail, still other structures might reveal 
themselves: subconcepts of the concept, and 'sub-subconcepts' belonging 
to the subconcept, and so on. Hence, we can say that conceptual space 
consists of multiply embedded manifolds. 
 
The superposition-relation (characteristically implying the mutual exclusion 
of subconcepts) is a special relation, and will not occur at every intra-level 
transition, but the structure in which a higher-level concept contains several 
other, lower-level concepts is ubiquitous, meaning that at least some 
regions of conceptual space are fractal-like in structureNOTE 43. Noteworthy is 
that superposition need not be limited to just the top level (i.e. the region of 
conceptual space containing little definitional detail), but might occur 
wherever a concept straddles a nexus of different kinds of explanatory 
accounts. 
 
The second implication of the chosen definitional method is that a concept, 
if used in a particular context, e.g. to play a role in the explanation of a 
particular phenomenon, does point towards all the other theoretical 
baggage that goes along with it, but this extra content does not need to be 
present or implied in the use of that concept in that context. In other words, 
in some cases it is perfectly fine to use a concept as a primitive notion. In 
such a case, I call that concept a contextual primitive. For instance, it is 
possible to specify a specific surface spectral reflectance profile, and have 
this be a perfectly acceptable explanation of why an object looks to have a 
certain colour (given a particular line of questioning or investigation), even 
though the very concept 'surface spectral reflectance' implies many more 
theoretical notions and relations. 
 
However, the notion 'theory' with which to specify the content of a concept 
(i.e. an embedded manifold in conceptual space) is too restrictive: not every 
concept or subconcept has a neatly worked-out theory to define its 
meaning. In fact, the vast majority of concepts does not. SToCC bears 
some resemblance to Theory theory of concepts (see section 2.4), which 
does state that concepts are structured in terms of theories, but there are 
several important differences; the first to be discussed is they way in which 
concepts are to be definedNOTE 44. 
 
SToCC suggests a characterization of the relations between concepts and 
subconcepts in terms of inferred accounts. Such an 'inferred account', 
which fills in what a concept or subconcept means, is not necessarily a full-
blown scientific theory - in fact, more often than not it will consist of an after-
the-fact, possibly almost apologetic account. This is the backbone of the 
structure of conceptual space in the SToCC model: the relations between 
concepts are to be explained in terms of accountability, in terms of 
justification That is, someone can be said to possess a particular concept if 
he is able to explain what he means in a coherent manner, or act 
appropriately in some other way that demonstrates he grasps the concept 
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at some level of sophistication (e.g. perform a behaviourally expressed 
categorization task with some level of success). 
 
The criteria to measure concept-possessing-behaviour against can then be 
defined in terms of achievement: is the concept-based action successful? 
Does it help the agent achieve whatever it is that he wanted to achieve, or 
does it at the very least enable a good enough attempt at reaching the 
desired goal-state? Are the discussion partners, to whom someone's use of 
a particular concept's content is explained, satisfied with the answer they 
have been given? This satisfaction might not take the form of agreement, 
but rather respect: the array of differences in opinion is probably finer-
grained than the array of differences in concept, so in some cases we might 
wish to concede that we use the same concept, even though there is some 
difference in the way that we use said conceptNOTE 45. 
 
It is possible to differentiate the 'achievement'-criterion for concept 
possession in terms of behavioural, cognitive and phenomenal aspects, 
each aspect yielding its own subcriteria, as follows: 
 
(1) Behavioural aspect: does the agent exhibit the appropriate kinds of 
action? For instance, how effectively does the agent capitalise upon 
opportunities for action in the environment? 
(2) Cognitive aspect: is the agent capable of creativity and devising 
contextually appropriate strategies? An additional (but not essential) 
criterium could be the agent's ability to provide a linguistic report on the 
reasons for his actions. 
(3) Phenomenal aspect: are there good reasons to suppose the agent 
possesses some kind of structured phenomenal content? Clues to help 
make this assessment can be derived from knowledge about the agent's 
neurophysiological structure and sensory faculties, and inferences based on 
criteria (1) and (2). 
 
The above, if coherent, means that in general concepts are not informed by 
theories, but by the broader phenomenon of narratives, i.e. the behavioural 
and cognitive 'jurisprudence' that we build up by living and acting, all the 
while using concepts, seeing other agents doing the same, and 
remembering effective behavioural profiles for application at a later date, in 
situations similar to the ones witnessed. This means that the normative 
aspect of this 'jurisprudence' is, to a large extent, defined in terms of the 
socio-cultural situatedness of agents. Many of these narratives are likely to 
be partly or wholly implicit, at least until an agent is asked to explain or 
justify his use of a particular concept, either in words, or in terms of action. 
And on this account there is no obstacle to the idea that some concepts are 
explicitly informed by theories - technical, scientific concepts for instance; 
these can be understood in terms of extraordinarily structured, shared, 
probably institutionalized, and explicitly defined and formulated narratives. 
 
However, most of these narratives more than likely do not satisfy the 
rigourous criteria of logic and rationality that proper theories should conform 
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to: inquiries into the meaning of most concepts probably bottom out at some 
idiosyncratic dogmatic level just because that is how the agent learnt or 
experienced it. That is, the aforementioned idea of jurisprudence most often 
concerns subjective experience rather than objective data. It concerns the 
context from which the meaning of a particular concept derives, for a 
particular agent, i.e. the kinds of experiences said agent has had, in which 
this concept was forged. In the vast majority of cases, I wish to claim, such 
a context has a narrative structure - consisting of events following other 
events involving the agent himself interacting with other agents and/or the 
environment - and that context determines the content and character of the 
experiences and bits of knowledge that inform the concept in some 
nontrivial way. An African-American child being told about the ideas of Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., and deriving some grasp of the concept 'justice' 
from those ideas, and the child of a Ku Klux Klan member hearing about 
those same ideas and constructing some notion of 'justice' from those 
stories, will end up having very different concepts of 'justice'. This means 
that many variables are of influence here: what the child already knows, 
who tells the story and why, and in what kind of socio-cultural context the 
lessons learned from those stories are to be implemented all determine how 
that particular concept takes shape in that child's actions and thoughts. All 
these variables indicate properties of the child's own life story: the ways in 
which the various players and settings of his own story relate to eachother 
co-determine how specific ideas and experiences are to be interpreted.  
 
Implementing the concept that the child has acquired (e.g. behaving in a 
just manner, according to what he has learned), and experiencing the 
implications of that implementation, form a further contribution to the 
continued evolution of that concept: "last time I tried to act according to 
what I thought was just by telling the police officer that my father had indeed 
been speeding when we were pulled over. My father got a ticket and later 
got really angry with me, so apparently it is not always best to be completely 
honest...". Several such implementation experiences then come to 
constitute the jurisprudence associated with that concept, i.e. the memories 
and ideas - concrete cases of behaving in accordance with that concept - 
based upon which new implementations of said concept can occur. 
 
This means that a concept can be said to have a narrative character in two 
ways: (1) the concept acquires the content it has by virtue of those 
constitutive experiences being embedded in a specific meaningful narrative 
structure, and (2) having been informed by those experiences in that 
particular structure, the concept contributes to the continued unfolding of 
the agent's own narrative. 
 
This does mean that each individual agent probably has at least some 
utterly unique concepts, because the way in which this agent learnt the 
meaning of that concept, and the way in which he experienced those 
learning processes, are unlike the concept-constituting experiences 
someone else has had. However, even though at a sufficiently high level of 
detail different agents' concepts are distinct, it is entirely possible for those 
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agents to believe that they share a concept, simply because those detailed 
depths of conceptual meaning and etymology are rarely - if ever, for most 
concepts - explored (see section 6.8 for more on this idea). An important 
factor in this synchronization occurs because all speakers of a particular 
language use the same limited vocabulary to label concepts: subtly different 
idiosyncratic associations evoked by a particular word do not, in the vast 
majority of cases, prohibit the effective shared use of such a word. 
 
The arguments for Dan Hutto (e.g. Gallagher and Hutto 2008) to introduce 
his Narrative Practice Hypothesis (as an alternative to simulation theory and 
theory theory in the 'theory of mind'-debate) run largely parallel to 
arguments for me to defend the narratives-account regarding the structure 
of conceptual space. Hutto's claim is that a structure of practical narratives 
embedded in everyday life, rather than knowledge of theoretical folk 
psychological laws, is the source of our ability to understand others as 
mental beings with mental states. These narratives are the stories, 
containing knowledge about reasons for acting, that were delivered to us in 
our upbringing, and continue to unfold for us in everyday interaction with 
others. 
 
One of Hutto's main arguments against the claim that folk psychology 
underlies our theorising about the minds and reasons for acting of others is 
that folk psychology is not a proper theory, and that even if people construct 
predictions or explanations based on what could be called folk-
psychological knowledge, this is not a deductive procedure involving 
general laws. Any and all regularities that might, in some cases, allow 
inference towards rules are extracted from narrative contexts. As noted 
before, SToCC differs from the theory theory (of concepts) for a similar 
reason: concepts, and the inferences that they support, very rarely take the 
form of proper scientific theories and their allowed inferences. 
 
An additional similarity of the Narrative Practice Hypothesis and SToCC 
concerns the context in which these Folk Psychological Narratives come 
into play most prominently. That is, they are most explicit when something 
is amiss: we do not continually engage in active, explicit reconstruction of 
the lives of others in order to understand their moves and motives. Rather, 
when someone does something that baffles us, that is in direct conflict with 
what we feel he should have done, the need to provide a narrative 
justification of his actions is most pressing. Similarly, in SToCC, being able 
to appeal to conceptual jurisprudence (with its narrative structure) is a 
criterion for possessing a concept, but the situations in which you are called 
upon to make parts of this jurisprudence explicit will usually be 
characterised by a mismatch of some sort: I use a particular concept in a 
way that fails to align with the expectations of my discussion partner, and he 
demands an explanation. 
 
There is a third parallel between SToCC, and the views of Hutto. However, 
this parallel has yet to be made explicit. In their (2008), Gallagher and Hutto 
augment the NPH with Gallagher's hypotheses about primary interaction. 
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Gallagher's claim is that a great deal of the way in which we interact with 
someone is informed by subconsciously perceived cues in body language, 
facial gestures and so on. This pre-conceptual co-attunement of agents can 
be seen as a precondition, and a continual source of input, for the 
interactive, narrative-driven practice of understanding others as mental 
beings. These two domains, namely 'intersubjective perceptual processes' 
and 'narrative competence' (augmented by a third, namely 'pragmatically 
contextualized comprehension') collectively cover the range of agent-to-
agent interaction-processes, according to Gallagher and Hutto. 
 
In SToCC, conceptual space is utilised as a tool to describe an agent's 
concept-guided action, and this space could conceivably play 'host' to the 
narrative and pragmatic components of Gallagher and Hutto's theory: the 
inferential connections that exist between concepts are specified in terms of 
pragmatically oriented, narratively informed accounts, that are (supposed to 
be) provided when a concept-user is pressed to explain his views and 
actions. 
 
Given the above-mentioned components of the theory of Gallagher and 
Hutto, two things are still somewhat absent from the SToCC-model: a 
stronger, more explicit account of how concepts are embedded in a broader 
social context, and a description of the role and place of these 
intersubjective perceptual processes. Both these demands will be met in the 
development of the 'Radicality Manifold'-model, in chapters 7 and on. 
 
The above helps us achieve four things: 
 
(1) the concept 'concept' is dislodged from its strict connection to theories of 
the scientific kindNOTE 46. Obviously, not everything we use to explain 
concepts conforms to the (scientific) criteria of what a theory is supposed to 
be. However, the 'inferred account/narratives'-proposal retains the kind of 
specification of conceptual meaning and structure that is needed: the 
proposal suggests that the inference in question yields a structured account 
intended to express the interrelatedness of the elements and properties of a 
specific object, state-of-affairs or process with the purpose of providing a 
record, which can be available to personal or interpersonal access in 
contextual (situated) explanation-demanding inquiries. This structuredness 
depends, to a significant extent, on the structure of phenomenal experience: 
for instance, a particular decision by the court can feel wrong, because it 
does not align with whatever intuitive apprehension of what is and is not just 
was instilled in me via my experiences. This brings us very close to the 
realm of bodily and/or phenomenal feels, i.e. the structures prescribed by 
the phenomenal basis of conceptual space. This suggests that much of this 
narrative structure is likely to be remembered according to feelings, 
sensations and impressions that were once experienced by an agent, rather 
than fully formed theoretical accounts; 
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(2) the notion 'narrative' (as opposed to 'theory'), is allied more smoothly 
with the perspectival epistemology inherent in the embodied/embedded 
cognition-paradigm: a concept can be (and often is) an idiosyncratic entity; 
 
(3) if mental phenomena require diachronic, rather than synchronic 
definitions, the notion 'narrative' offers a much better fitNOTE 47. 
 
(4) The reason why concepts are not necessarily linguistically mediated or 
even symbolic representations, or any other type of mental entity (even 
though they can be, in some cases) can be summarised by the slogan 'the 
world is its own best representation'. What gives a concept its meaning is 
the way in which it is used, and how it is used is determined by, and to a 
large extent instantiated in, the meaningful action of an agent in a structured 
environment. For humans, this environment includes other agents, and the 
socio-cultural and linguistic structures they generate. These structures 
provide the constraints within which the agent is supposed to be a concept-
user - that is, these structures provide tools and tutorials he can use to hone 
his concept-using skills, hence they provide the criteria against which his 
efficiency in concept-use can be measured. 
 
To reiterate, conceptual space can be seen as an embedded manifold, a 
space containing structures within structures, in which the relations between 
structures and internal to structures are specified in terms of inferred 
accounts; these accounts are derived from the narrative formed by the 
agent's own experiences. There are two special characteristics of 
conceptual space that need to be spelled out a bit more: conceptual 
enslavement, specifying the internal structure of a concept, to be discussed 
in the next section (6.7), and granularity, an operator that defines which 
aspect of a concept (e.g. which 'layer') is active, to be described in the 
section after that (6.8). These two properties, combined with the properties 
that have already been attributed to SToCC, yield a theory that shares 
some features with both prototype theory and theory theory about concepts; 
however, section 6.11 below will explain how SToCC is different. 
 
6.7 - Conceptual Enslavement 
 
Implicit within the notion of a concept as a structured entity - namely, an 
embedded manifold - is the idea that such an embedded manifold might 
have an internal hierarchy, i.e. that some components or aspects of the 
concept might be more prominent than others, in the sense that they play a 
more important role, do more of the work in actually constituting whatever it 
is the concept means or does. 
 
What I call a conceptual enslaver is the most prominent component or 
component-cluster of a concept's internal hierarchy, and is, as such, an 
expression of the way a concept is most often used by a particular person. 
As such, an enslaver is often an idiosyncratic expression of habitual 
concept use. Conceptual enslavement is the extraction of a (contextually 
and/or causally important) element (or set of elements) from the narrative(s) 
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provided in experience, and establishing it as the highest-ranking member 
in the internal hierarchy of a concept. 
 
As such, enslavers are often derived from actually perceived objects or 
events, the best example available to a subject in his experienceNOTE 48, 
which can fulfill the function of a paradigm case, around which a concept 
might be built up. Eventually, the concept might be refined to such an extent 
that an abstract, prototype-like locus in conceptual space might come to 
represent more accurately what the concept is supposed to denote, but the 
initial 'best perceived example' will serve as the historical impetus of the 
concept, and at any given time there will be such a example (or class of 
them) which will reside at the top of the kinds of lists people give if they are 
asked to provide good, concrete examples of what a particular concept is 
supposed to mean. 
 
Using an enslaver as the defining core of a concept allows the provisional 
use of a concept by referring to such best examples (e.g. characterising or 
classifying birds on the basis of the sparrows you see in your back yard 
every day), which can be subject to revisions, expansions, detail shifts or 
even expansive redefinitions, if contextually demanded. When an enslaver 
grows to be more established, it tends to function like an 'essence', to mask 
the absence of a detailed definition, or exhaustive list of typical featuresNOTE 
49
. This is the reason why SToCC does not fall prey to the 'missing 
prototypes'-problem, that does plague Prototype Theory (see section 2.3, 
and 6.11.2 for a closer look at this issue). 
 
For instance, the meaning of the highly elusive concept 'justice' might, for a 
particular person's everyday use, be explained (or justified) in terms of a 
nonspecific moral stance somehow distilled from parental or religious 
guidance, or even the morality displayed by fictional characters. That way 
the enslaver of 'justice' can be a set of (privatised, possibly idiosyncratically 
modified) experiences and examples  that might contain such disparate 
elements as the 'I have a dream'-speech by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the 
particularly memorable punishment I received for breaking a window when I 
was six years old, a report on the evening news about the conviction of a 
murderer, perhaps even the climactic scene from a movie where the hero, 
in an act of compassion, spares the villain's life. These salient images and 
memories, derived from the agent's experience (aspects of a narrative - see 
section 6.7) are constitutive of a more or less vague idea of what amounts 
to 'justice' (or at least 'just behaviour'), hence form a comparison class 
based upon which behaviour (that of yourself or of another) is judged to be 
just or not. And when someone is asked to specify what their use of the 
concept 'justice' amounts to, this class (i.e. the conceptual enslaver) is used 
as a basis for the inferential process of justifying the use of this particular 
concept: examples from the concept's jurisprudence might be provided by 
way of explanation. 
 
The reconstruction of a narrative by way of justification of the use of a 
particular concept (or set thereof) in a particular way involves expanding 
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upon a conceptual enslaver cache, and this reconstruction is a social 
process, i.e. it is only one pole of a process of interactional co-construction 
in which, usually, multiple agents are involved. 
 
Being a low-detail placeholder, an enslaver can explain how someone can 
be said to hold a concept without explicitly holding the concept's complete 
and correct associated theory (e.g. what an experienced judge would 
provide as explanation of the concept 'justice'), which is the case infinitely 
more often than that we use a concept and are immediately aware of all it 
contains and implies.  
 
Another interesting property of an enslaver is that it can act as a kind of 
anchour, helping a concept or subconcept resist modification of its meaning 
in everyday use even when the inferred accounts change. For instance, 
nowadays the bubonic plague is understood as a disease that is caused by 
the enterobacteria Yersinia Pestis, whereas historic outbreaks of the 
disease (e.g. the Black Death, which  killed about a quarter of Europe's 
population between 1347 and 1350) were, at the time, judged to be the 
effects of divine retributionNOTE 50. So, the connected inferred account, 
hence an important part of what the concept 'plague' is understood to mean, 
is different now than it was six or seven centuries ago, but there is a case to 
be made for the idea that someone from the Middle Ages and someone 
from today can both use the concept 'plague', and both mean the same 
thing. This is because the enslaver for this concept is likely to involve 
particularly salient elements, such as the catalog of symptoms associated 
with the plague, that both people can use to indicate what they mean (e.g. 
'plague' means fever, swollen lymph nodes and so on), despite the 
differences in inferred accounts (bacteria vs. deity)NOTE 51. At least part of 
the reason of this type of similarity in concept possession (that is, despite 
non-trivial differences in inferred accounts), has to do with the level of detail 
at which a concept is used in the majority of everyday situations. I call this a 
concept's granularity - the topic of the next section. 
 
In this description, enslavers appear to be similar to the prototypes from 
Prototype Theory (described in section 2.3). They are indeed similar, but 
there are also some important differences. The main differences of these 
'enslavement'-properties of concepts in SToCC with the 'prototypes' from 
Prototype theory about concepts will be explained in section 6.11.2 below. 
 
6.8 - Granularity 
 
The ability to conceptualize the world at different levels of detail - different 
granularities - and to pick the appropriate one in a given situation, is an 
essential feature of our intelligence (Hobbs, 1985). This feature is also 
highly relevant to the meaning and use of concepts, because a significant 
aspect of the semantic content of a proposition can shift in aspectual 
structure due to such granularity-shifts or -transitions. Compare: 
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'(1) John was sick. 
(2) The virus attacked John's throat, which became inflamed, resulting in 
laryngitis, until the immune 
system succeeded in destroying the infection.' (Croft 1991; page 163NOTE 52) 
 
These sentences describe the same 'thing', but at different levels of 
granularity, and - this is an important point to be taken note of here - as 
concerning different kinds of events. (1) is a low-detail description of a state 
of affairs, whereas (2) exhibits the aforementioned shift in aspectual 
structure by providing a higher-detail description of a series of processes. 
 
In other words, the differences between using either (1) or (2) extend 
beyond merely being about the same 'thing' at different size levels. If I 
inquire after the condition of my friend John, because I knew he wasn't 
feeling well, I might get an answer like (1), which tells me something about 
John as a person. If I am a doctor, asking about John not (just) as a person 
but as a composite of organs that needs to be cured of its ailment, I might 
be told something like (2), which tells me something about the functioning of 
John's proper parts. The shift in levels as such concerns different aspects 
(these might be either aspects of the whole, or part-aspects) of the same 
'thing', and a description of one aspect (say, 'John' as a irreducible primitive, 
namely a person) does not necessarily translate to the other without the 
loss of important contextual information. 
 
Recall that I introduced the term 'contextual primitive' in section 6.6 - there I 
said that "(...) it is possible to specify a particular surface spectral 
reflectance profile, and have this be a perfectly acceptable explanation of 
why an object looks to have a specific colour, even though the very concept 
'surface spectral reflectance' implies many more theoretical notions and 
relations". That is what 'granularity' is: a conceptualization of some object, 
process or state of affairs at a level of detail that befits the situation, and the 
agent's body of knowledge pertaining to the entity in question. 
 
That means that it should be possible to define a granularity gradient, a 
trajectory of increasingly detailed conceptualizations, in some cases 
possibly continuous but in most cases probably discrete in character, which 
corresponds to the exploration of a subsection of conceptual space. It is 
important to understand that exploring the 'hierarchy' of ever more detailed 
definitions constitutive of a concept's inferred account is not necessarily the 
same as moving towards the non- or low-conceptual 
(perceptual/phenomenal) basis of conceptual space. Rather, 'digging 
deeper' along the granularity gradient means 'zooming in' on some 
subsection of conceptual space, and exploring the finer-grained structure of 
a (sub-)concept. A helpful visualization might be to think of conceptual 
space like a capillary system (the lungs or blood vessels, for instance), with 
the nonconceptual, perceptual spaces forming the 'trunk', and traversing 
along the granularity gradient as successive, increasingly detailed views of 
a finely veined subsection of the space. 
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The structure along which the zooming-in can occur consists mostly of 
implicatory, inferential, definitional connections. These inferential 
connections might get rather complex, especially if they are non-local - that 
is, defined in terms of other kinds of objects, entities or relations. Part of the 
inferred account of the (non-complex) concept 'tiger', for instance, involves 
reference to similar-styled and intuitively implied concepts like 'cat' and 
'furry animal', but may also involve rather different kinds of concepts like 
'DNA', 'reproduction', and inferences involving evolutionary history, 
preferred niche, animal rights, and so on, depending on how detailed and/or 
broad the inferred account gets. Each of these concepts has its own 
inferred account, also possibly with trans-categorical (i.e. non-local) 
inferences; this results in a highly tangled conceptual space structure. 
 
Some of these inferential transitions in the structure of conceptual space 
might be of a kind that implies the concepts involved resist reductionNOTE 53. 
Conceptual superposition is a special case, involving a relation of a similar 
kind: a superposed concept caps (a particular subsection of) the granularity 
gradient at a low-grain end, but there is a kind of discontinuity between it 
and the rest of the gradient: the relation between the superposed concept 
and its subconcepts is inferential, according to the properties explained in 
section 6.6, but not straightforwardly inclusive. 
 
In a somewhat stricter formulation, granularity concerns a mapping between 
conceptual space and the particular contextual demands that the 
environment places on occurrent conceptual dispositions. Seeking out a 
specific location along the granularity gradient involves relating conceptual 
space to the agent's context of action, to which the concept at that particular 
granularity is most suited. For now, this description should suffice; in 
chapter 8, the introduction of the 'Radicality Manifold'-model will yield a 
more concrete characterisation of the mappings and relations that connect 
conceptual space with the agent's environment. 
 
There is one final property of granularity, in conjunction with conceptual 
enslavement, that I will highlight here: now, it is possible to clarify how 
someone's use of a complex concept need not follow the guidelines 
pertaining to complex concepts as set out above. If a person's enslaver of, 
say, the concept 'colour' is of a low enough granularity, and he is never (or 
has not yet been) placed in a situation where the use of a finer-grained, 
hence contextualised subconcept is required, he will not view the concept 
'colour' as a complex concept. Similarly, it is not difficult to imagine a case 
in which someone is never in need of contemplating the differences 
between 'time' as a variable in physics, a substantivalist theory of time as 
an interpretation of the General theory of relativity, and the knotted 
topologyNOTE 54 of 'lived', phenomenal, remembered time; this person would 
not think that 'time' was a complex concept. 
 
The main differences of these 'granularity'-properties of concepts on SToCC 
with the 'basic level categories' from Prototype theory about concepts will 
be explained in section 6.11.2 below. The properties of (complex) concepts 
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as described so far suggest particular ways in which concepts and 
conceptual space expand and evolve; the following few sections are 
devoted to various aspects of concept development. 
 
6.9 - Concept Development Part 1: From Sensorimotor Acuity to 
Conceptual System 
 
The discussion of 'enslavers' and 'granularity' above concerned the 
properties and dynamics of evolved and functional conceptual spaces. 
Obviously, there also needs to be a story about how such conceptual 
spaces came to be the way they are. Recall that in section 6.4, I suggested 
that that even higher-order concepts are ultimately rooted in basic 
sensorimotor contingencies. One way of supporting that claim is by 
providing a plausible account of the way in which, throughout a child's 
development, more advanced concepts can emerge from fairly basic 
sensorimotor contingencies. Based on suggestions by Mandler (2007) and 
incorporating the SToCC vernacular developed in the preceding sections, I 
will now present a brief overview of exactly that: the way in which an 
advanced conceptual system might emerge from humble sensorimotor 
beginnings. That is: right now I will focus on the development of a 
conceptual system as such, whereas after that, section 6.10 will offer a 
description of the refinement of concepts in terms of a progressive 
segmentation of conceptual space, inspired by Jameson's IDM (see section 
5.2). 
 
The sensorimotor apprehension of motion forms the foundation upon which 
several mechanisms for the expansion and refinement of conceptual space 
are built. In order of discussion, the components are: 
 
[Stage 1]: sensorimotor apprehension of motion 
[Stage 2]: correlation of sensorimotor knowledge and linguistic encoding 
[Stage 3]: embodied and embedded crossmodal mapping 
[Stage 4]: correlation of embodiment and abstraction 
 
[Concept development Stage 1: sensorimotor apprehension of motion] 
Mandler (2007) states that in the earliest stages of their development, 
children tend to be less focused on the details of what objects look like 
(despite having the perceptual capacity to do so), but appear more focused 
on what those objects are doing: motion, novel motion in particular, attracts 
attention above everything else. At two months old, many children pay 
closer attention to objects that move in ways independent from their own 
motion, and at three months, they can already distinguish between 
biological and non-biological motion. At six months, they can pay attention 
to the beginning and end of an object's trajectory, and at nine months, many 
children are surprised when a non-biological object starts moving on its 
own. Mandler (2007) uses this developmental sequence to claim that a 
relatively simple tendency to attend to motion can help generate a lot of 
knowledge, and that the first practical conceptual fission is one which 
distinguishes animals (with their characteristic movement patterns) from 
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non-animals. A progressive interest in salient features of the objects in 
question can help specify the content of the associated concepts: in 
addition to a characteristic way of moving, animals also tend to have eyes, 
mouths, and so on. 
 
Apart from helping the child in getting a start at categorising the objects he 
encounters, his early preference for moving things also provides him with 
the earliest relational concepts, says Mandler: consider spatial notions such 
as 'containment' and 'attachment', but also 'physical cause', which might be 
derived from witnessing objects bumping into eachother. 
 
Even an apprehension of the object-concept as such (including ideas about 
the persistent existence and continued motion of temporarily occluded 
objects: children will expect an object that moves behind a larger object to 
reappear on the other side) can be motion-based. 
 
Hence, the spatial primitives that lie at the very foundation of concept 
formation as a strategy to interpret events, according to Mandler, are 'path' 
(including 'start-of-path' and 'end-of-path'), 'into-container' and 'out-of-
container', 'onto-surface' and 'off-of-surface', 'up' and 'down', 'linked paths' 
(pertaining to objects interacting), 'blocked path' and 'motion transfer'. 
Hence, a good hypothesis could be that the foundation for the development 
of conceptual ability is formed by a sensorimotor apprehension of motion. In 
that vein, Gallese and Lakoff (2005) provide a suggestion on how we can 
conceive of basic action concepts as rooted in the sensorimotor system's 
activity 
 
They claim that both abstract concepts and more concrete action-centered 
concepts depend on action-related neural activity for their realisation. 
Specifically, they state the sensorimotor system exhibits the kind of 
structure and activityNOTE 55 to characterise these concepts in an appropriate 
way. 
 
Gallese and Lakoff discern the traditional idea of 'concept' from 'schema'. 
The former they describe as an internal (disembodied) representation of 
something external, whereas a schema is inherently interactional, in a way 
that depends on the way our bodies and our brains are put together, and 
how we interact with the world, both physically and socially. These 
schemata can do the work concepts (used to) do, and the parameters and 
their values used to define these schemata can be linked to the functional 
structure of the sensorimotor system's activity. 
 
It should be obvious that the definition of schemata given by Gallese and 
Lakoff appears to be quite compatible with the definition of concepts used in 
SToCC, at least in the sense that concepts as I understand them are also 
defined in embodied and embedded terms; the definition of 'concept' they 
argue against is a disembodied representation of the old cognitivist kind. 
For the purposes of this book, their use of 'schema' vs. my use of 'concept' 
is merely terminological. 
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Gallese and Lakoff's schemata are depictions of the functional roles of 
relevant neural clusters, and these clusters are characterised by 
parameters and their values. 
 
For example, they decompose the 'grasp'-concept/schema as follows: 
 
"The grasp schema. 
1. The role parameters: agent, object, object location, and the action itself. 
2. The phase parameters: initial condition, starting phase, central phase, 
purpose condition, 
ending phase, final state.  
3. The manner parameter. 
4. The parameter values (and constraints on them)." (Gallese and Lakoff 
2005) 
 
And: 
 
"The various parameters can be described as follows. 
Agent: An individual. 
Object: A physical entity with parameters: size, shape, mass, degree of 
fragility, and so on. 
Initial condition:: Object Location: Within peri-personal space. 
Starting phase:: Reaching, with direction: Toward object location; opening 
effector. 
Central phase:: Closing effector, with force: A function of fragility and 
mass. 
Purpose condition:: Effector encloses object, with manner (a grip 
determined by parameter values and situational conditions). 
Final state:: Agent in-control-of object." (Gallese and Lakoff 2005) 
 
Below, under 'Concept development Stage 4' (correlation of embodiment 
and abstraction), this idea will be expanded to apply to abstract concepts. 
 
[Concept development Stage 2: correlation of sensorimotor knowledge and 
linguistic encoding] An important step towards expansion and refinement of 
this basic mode of agent-environment interaction is the acquisition of 
linguistic skills, which can force the child to start paying closer attention to 
the details, rather than merely the broad motion-based properties of 
observed objects. After all, notes Mandler (2007), a one-year-old child might 
call many kinds of self-moving, interacting entities 'doggie', thus placing 
dogs, cats, guinea pigs and rabbits in the same category. The child's 
parents, rather, do differentiate between these various animals, using a 
different linguistic label for each. These different labels, and the additional 
features that belong to each of the various tokens of the child's primitive 
'doggie'-type which parents might draw attention to (a dog says 'woof', a cat 
says 'meow', and a rabbit says very little but has long ears and a bushy tail), 
will serve to draw the child's attention to the fact that these tokens do 
indeed differ, and might require their own concept. Each of these concepts 
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('cat', 'dog', 'rabbit' and so on) having its own linguistic label will help solidify 
and stabilise these concepts, especially when the child notices a reliable 
correlation between his linguistic utterances and approval-expressing 
reactions of the parents ('yes, very good, that is a cat!'). Increasing 
knowledge of each concept's associated object features will constrain the 
generalisations made by children: at some point the child will realise that 
certain things which might be true for dogs can no longer be held to apply to 
cats (for instance 'retrieves balls that are thrown away', or 'likes to swim in 
murky ponds'). 
 
Mandler describes another form of language-based conceptual expansion 
and refinement: the development of linguistic skills will aid in connecting 
mainly phenomenally specified concepts to their linguistic labels. He says 
that learning colour words, for instance, will establish indexical relations 
between colour concepts on the one hand, and otherwise unanalysed 
colour qualia on the other. I would like to suggest an adaptation of this 
particular way of concept development that is less representationalist, 
focusing not on indexical relationships as such, but on qualia-related 
behavioural patterns that are appropriate to the contexts in which they are 
usually applied. That is: as discussed in chapter 4, colour concepts, which 
develop relatively late in a child's development, encode how colour qualia 
are linked to the objects that are perceived to be coloured by way of a 
behavioural prescription, specifying the appropriate patterns of action-based 
agent-environment interaction if confronted by said coloured object 
(examples being: having the ability to pick a red piece of fruit instead of a 
green one because you know 'red' means 'ripe/edible', or knowing how to 
make the correct kinds of theoretical inference pertaining to 'colour'). 
Acquiring the linguistic labels then stimulates the progressive refinement of 
conceptual (i.e. perceptuo-behavioural) space as it pertains to colour. 
Because, on my account, the link between qualia and linguistic labels is not 
an indexical relationship (colour words do not refer to colour feels alone), 
but the expression of a behavioural interaction practice, I would not count 
this as a separate mechanism for concept development. Rather, this is a 
special case of the mechanism described above, i.e. the stimulating 
impetus on concept development of the acquisition of a linguistic encoding 
scheme. 
 
[Concept development Stage 3: embodied and embedded crossmodal 
mapping] Crossmodal mapping is a major source of new, more complex, 
higher-order, and possibly even abstract concepts. This is, to a large extent, 
the point made by Gallese and Lakoff (2005), already referenced briefly 
above. Gallese and Lakoff, extrapolating work done in Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980; 1999), claim that higher-order concepts can be interpreted as 
utilising metaphorical transformations linking them to lower-order concepts, 
i.e. the ones informed by somatosensory and/or sensorimotor processes: 
 
"The sensory-motor system can characterise action concepts and, in 
simulation, characterise conceptual inferences. And the concepts 
characterised in the sensory-motor system are of the right form to 
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characterise the source domains of conceptual metaphors." (Gallese and 
Lakoff 2005) 
 
The cognitive task achieved in using conceptual metaphors (i.e. cross-
domain mappings, e.g. the description of an abstract process with an action 
metaphor, like 'The Eurozone fell into a recession') might be related to the 
synaesthetic confluence of sensory information in the modality-integrating 
function of consciousness, with a special role in that integrative process 
reserved for the sensorimotor systemNOTE 56. 
 
Another interesting parallel to be drawn is with Jameson's cross-
dimensional mapping hypothesis. In section 5.2 I discussed that Kimberly 
Jameson suggests tetrachromats in a trichromatic world use a cognitive 
four-to-three-dimensional mapping function. In my discussion of that idea, it 
was claimed that the possibility of tetrachromatic humans which would, for 
Jameson, necessitate such a strategy should not (currently) be overstated. 
However, for an understanding of shifts in granularity, or even the reduction 
of a conceptual superposition to the temporary, contextual usage of a 
particular conception, Jameson's idea might be illuminating. 
 
Recall that the general idea, which Jameson develops in her (2005), is as 
follows. Dichromats and trichromats differ in the sense that individuals from 
the latter category are able to make distinctions that individuals from the 
former category cannot. That is, colour samples that, for a dichromat, lie 
within the same discrimination tolerance (the region in perceptual space of 
matching colour samples), can lie in separate regions for a trichromat, and 
this is due to the fact that the trichromat has an additional chromatic sensor 
type on the retina, because of which the trichromat’s perceptual space is 
more complex, enabling him to make finer-grained colour distinctions.  
 
Now suppose the majority of humans were dichromats (of a specific type), 
then colour language would be ‘dichromatic’ as well: only the colours these 
dichromats could distinguish would be encoded linguistically. A trichromat 
would have no problems using this dichromatic language, for all the colour 
discriminations the dichromats can make, he can make as well. He might be 
confused about the fact that some colours he can distinguish as being 
rather different are nonetheless grouped together and given the same 
name, but achieving this translation from ‘trichromatic colour experience’ to 
‘dichromatic colour language’ is a trick that should be relatively easy to 
learn. 
 
Jameson then claims that tetrachromats (living in a trichromatic society), 
who have a more sophisticated colour perceptual space than normal 
trichromats, would need to achieve a similar reduction of ‘tetrachromatic 
colour experience’, to ‘trichromatic colour language’, grouping certain 
distinguishable colours together just because there are no words to cut 
colour space as finely as the tetrachromat’s experience does. 
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For granularity-shifts in conceptual space, something similar might happen, 
but because these shifts and cross-dimensional-mappings occur in 
cognitive, theoretical terms rather than in terms of innately specified 
perceptual dimensionalities, they are much more frequent than any of 
Jameson’s scenarios would be. In terms of the theoretical tools of SToCC 
that we have discussed so far, this would involve the mapping of 'high-
dimensional' or fine-grained talk in terms of a conception that encodes 
detailed theoretical knowledge and hypotheses about a subregion of the 
colour perception process onto the 'low-dimensional' or coarse-grained talk 
in terms of the much less specific and complex superposed colour 
conceptNOTE 57. 
 
This involves the fact that, when speaking about colour in general, the 
language we use does not cut nearly as finely as the separate theories 
about various aspects of the colour-perception-dynamic would prescribe: a 
shift from a conception to the superposed concept is one of decreasing 
detail, and involves ignoring knowledge about colour encapsulated in the 
various subdomains. 
 
The translations in conceptual space are more complex than the ones in 
perceptual space, because it is also possible to traverse from one concept 
to the other – the main link between the two, SToCC would claim, is due to 
the fact that they are both contributors to the superposed concept. 
 
Now, crossmodal mapping conflicts such as the ones indicated above can 
occur when a more detailed theory (or more or less coherent explanatory 
account) about some phenomenon is devised, necessitating the 'invention' 
of new (sub-)concepts - this is one means of concept development. 
 
[Concept development Stage 4: correlation of embodiment and abstraction] 
An additional refinement of conceptual contentNOTE 58 can derive from the 
extrapolated interpretation and implementation of phenomenal awareness, 
as it operates in agent-environment interaction. Mandler asks us to consider 
an abstract concept such as physical cause. His suggestion is that a deeper 
apprehension of this concept can result from the amalgamation of, on the 
one hand, the child's basic, sensorimotor intuitions about the difference 
between autonomous motion and caused motion (see above, under stage 
1), and, on the other hand, the child's own phenomenal experience of 
bumping into other objects. A conceptual understanding of the physical 
causation involved in seeing one object causing another object to start 
moving can then be ameliorated by the 'oomph'-like feeling remembered 
from earlier encounters with walls and table legs, and/or the work required 
to overcome the inertia of movable objects such as toys. 
 
This correlation of embodiment and abstraction can take the form of an 
embedded manifold, in a schema that can be extrapolated from the 
suggestions done by Gallese and Lakoff (2005) about the way in which 
more complex concepts are based on action-based sensorimotor activity. 
This is how that might work for colour-related behaviour. The colour 
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perception/cognition/action-process will, in most cases, be a multi-stage 
process consisting of various action-processes (perceiving, thinking, 
deciding, reaching, grasping), which might each have its own schema. 
Hence, the schema for a colour-perception/cognition/action-process will 
itself be an embedded manifold (see section 6.6) containing various sub-
schemata. However, it is possible to simplify and summarise two 
reasonably basic scenarios involving colour-perception as follows: 
 
Scenario [I]: obtaining a desirably-coloured object, e.g. a piece of fruit. 
Scenario [II]: fleeing from a ‘non-desirably-coloured’ object, e.g. a predator. 
 
Agent: An individual. 
Object: A physical entity with parameters: shape, size, colour, visual 
texture, desirability. ‘Desirability’ is a higher-order function of the way in 
which the agent relates to the object, with, in these cases, either a positive 
[I] or a negative [II] value. This value depends on an apprehension of the 
goal-state of the associated scenario, which could, for instance, be obtained 
by way of a simulation - imagined re-enactment - of the process. 
Initial condition:: Object Location: Within peripersonal space. In this case, 
this is larger than tactile peripersonal space, for it is determined by visibility 
and occurrently relevant distance, i.e. whether the individual can reach the 
fruit in a sufficiently easy manner [I], or whether the predator is close 
enough to be a threat [II]). 
Starting phase:: Deliberated, directed movement: Towards [I] or away from 
[II] object location. 
Central phase:: Executing grasp schema [I]. 
Purpose condition:: [I]: Apprehension of desired object: Effector encloses 
object, with manner (a grip determined by parameter values and situational 
conditions); [II]: reaching a safe(r) location 
Final state:: Agent in state of relative well-being 
 
Note how, for these two somewhat more complex action scenarios, various 
action-, perception- and cognition-depicting schemata (locomotion, reaching 
and grasping, goal-state assessment, mental simulation) are embedded 
within the overarching schema. The increase in complexity/dimensionality 
needed to model these action patterns in conceptual space would require 
reference not just to colour, but also to object shape, the visual context of 
the object, and more in general the affordances the object in its 
environment represents to a particular agent. 
 
A deeper exploration of the way in which higher-level concepts relate to the 
pre-conceptual level of sensorimotor activity is a highly complex affair, but I 
hope this discussion of the Gallese/Lakoff model functions as a kind of 
intuition pump, that causes the idea of a conceptual spectrum (and its 
development) to make sense. It should be noted that for SToCC, a 
reduction all the way down to the basic level is not needed for definitional 
purposes, because in SToCC, definitions are given at a contextually 
determined granularity, including a justificatory structure (see section 6.6). 
 
 120 
I can currently make one brief additional suggestion. Adapting the 
'conceptual metaphor'-idea mentioned above (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 
1999; Gallese and Lakoff, 2005) I can offer a rather tentative hypothesis 
about the evolution of higher cognition. The idea is that neural activity for 
objects within an agent's reach, i.e. within peripersonal space, is markedly 
different from activity related to objects outside that reach. Providing a test 
subject with a tool, e.g. a stick, will change the contours of peripersonal 
space to include the extended reach provided by the tool (Maravita and Iriki, 
2004). This is thought to result in a modification of the way in which space 
and spatial relations are 'represented' in the agent's brain. Furthermore, an 
agent's canonical neurons exhibit specific activation patterns when objects 
are present that afford action (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi and Rizzolatti, 
1996). My idea, which might be interesting to attempt to corroborate 
empirically, involves whether these neuronal activation patterns of action of 
manipulable objects within peripersonal space, as implementations of 
Gallese and Lakoff's (2005)  'grasp' schema, have anything in common with 
the metaphorical extension of cognitive 'grasping'. That is, perhaps there is 
a structural similarity and/or evolutionary continuity between the neural 
activation patterns associated with the following successive stages: (1) 
manipulating an object within peripersonal space; (2) observing a physically 
manipulable object within peripersonal space; (3) observing a cognitively 
comprehensible object outside peripersonal space. 
 
Apart from the SToCC-specific version of Lakoff and Johnson's modal 
metaphor-based idea that is described above, there are several other ways 
in which SToCC can accomodate the creation of more complex and/or 
abstract concepts. After all, a substantial challenge for any theory of 
concepts is how to explain the existence of concepts of unobservables 
('electron') or abstract concepts ('truth', 'justice', or mathematical concepts) - 
concepts which are not linked to or composed of specific perceptual 
representations in any obvious way. 
 
Jesse Prinz (2002; see section 10.3) notes that we are capable of 
developing and using concepts without full knowledge of their referents. We 
accomplish this feat by attending to reliably correlated properties, an activity 
called 'sign tracking'. There are several different kinds of such signs. Often, 
we use superficial appearances to classify and conceptualise, focusing not 
on the properties that are necessary and sufficient for something to count 
as an example of what it is perceived to be, but on merely contingently but 
reliably connected properties. For instance: the concept 'human being' is 
usually specified not by reference to the properties of the human genome, 
but in terms of a general human-like appearance, including the presence of 
a certain number of limbs of a specific size, shape and functional 
applicability, characteristically human facial features, and so on. 
 
We can also use perceivable correlates of inperceivable properties 
(someone's 'being humourous' can be detected by determining the 
proximity and frequency of smiling faces, sounds of laughter, etc.), or 
scientific instruments (in the case of electrons, quarks, weak 
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electromagnetic fields, quasars at the edge of the observable universe and 
other such entities, which cannot be detected without aid). And finally, 
words in natural languages can be used to keep track of complex or 
abstract concepts: I need not have personal experience with or intimate 
knowledge of certain entities, as long as there is a word available that picks 
out said entity, the exact meaning of which has been defined by experts. 
 
In SToCC, an enslaver is what results from the practice of sign tracking; a 
collection of specific characteristic signs is often what constitutes the 
concept's narrative jurisprudence (see section 6.6). The meanings of 
concepts associated with unobservables, abstract concepts and even the 
concepts of observable but highly complex entities, processes or states of 
affairs are often implicated as a central tendency of a catalogue of 
observable signs that is remembered. A formal description of this 
implicatory tendency might be in the style of David Lewis' (1972) definition 
of functionalizability (which was discussed, briefly, in section 6.5): the 
trackable signs pertaining to some unobservable entity collectively specify a 
particular role for the concept of said unobservable to play in our accepted 
ways of speaking, thinking and acting involving the unobservable. For 
example: individual electrons cannot be observed (or at the very least not 
directly) by human beings, but because we have the output of instruments 
detecting electrons, scientific papers describing properties of electrons, 
memories of high school physics classes about electrons, and so on, most 
people have the concept 'electron' in the sense that they are capable of 
conversing and thinking about them at some level of granularity.  
 
Summarising, this is the general sequence of mechanisms involved in the 
development of conceptual abilities from a sensorimotor foundation: 
 
Foundation: 
 - sensorimotor apprehension of motion 
Expansion and refinement: 
- correlation of sensorimotor knowledge and linguistic encoding 
- embodied and embedded (body- and motion-based) crossmodal mapping 
(analogies) 
- linkage of embodiment and abstraction (extrapolated interpretation and 
implementation of phenomenal awareness, and the exploitation of signs) 
 
In the next section, I will offer a description of the continued evolution and 
refinement of a particular concept (or class of connected concepts) inspired 
by the perceptual space-vernacular introduced earlier (in section 5.2). 
 
6.10 - Concept Development Part 2: Conceptual Space Evolution 
 
Part of the evolution of concepts, and more specifically the evolution of the 
array of concepts an agent might hold, can be described in terms of the 
progressive segmentation of conceptual space as new concepts are 
implemented. A suggestion for the mechanism involved in such a process 
was developed throughout chapter 5, in the discussion of Jameson's IDM. 
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Recall also that for complex concepts such as 'colour', SToCC includes the 
thesis that differences of categorization and definition result in an array of 
potentially incommensurable stories about a particular phenomenon, and 
that due to that incommensurability the concept of that phenomenon cannot 
be held to apply in full in all situations it is supposed to. 
 
Maund (1981, 1995) draws attention to this peculiar property of the colour 
concept by stating that there is no single property (physical, mental, or 
whatever) that plays all the roles customarily attributed to 'colour'. His 
solution to this problem was to invoke the idea of 'conceptual splitting': the 
process by which a unitary, naive colour concept that was prevalent in the 
(distant) past split into two incompatible subconcepts at some point during 
our cultural and scientific development. 'Colour' actually has a physical and 
a psychological component, he says in his (1981) article, each with its own 
content and domain of application. 
 
Like Thompson (see chapter 4.5), Maund posits the current situation in the 
philosophy of colour involves a particularly persistent dichotomy of 
objectivism versus subjectivism. To overcome the deadlock, Maund 
suggests we should adopt a pluralist view of colour. 
 
He says: 
 
"(...) there are no properties (or no good reason to believe that there are) 
that satisfy all of the following constraints (nor even satisfy any two of 
them): 
1. which play the causal role required to be played by colours in the 
perception of colour, i.e. in the production of colour experiences and  
2. which collectively have the kind of structure embedded in colour ordering 
systems; and 
3. which have the sensuous character of colour." (Maund 1995) 
 
And:  
 
"(...) there is not one viable concept of colour but several. (...) we can 
distinguish between different kinds of colour, e.g. physical colour, optical 
colour, psychophysical colour and so on. (...) Each serves its own purposes 
and functions." (Maund 1995, pg. 114) 
 
So, Maund notes that the word 'colour' has several different uses. It is easy 
to see how this can be the case: the colour perception dynamic is a 
complex process spanning different kinds of processes. As noted before 
(section 6.1) the descriptive and explanatory accounts to understand these 
processes derive from different branches of science - physics for surface 
spectral reflectance, neurophysiology for the neural processing of retinal 
stimuli, phenomenology for the ‘feels’ of colour percepts, anthropology and 
linguistics for the segmentation of perceptual colour space, evolutionary 
biology and philosophy to provide an interpretation of the meaning of it all, 
and so on. These different branches of science are not compatible, in the 
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sense that they use different kinds of research methods and tend to define 
their terms differently: for current purposes, it suffices to note that each of 
these theories attempts to say something about colour, but that they all use 
the concept ‘colour’ in different ways. 
 
This boils down to the fact that, for instance, ‘colour’ defined in terms of 
surface spectral reflectance can not, in any obvious way, be translated into 
or connected with phenomenal ‘colour’. Part of this incompatibility can be 
explained by the classic form of metamerism as applied to colour: the vast, 
potentially infinite dimensionality of object reflectance space is reduced to 
the relatively compact dimensionality of retinal receptor space, which 
means that a particular perceived colour cannot be linked in any consistent 
fashion with a specific reflectance, or the physical structure underlying it. 
 
However, the problem of an incompatibility of dimensionalities and space 
characteristics of the various ‘components’ of the colour perception dynamic 
is more widespread that that: there are discrepancies of that kind between 
almost every stage. The infinite dimensionality of reflectance space clashes 
with the three-dimensionality of chromatic receptor space (for normal 
humans), which requires some kind of transformation before it might be 
mapped onto the four-component chromatic opponency structure of 
perceptual colour space. The layout of perceptual space is determined, in 
part, by the complex structuredness of the physical and socio-cultural 
enviroment, and is linked to the equally complex structuredness of 
conceptual space. 
 
Maund attempts to explain an incompatibility of various kinds of speaking 
about colour (which he, by the way, does not explicitly define in terms of 
diveregent dimensionalities) by suggesting that there is nothing in the world 
that actually possesses the property ‘colour’ in the way we habitually 
attribute it, hence that the normal idea of colour refers to a virtual property. 
What this means and why Maund’s ‘solution’ does not work will be explored 
further down, but for now it suffices to note that it is of paramount 
importance that we find a theory that can deal with the fact that there are 
various subconcepts that might not refer to the same property when using 
the term 'colour'. As noted, ‘colour’ is used in various kinds of science and 
everyday practice, each with their own area of application: physical, 
neurophysiological, phenomenological, linguistic, practical (red paint caused 
white paint to turn pink), emotional and aesthetic (green is soothing), and so 
on... 
 
Still, it appears to be coherent, in some fashion, to speak of ‘colour’ as a 
single concept. Maund holds that an important reason for this perceived 
coherence of the various colour concepts is their conceptual ancestry: once 
upon a time, there was a unified concept of 'colour', but over time several 
aspects of our way of speaking about colour have diverged, yielding the 
current pluralist matrix. In Maund (1981), this process is called 'conceptual 
fission'; and alternative term (and the one to be used in the current text) is 
‘conceptual splitting’. 
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This is what that means: we once might have had a singular colour concept, 
which underwent a series of segmentations to result in the current situation 
of an array of colour sub-concepts, each with its own domain of 
applicability, and in some instances mutually exclusive in scope, while at 
the same it makes sense to speak of colour as a singular concept. 
 
The story developed in my account so far can be understood as an 
extrapolation of Maund's idea, for it includes the idea that the naive 'colour'-
concept breaks apart if put to contextualised use, not in just a physical or 
psychological part, but in several more subconcepts. However, now I can 
say a bit more about how this process of conceptual splitting might 
transpire. 
 
Recall once again chapter 5, in which I developed a description of a 
mechanism of perceptual space segmentation, and my suggestion is that 
this process can be viewed as a low-dimensional instantiation of the kind of 
process that can produce new, finer-grained concepts from old ones. 
Jameson and D'Andrade (1997) and Jameson (2005) in particular claim that 
irregularities in perceptual colour space facilitate its progressive 
compartmentalisation that turns out to line up fairly neatly with Berlin and 
Kay's (1969) evolutionary sequence. 
 
As mentioned before, three-dimensional colour space is not a perfect 
sphere, with protrusions at places where the saturation for particular hues 
can be specified at much higher levels (in the case of red, for instance), and 
indentations at places where saturation levels are unavailable beyond 
relatively low values (in the case of yellow). Because of these irregularities, 
distances between foci are not uniform. If the most primitive lexical 
segmentation of colour space has been made by separating colours into 
dark/cool and light/warm categories, the most informative additional term 
that might be acquired specifies RED, which has a focus farthest away from 
the regions specified by the intial two categories. The fourth most 
informative colour word to be acquired would be either yellow or blue, 
followed by green, purple, pink, orange, brown and gray (as determined by 
distance computations carried out by Boynton and Olsen (1987)). 
 
Adapted for the evolution of conceptual space, this idea would imply that 
new subdivisions of conceptual space - i.e. the emergence of new, finer 
grained (sub-)concepts -, are likely to occur if the interaction of agent and 
environment is such that behavioural, locutionary and/or cognitive patterns 
arise (or are evoked to emerge), that need to be given a structurally 
appropriate place in the agent's repertoire of dispositions. In brief, each 
iteration of conceptual space segmentation occurs in such a way to achieve 
a maximum increase in cognitive and/or perceptuo-motor acuity. The 
'evolutionary pressure' exerted then concerns whether the formation of a 
specific concept will help the subject perceive/act in a more efficient 
manner. 
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Taking a cue from Vantage TheoryNOTE 59 (MacLaury, 2002), it might be 
helpful to say that this process of categorization is driven by the need to find 
a niche-appropriate balance between the opposing forces of similarity-
seeking versus differentiating judgments. Similarity-seeking judgments 
result in fewer distinctions being made, hence coarser-grained concepts, 
which would benefit the expedience and cost-effectivity of cognitive 
processing. Differentiating judgments, on the other hand, consist in a 
context-driven exploration of the granularity-gradient, pressing for finer-
grained distinctions in cases where detailed judgments are requiredNOTE 60. 
 
The pressure towards forming new or more finely grained concepts derives 
from an agent perceiving a conflict between what he wants to do, or thinks 
he is able to, based on the concepts he has, and what his environment 
allows him to do successfully. If the success of his act disappoints - if there 
is a misalignment between intent and pay-off -, the agent might be forced to 
re-examine his beliefs or behavioural strategies, hence revise the 
implications and relations encoded in his conceptual space. This means 
that the evolution of conceptual space is the expression of an embodied 
and embedded learning curve, in which (conscious) cognition might (but 
need not!) play the role of catalyst: if the misalignment registers in 
consciousness, this could result in an impetus of increased strength 
towards a fitting adaptation. 
 
Apart from the progressive segmentation of a conceptual space with more 
or less pre-established boundaries, aspects of conceptual space evolution 
can also be described in terms of expansion of the space, as completely 
new concepts are formed, and density increase, as a particular concept is 
defined in a more rigorous and detailed fashion. All these processes can be 
described in terms of processes involving embedded manifolds. 
 
Recall , from the discussion in section 6.4 and 6.5, that conceptual space is 
to be thought of as an embedded manifold, which in this case means that it 
is an abstract space-like structure containing smaller structural elements. 
So, subsections of conceptual space are themselves embedded manifolds, 
constituting a concept or subconcept at some granularity. It is embedded 
because it co-constitutes, with other manifolds (subconcepts), a concept at 
a lower granularity, and contains multiple manifolds, each associated with a 
subconcept at a higher granularity. It is the diversification, refinement and 
expansion of embedded manifolds at some granularity that drives the 
segmentation of conceptual space. 
 
A possible cause of this diversification, refinement and expansion of 
conceptual space can be the increase of the space's dimensionality, as new 
concepts are added.This occurs, for instance, when something changes in 
the environment in such a way that a novel strategy for dealing with that 
new situation is required. So, the advent of a new and/or better theory or 
idea about some aspect of the world might consist in the refinement of 
some components of a particular concept or the structure of the manifold. 
Such a change could also help unlock new ways of seeing, understanding 
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and/or conceptualising elsewhere in conceptual space, for instance by 
offering new data (due to better instruments and shifts in ideas in those 
other areas) or new interpretations of existing data. 
 
For example, suppose that fossils of a previously unknown species of 
hominid are discovered, carrying some hitherto unforeseen implications 
about the evolutionary history of homo sapiens. This means that some 
aspect of the concept 'human', namely the fairly high-grained aspect that 
says something about the species' evolutionary heritage, needs to be 
modified. We can suppose that at a particular grain, what was previously 
covered by one subconcept now needs to be described by a more complex 
account, involving one or more new subconcepts. That is, conceptual 
splitting at some granularity leads to conceptual space density increase, an 
increase in 'content', in that region. 
 
This form of conceptual space evolution, i.e. involving embedded manifolds, 
allows more detailed descriptions, for instance of the following kind: the 
evolution of either singular subconcepts or semantically linked groups of 
them in itself, or a shift in the overarching concept, might result in 
embedded manifold boundary transgressions, which means that an object, 
event or process that was previously described by a particular concept, now 
falls outside the explanatory range of that concept. That is, in the new 
situation (either because the subconcepts' enslavers have changed or the 
inferred account has), some component of a concept will fall outside what 
we can call the legitimization region of the inferred acount. If the errant 
concept-component is still of demonstrable use in a relevant context, it 
might demand a new and fitting subconcept (plus an inferred account) to 
contain it. Hence, what was previously a single embedded manifold (defined 
by its inferred account) will now have split into two manifolds, with separate 
inferred accounts to go along with them. 
 
For instance, this abstract scenario can function as a description of a way in 
which the concept change involved in the case of the new ape fossil as 
described above could occur. Suppose that the old explanation involved 
several sources of evidence that suggested that a group of one kind of 
human ancestors traveled from one region to the other, over a specific 
period. Suppose that the concept of what this kind of human ancestor was 
and did, is modified due to the discovery of some new evidence, which 
suggests that this group could not have visited some distant part of the 
region it was previously thought to have inhabited. Still, there are indications 
that at least some type of hominid must have inhabited that distant part of 
the region, and sure enough, new excavations there uncover fossils of a 
new type of hominid. So, a high-grained remnant of the old concept that 
now falls outside the boundaries of the new concept is still demonstrated to 
be of sufficient use, hence demands a new concept to 'contain' it. 
 
More in general, a change in some concept or subconcept can be described 
in terms of: 
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-embedded manifold density increase (or decrease, if a subconcept that 
was useful before falls into disuse, i.e. is forgotten) 
-embedded manifold expansion or contraction (without change in density) 
-sections of other embedded manifolds being colonised/acquisitioned, or 
sections being abandoned/relinquished. 
 
...or a combination of the above. 
 
Here is another example, one that incorporates a few of these processes: 
suppose that a neurophysiological theory about colour is found that is (a) 
much more detailed than the current theories (i.e. embedded manifold 
density increase), (b) uses new subconcepts (i.e. inherent manifold 
expansion) and (c) explains away certain aspects of the phenomenology of 
colour perception (i.e. acquisition of (part of) another manifold; manifold 
expansion by conquest). 
 
The weight of the occurrent enslavement force (see section 6.7) of certain 
elements of some (sub)concept is the factor that determines the difference 
between mere manifold overlap (some concepts might share a few 
elements in a peaceful, mutually 'unthreatening' manner) and actual 
conquest of another manifold. A strong enslaver might 'overpower' a weaker 
enslaver if it comes too close, for instance when a powerful new theory 
offers explanations for cases that were previously thought to require their 
own subconcepts. These are all metaphors we can use to describe the 
ways in which (aspects of) concepts develop. 
 
The above implies a kind of conceptual holism: first, there are webs of 
meaning between concepts and subconcepts, and these webs often reach 
across manifold boundaries; second, there are various kinds of mutual 
multi-level influences within classes; and finally, 'shockwaves' of manifold 
change may ripple throughout conceptual colour space, as changes in one 
concept influence the contents of several other concepts. 
 
6.11 - Intermediate Evaluation of SToCC 
 
The foregoing concludes the cursory description of SToCC. The most 
important part of assessing whether SToCC is an appropriate 
characterization of concepts will occur in the following section of this book, 
when this model is used to build a framework that is intended to provide 
clues about how to account for higher cognition in an embodied and 
embedded context. For now, however, we can take a look at the way in 
which SToCC deals with the 'inherent instability of the concept-concept', 
introduced earlier, how it differs from Prototype Theory, and how it is able to 
answer two arguments directed against Theory Theory about concepts (see 
Laurence and Margolis, 1999), which resembles SToCC in some ways. 
Then, I will discuss three arguments against SToCC-style theories of 
concepts, courtesy of Fodor (2004), and finally, I will compare SToCC to 
Conceptual Role Semantics. 
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6.11.1 - SToCC and the Instability of the 'Concept'-concept 
 
First, I will discuss SToCC's solution for the instability-issue. The claim will 
be that the notions 'conceptual enslaver' and 'granularity' in tandem allow us 
to see how concepts can be real, and how the previously mentioned 
inherent instability of the 'concept'-concept might be solved. 
 
In SToCC, having a concept crucially involves doing something, or being 
able to do something: it involves acting or speaking or thinking, or being 
disposed towards such activities in particular circumstances. Having the 
correct concept of 'traffic light' involves successfully utilising the light signals 
it emits to avoid being run over by a city bus in the middle of the 
intersection; having an appropriate concept of 'mold' involves being able to 
correctly identify it amongst a bevy of other furry purplish-green substances. 
 
In short, having a concept and possessing some grasp of its behavioural 
and/or cognitive implications are necessarily intertwined. Obviously, this 
allows for gradations in the appropriateness with which concept-possession 
can be ascribed to some agent: someone can be more, or less adept at 
understanding the implications inherent to a particular object, process or 
state of affairs. An ornithologist will obviously have a much better grasp 
than I do of what a nightingale is and which traits belong to the creature, but 
that does not mean that he, with his sophisticated bird-related concepts, 
and I, with my limited knowledge of them, could not be said to be using the 
same concept. The difference between the two of us to take note of here 
would be the potential of exploring the properties and implications of the 
concept along its granularity gradient, which for the ornithologist extends 
much deeper into the details than for me. This can be a criterium for 
possession of the same concept: the main concept we both use in everyday 
parlance would be the same if we were able to communicate successfully 
while using said concept, within a particular granularity-bandwidth. 
 
Even if, due to ignorance, I were to ascribe certain properties to a 
nightingale incorrectly, that would not necessarily disqualify the expert and I 
from using what, in some relevant practical sense, could still be called the 
same concept: we would both use the same word to denote the same 
creature, for instance by adhering to the same conceptual enslaver (e.g. a 
characterisation that could be something like 'a flying animal of this size and 
these colours, producing such-and-such bird songs (...)'), albeit with slightly 
different property-ascriptions. A lot of coarse-grained practical discourse 
would still be possible without these differences in finer-grained beliefs 
having any discernable influence. However, obviously the stretchability of 
the concept knows bounds: when the discussion turns to the nitty-gritty of 
nightingale-properties, the inaccuracy of my beliefs might be exposed. In 
such a case, the notion that we possess the same concept is tested, and 
the ability to either reach a middle ground or yield to the more 
knowledgeable of the two discussion partners determines whether this 
notion of shared concept-possession can be maintained. 
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The message to take away here is that concepts, in SToCC, are 
fundamentally defined in terms of socially shared behaviour and 
dispositions towards behaviour, and that this has the important implication 
that the possession conditions of concepts are also defined in terms of a 
communal heuristic: two people can come to believe that they possess the 
same concept of some object, process or state of affairs if they can exhibit 
behaviour (action, locution or cognition) involving this entity, and can find no 
glaring or debilitating incompatibilities in their respective approaches to the 
entity in question. This kind of practically forged belief that there is a shared 
concept often suffices for interpersonal concept identification. And even if 
recognizing a shared directedness at some object in the way described is 
not enough for a judgment of concept-identity, an additional uniting, 
generalizing force is likely to be found in language (as mentioned a few 
times before). We like to label concepts with linguistic terms, and the finite 
nature of the array of available terms necessarily renders this labelling 
practice an act of imperfect categorization: language does not 'cut nature at 
its joints', to borrow a poignant phrase from PlatoNOTE 61. This 
compartmentalization of (knowledge about) the world contains an inherent 
generalizing tendency, an inclination to ignore differences if they are small 
enough. These behavioural and linguistic tendencies together alleviate, to 
some extent, the inherent instability of the 'concept'-concept. 
 
6.11.2 - SToCC vs. Prototype Theory 
 
Back in section 2.3,  the Prototype Theory of concepts (PT; e.g Rosch 
1978) was explained as containing the idea that some things may be better 
examples of a particular category than others. An object will be counted as 
an exemplar of a particular concept, not just in case it possesses all the 
necessary features included in the concept, but also if it possesses a 
sufficient number of them, and sufficiently many important ones. 
 
PT's main strength is its elegant account of categorization, which utilises 
fuzzy set theory to characterize similarity judgments of a category 
representation and an exemplar representation. SToCC bears some 
resemblance to PT about concepts; the notion 'enslaver' in particular 
appears similar to the notion 'prototype'. However, there are critical 
differences as well. Two general difficulties for PT were discussed in section 
2.3; two additional problems are especially relevant when discussing the 
similarities and differences of SToCC and PT, and it is to these differences 
that I will now turn. 
 
One of such differences involves the probem (for PT) that for a large 
number of concepts, test subjects fail to isolate any typicalities. Fodor 
(1981) provides the example that even though there might be prototypical 
cities, or even prototypical American cities, there are no prototypical 
'American cities situated on the East Coast just a little south of Tennessee'. 
Uninstantiated ('31st century invention') or overly heterogeneous concepts 
('object that weight more than a gram') fail for obvious reasons (one 
wouldn't know where to begin in assessing the typicality of examples), but 
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even more commonplace and rather important concepts such as 'belief' and 
'justice' fail to exhibit prototype structure. 
 
Enslavers differs from prototypes exactly because of such 'missing 
prototypes' cases: an enslaver tends to function like an 'essence', as 
explained in section 6.7 aboveNOTE 62. Recall that in section 6.7, the case of 
'justice' was discussed. Now, Prototype Theory will have difficulties isolating 
any most important exemplar belonging to such an abstract concept, hence 
in this case it will not be able to specify what would be this concept's 
prototype. SToCC's enslaver, on the other hand, is a selection of 
characteristic experiences and ideas which have come to shape the agent's 
understanding of the concept. In case of a concept as abstract as 'justice', 
the enslaver does not so much 'contain' examples of justice itself, but rather 
of 'just behaviour'. In this case certain behavioural elements that are shared 
amongst these examples can be used to individuate the concept 'justice' by 
proxy, i.e. by focusing on properties of an associated phenomenon (the kind 
of behaviour people exhibit while acting according to just principles or in a 
just manner) rather than justice itself. The main difference between 
Prototype theory and SToCC is then that prototypes collectively lock in the 
definition of a concept, whereas an enslaver enables inference towards 
ideas and behaviour that are appropriate for someone professing to have a 
particular concept. 
 
Another important argument against PT involves its inability to explain how 
to combine graded extensions in a way that aligns with strong intuitions 
about concept combination (Osherson and Smith, 1981; Laurence and 
Margolis, 1999). It is possible to see this problem as the difficulty, in certain 
cases, of Prototype theory's subsidiary, fuzzy set theory, to relate the 
prototype of composite categories to the prototypes of the constituent 
categories. Problems arise with composite concepts such as 'pet fish': a 
prototypical fish would be, for instance, a bass or a trout - it would possess 
features such as 'gray', 'undomesticated', and 'medium-sized'. By way of 
contrast, good examples of pets would be cats and dogs, possessing 
features such as 'furry', 'affectionate' and 'tail-wagging'. How does a 
prototypical pet fish - a goldfish, say, with features such as 'small', 'brightly 
coloured', 'lives in a fishbowl' - relate to the features associated with its 
constituent categories? The features of the composite concept are not, in 
any clear fashion, a function of the features of its constituents. 
 
SToCC can state that a composite concept requires a new inferred account 
to provide its (initial) structure, which can depend on the accounts 
associated with its constituent concepts, but need not be a straightforward 
intersection of those accounts. The inferred account about pets defines a 
specific subsection of the animal kingdom, populated by creatures that 
might be pets according to the criteria set forth in the account. Some 
creatures will make great pets, according to the account (say, cats and 
dogs), while others would be less ideal, but still fall within the specific 'pet' 
domain. Within that domain, one would suppose, falls a number of fish 
species; perhaps none of the fish are in the vicinity, within this abstract 
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space, of ideal pets. Obviously, the ones that are too large and ferocious 
(and so on with a list of traits not applicable to pets), such as great white 
sharks, will not even be within the 'pet' domain. The inferred accounts, 
hence the structures of the specified domains in conceptual space, as well 
as the 'solidity' of the borders between domains (whether it constitutes a 
fade into gray, or rather a clear cut-off point) will be context- and agent-
dependent: a very valuable, rare and fragile fish might make an acceptable 
pet for a wealthy collector, but not for a small child. The ways in which the 
composite concept relates to its constituents is mediated by the ways in 
which the inferred accounts of the constituents relate to eachother, plus the 
way the composite concept functions in its own context. 
 
This difference in explanatory potential between PT and SToCC suggests 
that even though both theories might appear somewhat similar to eachother 
in a first analysis, there turn out to be substantial differences as well. This 
is, first of all, because in SToCC, concepts are not representational entities 
of the classical kind, but involve abilities. The difference mentioned is also 
due in part to the fact that complex concepts require a different set of 
explanatory tools than what standard PT would be able to account for. 
Rather than a clean compositional hierarchy of elements, colour conceptual 
space (for instance) contains subconcepts of colour which do not refer to 
the same kinds of entities, yet are used in a kind of suspension of judgment 
as if they might do anyway. In the case of colour, the role of the concept 
‘colour’ or any of its subconcepts is more complex than for many ‘regular’ 
concepts, considering their entanglement with many different forms of 
science (and the active summarising, theory-constituting and theory-
generating roles the colour concept[-s] take on), the tension between 
universalist and relativist tendencies in terms of intercultural manifestation 
(see chapter 4), and (importantly) the strong intuition that colour involves a 
fact of the matter about the world rather than being merely a by-product of 
quasi-idiosyncratic definition (which is the case for many ‘regular’ concepts).  
 
Hence, there is an important way in which the account of (complex) concept 
formation and maintenance expressed in SToCC edges away from Rosch's 
PT. In PT, the relations between the various strata of the conceptual 
mereology are fairly straightforward: they can be characterised in terms of 
inclusion relations, resulting in a taxonomic-tree-like structure in which a lot 
of particulars are gathered, on a higher level, under a single banner, and 
these classes themselves might be grouped together in some way on an 
even higher level. At least for colour (and other complex concepts), the 
suite of relations between the strata, as well as the content and internal 
structure of each stratum, is much more complex. A concept is not just a 
categorization tool, but (also, in some sense) a functional entity following 
(and helping to create) a specific set of application rules - this active and 
interactive power of concepts was characterised earlier (section 6.3) in 
terms of dispositions for embodied and embedded action of an agent. In 
other words, where in PT the internal structure of a concept is determined 
by generalized definitional categorization, SToCC suggests a structure 
based on interactively idiosyncratic explanatory inference or justification, 
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involving the construction of enslavers from the agent's narratively arranged 
action-context. 
 
The tangled conceptual structure that results, including the contents of 
particular embedded manifolds, cannot be explained away merely by a 
blanket referral to the Theory Theory of concepts (TT); as expained in 
section 6.6, SToCC uses inferred accounts instead, and the differences with 
TT will be explained in the next section. 
 
6.11.3 - SToCC vs. Theory Theory 
 
This part of the intermediate evaluative discussion involves the way SToCC 
can deflect attacks on the (in some ways similar) Theory Theory (TT) about 
concepts. During the earlier discussion of TT, in section 2.4, I mentioned a 
few problems that this theory needs to face. I will now briefly mention the 
ways in which I feel SToCC is able to parry these attacks, before diving into 
a discussion of a more serious attack on TT, by Kwong (2006). 
 
Recall that for TT, the way in which the essence placeholder picks out an 
extension is judged to be overly sketchy. In SToCC, an enslaver need not 
be sketchy at all, but still function as a 'placeholder' in the sense that it 
stands in for the totality of the concept, and by proxy for the inferred 
account. An enslaver can come to function like a memeNOTE 63, buttressed 
by the most characteristic case or cases from the concept's jurisprudence, 
and might as such be transmitted in a form with properties that, from the 
point of view of the (highly detailed and carefully constructed) theory, are of 
secondary importance. For example, the concept 'bird' might have the 
enslaver 'sparrow', because for that person the characteristic examples of 
birds are the sparrows he sees flying around his backyard every day. 
Hence, the primary memetic properties he associates with bird are 'flies', 
'has wings', 'lays eggs', 'dwells in trees', and so on. In everyday situations, 
judgments about whether or not something is a bird might indeed be based 
on its resemblance to the sparrows he knows so well. However, when we 
need to know what kind of a thing a bird really is, it appears a scientific 
judgment is warranted, so a DNA test or a consult from a ornithologist might 
be in order. Thus, the context of the classification judgment determines the 
richness that is required of the concept, but even in the most superficial 
tenure of the concept there is a clear path towards the underlying account. 
 
The related problem for TT, that some people might represent incorrect 
information as part of their essence placeholder can also be dealt with by 
SToCC. After all, in SToCC there is some flexibility in the connection 
between a concept and its inferred account - enslaver stability can ensure 
survival of the concept even under shifts in the kinds of things the inferred 
account picks out. An important reason for this ruggedness is the explicit 
acceptance, in SToCC, of the historical and dynamical aspects of concept 
possession (via the narrative that supports the concept). An inferred 
account might very well be wrong (in fact, SToCC can say that the relevant 
kinds of accounts are, by and large, hypotheses subject to modification), but 
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that does not change the fact that said account was explicitly intended to 
explain or describe a specific state of affairs in the world: 'this story is about 
that phenomenon right there!'. The specific phenomenon a concept is 
supposed to be associated with will still be there after a shift in the way an 
agent wishes to account for said phenomenon (for instance, because he 
discovers a new and better theory about it), and the way the concept points 
towards the phenomenon in question could still be intact, so if said change 
stays within certain bounds, there is no inherent difficulty in allowing 
different accounts to be associated with the same concept, hence with the 
same phenomenon - all this as argued for in section 6.6. 
 
In fact, SToCC is committed to the idea that concepts and their inferred 
accounts evolve - there is a continuity of practical contexts in which a 
specific concept is used, and a continuity of the roles said concept assumes 
in those contexts. As long as a concept and its inferred account, or a 
sufficiently large part of that constellation, remain within that utility 
continuum, we can continue to speak of the same concept. When there is a 
large schism - say, a significant paradigm change - perhaps the re-use of 
the name of the concept might offer some modicum of continuity, but then 
the case for the assertion that a wholly new concept has emerged can also 
be made. 
 
However, in the majority of cases it should be possibe to identify some 
concept as the same one from instance to instance, for the reasons outlined 
above, despite changes in the inferred account. Similarly, some people 
might attribute incorrect beliefs (which would, effectively, constitute using a 
different explanatory account) to what they believe their concept to denote, 
but still hold the same concept as someone who does utilise the correct 
account (where an account's correctness is judged by, say, the 
overwhelming majority of experts). And even in that case it should be 
possible to weed out blatantly false explanatory accounts soon enough, 
simply because they fail to provide good explanations in the relevant 
contexts, and interactions with other, more knowledgeable concept-users 
will usually generate the appropriate feedback. 
 
With this explanation, I believe I have also deflected the second attack on 
TT: the problematic stability of concepts under theory-change. 
 
Now I turn to a more potent attack against TT, which is launched by Kwong 
(2006). With his arguments, he aims to support Fodor's (e.g. 2004) 
contention that there are currently no tenable theories about concepts. 
Kwong distinguishes two variants of Theory Theory about concepts: the 
literal variant states that concepts are structured analogous to scientific 
theories (Gopnik and Wellman, 1994), and the liberal variant likens 
concepts to theories on much looser criteria, which count the power to 
provide explanatory relations and the general capacity to account for 
conceptual correlations as a theory of some kind (Laurence and Margolis, 
1999). 
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The thought experiment he uses to support his arguments involves James, 
who has acquired a fair bit of scientific knowledge about mold, and 
therefore qualifies as possessing the concept 'mold' even on the literal view. 
However, his grandmother shrieks when and only when she is in the 
presence of mold, which for James comes to count as a highly reliable 
mold-identifying clue, and the only mold-identifying clue when he 
encounters a kind of mold he is unfamiliar with. So, for James, his 
grandmother's shrieks come to represent an essential component of his 
categorization-behaviour involving mold, even though these shrieks are not 
in any way necessarily connected to the scientific theory. 
 
Against the literal view, this scenario levels the objection that, in its strictest 
formulation, it does not allow such idiosyncratic additions that do not fit in a 
proper theory. Even if the criteria for what would count as a theory are given 
a somewhat looser interpretation to allow inclusion of these kinds of 
contigent, but empirically relevant beliefs, the literal view of the Theory 
Theory comes up short: this would result in an uncontrollable expansion of 
conceptual structure, violating the laws of cognitive economy. 
 
This latter point is also the main objection against the liberal view of Theory 
Theory: if any and all beliefs that are relevant to a particular concept or 
categorization task are to be represented in a concept's internal structure, 
this will result in extremely cumbersome entities, which would place 
extreme stress on cognitive processing capacity; tests measuring 
processing time do not show these effects. 
 
I contend that SToCC is capable of resisting these arguments. The easy 
way out would be to note that SToCC does not view concepts in general as 
representations of the classical, internal kind, hence does not require 
anything to be 'represented' under some concept, but there is room for a 
more substantial counter-argument. Seeing why this is so begins with 
understanding that the notion 'inferred account' in SToCC differs from the 
notion 'theory' in Theory Theory. To recap, the idea is that an inferred 
account is not necessarily a fully realised scientific theory (or even folk-
psychological theory, if there is such a thing), but consists in the capacity of 
meeting appropriate standards of accountability. This is the main general 
difference of SToCC with at least what Kwong calls the literal interpretation 
of the Theory Theory of concepts. Perhaps SToCC exhibits closer 
resemblance to Kwong's liberal explication of Theory Theory, but SToCC 
contains a few theoretical components that allow it to accept much of the 
scenario of Kwong's thought experiment, and explain why it does not 
automatically fall prey to the weaknesses he highlights, where even the 
liberal variants of Theory Theory do. 
 
These elements include, as explained, the fact that for SToCC, concepts 
are not theories, but capacities that are structured in conceptual space in 
terms of inferential relations (and yes, sometimes in terms of relations 
prescribed by actual theories, especially where it involves scientific 
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concepts). Also, it includes enslavers and granularity as structural elements 
of the theory. 
 
I can substantiate my counterargument by formulating the following claim: 
idiosyncratic definitional elements of a concept are not necessarily 
problematic. One possible worry that underlies Kwong's thought experiment 
is that 'concept-possessing behaviour' might not be caused directly by the 
object/process/state of affairs the concept is of, but rather by some 
correlated state, where this correlation can be highly idiosyncratic. In 
Kwong's example, this correlation (of the presence of mold and his 
grandmother screaming) is reliable, and seemingly ridiculous. However, that 
type of a roundabout route towards identifying some object is not nearly as 
uncommon as one would think. 
 
Consider the following example: even the physicists who have the most 
complete and accurate concept 'muon' do not possess it because of direct 
personal acquaintance with muons, but because they have learned to carry 
out experiments and interpret computer readouts in a particular way: the 
occurrence of some event involving muons would, if such be reliably 
correlated with the output of the measuring equipment that these physicists 
do have access to. The limited concept I have of muons lies at an even 
greater distance from the conceptualised items themselves: I have read a 
few articles and books about them, but I have never conducted or even 
witnessed an experiment that corroborated their existence. Still, for reasons 
given above (section 6.7), those scientists and I can still be said to possess 
the same concept, in some cases. 
 
This knowledge-by-proxy is probably rather widespread, and might even be 
evolutionarily significant: Dooremalen (2003) argues that many complex 
and/or hidden but important properties are perceived by way of much more 
overt properties, which are sufficiently reliable indicators of the 
complex/hidden properties. An example of such a hidden property would be 
fertility, a property that is undeniably relevant to procreation. However, we 
(much less an animal) cannot see 'fertility' directly, so we have evolved in 
such a way that we react to a correlated feature, physical attractiveness. 
The (hormone-modulated) directedness towards this easily detected feature 
allows the most attractive, hence (what are likely to be) the fittest 
specimens of a particular population to mate with eachother, thus 
increasing the chance of healthy progeny. Dooremalen calls this evolution's 
shorthand: a compact and salient way of denoting a complex property that 
is evolutionarily significantNOTE 64. 
 
If this idea is correct, the kind of mediated concept acquisition Kwong uses 
to drive his arguments contra Theory Theory is very common. However, 
one aspect of his argument does remain: the idea that all knowledge that is 
linked or correlated to some concept is to be included in the concept's 
theory, hence the concept itself, results in a highly uneconomical 
conceptual structure. It is my claim that SToCC's enslavement hierarchy, as 
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well as the granularity gradient, provide enough tools to explain how a multi-
denotational concept can still be encoded in a compact fashion.. 
 
The introduction of the Radicality Manifold in chapter 8 will provide a more 
detailed description of the connection between concepts and the agent's 
specific way of embodiment and embeddedness, but for now I can make my 
case in the following way: SToCC defines concepts in an embodied and 
embedded fashion. That is, in SToCC, concepts are defined in terms of an 
agent's capacities towards successful interaction with his environment. This 
means that significant aspects of conceptual structure need not be 
represented internally, but can be 'outsourced' to the environment, where 
this environment can include books, the internet, cultural customs, other 
people, and so on (compare Clark's [1997] 'scaffolds'). Apart from this 
spatial outsourcing, there is also a temporal variant, which is essential to 
the notion of an enslaver: having accountability as a central criterion of 
concept possession involves shunting a lot of content that is low in the 
enslavement hierarchy away, betting/hoping that the possibility of someone 
requesting an explanation (i.e. a justification of the way you use a particular 
concept) is not actualised. In other words, possessing and using a concept 
by having an economically structured enslaver stand in for a much more 
complex conceptual structure involves, in some sense, bluffing your way 
through everyday life, and as long as no one calls you out, there is little 
need to use complete representations of concepts, carrying along all those 
other beliefs that are implicated by and otherwise connected to your 
concepts. A given concept's enslaver in effect occupies the role of a more 
elaborate inferred account, and often the use of just that enslaver suffices 
for everyday use. 
 
6.11.4 - SToCC vs. Fodor 
 
One of the main adversaries to anyone claiming to have a theory of 
concepts nowadays is Jerry Fodor. In his (2004), he formulates three 
arguments against what he calls 'bare bones concept pragmatism' (BCP). 
BCP, in his description, is a collection of approaches to explaining concepts 
that can be characterized by the shared feature that concept possession is 
constituted by certain epistemic capacities, namely 'inferring' and 'sorting'. 
Whatever the differences in detail between SToCC and the various 
exemplars of BCP, the way the 'capacity'-angle is stressed makes it sound 
similar enough to SToCC to warrant a closer look at Fodor's three counter-
arguments. Luckily, the preparatory work of the sections above allows me to 
be reasonably brief in showing how the problems described by Fodor do not 
arise for SToCC. 
 
First, Fodor's 'analyticity'-argument states that if the possession conditions 
for a concept are defined in terms of inferentiality, neither of the two options 
available to characterise what kind of inference is in play (holism and 
molecularism) appears to be able to do the job. The 'holism'-tack would 
state that every inference involving some concept counts as a possession 
condition for that concept, but that would mean, says Fodor, that the 
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publicity of concepts is in danger: no one could ever be said to have the 
same concept as anyone else, because the chance of an exact match of 
the idiosyncratic set of possession conditions for concepts between two 
people is infinitesimally small. 
 
SToCC accepts the (potential) idiosyncracy of concept formation and use, 
but provides granularity and the social practice of providing justification for 
concept use as properties to explain why and how two people can be 
claimed to possess the same concept, despite idiosyncratic differences at 
certain levels of granularity - see section 6.8. However, SToCC defends a 
kind of 'local holism' (embedded manifold change might only have local, 
plus selectively distal effects) that might share some features with 
'molecularism', as Fodor describes it. 
 
That is, molecularism, in this context, is a weaker claim which states that 
some, but not all inferences involving a particular concept can count as 
possession conditions for that concept; the question then becomes which 
inferences are appropriate. In SToCC, the answer to the question whether a 
particular inference is appropriate will be measured in terms of 
achievement: the three-tiered achievement-criterion provided in section 6.6, 
with behavioural, cognitive and phenomenal aspects, can help decide which 
apparently concept-based actions are appropriate, and which ones are not. 
 
Second, Fodor's 'Compositionality'-argument claims that epistemic accounts 
of concept possession are incompatible with the (seemingly) non-negotiable 
principle of compositionality. Very sketchily, 'compositionality' involves the 
property of language that if we can think and speak of pets and of fish, this 
also allows us to think of pet fish. However, an epistemic account of 
concept possession is developed, in part, in terms of sorting acuity (i.e. how 
adept an agent is in distinguishing A's from not-A's), and that acuity is 
mostly limited to good instances of the exemplars in question (an agent 
might not be able to identify far-from-typical A's correctly), and favourable 
sorting conditions. This yields a problem that is very similar to one 
discussed earlier, namely the problem of concept combination as it arises 
for Prototype Theory: pet fish are neither typical (i.e. good) instances of the 
category 'pets', nor of the category 'fish'. I trust the explanation given in 
section 6.11.2, when this problem arose before, suffices to support the 
claim that SToCC is not harmed in any significant way by the 
'compositionality'-argument. 
 
Fodor's third and final attack on BCP, the 'Circularity'-argument, says that 
both the 'sorting' and 'inferring'-conditions of concept possession yield 
vicious circularities. On BCP, being able to sort all triangles from non-
triangles means having the concept 'triangle'. But what are these sorting-
actions based on? Surely, on the conceptual knowledge that one has, which 
would need to include the concept 'triangle', or a conceptual equivalent 
(such as 'closed trilateral'). Circularity also arises, argues Fodor, for 
'inference' as used by BCP. An inferential grasp of 'conjunction' necessarily 
presupposes the understanding of the 'and'-operator, it seems - any and all 
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definitions that attempt to infer it without already using it (implicitly or not-so-
implicitly) fail. 
 
I suspect much of what Fodor finds problematic in both these cases derives 
from his insistence that concepts are bound up with - or constituted by - 
representations, defined internal to the mind. So runs the argument: 
possessing the concept 'conjunction' is exemplified in 'conjunction-
understanding behaviour', which includes inferences to recognising the 
content of the conjunction-concept, but that already presupposes the 
possession of that concept as an internal representation, with a particular 
function in mental processing involved in exhibiting 'conjunction-
understanding behaviour'. And there we have circularity, says Fodor. 
 
I can concede Fodor's circularity-argument as applied to BCP without 
problems, for according to SToCC, concepts are not defined solely in 
internal terms - rather, conceptual possession is defined in embodied and 
embedded terms. For instance, sorting on the basis of a particular concept 
is actually sorting on the basis of bits of knowledge, observed and 
remembered behavioural profiles, and environmental cues that form the 
extension of the concept's enslaver, and the inferences based on that 
enslaver's contents. In other words, exhibiting a specific kind of behaviour 
as a criterion for concept-possession (e.g. carrying out a sorting task 
successfully) is not circularly dependent on having said concept, but rooted 
in the narrative that forms the embodied and embedded substrate of the 
accountability involved in having a concept (see section 6.6). This narrative 
can exhibit a marked difference between the case in which an agent 
possesses (and acts upon) the concept 'triangle' and the case in which the 
concept 'closed trilateral' is involved, for instance in terms of the acquisition 
history for either concept. That is, learning about triangles during a math 
class need not imply the acquisition of an explicit definition of such objects 
in terms of the concept 'closed trilateral'. 
 
6.11.5 - SToCC vs. Conceptual Role Semantics 
 
There are a few similarities between SToCC and Conceptual Role 
Semantics (CRS). CRS arises from a functionalist approach to the mind: a 
weak form of CRS aligns, to a certain extent, with analytic functionalism: 
 
... (a representational state) "is meaningful (i.e. has some meaning or other) 
by virtue of the fact that it plays a certain role in a person's psychology." 
(Block 1998) 
 
So, according to CRS, the meaning of a concept is determined by its 
psychological role, hence (in contrast with more behaviouristically inclined 
theories) talk of internal states is explicitly included in explanatory accounts. 
A stronger form of CRS expands the characterisation of weak CRS above 
by positing that not merely any content whatsoever would be characterised 
by its role, but that there is a connection between specific mental content 
and the role it might play in certain processes. 
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In SToCC, a concept's content is also defined by its use (structuring by the 
associated account's narrative situatedness, which in the case of more 
carefully defined theoretical concepts can consist of a particular theory's 
definitions corollaries), but by virtue of conceptual space's groundedness in 
perceptual performance, there is a basis of intrinsic, neurophysiologically 
informed content: the Neurophysiological Yield (NPhY; see section 5.2 and 
note 31). 
  
Block (1998) highlights a common objection to CRS: 
 
"CRS is often criticized from the point of view of truth-conditional theories of 
meaning. If the meaning of a sentence is its truth conditions, then the 
meaning cannot be its conceptual role." 
 
In SToCC, the conditional of this latter statement is called into question, by 
claiming it appears profligate to speak of truth-conditionsNOTE 65. Rather, 
SToCC would support speaking of possession-conditions, but not in a 
binary fashion (i.e. either you have a concept or you do not, without 
intermediate options); even better would be appropriateness-of-use 
conditions. Appropriateness-of-use judgments define a domain of correct 
usage, and a subject satisfies the possession-conditions for a specific 
concept if the way he uses said concept (either in speech, thought or act) 
falls within this domain, i.e. if the sentences containing the concept the 
subject utters are understood to be correct (or at least appropriately so) by 
the other users of the concept, if they accept the justificatory account. This 
creates a mutual-attunement-dynamic between these concept-users: for 
shared theories, such as scientific ones, this is a communal, hence socially 
embedded domain. Obviously, the ultimate touchstone is the real world: the 
range of ways in which a concept is used by a group of people should be 
defendable with proper empirical arguments. 
 
In short, SToCC does not, in the end, endorse any one approach in the 
philosophy of science regarding the truth of theories. Instead, the weaker 
notion 'appropriateness-of-use-judgments' is to be understood as a mild 
suspension of judgment on this matter. However, the underlying thrust of 
the account is that the modern scientific method of empirical, argument-
based confrontation of differing theories is the correct kind of activity to 
improve our knowledge of the world. Whether any one opinion is truth 
(ultimate and eternal) and what the criteria for this would be are not 
questions SToCC aims to confront. Quite the opposite: SToCC is intended 
to forge a semblance of unity in a chronically, possibly even fundamentally 
fragmented field of research. After all, the notion 'colour' can be understood 
in many different ways, ways that, in terms of actual content, are not in an 
obvious sense connected, except that they appear to refer to various 
components of a single, highly complex process. SToCC is intended to help 
dissolve this tension between a fragmented epistemology and an apparently 
unified ontology. 
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Because in SToCC the meaning of a concept depends, to an important 
extent, on the associated, justificatory account, the need to find analytical 
bedrock for a concept's meaning can be relinquished. In everyday 
situations, agreeing to disagree beyond a particular granularity suffices, but 
even when more robust justification is required, for instance in terms of an 
actual scientific theory, this non-reductivist inclination can be upheld. This is 
due, to an important extent, because of the properties of the theories that 
might be called upon for support. Any scientific theory is explicitly 
embedded in a web of propositions, and, if one traces the connections far 
enough, to the totality of human knowledge as well as its axioms, but it is 
artificially walled off from non-relevant propositions by virtue of its definitions 
(and their corollaries). Theories (almost?) always concern artificial 
segmentations - often even idealised, abstract and/or ceterus paribus 
models - of the interconnected totality of reality. Obviously this 
segmentation is usually modeled after intuitively natural categorizations, but 
to suppose that science always or even usually cuts nature exactly at its 
joints is disputable. This discrepancy of a theory with the actual situation is 
already accomodated for in the appropriateness-of-use-judgments: in the 
vast majority of practical cases, there is no need for an boundlessly exact fit 
of the actual encountered situation with the textbook example of a particular 
phenomenon. 
 
In that sense, SToCC's solution is similar to one of Block's suggestions: 
 
"A third approach to accommodating holism with a psychologically viable 
account of meaning is to substitute close enough similarity of meaning for 
strict identity of meaning. That may be all we need for making sense of 
psychological generalizations, interpersonal comparisons, and the 
processes of reasoning and changing one's mind." (Block 1998) 
 
Gilbert Harman defends a specific kind of CRS: Nonsolipsistic Conceptual 
Role Semantics. He says: 
 
"(Nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics may be seen as a version of the 
theory that meaning is use, where the basic use of symbols is taken to be in 
calculation, not in communication, and where concepts are treated as 
symbols in a 'language of thought'. Clearly, the relevant use of such 
'symbols', the use of which determines their content, is their use in thought 
and calculation rather than in communication." (Harman 1998) 
 
In (stark) contrast, SToCC steers clear of a 'language of thought'-hypothesis 
of the computationalist kind. At some level of description, SToCC can be 
about things (i.e. concepts and associated notions) that might, in some 
sense, be represented in consciousness, and might exert influence in a 
subconscious way in some cases. Whatever explication is to be awarded to 
this string of what some might call 'weaselers', SToCC is quite clearly not 
about symbols or somesuch entities that are supposed to reside at the most 
basic and fundamental level of thought. Rather, SToCC is about embodied 
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agents acting in an environment, and concepts are a way of describing 
certain aspects of that interaction dynamicNOTE 66. 
 
Harman continues: 
 
"Concepts and other aspects of mental representation have content but not 
(normally) meaning (unless they are also expression in a language used in 
communication). We would not normally say that your concept of redness 
meant anything in the way that the word 'red' in English means something. 
Nor would we say that you meant anything by that concept on a particular 
occasion of its exercise." (Harman 1998) 
 
SToCC holds that concepts actually mean something, in the sense that they 
involve the behaviour-directed attitutude of an agent towards some object, 
process or state of affairs in a specific way (namely, the way locked in by 
the associated narrative, as contextualised in the utterance or think-act of 
the proposition the concept is a component of). An important part of SToCC 
is the idea that a concept is often not, ultimately, a unitary notion, even 
though it is often used as such. A 'concept of redness' means whatever the 
associated justificatory account says it is, in the relevant context. 'Red' can 
mean something only by virtue of its embeddedness in theories and the 
world as well as the fact it is used by embedded 'animals' in a particular 
way. 'Red'-the-word means something by virtue of the meaning of the 
associated concept, which means something itself by virtue of its 
associated justificatory accountNOTE 67. Content, in SToCC, is never solely 
intrinsic, and perhaps this is exactly what Harman's one-place CRS, as 
opposed to Block's two-place CRS, is about, for Harman might have to 
agree that content depends on something external: 
 
"The moral is that (nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics does not 
involve a 'solipsistic' theory of the content of thoughts. There is no 
suggestion that content depends only on functional relations among 
thoughts and concepts, such as the role a particular concept plays in 
inference. Of primary importance are functional relations to the external 
world in connection with perception, on the one hand, and action, on the 
other." (Harman 1998) 
 
This sounds quite compatible with SToCC: a concept is an 
embodied/embedded agent's disposition towards action; it is about some 
object, state of affairs or process, and this intended entity is needed to 
specify what the concept is. 
 
In SToCC, there might be some aspect of conceptual content that is 
intrinsic: the neurophysiological basis of perceptual judgments (the 
Neurophysiological Yield). But that kind of content on its own does not a 
concept make (let alone a structured web of concepts). This 
neurophysiologically defined structure of saliencies needs to be embedded 
within a context of use for it to be in any way relevant, because only then 
can it serve to underlie meaning. 
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We hit upon an important difference between Harman's account and 
SToCC, as Harman says: 
 
"(Nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics asserts that an account of the 
content of thoughts is more basic than an account of communicated 
meaning and the significance of speech acts. In this view, the content of 
linguistic expressions derives from the contents of thoughts they can be 
used to express." (Harman 1998) 
 
Of course the concepts and their contents underlie the speech acts, but the 
kind of relation of the speech act to the intended object (or process, or 
state-of-affairs...) is not radically different from the kind of relation of the 
concepts to that same object, in part because, just like speech acts, 
concepts are contextual, inherit their meaning in use, refer to something, 
and so on. This is why differentiating acts (speech, thought, bodily) and 
concepts on the basis of the way they are connected to that outward object 
(or process, or state-of-affairs...) will not work. 
 
A suggestion for a different strategy, allowed by SToCC, could be to assert 
that appropriateness-of-use judgments allow different uses of a concept to 
actually be tokens of the same thing, whereas acts (speech, thought, 
bodily...) are more obviously anchoured to a specific time and place: they 
are 'happenings' rather than recurrent uses of the same (or a similar) 
schema (i.e. concept). 
 
In summary, SToCC differs from Block's CRS because of its ability to parry 
the 'truth-conditions'-counterargument, and from Harman's Non-solipsistic 
CRS by being, in general, much less cognitivistically inclined. 
 
6.12 - Intermediate Conclusion 
 
Based on the results of this intermediate evaluation, I claim that SToCC 
offers an appropriate account of concepts: SToCC's notions enslaver and 
granularity can provide an account in which concepts are cognitively 
economical, yet informative qua inferred content. This inferential structure is 
expressed in the structure of conceptual space, and part of this structure is 
explained by the mechanism of conceptual space splitting: a splitting 
sequence provides a historical explanation of why certain complex concepts 
are compactly represented at a particular granularity level. 
 
Furthermore, these mechanisms and properties are linked to the agent's 
embodied and embedded nature; two components exemplify this link most 
explicitly: (1) an enslaver is derived from perceptions and assessments 
which occur in the embodied and embedded perception/interaction of an 
agent; (2) the precise trajectory of conceptual space splitting depends on 
the way in which the agent functions in his environment, i.e. the kinds of 
things he perceives, learns, does, combined with how his environment 
reacts to him. 
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This means that, clearly, SToCC needs a broader framework of 
embodied/embedded cognition to explain why a particular concept is the 
way it is, e.g. why a particular concept has this or that enslavement 
hierarchy, or behaves a certain way under the context-driven exploration of 
a granularity gradient, without the agent explicitly holding a concept's 
associated theory. More specifically, I have to say more about how 
conceptual space is linked to the environment, to the agent's behaviour and 
to the biomechanical properties of his body. The model to be developed 
next, called the Radicality Manifold, provides a way of understanding the 
interactive, embodied/embedded dynamics which SToCC needs for 
support. 
 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
 
[SUMMARY of chapter 6 AND PREVIEW] 
 
In this chapter, the idea of 'colour' as a complex concept (which has 
applications in different contexts which cannot be reduced, without 
remainder, to a single definition: the 'combined' colour concept incorporates 
mutually exclusive notions, hence was characterised as a 'superposition') 
gave rise to the idea that a concept in general is context-dependent. This 
lead to an E( i )C-appropriate concept definition: a concept is a structured 
behavioural disposition of an embodied and embedded agent - behaviour, 
in this case, includes cognition and locution. Conceptual space, then, is an 
expression of the structure that is inherent to the inferential connections 
between the kinds of behaviour an agent might exhibit as justification of his 
use of a particular concept. Concepts are interrelated along inferential lines, 
and are informed by narratives, which are built out of the agent's own 
experiences, memories and ideas. 
 
Conceptual enslavement is the phenomenon that such a narrative as it 
informs a concept can have a particular centre of gravity - experiences and 
such which form a comparatively great contribution to the meaning of the 
agent's concept, and which will be offered more readily than other ideas in 
explanation of his use of a particular concept. The granularity at which a 
particular concept is explained may vary from situation to situation, and will 
help two agents come to the realization that they share a concept, even 
though one of the two might have a much deeper understanding of said 
concept, if he were pressed to explore those depths. In many everyday 
situations, however, such detailed accounts are not necessary, and a low-
grain recognition of the other's contextually appropriate concept-use is 
deemed satisfactory. This practice highlights an important aspect of 
concepts: a concept is what you do/say/think in a particular context, to an 
important extent as appraised by a conspecific. Having concepts is, in part, 
getting the acknowledgement from others that you did, in fact, use said 
concept in an acceptable fashion (see section 9.2 for more on this). These 
ideas together yield Superposition Theory of Complex Concepts (SToCC), 
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where superposed complex concepts were understood as special cases of 
a general concept theory. 
 
Given the idea of conceptual space (expressing all concepts a specific 
agent has) as a spectrum ranging from basic sensorimotor acuity to 
complex, abstract ideas, it is possible to sketch the development of a 
conceptual system. In this chapter, I outlined a four-stage process, 
incorporating the following stages: 
[Stage 1]: sensorimotor apprehension of motion; 
[Stage 2]: correlation of sensorimotor knowledge and linguistic encoding; 
[Stage 3]: embodied and embedded crossmodal mapping; 
[Stage 4]: correlation of embodiment and abstraction 
 
A description of the continued development of conceptual space, once it is 
actually in place, along the lines set out in chapter 5 (in which perceptual 
space segmentation was described), was also provided. More finely-grained 
and sometimes even new concepts can emerge via conceptual space 
splitting, which involves the progressive segmentation of conceptual space 
as an embedded manifold. Understanding conceptual space as an 
embedded manifold is to say that conceptual space can be conceived as 
being composed of interlocking regions expressing various subconcepts 
and inferential connections, ever more detailed at ever finer granularities. 
Some of the most basic divisions of conceptual space depend on the 
categorizations enforced by the properties of our body and our senses. 
 
An intermediate evaluation of SToCC - comparing it to Prototype theory, 
Theory theory, Jerry Fodor's view and Conceptual Role Semantics - 
suggested that it compares favourably to those existing concept theories. 
An important comment to repeat here concerns the difference between 
prototypes and enslavers: prototypes collectively lock in the definition of a 
concept, whereas an enslaver enables inference towards ideas and 
behaviour that are appropriate for someone professing to have a particular 
concept. However, in line with the discussion in the chapters before this 
one, it is still apparent that a more detailed description of the 
interrelatedness of conceptual space ('C-space') with bodily properties, 
sociocultural environmental properties and physical environmental 
properties (respectively: M-, S- and P-space) is needed: why is conceptual 
space structured the way it is? How can we say more about the ways in 
which an embodied agent is embedded in his environment, and how this is 
reflected in his concepts? Chapter 7 is the first step towards answering 
these questions, providing an E( i )C-appropriate account of representation 
to help define that relation between body, social environment, physical 
environment and concepts. 
 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
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[7 - The Radicality Manifold: Preliminaries] 
 
7.1 - Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters, I have attempted to synthesize E( i )C-perspectives 
from already raging discussions about the ecological and socio-linguistic 
agent-environment-interactions involved in colour perception. Because the 
philosophy of colour perception constitutes a microcosmos of the 
philosophy of mind, touching upon many of the major themes of that 
broader domain but in a more compact manner, this preparatory work 
allowed me to construct a more general, E( i )C-compatible account of 
concepts: Superposition Theory of Complex Concepts. It is my intent to use 
this theory of concepts, in conjunction with the behavioural planning field 
that was discussed in section 3.2, to yield a few suggestions about how to 
think about concepts and higher cognitive abilties in an E( i )C-perspective. 
 
These topics would require another book (at the very least) to address 
properly; therefore, in the pages to come I can only offer suggestions, 
sketches and hypotheses. What I do hope to accomplish, is to demonstrate 
that even though a lot of research is still needed, the model developed 
below, the Radicality Manifold (RM), hopefully constitute a modest nudge 
towards a more substantial understanding of E( i )C, as well as concepts. 
 
I will start with developing a characterisation of low-level content, i.e. the 
kind of content present at the lower reaches of the conceptual space 
spectrum. To do this, I will use the work of Dan Hutto as a springboard. This 
might come across as odd; after all, for Hutto, low-level content is an 
inherently contradictory notion, as it implies a kind of reification of mental 
entities that he feels lies at the root of many current problems in the 
philosophy of mind: whatever is 'low-level' cannot be 'content', at least not 
content 'inside the head'. 
 
Still, I will offer some suggestions for conceptions of content and of 
representation which can be made compatible with the (quite substantial) 
subsection of Hutto's account that I wish to salvage. In line with the critique 
Prinz and Barsalou (2000) level against the defenders of dynamical 
systems theory as applied to cognition, the tenor of the sections to come 
will be that supporters of E( i )C (and even E( A )C) are under no strict 
obligation to do away with any and all talk of content and representation. On 
the contrary, if sufficient care is taken to avoid the pitfalls of the old 
cognitivist approaches, these conceptions can strengthen rather than 
weaken the E( i )C programme. 
 
7.2 - Radical Enactivism 
 
It is to Dan Hutto's philosophy that turn to once more (I visited his Narrative 
Practice Hypothesis earlier, in section 6.6), because his opposition to talk of 
content being involved in cognition is illuminating. Hutto (e.g. 2006) calls his 
position Radical Enactivism, and as such he allies himself with other 
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philosophers and scientists working in the enactivist tradition, but with a 
critical inclination: many enactivists are, apparently, not radical enough in 
following through on their own principles. That is, his theory embodies an 
attempt to purge the last representationalist remnants from the enactivist 
program (recall that Thompson's theory of colour is enactivist). One of the 
formative papers of the enactivist movement, O'Regan and Noë (2001), 
contains several claims and explanations which Hutto invokes to support his 
case that there is still some cognitivist ballast left to exorcise. Consider the 
following quotations, which come dangerously close to containing 
references to kinds of knowledge that are supposed to mediate between 
sensory input and behavioural output: 
 
"In what does your focussing on the red hue of the wall consist? It consists 
in the (implicit) knowledge associated with seeing redness: the knowledge 
that if you were to move your eyes, there would be changes in the incoming 
information that are typical of sampling with the eye; typical of the 
nonhomogeneous way the retina samples color; knowledge that if you were 
to move your eyes around, there might be changes in the incoming 
information typical of what happens when the illumination is uneven, and so 
on." (O'Regan and Noë, 2001) 
 
"...seeing is a skilful activity whereby one explores the world, drawing on 
one’s mastery of 
the relevant laws of sensorimotor contingency." (O’Regan and Noë, 2001) 
 
Implicit though the 'knowledge' and 'mastery of laws' might be according to 
O’Regan and Noë, Hutto, an avowed Wittgensteinian, claims this is not 
nearly radical enough. As stated, he baptised his own theory Radical 
Enactivism, to stress the fact it removes any and all hints of 
representationalism at the sensorimotor level. 
 
Hutto defends a distinction between basic visceral responding and 
linguistically mediated thought. The level of basic visceral responding is the 
level at which most of the sensorimotor activity takes place that is central to 
enactivist accounts, and it is the confused description of some enactivist 
writings, still involving analyses in terms of mediating knowledge and 
representation-like entities, that Hutto targets. At this basic level, there can 
be no talk of content. There are no internal states (e.g. symbolic 
representations) at work here - rather, the dynamics of these processes 
should be understood in terms of contentless intentional directedness. 
 
The bedrock on which this view is founded, is biosemioticsNOTE 68, in 
particular Ruth Millikan's ideas involving intentional icons, i.e. the kinds of 
signs and 'representations' (Millikan's word, not Hutto's, but the gist of the 
latter's claim is the same) that play a role in an interlocking 
action/interaction dynamic of agent and world. 
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These are the features of intentional icons: 
 
"1. They are relationally adapted to some feature, object or state of affairs. 
2. The relation described in (a) can be characterised by means of a 
mapping rule. 
3. They have the direct proper function of guiding co-operating (consumer) 
device(s) in the performance of its (or their) direct proper function(s)." 
(Hutto, 2006) 
 
Millikan describes these 'representations' as pushmi-pullyu's: signs that are 
both descriptive (stating what is the case) and directive (stating what is 
supposed to be the case, e.g. what should be done). The proper function of 
a hen's call to her chicks, for instance, is to direct the chicks towards food; 
the descriptive content would be something like 'there is food right here!', 
the directive content would be 'come here and eat!' (Millikan, 1996). 
 
Another example concerns bee dances, used by scouts to indicate sources 
of food to conspecifics that were left behind in the hive. The point that Hutto 
wants his readers to take home is that these dances are not representations 
of the location of nectar, nor do they contain any information whatsoever. 
Rather, following Millikan he claims the dancing and spectating bees enact 
a specific interaction dynamic that has evolved for a particular purpose: the 
dance has the proper function of evoking a particular kind of response, 
namely a sufficient number of bees leaving the hive, flying to the food 
source and bringing the nectar back home. As Millikan says: 
 
"Bee dances, though (as I will argue) these are intentional items, do not 
contain denotative elements, because interpreter bees (presumably) do not 
identify the referents of these devices but merely react to them 
appropriately." (Millikan, 1984) 
 
Hutto's (2006) claim, following Millikan, is that these signs are patterns of 
interaction dynamics that evolved to evoke a response, and nowhere in or 
during this process does there need to be an explicit representing, 
mastering, processing or decoding of rules, laws or any other kind of 
content that would somehow be present in the bees' dances. The almost-
rhetorical question then becomes: why would our basic sensorimotor 
activity be different? Human intentional directedness, as well as the causes 
of our basic sensorimotor responses are to be understood in terms of 
biologically proper functions - in terms of these causally interlocking 
processes amongst conspecifics that does not require the encoding and 
decoding of symbolic representations to work. 
 
As announced, the second issue to be discussed involves concepts and 
content, especially the idea (defended by Hutto) that content has no place 
in descriptions of basic sensorimotor interaction. If coherent, this idea could 
prove detrimental to SToCC/RM, which includes the idea of a conceptual 
spectrum that is supposed to include basic sensorimotor processes as well 
as complex cognitive activity. 
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To get a tighter grip on this claim, regard Tim Crane's view, which Hutto 
criticises in (Hutto, 2006). Crane characterises the intentionality of a 
sensation as a relation holding between a subject, an intentional mode and 
a specific intentional content. For instance: 
 
"the content of the sensation is that one's ankle hurts, the object of the 
sensation is the ankle (apprehended as one's ankle) and the mode is the 
hurting." (Crane 2003) 
 
This content need not be propositional. Crane says it is 'what one would put 
into words, if one were to have the words into which to put it' (Crane 2003). 
 
There is something to be said in support of Hutto's worry that this opens the 
door to an intrusion of the conceptual (in terms of Hutto's apprehension of 
concepts, i.e. linguistically specifiable) on the nonconceptual realm. Hutto 
says that talk of content is fine when characterising conceptual aspects of 
experiential modes, but not when the nonconceptual aspects are at issue; 
these aspects are are defined as not involving judgments of any kind. 
Hence, the basic capacities of experience are non-conceptual and not 
content-involving 
 
It should be clear that Hutto utilises a specific notion of 'conceptual', one 
that automatically implies content. What is more, Hutto endorses a strongly 
Fregean conception of 'concept', where a concept's content is (or should 
be) linguistically specifiable. Anything that is not so specifiable, cannot be 
conceptual; for Hutto, the notion 'nonconceptual content' is inherently 
contradictory. 
 
The notion I wish to defend concerning concepts and content is not 
Fregean, but Hutto's insistence on these issues does force me to be much 
more specific about what it is that I am trying to say. An important aspect of 
my message is that the phrase 'having a concept' in the provisional 
characterisation of concepts provided in section 6.3 is actually a rather 
misleading way of speaking. In SToCC/RM, the phrase in question denotes 
'having a capacity, in a particular context'; more in particular, the capacity to 
provide an inferred account and/or behave in an appropriate fashion, when 
pressed to do so. These concepts-as-capacities are also intended to be 
present at very basic levels - levels where Hutto claims there can be no talk 
of content whatsoever. Is it possible to reconcile these views? And if this 
cannot be done, what position is inherent to SToCC/RM concerning the 
content of concepts, even basic ones? 
 
The first step towards an answer is as follows: it is very important to note 
that the 'having' of a capacity is quite different from the 'having' of a car, or 
of blue eyes. Nonetheless, I would like to claim that we at least (I am not 
sure about other animals) are capable of assuming a perspective on our 
capacities, of reflecting on their structure and properties. That is, we can 
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have a relation to our own concepts-as-capacities; does this lead to the kind 
of reification and content-ascription Hutto hacks away at so adamantly? 
 
I want to say: yes and no. Yes, I suggest that there should be (at least 
some) talk of content, but no, this need not lead to unwarranted reification 
of concepts. 
 
In SToCC, the relation one can have to one's own capacity to do/say/think X 
(the mark of concept-'possession' on this theory) is mediated by the inferred 
(narrative) account, and its behavioural consequences. I suspect (but will 
not argue this suspicion extensively at this time) that this ability is at least 
socially, and possibly also linguistically mediated: the ability to engage in 
social interaction and utilise language might be a precondition for 
generating such inferred accounts, even the non-linguistic ones. As such, 
the 'having' of concepts involves content, but I believe this claim is not in 
conflict with Hutto's ideas, for these narrative accounts can be placed 
squarely in the linguistic/narrative realm, the relevance of which he himself 
also advocates. 
 
However, it is at the more basic end of the sensorimotor spectrum that the 
conflict between Hutto and SToCC is supposed to emerge. My claim is that 
the capacities at play here also involve content, but in a very particular way. 
To support this claim, I need to cover quite a bit of ground: the topics to be 
discussed next include conceptual content (obviously), but also 
representations, truth conditions (again!), and the realization of properties 
that the RM-account is capable of providing. 
 
7.3 - Representation 
 
First, for a somewhat clearer notion of what 'representation' actually is, we 
can look at Menary (2006), who presents the following general definition of 
'representation': 
 
$ WRNHQYHKLFOH- LV D UHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO YHKLFOHZKHQ LW KDVSURSHUWLHV
that can potentially be exploited by a representational consumer. For 
H[DPSOH - LV VDOLHQW EHFDXVH LW Ls reliably correlated  with an 
object/environmental property X, or with objects/environmental properties X, 
Y, Z... 
 
-KDVDUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOIXQFWLRQZKHQLWVVDOLHQWIHDWXUHVDUHH[SORLWHG
E\VRPHFRQVXPHU)RUH[DPSOH-KDV WKH IXQFWLRQRI UHSUHVHnting X 
IRU FRQVXPHU  EHFDXVH - LV UHOLDEO\ FRUUHODWHG ZLWK DQ
object/environmental property X. 
 
- UHSUHVHQWV; IRU FRQVXPHU LQ WKH SHUIRUPDQFHRI VRPHELRORJLFDO
function." (Menary 2006)  
 
This is a kind of representation that Bennett and Hacker (2003)(see note 1) 
described as representation which involves the correlation of two states 
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(e.g. one internal, the other external); these states are mutually attuned due 
to being causally linked in some way. 
 
Peschl and Riegler (1999) discern several main structural variations on this 
theme. Defining the two poles involved in the correlation as Realität (R; the 
real world 'as it is in itself') and Wirklichkeit (W; the constructed world 'in our 
heads'), these are the options they suggest: 
 
* Naive imaging: W = R 
The 'real world' and the internal representation display a one-on-one 
mapping. 
 
* Classical representational theory: W = f(R) 
Internal representation W refers to external reality R, but is distorted in 
some fashion via function f(x). 
 
* context-dependent representation: W = f(R, O, C) 
internal representation W emerges in interaction with reality R, but is 
modulated by properties of the observer O and cultural influences C 
 
* Self-referential Representation: W = f(W, E, P) 
Internal representation W depends, via function f(x), on the structure and 
content of W itself, background experiences E, and perturbation events P. 
The absence of R indicates the operational closure of the cognitive system: 
the representational dynamic self-organises, and external input (sensory 
stimuli) are merely perturbations of that dynamic. 
 
At first glance, the causation/correlation process that lies at the basis of 
Menary's definition, understood in a context-dependent way as outlined by 
Peschl and Riegler, shares some properties with to the biosemiotic 
approach defended by Hutto (see section 7.2 above). However, it is the 
interpretation or operationalisation of such biosemiotic correlation in terms 
of representations as mental 'objects', the features of which need to be 
'exploited', and this exploitation process involving or yielding 'information' 
(as mental content), that affronts Hutto.  
 
7.4 - Representation and E( A )C NOTE 69 
 
As has been established, many forms of E( i )C, including the E( A )C of 
Thompson (see chapter 4) and the dynamicism of Thelen and colleagues 
(see chapter 3), are not in the least bit fond of explanations of cognition that 
involve reference to representations. The invocation of representations by 
Fodor (1975), and in particular by Marr (1982) in his account of visual 
perception, is diametrically opposed to the E( A )C-approach, it is often 
claimed. Is this really true? 
 
Not all E( i )C-supporters are morbidly opposed to incorporating the notion 
'representation' into theories about cognition. Clark (1997) offers a version 
of representationalism that holds the middle ground between, on one 
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extreme, the kind of explicit symbol-based representation that, for instance, 
Gibson (1979) argues against (but which, I believe, isn’t a very popular 
position any longer anyway, if it ever was), and at the other end of the 
spectrum the kind of non-representationalism he and like-minded 
dynamicists (such as Thelen et al.) argue in favour of. Clark says (1997, p. 
147): 
 
"(. . .) let us call a processing story representationalist if it depicts whole 
systems of identifiable inner states (local or distributed) or processes 
(temporal sequences of such states) as having the function of bearing 
specific types of information about external or bodily states of affairs." 
 
This ‘definition’ offers room for a dynamicist connectionism to still use 
internal representation. The possibility to use representation in explanations 
is due to what Clark calls ‘representation-hungry’ problems: situations that 
might arise in the life of an animal, which require some modicum of 
representation to be dealt with successfully – in these cases, an explanation 
using representation is the best one available. These involve situations in 
which Haugeland’s main criterion for the existence of representation is 
satisfied: 
 
"(a system uses internal representation if) it (coordinates) its behaviors with 
environmental features that are not always ‘‘reliably present to the system’’." 
(Haugeland, 1991, p. 62) 
 
Clark mentions two possible scenarios that satisfy this condition: (1) 
reasoning about states of affairs that are absent or counterfactual, or do not 
exist (thinking about the past or the future); and (2) selective sensitivity to 
complex, multi-interpretable stimuli. 
 
Regarding Clark’s first category, it remains to be determined what kinds of 
‘reasoning’ belong to this particular category, and where exactly one must 
seek the boundary between cases demanding explanations involving 
representation, and cases that can do without it. Van Rooij, Bongers and 
Haselager (2002) build an interesting case for a non-representational 
explanation (using dynamicist models) of a type of imagined action 
(determining whether a rod, handed to the test subject, would be of 
sufficient length to reach an object, without actually performing the task) 
that could be claimed to lie within the most primitive reaches of the domain 
Clark identifies. If the model by Van Rooij et al. continues to hold up under 
strict scrutiny, this would require a sharper definition of Clark’s concept 
‘representation-hungry’, and would imply that the subset of situations to 
which that term could be applied is smaller than Clark assumes. 
 
With the research of Van Rooij et al. to weaken the force of Clark’s case for 
the prominence of the first category, I would suppose the suite of situations 
belonging to Clark’s second category presents a somewhat stronger case 
for the necessity to utilise representation in explanations. Furthermore, the 
associated representing ability would involve the capacity to construct and 
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use abstractions, and would therefore touch upon much of what is 
characteristic of human cognition. Clark offers the examples of selecting all 
the valuable items in a room, or all items belonging to the pope. In such 
cases, the selection criterion resides on a rather abstract level that has little, 
if anything to do with the directly observable physical characteristics of the 
objects. This means the selection process would necessitate internal 
representation: keeping in mind (rather literally) which feature is relevant 
and how to select items based on it. Clark tones down this conclusion by 
stating such a representation is not necessarily an (easily?) identifiable 
activation pattern in a specific brain region in the sense that old-fashioned 
computationalists might want to endorse. The representation in question 
could very well be highly complex, both in temporal structure and in physical 
instantiation and distribution. Furthermore, representations often, perhaps 
always serve a behaviour-guiding role, and from this point the step towards 
an account favourable to some of the dynamicist’s central tenets is not so 
big any more. 
 
After all, subsequent development of these ideas by Clark takes place in the 
context of his overarching project, in which he explicitly endorses an 
embodied account of cognition, signifying a slight additional shift towards 
the dynamicist position. Clark explicitly notes the compatibility of the attack 
on certain aspects and interpretations of computationalism by Thelen 
(1995) and Thelen and Smith (1994) with more sophisticated versions of 
theories from the computationalist programme. 
 
Thelen’s (1995) rejection of computationalism is not, out of necessity, 
incompatible with the kind of view Clark endorses. Thelen attacks two 
theses: 
 
(1) Piaget’s claim involving innate knowledge (Clark, 1997, p. 155: 
"development is driven by a fully detailed advance plan"); 
(2) the textbook (and rather coarse-grained) characterisation of 
computationalism (once more Clark 1997, p. 155: ‘adult cognition involves 
internal logical operations on propositional data structures’) 
 
As alternative suggestions, Thelen and associates put forth the following 
two theses (adapted by (Clark, 1997, p. 155): 
 
(a) "Development (and action) exhibit order which is merely executory. 
Solutions are ‘‘soft assembled’’ out of multiple heterogeneous components 
including bodily mechanics, neural states and processes, and 
environmental conditions (Thelen and Smith 1994, p. 311)" 
(b) "Even where adult cognition looks highly logical and propositional, it is 
actually relying on resources (such as metaphors of force, action, and 
motion) developed in real-time activity and based on bodily experience. 
(Thelen and Smith, 1994, p. 323; Thelen, 1995)" 
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In a sensibly moderate interpretation of these theses, there is nothing here 
to contradict an embodied, dynamicist connectionism with a properly dosed 
use of representationalist explanations. 
 
Clark defends his program from possible criticism deriving from the work of 
Gibson (1979), and this defense might also serve to deflect possible 
counterarguments of dynamicists, and serve to indicate wherein the 
moderation mentioned needs to consist. For Gibsonians and Van Gelder’s 
dynamicists alike, internal representation will only cause problems as an 
explanatory component if it is understood in a particular way, namely as 
‘rich, action-neutral encodings of external states of affairs’ (Clark, 1997, p. 
172). The emphasis, present in the original text, isolates the crucial 
(dynamic!) element. A more general concept of internal representation as 
"inner states, structures, or processes whose adaptive role is to carry 
specific types of information for use by other neural and action-guiding 
systems" (ibid.) is much easier to reconcile with the embodied approach of, 
for instance, Thelen and colleagues, partly because of its relative 
ontological neutrality, but mainly due to the emphasis on its role in the 
guidance of (embodied) action. This general concept of internal 
representation does appear to run the risk of being used as an explanatory 
panacea by those inclined to support the notion. Partly due to its generality, 
philosophers might feel less inhibited in using this kind of representation as 
silly putty to close gaps in their theories. Dosed usage of this explanatory 
possibility is recommended, and I get the impression both Clark and 
Thompson and colleagues (with their neurophenomenological method, to 
be discussed below) are careful enough. 
 
But to repeat the claim above, there is nothing in Thelen et al.’s rejection of 
what they perceive computationalists to claim to contradict an embodied, 
dynamicist connectionism with a properly dosed use of representationalist 
explanations. That is, I would say there are certainly possibilities for 
combining dynamicist and representationalist approaches in a fertile 
manner. Van Rooij et al. (2002) note that the main difference between an 
explanation involving representation on one hand and an explanation using 
the DST toolbox on the other, is assumed to be that the former offers a 
mechanism, whereas the latter can merely describe. Their solution to this 
dichotomy is to claim that both representationalist and dynamicist 
explanations provide mechanisms, in the sense of specifying the constraints 
the underlying physical process is subject to. 
 
I would maintain that neither account is complete, the representationalist 
perspective offering a top–down, somewhat metaphorical view of the 
phenomenon, and the dynamicist approach a more abstract, behaviourist 
account, while neither actually touches upon the phenomenon and its 
mystery itself, leaving a gap between the two approaches. The big question 
would be: how can the brain generate cognition? How does that work? 
Despite this shortcoming, the research conducted by Van Rooij et al. does 
enforce the highly important lesson we encountered earlier: when one 
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wishes to use representation to explain some cognitive phenomenon, make 
sure this is absolutely necessary. 
 
7.5 - Types of Representation 
 
Clark's discussion appears to centre on the relevance of the more-or-less 
classical idea of representation as an internal symbol-like entity (such as a 
memory) standing in for something external, for instance when that external 
object is no longer present for immediate perception. 
 
My suggestion will be that representation can be highly useful in explaining 
cognition in a broader sense, if and only if representation is understood in 
the appropriate fashion. Prinz and Barsalou (2000) appear to agree. They 
note that traditionally, representations are conceived as context-invariant, 
disembodied and static; it is exactly this orthodox conception of 
representation that is unacceptable to many E( i )C-supporters, defenders of 
E( A )C in particular. However, at least regarding the dynamicist form of  
E( A )C, Prinz and Barsalou suggest that 'dynamic systems theory and 
perceptual symbols theory are complementary. They can work in concert to 
describe different aspects of cognitive systems.' (Prinz and Barsalou 2000). 
A very similar conclusion was reached in section 4.5, where Thompson's 
enactivism and Shepard's ecological computationalism pertaining to colour 
perception were claimed to complement eachother in a rather interesting 
fashion. 
 
Prinz and Barsalou invoke the account of representation developed by Fred 
Dretske (see below) to bolster their own claims. The general idea of that 
account is to parse representation in teleological/informational terms: a 
state represents some entity if the state and entity exhibit some form of 
covariance, and the state actually has the function of somehow containing 
information about that entity. Prinz and Barsalou state that if representation 
is explained along Dretske's lines, this informative covariance-relation, is 
capable of exhibiting the contextual sensitivity, embodiment and time-
dependent dynamics E( i )C-supporters, including dynamicists submit are 
essential aspects of cognitive systems. Please be advised that the notion 
'information' is not a neutral term - see section 7.6 below for more on this 
topic. Here, I suggest we understand 'information' not in contentful terms, 
but as an external-to-internal causation of particular structures or forms on 
an agent's internal dynamics. 
 
But first, I suggest we take a look at the theory developed by Fred Dretske, 
which is one of the most important views that is habitually associated with 
the 'correlation view' of representations, to determine whether this 
internalistic, cognitivistic approach is the only possible one, or whether there 
are more constructive, E( i )C and E( A )C-friendly options available. 
 
Dretske's (1988) influential theory about representation contains distinctions 
between different kinds of such representation relationships, which he has 
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labeled Types I, II and III; only Type I representation is explicitly symbolic in 
the sense disqualified by most E( i )C-supporters. 
 
(Conventional) Type I Representation: The representational powers of 
the elements of Type I systems are not intrinsic, but derive from the 
creators and users of said systems, e.g. coins and bottles might represent a 
sequence of events during a sporting match by way of their relative 
positions and movements, as manipulated by an agent who claims to 
remember this sequence, and wishes to enact it for his audience. The 
objects are the agent’s representational instruments. Dretske calls these 
representational elements symbols. These systems are doubly 
conventional: their function is assigned to them by us, and the actual 
functioning is due to our manipulations and actions. 
 
Given this description, it would indeed be silly to suppose that something 
like this kind of representation would occur 'in the head' or 'in the mind': this 
mode of representation appears to require a shared attentional focus, a 
particular imposition of structure, and an interpretational act (someone 
manipulating the objects-as-symbols, placing them in particular relations, 
and another person regarding these symbols and attempting to recover the 
referential 'content'). These are external and social rather than internal and 
mental occurrences. 
 
(Conventional) Type II Representation: In Type II systems, natural signs 
perform the representational function that symbols perform in Type I 
systems. Natural signs are, for instance, animal tracks and approaching 
thunder clouds, and they signify what they do (the presence of animals at 
this location in the recent past, or the increased likelihood of rain falling here 
in the near future) quite independently of our interpretatory acuity and 
action. Symbols (which we find in Type I systems) mean whatever we say 
they mean, whereas signs, which figure in Type II systems, possess natural 
(i.e. non-conventional) meaning we might (or might not) pick up on. The 
connection between the sign and what it signifies is one of the sign 
indicating the presence or occurrence of the signified, consisting of a 
correlation that is lawful and persistent. In Type II systems, these natural 
signification relations are used in a specific way, to indicate this rather than 
some of the other states such a sign might naturally be correlated with. 
 
That is, Dretske states that what a Type II system represents is not what its 
elements indicate, but what these elements have the assigned function of 
indicating. Hence, a Type II-system represents whatever a particular 
element (symbol or sign) indicates in a particular context, in the light of the 
lawful and persistent correlations that link the sign to what it signifies, but 
excluding a variety of additional properties or states that the sign might also 
indicate, which are nonetheless not taken to be included in the set of 
properties or states the sign has the explicit assigned function of indicating. 
 
For instance, as Dretske notes, the functioning of a fuel gauge might be 
influenced by a variety of additional states and processes other than the 
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amount of fuel in the tank (gravity; electrical phenomena in the wiring; the 
tilt of the tank and/or the car [if the fuel gauging mechanism utilises a floater 
to measure the height of the fluid level], and so on), and as such instantiate 
an indication of these additional phenomena, but that is not what the gauge 
is intended or supposed or determined (by the designers and users) to do. 
The gauge does indicate these additional phenomena, but does not 
represent them. 
 
This means that, as opposed to a Type I system, a Type II system is 
constrained by its role as a natural sign to indicate what it does. That is, 
because of its specific causal structure, there is a fact of the matter 
concerning what it can do, hence limiting the ways in which we might 
interpret what is represented in the system. But, given the constraints of 
these natural signification relations, Dretske says we can assign specific 
indicator functions to such systems as we construct them. 
 
(Natural) Type III Representation: Type III systems, natural systems of 
representation, have the function of indicating something intrinsically, by 
virtue of the fact that the system’s elements developed (evolved) with that 
explicit function within the system itself. These elements are natural signs - 
dark clouds approaching indicate the increased likelihood of rain falling here 
soon, and no interpretation is needed for that to be true. Despite the fact 
both Type II and Type III systems utilise natural signs, there is an important 
difference: the indicator function of Type II representation is assigned, 
though constrained by the causal specifics of the natural signification 
relation that is utilised. The function of a Type III representational system 
can only be discovered, it being what it is by dint of its evolutionary heritage, 
hence independent from any interpretative action we might undertake. 
 
Dretske couches his discussion of the properties of various kinds of 
representations in an overarching question about the causal efficacy of 
internal states (a reason or intention, say). He uses the following schema to 
explain his views: 
 
 
[Figure 17: representation, adapted from Dretske (1988)] 
 
With this schema, Dretske means to elucidate his claim that the indication 
relationship between internal state C and external state F (i.e. C indicates 
F) explains the causal efficacy of C in realizing the occurrence of M. 
 
One of his famous examples concerns a thermostat. Central to such a 
device is a strip of bi-metal, which actually consists of two strips, each of a 
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different kind of metal, attached to eachother. Because the different kinds of 
metal expand and contract in different ways when the temperature rises and 
drops, the bimetal strip bends one way or the other during a change in 
temperature. Now, the thermostat has been built in such a way that as the 
temperature drops, the strip bends towards an electrical contact, closing the 
circuit, thus igniting the furnace. As the temperature in the room rises, the 
strip bends back, eventually breaking the circuit, thus causing the furnace to 
cease operations once more. 
 
 
[Figure 18: representation in a thermostat, adapted from Dretske (1988)] 
 
How does the system's internal state (the strip of bimetal being in a certain 
position) cause a change in temperature? There are two different kinds of 
causality involved: the drop in room temperature is a triggering cause 
(designated with 'Tr' in figure 19) for the thermostat to start to function, 
whereas the fact that the thermostat was designed and built to perform the 
function that it does in a particular way is called a structuring cause 
(designated with 'Str' in figure 19): 
 
 
[Figure 19, representation in a thermostat, causal structure] 
 
For a scenario involving a mental state, the structuring cause involved 
refers to the mental state being part of a system that has evolved to function 
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in a particular way in its environment, and the causal efficacy of the mental 
state is 'triggered' by virtue of its indicating some external state or event: 
 
 
[Figure 20: mental representation] 
 
In addition, the properties ('structure') of the mental state also contribute to 
the explanation of the resulting behaviour, because the behaviour is 
triggered by that mental state, in virtue of it being triggered by the external 
event it indicates. 
 
Now, the behaviour of the strip of bi-metal can be understood as a 
representation of the temperature in the room, but it is not a symbolic kind 
of representation that E( A )C-supporters are opposed to so vehemently. The 
same story can be told about mental states: saying that a mental state is a 
representation does not equal saying that a mental state is a symbol (or 
constellation thereof) that performs a particular function in a language of 
thought. In other words: an explanation involving representations need not 
be a profoundly computational story. 
 
This undercuts some of the most consistent dynamicist criticism on 
representational explanations, at least for representations of the non-
symbolic kind described above. Prinz and Barsalou (2000) note how Van 
Gelder (1998, 1999) suggests that the inherently coupled nature of the 
components of many dynamical systems presents a relation that is much 
more subtle than representation. Prinz and Barsalou object, and I would 
tend to agree, that the kind of representation at work in the thermostat case 
exhibits exactly the kind of coupling Van Gelder should claim disallows 
representation-nvolving description: the thermostat and the room's 
temperature are coupled dynamical systems. 
 
I submit it is possible to understand Dretske's indicative causal link in terms 
of embeddedness, hence, compatible with at least some forms of E( S )C. 
That is, Dretske's story would allow us to formulate an explanation of the 
causal efficacy of some internal state C of an embedded agent by virtue of 
the indication relationship between C and F obtaining, and defining that 
interrelatedness (i.e. embeddedness), or at least the ability of the agent to 
engage in such interrelations and no less than one prior actual occurrence 
of such an interrelatedness, to be an essential precondition for C being a 
mental state. 
 
 159 
I make no claims as to Dretske's acceptance of my extrapolations - I merely 
use his ideas as a jumping-off point for my own speculations. Some work 
still needs to be done to turn the story above, about internal representation 
in thermostats, into an adequate account of the kind of representation that 
would contribute to cognitive processes, especially if we wish to understand 
cognition in E( i )C-terms. Now, the idea that I should want this is perhaps a 
bit odd: is it not true that much of the work done in the field of E( i )C, and of 
E( A )C in particular, is geared towards abolishing (the need to speak of) 
internal representations? 
 
In the case of mental representation (rather than the internal representation 
of thermostats), I would hypothesize that an internal state would acquire 
Type II representational status by virtue of the fact that the system of which 
that state is an integral part has acquired, through evolution, a specific 
meaningful relationship to (certain features of) its environment - the system 
in question comprising the embodied agent and the structure of physical 
and social affordances he is embedded in. This description as such does 
not distinguish it from Type III representation (see below); the additional 
feature of having a function assigned to a naturally occurring correlative 
state that appears vital to Type II representation might, in the case of 
mental representation, be understood in terms of the multiple realizability of 
goal-directed behaviour. That is, an important aspect of having a mind is 
being able to autonomously pare down the extant degrees of freedom, i.e. 
design a creative yet effective act in a complex, dynamic environment of 
shifting conditions, based on the occurrence of a particular Type II 
representation. The idea is that this paring down need not follow a 
predetermined scenario: there is, in some sense, freedom for the system to 
'pick' any one of a number of different possibilities. 
 
However, this can constitute only part of the assignment feature essential to 
Type II representations: it captures the idea that one mode of realisation is 
arrived upon from a number of different options. However, it leaves open 
the matter of who or what is doing the assigning in this case. My suggestion 
is that care must be taken to avoid saying that the internal representative 
state as such is introspectively judged or interpreted by the agent, to be 
subsequently used as the basis for some act - this is exactly the kind of 
view I've been trying to get away from, in accordance with one of the most 
strongly held E( A )C-views. Luckily, there is another option available. 
 
I can sketch some of the particulars of this alternative by revisiting the 
example of colour vision. In the case of colour vision there is a particular 
constellation of internal states (the activations of different areas of the visual 
cortex) that stand in some causal relationship to features of some external 
object, such that there are sufficient grounds to call the co-occurrence of 
certain features of the object (microphysical surface properties) and 
activation patterns of the visual cortex a correlation of the kind required for 
the latter to be an internal representation of the former. Obviously, 
metamerism (see note 20) and the stochastics involved in the realisation of 
neural states disallow a perpetually valid one-to-one correspondence 
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between these two states, but the causal link obtaining, however multiply 
realizable it is, suffices here. 
 
Now, this neural activation plays an essential role in causing, yielding or 
instantiating the phenomenal state associated with perceiving the colour the 
external object is identified as having. Decades of discussion about the 
status and properties of qualia tells us that what the exact relationship is 
between the neural state and the phenomenal state is as yet undecided, 
and suggested solutions to the problem are always controversial, but I will 
suppose it to be relatively uncontroversial that the former (the neural state) 
has at least some role to play in the occurrence of the latter (the 
phenomenal state). This is enough: for it does not make a difference 
whether there is a direct stimulus-response-reaction ummediated by 
phenomenal 'feels', or whether colour qualia perform some kind of 
motivating role, as long as the fact that there is that particular kind of neural 
activation that actually does something in the complex causal dynamic that 
makes the agent react to a colour in his environment. The neural activation 
need not even be the sole cause, or some kind of causal bottleneck that 
excludes other causal relations; if I were to hazard a guess, I would even 
say the real causal story is not nearly so simple, involving complicated 
interlockings of dynamical processes on multiple spatial and temporal 
scales. It is up to the biologists, neurophysiologists, computational 
neuroscientists and other experts to provide a more detailed account of the 
exact neural processes involved, but I believe it is fairly evident that without 
the activation of the visual cortex, without the activity in that brain region 
being correlated in a structured fashion with the external stimuli, much or all 
of what we would consider colour-related behaviour, at least the more 
complex and 'thoughtful' behaviour, would be impossible. 
 
Now, that this causal link obtains and that an internal correlative state 
evolved into a state that has a particular role to play, makes this internal 
state a Type III representational state. The fact that the agent himself has 
the capacity to pick one of several different possible behavioural responses 
to coloured objects in his environment, and that this Type III 
representational state plays a role in that agent-environment interaction-
dynamic, yields an interesting conclusion. The assignment feature to 
transform this Type III representational state into a Type II representational 
state is the paring down of degrees of freedom for action by the agent 
himself: with his actions, as embedded in a particular environment, the 
agent imposes a specific function on that internal Type III representational 
state. It is the embodied and embedded action that makes the difference: 
the evolutionary assignment of a function to a particular correlative structure 
can, on its own, merely lock in a Type III status, but the agentive action 
related to that Type III representation turns it into a Type II representation. 
 
What is important - nay, positively crucial - to realise is that while these 
internal representational processes play a role in generating cognition, they 
are not cognitive themselves. Cognition is understood as something that an 
embodied agent as a whole, and as embedded in a particular physical and 
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social context, does: it is a process at the personal level. These 
subpersonal representational states contribute towards a complex dynamic 
of interlocking processes at different spatial and temporal scales (as 
hypothesized a few paragraphs ago), but, and I guess this is (part of) the 
problem, cannot be invoked to provide a complete explanation of cognitive 
processes. We certainly need them - they tell part of the story -, but there is 
more to be said, even when we were to obtain a perfect theory about the 
workings of the brain. 
 
There are two reasons for this incompleteness, the first being that the 
vernacular we use to explain cognition in everyday circumstances, namely 
folk psychology, is formulated in terms of agentive behaviour and social 
interaction, not in terms of neural processing. The second reason is that, in 
most cases, it makes little sense to attribute sole causal responsibility to a 
neural region engaged in a particular activation pattern. This is because 
these neural activation patterns are themselves embedded, spatially 
(embedded in a constellation of other brain regions, encased in the head of 
an embodied agent that is embedded in and interacts with a complex, 
dynamic environment) as well as temporally (this dynamical neural system 
has a history).  
 
This account is different from what Dretske (1988, pg. 88, 99) himself 
suggests. He claims that internal states, via the development of the 
organism they are a part of, acquire control of (say) the animal's limb 
movement. These internal structures, in being responsible for that 
peripheral movement, acquire an indicator function: because they indicate 
what they do, carry the information about some external state the way that 
they do, they exert control on the animal's movement. This indication 
relationship can also be incorrect, hence can misrepresent some external 
state: actions, as they are controlled by these internal states, might not 
always be successful.  
 
The first modification that I wish to suggest is that internal states do not 
control external movements, but that they contribute to the dynamic agent-
environment interaction (and contribute thus because of the specific 
correlation relation they exemplify with external states) which also includes 
contributions by bodily and environmental forces and inhibitions (i.e. 
enablings and constraints!). 
 
In discussing Type III representational systems, Dretske says: 
 
‘Can there be a serious question about whether, in the same sense in which 
it is the heart’s function to pump the blood, it is, say, the task or function of 
the noctuid moth’s auditory system to detect the whereabouts and 
movements of its arch-enemy, the bat?’ (Dretske 1988, pg. 63) 
 
Perhaps there cannot be. But, to once again invoke the example of colour 
(see chapter 4), there can be, and is, disagreement about what the proper 
function of colour vision is. Obviously, something along the lines of 'to help 
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the animal interact with its environment' is correct, but saying this means 
making a fairly innocuous and non-committal claim. It says nothing about 
the underlying means and ends that are in play in colour vision: does the 
animal extract the surface spectral reflectance from incoming stimuli, or 
does it react to contextually meaningful invariants, or should we pick yet 
another description? This unclarity emerges because what colour vision 
does for the animal, how it does so and why it might do what it does appear 
to be different questions (this claim is in line with the differentiation between 
several notions of function as presented in section 4.5), and each question 
requires different strategies and supporting theories to receive an answer. 
How we describe its function is determined by context, i.e. how we 
conceptualise the colour-involving agent-environment interaction-dynamic, 
and at what granularity we do so - that does not mean we are free to assign 
a function (as we are free, to some extent, in the case of Type II systems). 
The function of colour vision within a particular context is still something that 
needs to be discovered, but which function we might discover depends on 
the direction of our investigation - the exploratory strategy we pick, and the 
intent with which we implement that strategy (i.e. the kinds of questions we 
feel compelled to ask). 
 
Dretske couches such issues in terms of indeterminacy of function, with an 
associated indeterminacy of representational content. This is what that 
means: we assign to a fuel gauge the function of measuring the amount of 
gasoline in a tank, so the position of the needle on the meter represents the 
amount of gas. However, suppose the gauge does not distinguish between 
there being gas or water in the tank. Dretske says that if there is water in 
the tank, this does not mean the gauge misrepresents something; rather, it 
means that there is some indeterminacy concerning the fuel gauge's 
function. After all, it can be said to correctly represent the presence of a 
certain amount of liquid (rather than specifically 'gas'). 
 
We, as users of the fuel gauge, have the responsibility of checking whether 
the tank really does contain gas, and if it does, the gauge can perform its 
function as it was assigned by us. For systems of Types I and II, we as 
users have a lot of leeway, because the function of a system is what we say 
it is (obviously: given certain constraints, at least for Type II systems). For 
systems of Type III, determining what a system's function is, is shrouded in 
more uncertainty, at least to the extent that we need careful (scientific) 
investigation to discover that function: we have relatively little say in the 
matter. However, the story above, about embodied/embedded paring down 
of options helping to give a Type III representation certain Type II 
properties, muddles the issue once more. 
 
The moral of the story is that the function of some representational system 
depends, to a large extent, on its context; this aligns quite nicely with the 
idea that the content of a concept depends on its context of use. For a 
weathered E( i )C-supporter, and especially those inclined towards E( S )C, 
neither of these conclusions is suprising: what cognition, or a formative 
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component of the cognitive dynamic, is or does, depends on the kinds of 
processes it partakes in and depends on. 
 
As I have shown, Dretske suggests that the addition of mechanisms whose 
use depends on the representation correctly indicating something, can 
attenuate the uncertainty concerning what the function of a particular 
representational correlation is. If a representational system has the function 
of indicating the presence of a particular prey, and such a representation 
occurring causes the animal to perform a sequence of actions designed 
(evolved) to capture the prey, there is a criterium for the representational 
system performing the function it is supposed to in a successful manner: if it 
misrepresents, the action fails, and if this happens often enough, the animal 
dies. 
 
So: this is my first modification of Dretske's idea: representational states of 
whatever type perform a function in a multi-layered agent-environment 
interaction dynamic, rather than being the sole cause of some action. 
 
My second modification of Dretske's account is the point I already made 
above: representations (of Types II and III at least) are not cognitive 
entities. Dretske states (1988, pg. 99) that the process of learning confers a 
particular function, hence meaning onto the representational, indication-
exemplifying structures. I would suggest, rather, that something having 
meaning can only occur at the personal level, not in the subpersonal realm. 
Meaning emerges in socially mediated, agentive interaction profiles: it 
requires some form of interpretation, and interpreting is what persons do, 
not neural regions or representational states. To scaffold this last 
suggestion, I will say more about the emergence of meaning in section 9.1. 
But for now I can say that these two modifications go to the very core of the 
RM-model, which is an attempt to provide a template for the description 
(and possibly explanation) of cognition, as it is to be understood within the 
E( i )C-approach, and it is apparent that many different kinds of data, 
described in terms of the different spaces of the model, contribute to the 
total explanatory account. 
 
Particular ways of utilising Dretske's theory could have implications that 
some E( A )C-supporters would wish to avoid; Dan Hutto's insistence that he 
adheres to a bio-semiotics rather than a bio-semantics (see section 7.2) is 
an expression of such an inclination. The point I want to make is that a 
particular, qualified way of invoking representations of Types II and III in 
providing explanations need not be in any flagrant dismissal of the non-
cognitivist groundrules laid down and adhered to by most E( A )C-supporters. 
To strengthen this claim, I need to say more about the notion of information 
involved in these representational processes. 
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7.6 - Information 
 
It is time to dive deeper into the complex concept 'information'. Note how 
Clark's (1997) general definition of representation (reproduced in section 
7.4 above), invokes this notion: 
 
"(. . .) let us call a processing story representationalist if it depicts whole 
systems of identifiable inner states (local or distributed) or processes 
(temporal sequences of such states) as having the function of bearing 
specific types of information about external or bodily states of affairs." (Clark 
1997, pg. 147; italics not present in original text). 
 
The most common accounts of information focus on syntaxis. Norbert 
Wiener (1961), for instance, one of the main inventors of cybernetics (the 
study and associated industry of transmitting and processing signals), 
states: ‘Information is information, not matter or energy’. Expanding on this 
idea, Gregory Chaitin (1999) defends the thesis that information is muliply 
realisable. He writes: 
 
"The conventional view is that matter is primary, and that information, if it 
exists, emerges from the matter. But what if information is primary and 
matter is the secondary phenomenon? After all, the same information can 
have many different material representations in biology, in physics, and in 
psychology: DNA, RNA; DVD’s, videotapes; long-term memory, short-term 
memory, nerve impulses, hormones. The material representation is 
irrelevant, what counts is the information itself. The same software can run 
on many machines."  
 
The sign might be understood as the basic component of information, or 
perhaps the carrier of information, or the entity in which information 
habitually congeals. Semiotics is the branch of science that studies signs, 
and is described in the on-line Merriam-Webster dictionary as follows: 
 
"a general philosophical theory of signs and symbols that deals especially 
with their function in both artificially constructed and natural languages and 
comprises syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics." (entry 'semiotics', 
www.m-w.com) 
 
These three aspects of signs or ways of studying them break down as 
follows: 
 
(1) syntactics: this aspect involves the formal relations between signs.  - 
coherence of sequence). A focus on this aspect supports multiple 
realizability of information most explicitly; still, there is always a substrate in 
which this informational structure needs to be realised. 
 
(2) semantics: this involves the relations between signs and the world, i.e. 
how signs refer; 
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(3) pragmatics: this involves the function and evolution of signs, and 
specifies the relation between sign and user. 
 
One could now ask what aspect of the sign actually carries the brunt of the 
signifying burden. It appears obvious that, if one accepts the essential role 
of contextuality (as is one of the main theses to emerge from SToCC - see 
chapter 6), the pragmatist dimension would have to be where much of the 
‘work’ is done. That is, it is in the use of some decoding strategy applied to 
an information-bearing structure that the semantic and syntactic dimensions 
are attributed their content. The syntaxis will the main factor in constraining 
the probability for the (physical?) structure being picked as possessing an 
affordance of meaning-attribution, semantics emerges in the interaction of 
physical constraints (syntax) and utilisation (pragmatics). Hence, whether 
some syntactic structure actually contains information, and what kind of 
information it contains, is context-dependent. 
 
Look at the way DNA can be said to contain information: it prescribes in a 
basic way what kinds of protein structures might or should be formed, but 
the way in which those are actually constructed, taking into account the 
many processes providing contextual influences (e.g. the parameters of the 
intra-cell chemical milieu, which can either inhibit or accelerate DNA 
formation), is underconstrained by the information actually present in DNA. 
 
This would entail a kind of dispositionalism about information: information is 
characterised as a kind of disposition, i.e. as a property which plays a 
particular role in a particular context, in relation to a particular agent. Hence, 
it is possible to define a information-bearing structure as constituting an 
affordance (obviously: for some agent in a specific context). The 
impossibility of defining general and objective translation prescriptions for 
information-bearing structures and the associated inherent contextuality of 
information-use underline the role of some form of interpretation in the pick-
up of information. 
 
A general definition of information could then run as follows: information is a 
disposition to constrain probabilities of the unfolding of some causal 
process within a particular context, i.e. to nudge the system in question 
towards exhibiting structured behaviour. Or, more compact: information is a 
structural feature of some object, process or state-of-affairs that constrains 
and/or enables an interpretational process by an agent. 
 
The suggestion I wish to make is the following: concept use, in its most 
general form, is information use (or at the very least involves a behavioural 
dynamics that is instigated by interaction with information-bearing 
structures), and information use can be described as interpretation. Now, it 
is important to realise that there is nothing that forces us to understand this 
process of 'interpretation' in line with the charicature of cognitivism, e.g. 
where even the lowliest mental process is described exclusively in terms of 
an introspective attending to the contents of one's experience. 
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Think of how a particular dance performance might be called an 
interpretation of a particular piece of music: the occurrent performance is 
based on or inspired by the song. Or, I submit we say the dance is informed 
by the music: the structure of the music imposes constraints upon, and 
discloses possibilities for (i.e. enables), the dancer's movements as they are 
understood as an appropriate expression of the structure and flow of the 
music. Such an interpretation does not necessarily require a cognitive 
appraisal of the music's rhythm and modulations - an agent can, as it were, 
resonate along with the music, without having to think about the movements 
that need to be made. The claim can be stronger still: when a dancer thinks 
too much about what to do next, the resonance breaks down. A more 
pedestrian example is the following: try walking down a staircase really 
quickly, consciously placing your feet on the steps. Chances are this is not 
as easy as it sounds, because the considered placement of feet interferes 
with the natural movement involved in letting gravity and leg joint dynamics 
do their work. Thinking too much in this way will result in a jerky, unnatural, 
possibly even unbalanced and dangerous hobbling down the staircase. 
 
This uneasy interaction of higher, supposedly 'representational' thought, 
and basic bodily dynamics suggests the familiar gap between the two. This 
gap is what I would like to do away with; however, in Hutto's discussion of 
biosemiotics (see section 7.2) it still appears to be present. His account 
concerned a characterisation of basic-level interaction that does not involve 
semantics; it is at higher, more complex levels that somehow notions such 
as meaning, content, representation and information are supposed to 
acquire a stronger descriptive presence. After all, Hutto does not deny that 
content and the like are appropriate ascriptions at the higher, linguistically 
mediated level of agents in a social world.  
 
Now, there are certain aspects that appear to show a certain degree of 
similarity at both low and more advanced levels: the agent and his 
appropriate environmental niche have co-evolved in such a way that the 
agent is predisposed towards reacting in a fitting way in certain situations: 
this constitutes a coupling of these two systems, in which properties and 
powers of one influence the other, and vice versa. 
 
My suggestion is that the content-involving properties and regularities that 
are present at that higher level, are higher-order expressions of processes 
that occur at the more basic levels. This does not mean I suggest an 
unmitigated return to standard cognitivist descriptions of subpersonal 
processing involving content, representations and information; rather, I 
suggest that the relevance of these basic-level processes should be 
understood in personal terms, i.e. the embodied agent as a whole, acting in 
(and interacting with) a particular physical and social environment. Some of 
the higher-order agentive descriptions of properties and abilities connected 
to these various levels were given in section 6.9 and 6.10. 
 
 
 
 167 
7.7 - Concepts and Content 
 
The position about content that I wish to defend suggests a (possibly) 
unusual twist involving the idea of 'content' inherent in most theories of 
concepts. In general, mental content is defined as that aspect of a mental 
state that represents or refers to some other entity (or particular properties 
thereof). What that orthodoxy entails in a bit more detail is demonstrated by 
the following two quotes. First, Alex Byrne unpacks the notion 'content' in 
the following way: 
 
'Contents are propositions: abstract objects that determine possible-worlds 
truth conditions. Three leading candidates for such abstract objects are 
Fregean ThoughtsNOTE 70, Russellian propositions (structured entities with 
objects and properties as constituents), and Lewisian/Stalnakerian 
propositions (sets of possible worlds).' (Byrne 2004; note not present in 
original text)  
 
So, according to Byrne, representational content has a structure and 
purpose congruent with the structure and purpose of a (linguistic) 
proposition: a representation being a certain way entails this representation 
having a truth-value, dependent on how it relates to the object, process or 
state of affairs which it is intended to represent. 
 
Gareth Evans circumscribes content, and contrasts it with nonconceptual 
content, as follows: 
 
'In general, we may regard a perceptual experience as an informational 
state of the subject: it has a certain content - the world is represented a 
certain way - and hence it permits of a non-derivative classification as true 
or false. For an internal state to be so regarded, it must have appropriate 
connections with behaviour - it must have a certain motive force upon the 
actions of the subject... The informational states which a subject acquires 
through perception are non-conceptual, or nonconceptualized. Judgements 
based upon such states necessarily involve conceptualization.' (Evans 
1982, pg. 226-227).  
 
Hence, according to Evans, experience has a certain representational 
content, and this content can represent the world correctly or incorrectly; 
judgments about experiential content involve or are constitutive of concepts, 
and these judgments can be true or false. This means that an important role 
that content plays, by virtue of it representing properties of some entity, 
process or state of affairs, is the role of infusing the concept (which it is a 
content of) with the possibility of assuming a truth value - assessing the 
content of a concept as it is used allows a judgment about whether an agent 
(the purported concept-user) actually possesses a particular concept (or 
possesses the correct concept). Hence, by virtue of an agent's concept 
being or involving a contentful (mental) state or object, it should be possible 
to judge whether this concept correlates with the appropriate aspect of the 
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world (a particular state of affairs) in either a truthful or an erroneous 
fashion. 
 
It is a small step from judgments about having the correct concept to 
judgments about having a particular concept at all: if someone has formed a 
particular concept of some state of affairs, and this conceptualization turns 
out to be incorrect, do we say that he has the concept anyway, but an 
incorrect version of the concept, or do we say that he fails the criteria of 
concept possession in this case? Peacocke (1992) for instance, notes that 
possessing a concept means meeting the concept's 'possession condition', 
comprising the kinds of inferences a person should be disposed towards for 
him to have a full mastery of the concept in question. If you do not meet the 
conditions, you do not have the concept in question. 
 
If we accept the application of truth conditions to representational content 
and to the judgments of representational content that yields concepts, there 
is a definite temptation to attribute to content the role of affording a rather 
strict concept-world correlation, a concept being a kind of judgment or 
apprehension of experiential content (consisting of representations). And 
when the meter reads 'false' in both cases (the 'world-representation'- and 
'representation-conceptualizing judgment'-correlations), to deny the agent in 
question the possession of a particular concept. 
 
For SToCC/RM, the story runs differently. It is the prevalence of 'truth'-talk 
involving conceptual content that I wish to tone down significantly, with the 
SToCC/RM-model in hand. More specifically, I take issue with the 'truth'-talk 
in a binary fashion as applied to concept possession. Because the use of 
concepts is an essentially contextual affair - concept possession is socially 
mediated, expressed in terms of situational agreement amongst discussion 
partners (i.e. social affordances), and further constrained by environmental 
affordances - the notion 'truth' is hollowed out. That is, on SToCC/RM, 
concepts usually do not admit of clear-cut, black-and-white truth-values. 
 
Recall the claims in section 6.11.5, where in distinguishing SToCC from 
Conceptual Role Semantics, one of the claims concerned the former's use 
of appropriateness-of-use-conditions rather than the truth-conditions 
espoused by the latter. This intuition is strengthened by the properties of the 
granularity operator, which enables two discussion partners to have the 
same concept at a certain granularity (that lies within the bounds specified 
by the low-detail similarity-criteria inherent in normal conversational 
exchange), without having exactly the same knowledge (down to the very 
last detail) concerning the concept's correlate (see section 6.8). 
 
However, even with this modification, I would wish to claim that there 
cannot be a neat separation between correct and incorrect. SToCC 
suggests that after tallying up the scorecards for possession conditions, we 
are not left with binary values; rather, appropriateness-of-use-conditions 
admit of many intermediate values. An exacerbating factor in this case 
involves the multiple realization of concepts in SToCC: there are many 
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different ways of 'having' a specific concept, in part because the possible 
behavioural profiles associated with a concept usually range rather widely. 
 
But the above appears to cause a problem for SToCC - or rather, increase 
the urgency of a problem that has been lurking under the surface for a while 
now. The problem is this: SToCC is a theory in the E( i )C-tradition, hence is 
supposed to be careful about invoking 'representations' in its explanations. 
It should be clear that SToCC endorses the enactivist claim that basic 
sensorimotor interaction does not require symbolic representations: the 
scenarios in play at this level more closely resemble the interlocking 
dynamics of Millikan's intentional icons (see above, in section 7.2). And 
what was stated above amounts to the claim that even if there were such 
representations, talk of truth-conditions or ascription of concept possession 
in a binary fashion would be problematic: possession and correctness-of-
use of concepts are to be judged in a gradual fashion. 
 
Despite fuzziness invading the concept-world-correlation in SToCC at two 
fronts, I wish to maintain there is a role for content to play here. If, on a 
more mainstream understanding of concepts, a role that content plays is the 
role of infusing the concept with the possibility of assuming a truth value (as 
stated above), the task to be carried out now is to find an E( i )C-compatible 
account that enables the existence of appropriateness-of-use-conditions. 
 
In terms of the SToCC-account, 'having' a concept means being able to 
act/speak/think appropriately in a particular context (see section 6.3). In that 
sense, the role of content is to lock in what 'acting appropriately' means: in 
general, ascribing the appropriate content  (i.e. at a reasonably 
accomplished granularity level) of the concept 'Eiffel Tower' to another 
agent means, amongst other things, that if one asks this agent where the 
Eiffel Tower is located, we expect him to say 'Paris'. And, in a less rigidly 
defined case, the content of the concept 'great white shark' will, to the vast 
majority of people, entail the imperative 'stay in the boat', rather than 'go 
skinny-dipping'. If someone chooses to do the latter, an appropriate 
response of ours can be to wonder whether this person has really managed 
to grasp the seriousness of the situation, has really understood what a 
shark is and is capable of - that is, whether he really does possess the 
concept 'shark' as we possess it. 
 
The mechanism that realizes appropriateness-of-use-conditions for 
concepts to obtain, will have to do this by establishing an E( i )C-alternative 
to the representational mapping that is invoked by the standard account: it 
is the representation that constitutes the connection of agent and world in 
such a way that an agent's decision to act in a particular way can be right or 
wrong, i.e. that there is a specific species of normativity involved. The issue 
of normativity will return later (in section 9.2); I will first attempt to flesh out 
the account of content that has so far been implicit in SToCC. 
 
I submit that the RM-account already contains an E( i )C-compatible 
mechanism that can perform the function that representational content 
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would on the standard theories: the dynamics of constraints and enablings 
(see section 3.5; more on this in chapter 8) constitutes a linkage between 
concepts on the one hand and body and world on the other. There is a 
specific account of property realization available which I will use to beef up 
the metaphysics of this dynamic. 
 
7.8 - Dynamical Dimensioned RealizationNOTE 71 
 
In his (2002), Carl Gillett takes a stand against the theory of property 
realization defended by Jaegwon Kim (e.g. 1998). I do not intend to present 
to you a well-wrought position of my own in this particular debate, but I do 
believe that the account developed by Gillett can be of use in aiding my 
current argumentation. That is, his story about how microphysical entities 
can collectively yield new, non-reducible higher order properties has an 
interesting application in the kind of story that needs to be told about what 
kind of content there is in the SToCC-approach to concepts. 
 
Gillett describes Kim's account of realization as flat: any and all properties 
or powers of an object can ultimately be described in terms of the properties 
or powers of the object's microphysical constituents, and/or constellations of 
such constituents and their resultant powers. Kim says: "It is evident that a 
second-order property and its realizers are at the same level (...) They are 
properties of the very same objects" (Kim 1998). This is a reductionist view, 
entailing that a complete explanation of causal interactions involving 
macrophysical entities ultimately boils down to a story about causal powers 
at the microphysical level. 
 
As an alternative to this, the standard theory involving flat realization, Gillett 
offers his own account of dimensioned realization. Characterizing a property 
as something that can be individuated in terms of the powers it contributes 
to an individual, the idea is that, in macrophysical objects composed of 
microphysical entities, new properties can emerge that are not reducible to 
powers had by the microphysical realizers: 
 
"Property/relation instance(s) F1-Fn realize an instance of a property G, in 
an individual s, if and only if s has powers that are individuative of an 
instance of G in virtue of the powers contributed by F1-Fn to s or s’s 
constituent(s), but not vice versa." (Gillett 2002) 
 
An example often invoked by Gillett involves cut diamonds: the power to 
cause scratches in glass is a power of the diamond, not of the individual 
carbon atoms. The idea is that the diamond has new powers that are not in 
any way amongst the powers of the individuals that it is composed of (the 
carbon atoms), so that an explanation of the diamond's power to scratch 
glass is incomplete if only the causal powers of the microphysical 
constituents are invoked: a proper explanation requires reference to the 
diamond itself. That is, the causal power of the carbon atoms that are 
relevant here is the power to remain a certain distance from eachother 
under high pressure and/or temperature (i.e. maintaining a diamond's 
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characteristic atom grid pattern), and this power contributes to the hardness 
of the diamond, but it is not the same power as being able to scratch glass, 
which is a power only of the diamond as a whole. This suggestion edges 
away from Kim's view in attributing unique causal powers (hence properties) 
to compound entities (e.g. macrophysical objects) that involve, but are not 
exhaustively described in terms of the powers of the microphysical 
realizers. 
 
Now, recall that on the standard account of content, representations and 
concepts, a version of which is exemplified in the citation of Evans above 
(section 7.7), a representation-involving interaction imparts an agent's mind 
with content, and a particular representational content implies specific truth 
conditions. 
 
In the SToCC-model, the behavioural expression about which judgments 
pertaining to appropriateness-of-use-conditions can be made, is the inferred 
account. Being able to generate inferred accounts is the criterion for having 
concepts, and the ability to have concepts depends on being embodied and 
embedded in a specific way. It should be clear by now that if there is to be 
talk of 'representations' in this model, these are not static mapping relations. 
 
Instead, the generation of conceptual structure in SToCC is a diachronic 
constraining/enabling dynamic, and I wish to suggest that this dynamic is 
that from which talk of content (which is expressed in terms of inferred 
accounts) is derived, and the presence of this content implies the 
applicability of appropriateness-of-use-conditions. That is, the property of an 
agent of having concepts imparts appropriateness-of-use-conditions, and 
this property is dynamically dimensionally realised by the properties of the 
physical and social environmental processes that the agent is immersed in, 
as well as the biomechanical properties of his own bodyNOTE 72. The 
interaction dynamics that these properties play a role in constitutes 
constraints and/or enablings for processes to be described in terms of the 
entire agent's concept-use-involving abilities, i.e. the concepts that he 
'possesses'. 
 
Because all these constraints and enablings are reciprocal (see section 
8.5), hence the properties of the agent's conceptual dispositions thus 
realised impose constraints and evoke enablings for the other kinds of 
properties and processes in return, this realisation process can be 
understood as a dynamical coupling of agent and world which yields a new, 
higher-order property (i.e. involving an agent-world structure with normative 
aspects). 
 
In a first analysis, there might be a problem with suggesting that this 
realised, higher-order content-establishing property is supposed to inhere in 
an entirely new individual, as Gillett's theory would. Because of the 
inherently temporary nature of the resultants of the constraint/enabling-
dynamic, this would imply these content-establishing properties are to be 
understood as individuals, as things winking in and out of existence at a 
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staggering rate. This would appear to bring us right back at the kind of 
suggestion that Hutto spent so much effort at undercutting.  
 
However, there is no need for alarm in this case. The very core of the 
dynamic dimensioned realisation-suggestion is that the constraint/enabling-
dynamic realises a new dynamic, namely a (proto-)conceptual dynamic, i.e. 
the dynamics of conceptual space,  with an important new property. This 
new property is characterised by the power to immerse the agent in 
normative structures: appropriateness-of-use-conditions are now in play, 
and these are the conditions that perform the modified roles that would, in 
standard theories, be performed by truth-conditions (see sections 6.3, 
6.11.1 and 6.11.5). Because conceptual space constitutes a description of 
concept-involving dispositions of the agent as a whole, the individual to 
which this new, normativity-implicating property belongs is an individual in 
the truest sense of the word, namely the agent himself. 
 
Hence, in this sense this case of dimensioned realisation in establishing the 
agent's conceptual dynamic affords the agent/individual a special status: the 
new property involving normative structures can only emerge when all 
realiser properties are present and in working order in concert, hence these 
properties all contribute to realise the norm-involving situation, but the 
normativity itself is not in play at the level of the realisers. That is, any and 
all judgments based on the normativity involved can only be applicable to 
the agent as a whole, and as immersed in his environment in a specific 
way. When I steal a CD from a store, judgments involving wrong or right, 
appropriate or inappropriate or wise or unwise are not applicable to the 
hand I used to grab the item, nor to my arm, my central nervous system, or 
even my brain or my body (as an object), but to me: I am the one 
performing the illegal act, I am the one to which these norms should apply. 
 
However, it is important to realise that this special status (of being subject to 
norms) is not something only humans can enjoy: it applies to all concept-
using creatures to a greater or lesser extent, and per my claims in section 
6.4, the set to satisfy this criterion is significantly broader than the mere 
subset Homo sapiens sapiens. When a dog knocks over a precious vase, 
we do not hold it responsible in the same way that we would an adult 
human, but it is nonetheless quite plausible to get mad at the dog, and that 
we attempt to demonstrate to it that this destructive behaviour is not 
something we would like to see repeated. When a strong gust of wind 
knocks down another vase, we might get mad again, but not at the wind, or 
at least not in the same, culpability-implying fashion as we would at a dog or 
human - we might instead be cross with whomever left the door open, even 
though this person did not touch the vase. Many things differ between gusts 
of wind and humans, but I submit that the difference which I choose to 
summarise with the epithet 'has concepts', is of crucial importance in our 
attempts to explain the kinds of norms an agent is subject to, hence the 
differences in responsibility-ascriptionNOTE 73. 
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Perhaps now Crane's 'aforism', criticized by Hutto (see above, in section 
7.2), makes a bit more sense. Crane said that the content of a sensation, if 
non-propositional, is "what one would put into words, if one were to have 
the words into which to put it" (Crane 2003). At the basic end of the 
spectrum, we do not have such words, which is what makes Crane's remark 
so nebulous, but if we suppose that these 'things', the content of which we 
cannot put into words, fall in a continuous spectrum with the kinds of 'things' 
we can express linguistically, the relation between the traditionally 
dichotomous kinds of entities nonconceptual content and conceptual 
content becomes somewhat clearer: they are different conditional arrays 
(i.e. of different complexity, and regarded in different ways, e.g. 
phenomenally and linguistically) that are realized by the very same process, 
namely the constraining/enabling dynamic due to influences of physical, 
social and biomechanical processes. 
 
Recall (from section 7.3) that traditionally, representations are conceived as 
context invariant, disembodied and static. Note how the kind of agent/world 
interrelatedness instantiated in dynamical dimensioned realisation (DDR) is 
the exact opposite on all three counts - my claim is that I can use DDR as 
the basis of a kind of representation that is congenial to E( i )C-approaches, 
to scaffold the account of E( i )C-appropriate concepts in the Radicality 
Manifold (RM), the expansion of SToCC to be described in the next section. 
 
This locks in at least part of the metaphysics involved in the agent/world-
interaction-dynamic as suggested by SToCC/RM. Now, it is likely that 
some, or perhaps many E( i )C-supporters, enactivists and dynamicists in 
particular, will object to the flirtation with representation that is implicit in the 
account developed above. However, I believe, based on the considerations 
above, that there are representation-invoking explanations available which 
are compatible with dynamical dimensioned realisation, and manage to 
avoid the kinds of reifying symbolicism which the E( i )C-approach is 
committed to evicting from philosophy and psychology. 
 
My claim is that DDR, information and Hutto's use of biosemiotics all 
highlight aspects of one and the same process. What DDR does is explain 
the emergence of the twofold content-like (i.e. performing the function 
content would in standard theories) property of (1) making environmental 
information available to the agent, and (2) having this information-involving 
interrelatedness introduce normativity. In classical terms, such processes 
would be claimed to involve representation and information. 
 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
 
[SUMMARY of chapter 7 AND PREVIEW] 
 
So far in this book, especially in the form of Thelen et al.'s dynamical 
movement planning field as a description of basic cognition-involving 
behaviour, Thompson's theory of colour perception and the behaviour-
based concept definition from chapter 6, the enactive (E( A )C) approach has 
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been relatively important. On the other hand, the classical theories of 
concepts that I have discussed make elaborate use of internal 
representations, and these two views cannot easily be synchronised. In this 
chapter, I discussed Dan Hutto's Radical Enactivism to try and get a clearer 
notion of the role of representation in my theory of concepts. Radical 
Enactivism espouses the idea that there should be no representational 
content (to be understood as 'things' that are 'in the head') at all, at least not 
in the description of more basic forms of enaction. 
 
My idea, in contrast, is that there are accounts of representation available 
which help us do the work of representations (i.e. establishing a meaningful 
link between the agent and his environment) without requiring the 
ontologically problematic use of reified internal mental processing. First, 
Andy Clark's notion 'representation-hungry problems' established that there 
are cognitive tasks which do sometimes require the re-presentation, in 
memory for instance, of objects that are not reliably present in the 
immediate environment. Based on a discussion of the various kinds of 
representation as distinguished by Fred Dretske, my suggestion was that 
we can have internal states which do not need to be representations of the 
classical kind (internal representations of external objects), but which are 
nonetheless representations in the sense that they contribute to the 
dynamic agent-environment interaction because of the specific correlation 
relation they exemplify with external states; this interaction also includes 
contributions by bodily and environmental forces and inhibitions (i.e. 
enablings and constraints). These 'representations' are not mental entities, 
however, but constraining or enabling factors in an agent-environment 
interaction-dynamic. 
 
This is a dynamic of mutual constraints and enablings: the bodily properties 
of the agent, his social and physical environment in interaction collectively 
realise a specific behavioural profile with new properties, chief amongst 
which is the property of realizing concept-involving behaviour. I called the 
metaphysical structure that is involved dynamical dimensioned realization. 
The agent himself, as embedded in particular environment, has concepts. 
The fluidity involved in these dynamic interactions implies that concepts are 
not subject to rigid truth conditions, but appropriateness-of-use conditions 
 
This interrelatedness of the agent's bodily properties, the social and 
physical properties of his environment and the concept-involving behaviour 
that results from this dynamic interplay can be expressed in a model which 
uses spaces, and this model will be explained in chapter 8. The dynamic 
movement planning field from chapter 3, the phenomenal colour space from 
chapters 4 and 5 and conceptual space from chapter 6 were all precursors 
to this final model, the 'Radicality Manifold'. 
 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
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[8 - The Radicality Manifold] 
 
8.1 - A Constellation of Spaces 
 
Now the time has come to cash in on all the preparatory work done so far, 
and offer the final sketch of the 'Radicality Manifold'-model (abbreviation: 
RM)NOTE 74. This is a framework that is intended to describe the complex 
interrelatedness of agent and world in a conceptually tractable fashion. The 
RM is intended as a combined extrapolation of the SToCC model and 
Thelen et al.'s (2001) dynamical movement planning field; the idea is to 
describe not just conceptual dispositions in terms of an abstract space, but 
all aspects relevant to the specification of a cognitive agent's interaction 
with the world. Towards this end, the integrated cognition-action-world 
interaction dynamic is split into separate 'spaces', each allowing its own 
type of descriptive strategies; at that point, the goal becomes to specify how 
those spaces are fundamentally intertwined. 
  
Before I turn to a more detailed description of these spaces, it is important 
to note two things. One, the spaces that constitute the RM are domains of 
description: the RM is, first and foremost, a tool of description - a rather 
complex metaphor, if you will -, of relating different kinds of data (namely, 
environmental, social, biomechanical, conceptual and behavioural) to 
eachother. Second, several of these domains are only separable in an 
abstract and epistemic sense, not in a straightforwardly ontological fashion. 
The idea is that the agent's perception/cognition/action-dynamic with the 
environment results in a system that is fundamentally holistic, hence cannot 
- in actuality - be separated into different sections without the loss of 
essential information. The way of carving up the interaction dynamic that is 
exemplified in RM is an explanatory tool, a way of describing this infinitely 
complex dynamic with the scientific tools at our disposal. Therefore, being a 
model that strives to accomodate the kinds of data and description we 
already have at our disposal, the spaces-description of RM might actually 
come across as quite traditional: in addition to conceptual space (C-space), 
describing the interrelatedness of an agent's concepts, there is behavioural 
space (B-space), describing the behaviour of the agent (including locution 
as well as physical action), biomechanical space (M-space), describing the 
physical, biological (and so on) properties of the agent's body, physical 
affordance space (P-space), describing properties of the physical 
environment with which the agent interacts, and social affordance space (S-
space), describing properties of the social environment with which the agent 
interacts. 
 
The resulting model offers a new metaphor for E( i )C, a framework with 
which, I claim, we can generate a structured conceptualisation of embodied, 
embedded (and so on) cognition that is more comprehensive and complete 
than, for instance, Thelen et al.'s (2001) model or Thompson's (1995) 
theory on colour perception, and in general more transparent about the 
interaction dynamics involved in cognitive behaviour. In other words, I 
suggest the RM offers us a suite of tools with which to pick apart instances 
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of the complex agent-environment interaction dynamics, with the intent of 
providing an explanation of what is going on. 
 
The interrelatedness of the spaces of the RM-model is, in some sense, 
similar to the way in which an embodied agent interacts with affordances in 
his environment, which is why the next section is devoted to a closer look at 
this specific notion. 
 
8.2 - Affordances 
 
For RM, the term 'affordance', already mentioned in section 4.5, is a 
significant concept. Gibson (1979) uses this notion to express the properties 
of the environment (or objects therein), defined in terms of the action 
possibilities of a particular organism. For instance, a standard-sized 
doorway affords unimpeded passage to humans, but not to elephants, and 
thermals afford flying to birds, but not to octopuses. 
 
Norman (1999) coins the modification 'perceived affordance', to take 
account of the fact that an object's user might not see all affordances of that 
object. In line with this remark, it is possible to see that the use to which an 
object is put by an agent depends not just on the physical capacities and 
dispositions he might, in principle, have, but also (rather crucially) on the 
capacities that he knows how to actualise. Gibson defines affordances as 
properties of objects, and these properties are defined relationally, i.e. in 
relation to the possibilities for action of the agent. However, some of these 
possibilities might never be realised, if the agent does not know how to do 
so. 
 
Suppose a cargo plane loses a crate filled with tennis equipment while 
flying over the Amazon rain forest, and this crate is found by a local native 
who has never seen tennis balls or tennis rackets before. He will not be 
able to detect the affordances those balls and rackets have for us because 
he does not know what these objects are, and what they are for: he lacks 
the conceptual abilities to perceive and actualise the affordances for playing 
tennis (and all it entails) that these objects have. Certainly, he will be able to 
find some use for these items, but the possibility that he arrives at a form of 
behaviour that we would readily describe as 'playing tennis' need not be 
realized. 
 
For RM, the role of the 'conceptual system' will, at least in part, be defined 
in embodied terms. This means that the native Amazonian in the above 
example might obtain the concept 'tennis racket' in limited form if he 
observes someone else playing tennis: in that case, he will have acquired 
some detached knowledge of the object, and this will suffice for limited 
concept possession, provided that this knowledge fits in with the concepts 
he already possesses (many of which are likely to be embodied or 
embodiment-based). However, he will acquire a much more complete and 
versatile concept if he, by chance or by following example, starts playing 
tennis himself. In this case, an important part of his concept 'tennis racket' 
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will consist of embodied knowledge, i.e. of having personal experience of 
how bouncing balls off a racket feels, and of being able to aim tennis balls 
without consciously guiding his arm through the required motions. 
 
This conceptualisation of affordance involves a complex relation, in which 
the physical properties of the agent and the physical properties of the object 
both constrain the possibilities for some events to occur: given my size and 
strength, I can lift a pebble, but not a city bus. Furthermore, some events in 
the interaction of agent and object might be possible, but not very probable. 
For instance, I can sit on a tennis ball and throw a chair, but it is much more 
likely that I sit on a chair and throw the ball. In addition to these body-based 
constraints, the agent's conceptual system further constrains what events 
are probable, or at least what events are probable as events that are 
brought about intentionally. For example, when I am put inside the cockpit 
of an airplane in flight, the probability of me being able to execute a flawless 
landing is not very high, because there is much about an airplane cockpit 
that I do not understand. 
  
The events that are mentioned above, the ones that are constrained by both 
physical properties of the object and physical properties of the agent, are 
behavioural events: in a sense, the relation between an object's affordance 
and an agent's physical properties are 'mediated' by behaviour. The 'walk-
through-ability' of a door is a possibility for action, and is only 'activated' 
when an appropriately configured agent actually performs the appropriate 
action. The influence of the conceptual system, as described above, adds 
another dimension: some affordances are only relevant when they are 
understood. This is especially clear in the case of more complex 
phenomena such as language: the instructions of an art teacher contribute 
towards understanding the affordances of charcoal, paint, canvas and so 
on, so it is possible to say that the teacher's words afford the creation of a 
work of art by me, but this effect evaporates if I cannot understand what he 
says, for instance because I speak a different language. 
 
These examples demonstrate, in line with Gibson's definition but probably a 
bit more radical, that an affordance cannot be merely a property of an object 
(or the environment): if we want to explain the agent's interaction with his 
environment, we need to take into account his behavioural patterns, the 
structure of his conceptual system and the properties and abilities of his 
body in addition to the properties of the environment. This structure of 
interacting objects, aspects and properties becomes even more complex 
when another crucial element is added: the constellation of meaningful 
properties that comes into play when the conceptual apprehension of the 
world is involved, especially when this world includes other agents with their 
own conceptual systems and behavioural patterns. That is, the inclusion of 
the conceptual system causes properties and events to mean something to 
an agent, especially when the environment's affordances are defined to 
include the actions of other agentsNOTE 75. This means that the behaviour of 
other agents is what establishes (part of) the world's affordance structure, 
alongside that environment's physical features. 
 178 
 
The Radicality Manifold (RM) is a model that includes a description of 
exactly these aspects of the agent-world interaction dynamic. Each of these 
aspects allows for a description in terms of an abstract space, that is similar 
to the account of concepts that was presented for concepts in the previous 
section (namely SToCC). 
 
8.3 - Description of the Spaces 
 
The RM portrays the interrelatedness of several domains of description, 
linked by recursive constraints on, or 'enablings' of, degrees of freedom 
between spaces, as well as explanatory connections. What this means 
exactly will be explained in the pages to follow, but one point needs to be 
made clear right now: these spaces are not located anywhere, least of all 
inside an agent's head; also, these spaces do not necessarily encode, 
exemplify, constitute or contain representations. What the RM does is offer 
a model to parametrize and describe the behavioural dispositions (including 
action, cognition and locution) of an embodied agent that is embedded in a 
particular environment. 
 
Recall the movement planning field devised by Thelen et al. (2001), which I 
discussed in section 3.2; this model forms an important source of inspiration 
for my model in two ways. First, their model expresses a prioritarisation of 
certain kinds of data, which I intend to expand upon in order to provide a 
more comprehensive description of cognitive behaviour. Second, I will use 
this movement planning field as the template for behavioural space. 
 
The general structure of Thelen et al.'s model can be depicted as follows: 
 
 [Figure 21: interrelatedness of agent and physical world] 
 
I have used this picture before: it also describes, in principle, the kinds of 
interactions that were conceptualised in the discussion involving ecological 
theories of colour perception (see chapter 4): properties of the environment 
(in the 'ecological colour'-case: structural regularities in the optic array) and 
properties of the observer (for colour: an agent with a specific retinal 
chromatic dimensionality, and biomechanical properties which allow him to 
perform certain actions in response to environmental structures) collectively 
determine the kinds of behavioural profiles this agent is capable of 
exhibiting (e.g. approaching food-shaped objects with a particular colour, 
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but avoiding objects of the same shape but with a different colour, such as 
ripe and unripe fruits, respectively). 
 
That is, the biomechanical properties of the agent as they change over time 
(dM/dt), in interaction with physical properties of the environment as they 
change over time (dP/dt), can, at some level of detail, be described as 
behaviour (i.e. the change of behavioural patterns over time, dB/dt). This 
behavioural description can be expressed in terms of a behavioural space, 
as a higher-dimensional version of the movement planning field utilised by 
Thelen et al. (2001). 
 
Mutatis mutandem, the structure underlying the discussing regarding the 
linguistic categorization of perceptual colour space (see chapter 4) might be 
characterised as follows: 
 
 [Figure 22: interrelatedness of agent and social world] 
 
That is, specific socio-cultural properties (i.e. linguistic regularities, social 
customs) and the properties of an agent's perceptual system also 
collectively exert some determining influence on the kinds of behavioural 
profiles an agent is capable of exhibiting (e.g. implementing particular 
categorizations, such as using the same colour word in describing objects 
that are alike in the appropriate sense). 
 
In reality, true E( i )C partakes in both types of interaction structure, for both 
physical and social environmental cues, together with the relevant 
properties of the agent, help constrain the kinds of behaviour an agent is 
likely to engage in. In terms of the depictions used above, this would look 
something like this: 
 
 [Figure 23: interrelatedness of agent with physical and social world] 
 180 
So, the interaction of physical (P) and social (S) aspects of the environment 
plus the biomechanical (M) properties of the agent collectively yield a 
particular agent-environment interaction dynamic, of which we can describe 
part (namely, the motion of the agent's body) in terms of behavioural (B) 
patterns. As said, the model by Thelen et al. (2001) provides a DST-based 
description of this behaviour (B), i.e. using a movement planning field (see 
section 3.2). 
 
In the following sections, I will specify the properties of the four (sub-) 
spaces depicted above, as well as the relations between them, in a bit more 
detail: Behavioural space (B-space), bioMechanical Space (M-space), 
Physical affordance Space (P-space) and Social affordance Space (S-
space). Then I will specify how Conceptual space (C-space) fits into this 
structure, in light of the considerations about concepts in chapter 6, and the 
dynamical dimensioned realization of concept-involving behaviour as 
discussed in chapter 7. The specification of B-space, the first space to be 
discussed here, offers a general format in terms of which the other spaces 
can be modeled. 
 
8.3.1 - Behavioural Space 
 
As noted, Behavioural space (or 'B-space') is inspired by the dynamic field 
used by Thelen et al. (2001) to model an infant's movement planning 
(described in section 3.2), and my adaptation of their model also serves as 
an example for the characterization of the other spaces of the RM. 
Irrespective of the shortcomings I believe Thelen et al.'s theory to have as 
an account of cognition as a whole (see also section 3.2, and Van 
Leeuwen, 2005), their ideas have significant merit as a template for the 
partial (namely, behaviour-based) description of cognition-involving 
processes, and that is how their ideas will be used in what follows. 
 
Recall that in SToCC, conceptual space was defined as a dispositional 
space, i.e. an abstract space describing what an agent might do (say, feel, 
think, ...), in terms of the concepts associated with those actions, in a 
particular situation. Each of the other spaces that constitutes the RM is also 
a dispositional space, a higher-dimensional version of a dispositional field, 
similar in form to the movement planning field used by Thelen et al. (2001). 
As described earlier, Thelen et al.'s model involves a dynamic function 
specifying a field which depicts a reach towards either location A or location 
B if it spikes beyond a particular threshold value. The dynamics of the field 
is determined by saliency of input (e.g. a brightly coloured toy vs. a bland-
looking object), 'memory' of earlier tasks, and the cooperativity of the field 
(to help generate a single response with complex input, regions of the field 
that lie close together are mutually stimulatory, while inhibiting more distant 
activation). Thelen and colleagues used this abstract construct to model 
behavioural performance, and the predictions of the model turned out to 
align quite well with the behaviour observed in real infants. 
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It should be possible, at least in principle, to increase the dimensionality of 
this field to include all types of behaviour a particular agent is capable of. 
That is, it should be possible to specify additional axes in Thelen et al.'s 
very simple behavioural space along which to depict other parameters and 
variables, which would allows us to model not merely reaches to either 
location A or B, but also the strength and speed (and other aspects) 
involved in reaching, plus other forms of behaviour such as walking, 
running, head-turning, jumping, and so on. We can then attribute weights to 
specific combinations of activation levels, to model the likelihood of 
occurrence of a specific behavioural pattern for some agent in a particular 
context. 
 
For instance, an agent with strong leg muscles and relatively low body 
mass is likely to be able to climb a staircase comparatively quickly; a tall 
person is much less likely to require a lot of exertion to reach objects placed 
on the top shelf in a kitchen geared towards regular-sized people; a very 
limber person is more likely to be able to execute certain movements than 
normal agents, and so on. 
 
These examples demonstrate one particular point quite effectively: bodily 
motion-based behavioural patterns are necessarily related to environmental 
properties (P-space: the physical environmental affordances, for some 
agent, of a staircase, or a top shelf) and the agents' biomechanical 
properties (M-space: the kinds of dispositions and abilities that are possible 
due to having strong leg muscles, or being tall or limber). Speaking of other 
kinds of behaviour - cognition and locution - becomes possible when social 
environmental affordances (S-space) are introduced. These domains of 
properties interact, and the mutual constraints and enablings between these 
domains collectively determine the possibilities for action of the agent in his 
environment. It is these relations and dispositional interactions that are 
encoded in the spaces of the RM. 
 
Just like having a concept was defined (in section 6.3) in terms of 
dispositions towards not only 'normal', physical action, but also cognition 
and locution, B-space should also contain cognitive and locutionary acts. In 
the case of cognition, this move safeguards against a slide towards 
behaviourism, which would make talk of the phenomenology underlying C-
space, as well as much of C-space itself, inexplicable; in the case of 
locution, this is because speech is an exceedingly important aspect of our 
behaviour, and together with these other types of behavioural expression, it 
contributes to the shaping of the sociocultural environment for other agents. 
 
8.3.2 - bioMechanical Space 
 
Biomechanical space, or M-space, 'encodes' the properties of the body as 
they constrain or enable activities of the agent, and certain dispositional 
patterns in the spaces it is linked to (P-space and S-space). In other words, 
M-space describes the biomechanical and neurophysiological contributions 
or inhibitions to the actions of the agent as a whole, i.e. the suite of the 
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agent's physically specifiable dispositions as constrained by the properties 
of the cells, organs, joints, muscles and so on. 
 
This space is the classic domain of embodied dynamics. Constraints are 
described as, for instance, possible movement dynamics in terms of 
properties of joints and ligaments and muscle strength, thus enabling 
particular behaviouro-motor patterns but disabling others (my arm can bend 
this way, but not that way), or endurance as a function of the capacities of 
the heart and lungs; the properties of the retina and additional downstream 
neural apparatus afford the perception of certain objects belonging to a 
certain range of colours, textures, sizes, and so on, and render properties 
and signals outside that sensitivity range (say, ultraviolet radiation) 
inaccessible. 
 
The constraints and enablings mentioned above are bottom-up in character. 
Top-down influences, where certain M-space dynamics influence an agent's 
biomechanical properties, can be e.g. activity that depletes energy (or 
restores it: eating), increases strength and endurance (exercise), or causes 
damage (careless behaviour resulting in a broken leg or arm). 
 
Obviously, M-space is structured. It should be possible to specify this 
structure in a layered fashion; here is a crude example: 
 
Visual distinction abilities 
Æ (are explained by) Æ 
(functional) properties of retina and subsequent neural processing 
Æ (are explained by) Æ 
properties of retinal and neural cells 
Æ (are explained by) Æ 
microphysical processes 
 
It is important to note a few things about this schema. First, the overall 
behaviour of M-space is described in terms of the biomechanical and 
neurophysiological contributions or inhibitions to the activity of the agent as 
a whole, i.e. the suite of the agent's physically specifiable dispositions as 
constrained by the properties of the cells, organs, joints, muscles and so on. 
These contributions and inhibitions provide the parameters with which to 
specify the properties of the contact layers (see section 8.5 below), i.e. the 
description of the way in which the various spaces are related to eachother. 
 
Second, the relations between the layers in the scheme given above are 
explanatory: a property at a particular layer is explained by properties or 
processes at some other layer. This implies that M-space also has a 
structure that can be defined in terms of a granularity gradient, just like 
conceptual space (see sections 6.7 and 6.8). 
 
However, and this is the third point, we should shy away from attaching too 
much importance to the fact this scheme has a layered structure. That is, 
there is not a necessary endorsement about microphysical reduction to be 
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distilled from this schema. In RM, as in embodied/embedded theories in 
general, the agent level is ontologically most significant: when explaining 
macro-level behaviour (of whatever form), the biomechanical and 
neurophysiological properties and processes that usually matter most are 
structural assemblies that occur at that same macro-level, and the 
microphysical particles (whatever they are) are not necessarily the entities 
doing the relevant work. Explaining how these properties arise could 
obviously, in many cases, lead to explanations in terms of microphysical 
events, but I want RM to resist across-the-board reductionism, and 
granularity is the tool to accomodate descriptions of relevant processes at a 
particular 'level'.  
 
This is important because macro-properties are not always exhaustively 
described as aggregates of micro-properties, where those micro-properties 
are ontologically primary; RM leaves room for explanations in terms of, for 
instance, self-organization and downward constraints and causationNOTE 76, 
that could result in irreducible properties and structures. However, apart 
from the claim that the agent level, the 'top layer' of M-space, is most 
relevant, RM is largely agnostic regarding the exact specification of the 
structure of M-space, allowing a lot of room for explanations in terms of 
whatever theory (in the scheme given above about, for instance, the 
functioning of the visual cortex) currently works best. A particular array of 
constraints on C- and B-spaces can be derived from M-space descriptions 
in terms of biological, chemical, neurological, anatomical (etcetera) 
properties, but also in terms of higher-level dynamical processes. This also 
means that the RM-model allows for multiple realizability in terms of the 
material composition of the agent, but I would like to claim that it is likely 
that any agent that can be described in terms of the RM, and exhibits 
human-level cognition, will possess a human-like body. At the very least, we 
have not yet encountered or constructed anyone or anything that is capable 
of full-fledged human-level cognition, and is totally unlike humans in 
material composition and bodily structure. While this is by no means a 
decisive argument, it does contribute to arguments about the likelihood of 
some of our intuitions in this area. 
 
8.3.3 - Physical affordance Space 
 
Physical environmental affordance space (P-space) 'encodes' the 
environment's constraints on and enablings for the agent's behaviour 
(action, locution, cognition). The idea of 'affordances' was discussed in 
section 8.2, and there the point was made that affordances should not be 
thought of as merely physical properties of objects that are defined 
relationally depending on an agent's physical characteristics (e.g. a chair is 
of the right physical size, shape and structural integrity to afford sitting for 
normally abled, regular-sized humans), but should also accomodate the 
influence of the agent's knowledge and conceptual abilities. 
 
It is important to note that all spaces that comprise the RM are perspectival 
descriptions of the entire agent-world-dynamic. Hence, this is also the case 
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of P-space, and this aligns quite neatly with what an affordance actually is: 
a specific possibility for action, emerging from the interaction of properties 
of agent and world. 
 
Operationalising that interactive aspect, P-space can structured in terms of 
the probability of interaction profiles, an idea that I mentioned already in 
section 8.2. P-space too allows modeling in terms of a weighted 
dispositional space, and the biomechanical dynamics of the agent (i.e. the 
dynamics of M-space) co-determines the shifting array of probabilities in P-
space. For instance, it is more likely that I sit on a chair and throw a ball 
than the other way around (unless I participate in a particular kind of talk 
show); both sitting and throwing are afforded to me by balls and chairs (as 
long as they are not too heavy), but not to the same extent. 
 
8.3.4 - Social affordance Space 
 
The affording dispositions of the environment to some agent modeled in P-
space constrain and enable the dispositions in M-space, but also impart 
certain structures on an agent's social effectivities.  
This means that if the depiction of the general structure of Thelen et al.'s 
(2001) model above, i.e. involving an interaction of physical constraints (P-
space) and biomechanical properties (M-space) to yield a description in 
terms of behaviour (B-space) is correct, their model is incomplete - it lacks 
the social dimension (S-space). 
 
We have already seen a very important class of socio-cultural influences on 
the ways in which an agent acts in his environment: chapter 4 contains an 
extensive description of the influence of language and customs on the 
behaviour of agents in response to specific chromatic stimuli. 
 
Now, it does seem to be the case that constellations of P- and S-properties 
flow into eachother, and are difficult to separate in concrete cases. 
Whatever social affordances are created appear to be mediated, in a sense, 
by P-space: a social affordance always involves a physical object (an 
agent's body, or some arrangement or design of physical objects wrought 
by an agent, or even an acoustic phenomenon we interpret as meaningful 
speech) as that in relation to which we are supposed to exhibit a specific 
kind of behaviour. 
 
Perhaps this would support the conflation of P- and S-space into a general 
affordance space (A-space), combining physical and social affordances, as 
these are all opportunities for behaviour, merely modulated by different 
kinds of external structures (objects as such for P-space, and objects 
arranged in a particular way, congruent with the intentions of another agent, 
for S-space). I do believe, however, that the addition of social structures 
results in a vast qualitative transformation of affordances: overlaying socio-
cultural practices over a physical world introduces a specific kind of 
normativity to that world, introduces a highly context-dependent and fluidly 
dynamic suite of constraints and enablings to our environment, and moulds 
 185 
the array of appropriate behavioural responses in ways that adhere to its 
own set of laws and regularities that are vastly underdetermined by the 
properties of the physical substrate. 
 
One example of this confluence of P- and S-properties is the emergence of 
meaningful structures. The array of environmental affordances is 
constituted not only by physical affordances, but also by semantic 
affordances, and I assume that in a narrow sense, this can still be 
understood as part of ('encodable in') P-space. This affordance type 
includes, for instance, contextualised objects: a toilet, placed in a particular 
context in a museum, affords different actions than that same toilet in a 
bathroom (and different actions yet again when it is part of a display in a 
store), and might actually mean something to some agents, e.g. it could 
instantiate a particular statement by the artist, and spectators might (or 
might not) pick up on that. 
 
However, and probably more significantly, semantic affordance also 
includes other agents as part of that dynamic environment - agents who say 
and do all kinds of things that are meaningful to the appropriately configured 
observer, and who engage in interactive behaviour to elicit equally 
meaningful behavioural responses from me. I suspect that the potential for 
profound, meaningful interaction is what sets this kind of affordance apart 
from the kind that is purely physically instantiated: a piece of text in a book 
and a personally delivered monologue by the writer might contain - in purely 
formal, logical terms - the exact same kind of semantic content, but the 
action opportunities afforded in these two cases are profoundly different. 
This results in the interesting situation where another agent's B-space 
contributes quite directly to my S-space (and vice versa): his behaviour 
constrains and enables my own actions and concepts in various ways. 
 
This is why I have decided in favour of the inclusion of a separate S-space 
in the RM: despite the entangled nature of P- and S-properties, the kinds of 
dynamics I can - appropriately - exhibit in response is quite different. 
 
There is more on the various kinds of influence (enablings and constraints) 
below: section 9.1 highlights the social, semantic relevance of physically 
instantiated patterns (what I call 'bodily syntax'), and section 8.5 describes 
some of the features of the constraints-and-enablings-dynamics that 
gouverns the interactions between the spaces of the RM. This latter 
description will be offered in terms of each space's separate contributions, 
inasmuch as it is possible to separate them - these will be abstract 
descriptions of properties and processes which, in actually, form a unified 
dynamic. 
 
Important to note is that all varieties of semantic affordance are subject to 
interpretation, and in a context dependent way: a red light at a busy 
intersection is usually interpreted as demanding a different kind of response 
than that same shade of red in a fireworks display. And interpretation, of 
course, is bound up with the structure of C-space. 
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8.3.5 - Conceptual space 
 
A lot has already been said about conceptual space (C-space), in chapter 6. 
There are two important steps left on the roster: explaining how C-space 
can be modeled in a way that takes B-space as its template, and integrating 
C-space into the RM-structure described in the sections above (i.e. 
involving B-, M-, P- and S-space). I will take these points in turn. 
 
First, the modeling issue. Recall that having a concept of some object was 
defined as having the dispositions towards displaying behaviour (action, 
cognition, locution) of a specific kind in relation to that object. As such, C-
space is a high-dimensional dispositional space by definition. Modeling 
these dispositions involves describing the concepts' enslavement 
hierarchies (see section 6.7) at particular granularities (see section 6.8). 
The fact that some aspect of a concept's internal structure (e.g. the 
enslaver) is more prominent than another lends itself to modeling in terms 
of dispositional fields with a particular weight distribution. This is how that 
works: in Thelen et al.'s (2001) model, the function that defines the field can 
be drawn up in such a way that a reach towards location A is much easier, 
occurs much more often, than a reach towards location B. Similarly, at 
some granularity, the bubonic plague's catalog of symptoms is likely to play 
a larger role in determining what the concept 'bubonic plague' means than 
some highly specialistic bit of knowledge about the cause of the disease. 
 
Thus it should be possible to model some agent's C-space (probably merely 
in part, but theoretically as a whole) as an array of dispositions with 
particular weights, where those weights are determined, at least in part, by 
the constraints and enablings offered by, for instance, the agent's 
environment. That is, in a hospital's emergency room a properly embedded 
agent is likely to use emergency-room-related concepts (patient, trauma, 
medicine, nurse), in a way that depends on his role in that environment (is 
he a patient, a doctor or a concerned family member of a patient?), and also 
in a way that probably differs from the way said agent would be disposed 
towards using emergency-room-related concepts in, say, a shopping mall. 
 
Second, there is the issue of integrating C-space into the RM-structure as it 
has been built up so far. In section 7.8, I outlined an account of the 
relatedness of concepts and conceptual abilities to the suite of bodily and 
environmental constraints and enablings, named dynamical dimensioned 
realisation. I submit that concepts allow an approach to behaviour that 
differs from what the model by Thelen et al. (2001) allows: explanation, 
rather than mere description. 
 
In chapter 3, I posed the question whether Thelen et al.'s model was 
capable of doing more than merely providing an abstract, formal description 
of behaviour - whether it was capable of explaining that behaviour. The 
answer back then was: not very well. Conceptualising (pun intended) the 
agent-world interaction dynamic (the dynamic tangle of constraints and 
enablings of P-, S- and M-space) as realising a suite of conceptual 
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dispositions (which can be described in terms of C-space) is capable of 
providing explanations, I wish to claim. 
 
8.4 - The 'Radicality Manifold'-Model 
 
This results in the following, final rendition of the Radicality Manifold: 
 
 [Figure 24: The Radicality Manifold] 
 
Legend: 
 : mutual constraints and enablings 
 : dynamical dimensioned realisation 
 : descriptive and explanatory relationships 
 1: ascription; 2': explanation (of basic bodily acts); 
 2'': explanation (of cognition-involving acts); 3: description 
 
This is what I intend to depict here: conceptual abilities emerge, via 
dynamical dimensioned realisation, from the interaction of physical 
environmental, social and biomechanical processes. The dynamics of an 
agent's biomechanical properties can still be described in terms of 
behavioural, bodily acts (BACT), but the availability of a conceptual 
description allows an explanation (rather than mere description) of a 
particular behavioural profile. That is, the structure of C-space - spanning, 
as it does, a suite of abilities from basic body-based reactions (e.g. the 
Neurophysiological Yield, the NPhY, mentioned in section 5.2) to theoretic 
apprehensions of objects and occurrences (scientific conceptualisations of, 
for instance, 'colour') - allows one to provide accounts of why (not just how) 
an agent exhibits behaviour of a certain kind: this is because the properties 
of physical environment, social environment and bodily biomechanics 
conspire in such a way to create a structural regularity, i.e. a conceptual 
disposition, which - and this is crucial for the possibility of explanations 
rather than descriptions - is closely tied to an environment in which norms 
emerge (as per section 7.8 above, and section 9.2 below). 
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The breadth of C-space structure enables two explanatory routes: one 
directly towards the BACT-description, for low-level embodied behaviour (the 
properties of the NPhY emerging in the interaction of - chiefly - P and M 
explain basic categorization-based behaviour, such as bees flocking to 
flowers with colour X rather than colour Y), and one via the ascription of 
cognitive behaviour (BCOG). To elaborate on the latter case: many folk-
psychological accounts presuppose (or even require) the ascription of 
mental states; such ascriptions to an agent are justified, I claim, by that 
agent exhibiting the appropriate kinds of conceptual abilities. Section 9.2 
below will contain a brief exploration of the important role of normativity as it 
is involved in such ascriptions. 
 
Please note that this comment about the possibility of explanations (giving 
reasons) rather than descriptions is not necessarily about what kinds of 
properties reasons have, e.g. whether or not reasons (as mental entities) 
can be causes (of behaviour)NOTE 77. Rather, this is to stress that invoking 
concepts enables us to provide interpretations and explanations of the 
behaviour of others (and ourselves), rather than being stuck at the 
descriptive level (which is where, for instance, Thelen et al.'s model still 
resides). The point of the RM model is that the interaction of biomechanical, 
physical and social properties is such that certain behavioural regularities 
are realised (via dynamical dimensioned realization) which allow the 
attribution of concepts to agents. This is all still purely descriptive: invoking 
concepts allows us to explain in addition to merely describe, simply 
because the kinds of explanations we usually give of agentive behaviour 
are defined in terms of having such and such a concept. 
 
The non-reducibility inherent to Dynamical Dimensioned Realization exists 
in the fact that the attribution of concepts to anything other than an agent is 
incomprehensible. Or, formulated the other way around: if we are correct, 
under informed scrutiny, in attributing the having of concepts to something 
(be it a human being or another kind of animal), it must be an agent. In 
accordance with earlier claims (see section 6.8: the role of the expert in 
defining the intension of a concept), a claim can be said to hold up under 
'informed scrutiny' if it can be made coherent within at least one 
scientifically sound paradigm. However, in most day-to-day cases, the 
scrutiny we subject claims to is not nearly so 'informed', allowing two agents 
to agree they share a concept as long as their discussion of that concept 
remains at a coarse-grained level. As we will see in section 9.2, the 
attribution of concepts is an integral part of the game of attributing reasons 
for acting, and this is mostly an epistemic practice: we use it to help us 
understand other agents and their actions. 
 
8.5 - Bundle Dynamics: Functional Clusters and Contact Layers 
 
It has become clear by now, I think, that the spaces that constitute the RM 
are fundamentally intertwined. However, there is a bit more to be said about 
this. For instance, it is important to note that C-space, at its perceptual/non-
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conceptual base, blends into M-space. That is, the dynamical dimensioned 
realisation yielding very rudimentary conceptual abilities (for primitive 
animals) does not result in a C-space that offers much over and above the 
already instantiated M-space dynamic. 
 
When we revisit the colour perception example, we can see that certain 
structural aspects of visual perception and phenomenology can be 
explained with psychophysical models. For instance, the specification of 
relations between colour experiences that can be expressed in terms of the 
dimensions hue, brightness and saturation - the three-dimensionality of 
phenomenal colour space - can be linked to the properties of chromatic 
sensors on the retina and the neural processing of their output signals (see 
Hardin, 1988). However, we should note that such models do not 
necessarily tell the complete phenomenal story: however sophisticated the 
models expressing the above-mentioned coupling of C-space and M-space 
might become, they are not necessarily capable of telling the whole story 
about the so-called 'what-it-is-likeness' of experience (see Nagel, 1974). As 
I do not presume to be able to solve the hard problem of consciousness I 
will put this issue aside (as mentioned earlier in note 36), and express an 
agnosticism about the role of phenomenal consciousness in the RM model: 
the main task to be carried out in this section is to sketch the model itself. 
 
However, these remarks do highlight an important aspect of the RM, one 
that has been mentioned in more or less explicit ways before, and will be 
addressed more thoroughly now: the component spaces of RM are not 
ontologically separate entities, they are partial descriptions, each from a 
very specific perspective, of what is in actuality an integrated agent-world-
dynamic. 
 
There is a kind of bundle dynamics in place: very often, there is a necessary 
connectedness or reciprocity of processes that can be described in terms of 
different spaces. Some subset of dispositions of, say, M-space might 
enable specific dispositional patterns of a connected space - say P-space -, 
whereas another subset of M-space-dispositions might enable a completely 
different set of dispositions in that same P-space. After all, the kinds of 
options for an agent with specific biomechanical (M-space) properties to 
'activate' a particular disposition is constrained by the kinds of activities 
afforded by the environment, i.e. the properties of P-space - a stairwell 
affords climbing (but only if the stairs are not too close together or too far 
apart, given the dimensions of an agent's body, i.e. the length of his legs, 
and the height he can lift them), a level field does not. All relations between 
P-, S- and M-spaces in figure 24 are recursively constraining/affording like 
this. So, the spaces of the RM describe an event sequence of an agent-in-
the-world collectively. 
 
The above implies that it is possible to distinguish several special relations 
involving subregions of the complete RM. I call these two-space relations 
the functional clustersNOTE 78. Spelling out the kinds of constraining and/or 
enabling properties that come into play between the various spaces will 
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help us to understand a bit more about the interaction dynamics that 
governs the relations between the various spaces. That is, not all properties 
and processes that can be described in a particular space are relevant for 
that space's interaction with another space, and even if some processes 
and properties are relevant at a particular time, they might not be at other 
times. 
 
So, for instance, for the behavioural disposition of walking, the 
biomechanical properties of relatively large-scale assemblies of bones, 
muscles, tendons and joints in the arms and legs are relevant (obviously, 
this is not a complete list of relevant M-space properties). These properties 
of M-space are less relevant for the behavioural disposition of speaking, 
where much smaller forces, not to mention different body parts, are 
involved. Obviously, there is also some overlap: in both cases, lung 
capacity plays an important role. But the differences remain - consider, for 
example, how perceptive acuity is important in both cases, but in different 
ways: where a blind person and a seeing person might exhibit little 
discernible behavioural differences while speaking, they are likely to display 
significantly different behavioural patterns while walking.  
 
These similarities and differences determine which properties from a 
particular space impose constraints or create degrees of freedom in another 
space, at a particular time, and how these influences manifest themselves. 
The simultaneous constraints and enablings at these various 'levels' can be 
mapped in terms of a multi-tracked granularity-gradient in each of the 
connected spaces: a specific subregion at some granularity can express 
properties that constrain or enable certain other properties or processes 
that are described in terms of a specific subregion at some granularity in the 
connected space, even while other properties, to be described in terms of 
those same spaces but at different granularities or in different ways, are 
also relevant. 
 
For instance, while walking, properties of muscles and tendons (M-space) 
influence the kind of gait that can be achieved (B-space); physical 
properties of the visual and auditory systems (M-space) determine whether 
or not a particular obstacle (P-space) is detected, with obvious behavioural 
consequences (B-space: will the agent step up onto the curb, or continue as 
if he were expecting the walking surface to be level, and trip?); properties of 
the heart and lungs (M-space) influence the agent's endurance (B-space), 
and so on. 
 
The theoretical vocabulary developed above allows us to get some grip on 
the dynamic coupling of each pair of spaces. A formal account of dynamic 
coupling in this sense would require the specification of how the variables of 
one system act as the parameters of the coupled system, and vice versa. 
An adaptation of that idea in the current context (i.e. as pertaining to the 
RM) will be given below, and it requires the development of one additional 
notion: the contact layer. This is what I call the array of properties and 
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processes in a particular space, at some granularity, that constrains or 
enables an array of properties in another, connected space. 
 
Contact layers always come in pairs (one in each of the connected spaces), 
but there may well be several pairs of contact layers 'active' as a description 
of the way two connected spaces constrain or enable eachother, if 
processes at multiple levels or domains are in play. The 'walking'-example 
above demonstrates this, as several different processes encoded in M-
space (muscle activity, processes in the perceptual system, respiration, 
blood circulation and so on) contribute to specific behavioural patterns. 
 
I propose that it is, in principle, possible to specify the properties of each 
pair of contact layers in terms of a coupled pair of dispositional spaces, of 
the kind described in Thelen et al. (2001). The parameters to define the 
contents and properties of all spaces are described in a common format, 
namely an agent-centered description: all the processes in the various 
spaces are understood in terms of their contribution towards the totality of 
the agent-environment-interaction, and that contribution consists in 
constraining or enabling certain other processes, to be described in terms of 
one or more of the other connected spaces. 
 
Some suggestions about what kinds of constraints and evocations of 
degrees of freedom occur in the various 'space-interactions' are specified 
below; this is by no means to be understood as an exhaustive description, 
merely as a coarse-grained indication. 
 
One brief remark before I provide the list, about notation: 'Pm' in the list 
below, for instance, describes the 'physical/environmental-to-biomechanical' 
mapping, involving the kinds of constraints and enablers/degrees of 
freedom generated by physical environmental affordances (P) as they are 
relevant to biomechanical properties and processes (m). 'Mp' describes the 
the relation in the opposite direction, namely the 'biomechanical-to-
physical/environmental' mapping, which is the way that an agent's 
biomechanical properties (M), possibly defined in terms of effectivities (see 
note 26), influence physical environmental properties and processes (p). 
 
So, listed below are the kinds of properties in terms of which the relevance 
of one space for another is to be specified - see once again figure 24 for a 
general overview, and where in the RM these relations are to be 'located'. 
 
C P+S+M: Semiogenetic Engine 
 
Special mention needs to be made of the dynamics that is instantiated in 
the relation between C-space and the constellation of P-, S- and M-space - 
what I wish to call the Semiogenetic EngineNOTE 79. The claim is that C-
space has a special role to play in the grasping of meanings - attributable to 
objects and processes, or other agents - in the environment. In section 7.8, 
I described the metaphysics of this relation as one of dynamical 
dimensioned realisation, which plays a role in creating interactions between 
 192 
agent and environment infused with norms; perhaps now I can say a bit 
more about the actual character of this suite of constraints and enablings. 
 
Cpsm: conceptual knowledge and abilities can curtail certain forms of the 
P/S/M-dynamics: it might be possible to understand this as a form of 
downward causation by the dynamically dimensionally realised property of 
exhibiting conceptual dispositions on the ecological substrate, i.e. the 
dynamics of the embodied agent interacting with his environment. That is, 
when a P/S/M-system exhibits such a dynamics that a specific suite of 
conceptual dispositions emerges, new affordances congruent with that suite 
of concepts are realised as well. A practical example: if you have an 
incorrect concept of some object, or no usable concept of it at all, the 
resultant dynamics (to be described in terms of some behavioural response, 
in B-space) is unlikely to result in sufficiently effective, useful interaction 
with said object. See the 'amazonian tennis player'-example in section 8.2: 
the physical affordances are present, but they are not 'activated' because 
the agent does not have the right concepts. 
 
At the cognitive level (i.e. involving the cases in which a particular 
conceptual dispositional profile justifies the ascription of mental states, in 
terms of BCOG), an example of this relation involves changing one's 
(metaphorical) point of view. The acquisition of knowledge can change 
semantic affordances; for instance, the way in which an unfamiliar device is 
approached and understood can change dramatically once its proper way of 
use is explained. Or: the way we see or attempt to understand an abstract 
painting can snap into place, perhaps like a kind of gestalt switch, when we 
are told what it is intended to depict. 
 
PSMc: embodied feedback from environment involves a kind of 'hands-on' 
experience which modulates concepts. When I attempt to pick up a cup of 
hot coffee for the very first time, I am likely to learn something of vital 
importance about containers filled with a dark, steaming liquid: they can be 
hot, and hot objects are to be handled with care. A cognition-involving 
example of this relation involves interpretational constraints in terms of 
object properties, or action or linguistic expression by other agents. For 
example, when someone asks me a particular question, this imposes 
constraints on the kinds of answers that are thought to be appropriate (by 
either of us). This array of constraints and enablings contains the 
Perceptuo-Cognitive Degrees of Freedom: perceptual constraints, for 
instance in terms of the boundaries of perceptual acuity, influence the kinds 
of concepts and agent can have. For instance, the properties of my retinal 
cells and the neural cells that process visual stimuli determine what 
subsection of the electromagnetic spectrum I am sensitive to, and in what 
way (e.g. specific stimuli, namely those corresponding to a give agent's 
focal colours, are perceptually more salient than others). Damage to 
particular brain regions - a biomechanically specifiable situation - can 
constrain cognitive activity: the agent will have a deficieny in a specific 
subsection of his conceptual abilities because the relevant parts of his body 
are not capable of processing certain kinds of stimuli. Furthermore, 
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something as basic as an agent's size can influence the kinds of concepts 
he can have: my concept of 'tree' would be markedly different if I were the 
size of an ant, or an Argentinosaurus. 
 
S M: Social Preconceptual Processing 
 
Sm: this relation involves, for instance, the kind of direct influence (i.e. in a 
fashion that is not consciously mediated) of another person's facial 
gestures, bodily posture and voice intonation on one's own bodily 
responses. In the theory of Gallagher (2005) this process is central to social 
interaction, and the practice of attributing mental states to othersNOTE 80. A 
case can be made for the claim that much of our understanding of others in 
conceptual terms depends on these processes. Proximal physiological 
processes involved in this relation (M-space), most famously the activity of 
mirror neurons (see note 55), constrain and enable certain behavioural 
responses, and awareness of one's own bodily processes might, in some 
cases, lead to an understanding of the situation that elicits a modification of 
the appropriate concepts. 
 
Ms: This is one's own influence on the other (hence, on S-space), which 
involves cases in which unconscious gesturing and vocal inflection 
influence the other agent. This is an indirect and conditional influence: it 
remains to be seen how much of one's signals are picked up, in whatever 
fashion, by the other agents, hence the constraining and enabling effectivity 
of this signaling behaviour on the appropariate aspects of one's S-space 
(namely, those other agents) depends on the behaviour of those agents, 
and the vast array of influences that underlies it. 
 
M P: Affordance-Effectivity Balance 
 
Mp: the Mp-relation encodes a set of basic constraints within which an 
agent is, in a sense, free to design behavioural profiles. A doorway of a 
specific size and an agent of certain dimensions will only be able to interact 
in a limited number of ways, and the 'behavioural implementation' (i.e. what 
kinds of action are executed), given these properties, determines which 
specific affordances are at play in a particular situation. M-space dynamics 
(describable in terms of BACT - bodily behaviour) can influence P-space, for 
instance if the agent realises a change in vantage. An example is actively 
scanning the optic array (see Gibson, 1979): I can learn something about a 
particular object if I walk around it, possibly discovering more of the 
affordance constellation said object represents for me. M-space dynamics 
(describable in terms of BACT) can also consist in an active intervention in 
the world to change physical environmental properties: a tree has a specific 
affordance array to me, but when I cut down the tree and make firewood, 
the object and its affordances have changed. 
 
Pm: this comes closest to the standard definition of affordances. An object 
can have specific properties, for instance spatial ones (size, shape), which 
instantiate particular behavioural opportunities for me, and different 
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behavioural opportunities for my cats. Conversely, the kinds of behavioural 
constraints such properties entail likewise differ from agent to agent. 
 
S P: Distal Ecological Dynamics 
 
Sp: this relation includes the influence of socio-culturally motivated 
(meaningful!) activity on the arrangement of the physical environment. For 
instance, another agent may have designed an artifact in such a way as to 
enforce a particular reaction by other users, i.e. to elicit a specific 
Affordance-Effectivity Balance in that user's relatedness to the environment 
(or an object therein): a pair of scissors is intended to cut paper, and was 
designed by its designer to do that well above all other uses that object 
might have. The Sp-relation includes the possibilities for other agents to use 
our shared environment as a substrate for their own socio-cultural 
expression: a piece of art, undeniably a part of the physical environment, 
can be imbued with a specific meaningful content by the artist. 
 
Ps: However, this artist too is bound by the constraints of that environment: 
the degrees of freedom of the Sp-relation depend on the degrees of 
freedom inherent to the other agent's personal affordance-effectivity 
balance, i.e. the constraints and enablings, presented by the physical 
environment to that other agent. This is the Ps-relation. 
 
The relations above involve the kinds of constraints and enablings that co-
determine the agent-world cognition/perception/action-dynamics. The 
influence by one space on the other can occur as modifications of 
dispositional weights of the other space's field, and/or as the forced phase 
change of such a field to include new parameters and variables. The main 
idea is that there be a structural coupling between adjacent spaces, where 
a change in one yields new constraints and degrees of freedom to be 
imposed on all other adjacent spaces. Collectively, this constellation of 
spaces describes an agent as he acts in his environment. 
 
Obviously, this structure of subspaces is an abstraction of the integrated 
mind/body/world-dynamic, but this way of superimposing an explanatorily 
pragmatic structure onto this diffuse dynamical structure yields a framework 
for different kinds of data to be presented and interpreted in a useful 
manner: the tendency for some particular process to occur is analysed in 
terms of its contribution to the functioning of the agent as a whole. Put 
differently: dispositions in each space are defined in terms of the way they 
affect adjacent spaces (constraints and 'enablings' of either space's activity 
on the other), and (more importantly) their contributions to the functioning of 
the RM in its entirety.  
 
For instance, the disposition of my ears and the auditory processing regions 
of my brain to react accurately to auditory stimuli within a certain bandwidth 
of frequencies and energies, allows me (the agent as a whole) to hear 
certain sounds, while others are rendered inaudible to me; what I can and 
cannot hear determines what I can have knowledge of, hence what I can 
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have concepts of; this influences my behaviour (either directly - a loud noise 
makes me jump up instinctively -, or via the conceptuo-cognitive route - 
someone says something and I can react appropriately because I 
understand him); and finally my behaviour and changes in my faculties for 
understanding (in terms of the concepts I possess) collectively modify the 
affordance structure of the environment as I perceive it.  
 
I can provide another brief example, one which I hope will show how RM 
can help us get some grip on an instance of a complex interaction dynamic 
involving higher cognition. I suppose a good theory of embodied and 
embedded cognition would need to be able to incorporate an appropriately 
characterized socio-cultural dimension, so this example concerns one of the 
basic constituents of socio-cultural interaction: two people talking to 
eachother, communicating face to face. 
 
In this complex interactional process, an agent's conceptual knowledge 
informs behaviour (including speaking, gesturing, unconscious body 
language), his behaviour (locution, body language) instantiates a particular 
affordance array for the other to relate to, and biomechanical properties 
(including mirror neurons, which respond to gestures, voice inflection and 
so on) inform the formation of concepts via conscious and subconscious 
awareness (which is generated in the picking up of affordances). Here we 
can see that all (sub-)spaces have relevant work to do, not a single one can 
be left out of the explanatory account, and changes in any one of the (sub-
)spaces affect the entire RM. 
 
All the processes and occurrences mentioned in these brief descriptions do 
what they do - are what they are - exactly because they stand in the kinds 
of relations they stand in. A neurophysiological account of auditory 
processing, for instance, has only limited use if it is not explained in terms of 
its broader context, which necessarily includes behaviour, cognitive 
structure and environment, and the way these hang together. This 
explanation 'in terms of its broader context' requires an act of interpretation, 
of devising how typical neurophysiological data is to be presented in order 
to be relevant for an account of cognition. 
 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
 
[SUMMARY of chapter 8 AND PREVIEW] 
 
This chapter saw the introduction of the 'Radicality Manifold'-model (RM), 
which is a metaphorical depiction of the interrelatedness of bodily 
properties, sociocultural environmental properties and physical 
environmental properties, and how these collectively yield concept-involving 
behaviour. The model describes behavioural (B-space), biomechanical (M-
space), physical affordance (P-space), social affordance (S-space) and 
conceptual (C-space) properties. Each of these domains can be expressed 
in the form of a dispositional space, and the interaction between these 
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spaces is affordance-based: each property type creates constraints and 
enablings for the development of another property type. 
 
This model expresses how conceptual abilities emerge, via dynamical 
dimensioned realisation, from the interaction of physical environmental, 
social and biomechanical processes. The availability of a conceptual 
description allows an explanation (rather than mere description) of a 
particular behavioural profile. That is, the properties of physical 
environment, social environment and bodily biomechanics conspire in such 
a way to create a structural regularity, i.e. a conceptual disposition. There 
are several kinds of interactions between the various spaces: the 
Semiogenetic Engine, Social Preconceptual Processing, the Affordance-
Effectivity Balance and Distal Ecological Dynamics. 
 
In chapter 9, a few implications of this model will be discussed: the 
emergence of meaning and normativity, the inherent circular nature of the 
model, the capacity of RM to individuate concepts, and the epistemological 
view that it implies. 
 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
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[9 - Implications] 
 
The RM-model as described in the previous chapter is capable of 
accommodating several E( i )C-appropriate insights, for instance about 
embodiment (see section 9.1). The model also holds a number of 
implications that need to be made explicit, about normativity (already 
referred to in sections 7.8 and 8.4, and explored in more detail in section 
9.2 below), impredicativity (section 9.3), concept individuation (section 9.4) 
and epistemology (section 9.5). Investigating these implications is the 
purpose of the current chapter. 
 
9.1 - Bodily Syntax and Meaning 
 
Gallagher (e.g. 2005) suggests that origins of (meaningful) speech lie in 
synchronized expression through bodily gestures and vocalisations. My 
speculation, congruent with Gallagher's suggestion and very naturally 
expressible in RM, is that this synchronisation demonstrates a multimodal 
metaphorical mapping ability that is present from a very young age. That is, 
'meaning' (of expressions) emerges from shared behavioural structures that 
are, out of necessity, embedded in a meaning-containing interactive 
process, and this emergence can be described in terms of an increase in 
metaphorical mapping acuity (in the style of Lakoff and Johnson, 1999 - see 
section 6.9). 
 
This how that works. In section 7.8, I suggested that concept-possessing 
behaviour emerges, via dynamical dimensioned realisation, from a 
particular structural coupling of agent and environment. I would like to put 
forth the ancillary hypothesis that the emergence of higher-order conceptual 
abilities from lower-level conceptual dispositions occurs in a transitional 
zone, commencing as soon as the infant is capable of social interaction 
(which is, to a limited but nontrivial extent, already in the womb), in which 
onto- and phylogenetically basic bodily syntax traverses a progressive 
solidification, towards the emergence of semantic content (or semantics-
exemplifying action, if we care to steer away from attributing content). This 
idea, to be explained below, is in direct opposition to claims made by 
Gärdenfors (2000; see also section 10.2), who defends a theory which also 
uses conceptual spaces. Gärdenfors states that the semantic content of 
meaningful expressions is first generated internally, after which an 
appropriate syntactical structure is chosen with which to make said content 
public. 
 
Rather, I would like to defend the idea that the exact opposite is true, both 
in the development of the child, and the evolution of our species' cognitive 
abilities (inasmuch as anything concrete - that is, anything beyond reasoned 
speculation - can be said about that development: the empirical base 
available to found phylogenetic claims on is notoriously slim): the 
structuredness of body-based interaction between agents (i.e. bodily 
syntax) comes first, and the meaning of behavioural, vocal and symbolic 
expressions emerges from those interactions. I suggest the hypothesis that 
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these behavioural structures are meaningful in part because they evolved 
as an inescapable (i.e. automatically occurring) mutual involvedness of 
conspecifics (e.g. mother and child). 
 
Support for this notion, at least for its ontogenetic aspect, can be found in 
Stern (1985), when he speaks of affect attunementNOTE 81. The way in which 
an infant and its mother are able to share affective states depends, to a 
large extent, on mirrored behavioural structures. 
 
Here, I will reproduce two examples from Stern (1985), to illustrate this 
phenomenon: 
 
Example 1: "A nine-month-old boy bangs his hand on a soft toy, at first in 
some anger but gradually with pleasure, exuberance, and humor. He sets 
up a steady rhythm. Mother falls into his rhythm and says "kaaaaa-bam, 
kaaaaa-bam," the "bam" falling on the stroke and the "kaaaaa" riding with 
the preparatory upswing and the suspenseful holding of his arm aloft before 
it falls." 
 
Example 2: "A ten-month-old girl accomplishes an amusing routine with 
mother and then looks at her. The girl opens up her face (her mouth opens, 
her eyes widen, her eyebrows rise) and then closes it back, in a series of 
changes whose contour can be represented by a smooth arch ( ). 
Mother responds by intoning "Yeah," with a pitch line that rises and falls as 
the volume crescendos and decrescendos: "Y h." The mother's prosodic 
contour has matched the child's facial-kinetic contour." 
 
The structure of these matched behaviour-aspects breaks down into the 
following more specific kinds of match (Stern 1985, pg. 146): 
 
-Absolute Intensity: despite the difference in modality, the intensity of the 
mother's behaviour is the same as that of the infant's behaviour, e.g. the 
mother generates a loud vocal expression to accompany the infant's 
forceful arm motion. 
-Intensity Contour: the intensity dynamics are matched, e.g. an increase 
and subsequent decrease in the infant's motion intensity over time is 
reflected in an increase and decrease of the mother's vocal behaviour. 
-Temporal Beat: the matching of a recurrent behavioural component, e.g. a 
mother nodding her head in step with her child's arm motion. 
-Rhythm: the matching of an irregular pattern of behavioural components. 
-Duration: the behaviour of the mother and the child match in time. 
-Shape: some spatial aspect of one agent's behaviour is matched in the 
other's behaviour of a different sort, e.g. a mother incorporating the vertical 
shape of her infant's hand motion by bobbing her head up and down. 
 
Intensity matches (absolute intensity and intensity contour) occurred most 
often, timing matches (temporal beat and rhythm) somewhat less often, and 
shape matches (duration and shape proper) were least common. 
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A highly significant feature of these interaction profiles involves their cross-
modality: Stern reports the mode in which the mother reacted differed from 
the mode of her child's behaviour in 39% of the cases; in 48% of the cases, 
at least some aspects of the response-profile were different. For instance, in 
the first example above, the rhythm of the child's arm movements is 
matched by the rhythm of the mother's exclamations. In the second 
example, features of the girl's facial gesturing are matched by the mother's 
changing vocal pitch.  
 
Because of their different modalities, these matchings are not imitations; 
Stern's suggestion is that these are matches between features of behaviour 
that express (some aspect of) the agents' feelings: 
 
"Affect attunement, then, is the performance of behaviors that express the 
quality of feeling of a shared affect state without imitating the exact 
behavioral expression of the inner state." (Stern 1985, p. 142) 
 
Of note is that, in the majority of cases (67%), the interacting agents are 
largely unaware that they are engaged in these matching activities: they are 
interacting, and the means by which they accomplish this are usually not 
controlled in a conscious fashion. 
 
I suggest that we can view this interaction as the basis of what has been 
called participatory sense-making (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007), the 
social practice of collectively realising meaningful exchange. 
 
 
[Figure 25: Development of participatory sense-making] 
 
Figure 25 offers a rough sketch of how I view the developmental continuity 
realised throughout the social practice of (learning to engage in) 
participatory sense-making. [1] and [2] are very closely linked: often, we are 
engaged in processes of joint action, reaction and interaction. And this 
social interaction serves as the basis of 'stages' [3] and [4], yielding a 
complex dynamic of a kind of negotiation in interaction in attempting to 
achieve complementary and reciprocal goals, and at least part of this 
interaction requires joint attention. 
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This social co-construction of interaction structures can yield differentiations 
in the two-tiered normativity inherent to the environment that we interact 
with (containing affordances that impose physical and social norms upon 
agents: P- and S-space), when the social realm accrues a layered deontic 
structure. This stacked structure of socially co-constructed constraints and 
enablings contains individual desires which are modulated by communal 
norms (e.g. laws), which might in turn be held accountable in the light of 
independent normative entities (e.g. the rules of a language, which 
constrain and enable the development and upkeep of communal norms - 
this is a re-affirmation of the muted relevance of linguistic relativism, as I 
developed it in chapter 4). 
 
My suggestion is that the ability to recognise intentions in one's social 
interaction partners, and the more advanced ability to to engage in an active 
attribution of reasons for action contributes to the ability to engage in 
concept-ascription. Concept-ascription involves positing or inferring 
predictions about behaviour (as opposed to positing the presence of mental 
entities). This constitutes a selective imposing of norms, i.e. making an 
assessment concerning the most likely or appropriate course of action for 
an agent, given the extant environmental and social normative structure. An 
agent's justification of his own concept-use involves explaining in what way 
his actions coincided with the observer's expectations, or explaining away a 
possible conflict between action and expectation, in some cases by 
providing arguments for the falsity of the concepts implicit in the oberver's 
demand for justification. 
 
I do not believe this inferential process should involve an active, cognitive 
construal of the other's beliefs, reasons, conceptual dispositions and so on - 
often, the other's behaviour just feels right (or wrong). However, attempting 
to explain another's actions can involve such an overt construal strategy: 
concept-ascription can justify mental state ascription, at least as a folk-
psychological working hypothesis, which in turn can serve to assist in 
explaining an agent's behaviour (see again figure 24). 
 
9.2 - Normativity 
 
In the above, I have attempted to clarify how the interactions of an agent 
with his environment involve an immersion in a two-tiered normative 
structure, involving physical environmental norms (to be expressed in P-
space) and social norms (to be expressed in S-space). It is these norms 
which determine the appropriateness that has been present in the general 
definition of concepts that I have been using all along (see section 6.3): 
 
having a concept A of some object/process/state of affairs O means being 
able to act in an appropriate manner, given the possibilities P for and 
constraints on action CA that O represents, and given additional contextual 
constraints CC. 
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This idea of our social practices in which we establish and explore physical 
and (especially) social norms shows clear parallels to the philosophy of 
Robert Brandom. Brandom (1994, 2000) defends a position he calls 
inferentialism, which constitutes a holist semantics that is generated in the 
social practice of giving and asking for reasons. This practice involves 
agents attributing commitments (being committed to playing the social 
game, with all it entails), acknowledging endorsements (accepting the 
behaviour of others as expressing a particular understanding of the world) 
and undertaking entitlements (underscoring one's own actions as being 
correct) (Bransen, 2000). 
 
One of the motivating forces in giving and asking for reasons consists of 
embodied emotions (in the sense propagated by Damasio, 1998), and the 
phenomenology that goes along with them. Brandom shunts the effectivity 
of embodied emotions such as desires directly towards intentions: Bransen 
says of Brandom that he thinks... 
 
"(...) desires are mere abstractions, they are what academically speaking 
would remain of intentions if one were to succeed in thinking away their role 
as practical commitments in inferentially structured action patterns." 
(Bransen 2000) 
 
Now, 'intention' is an exceedingly slippery notion. My claim is that being E( i ) 
means being immersed in an intentional structure in Brentano's sense: 
 
"Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the 
Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and 
what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a 
content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as 
meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon 
includes something as object within itself..." (Brentano 1874) 
 
That is, an agent is immersed, necessarily, in an environment, related to 
that environment and prodded to react by things in that environment. 
Hence, whatever internal representations of external states there are have 
this intentionality as 'aboutness' necessarily. 
 
An intention in the sense of 'having the intention to act in such and such a 
fashion' is not the same thing, although it is a strongly correlated notion. I 
will call Brentano's 'aboutness'-intentionality 'intentionalityA', and the having 
of intentions to act a certain way 'intentionalityB'. 
 
It can be argued that the former is a necessary precondition for the 
occurrence of the latter. That is, my hypothesis involves the idea that an 
intentionB (the felt intention to act) is an interpretation of the intentionalA 
immersion dynamic involved in paring down degrees of freedom for action 
(i.e. making choices). In other words: the phenomenology involved in being 
immersed in the structure of constraints and enablings realised in the 
interaction (dynamic interplay) of one's own body and the physical and 
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social world (intentionalityA) can be interpreted/explained as having the 
intentionB to do such and such. 
 
This intention-dynamic involves resonating along with the normative fields 
already present in the environment, interacting with them and exerting 
modifying influence. This resonance consists in an interpretational dynamic 
of one's own mode of embeddedness in this compound normative field: a 
continuously shifting push-pull balance of embodied emotions (originating in 
embodied processes, i.e. to be expressed at least partly in terms of M-
space), as well as constraints and enablings in the environmental (P-space) 
and social (S-space) sense. Interpretation here is a form of action; it 
involves paring down the agent-environment interaction-system's extant 
degrees of freedom. The result of this interpretational dynamic is the C-
space dispositional array. That is, the agent-world resonance involves 
exactly the same constraints-and-enablings-dynamic that generates, via 
dynamic dimensioned realisation, an agent's conceptual dispositions. 
 
Hence, my suggestion is that the agent's interaction with such normative 
structures evokes the development of a behavioural dispositional array of a 
specific nature: C-space. Having concepts, i.e. being disposed to (re-)act in 
a certain way in a specific context, is the structured answer to normative 
evocations (affordances) by the physical and social environment. 
 
To reiterate my remarks from section 6.6, concept attribution occurs when 
the other agent meets the criteria, i.e. (in terms inspired by Brandom) an 
agent obtains entitlement to be attributed certain concepts by exemplifying 
the appropriate kinds of behaviour that can be interpreted as endorsing the 
possession of these concepts. What is and is not 'appropriate' in this 
context will, in general but not exclusively, be defined in terms of 
expectations, i.e. whether the other's behaviour fits the profile we feel it 
should fit. If an expectation is violated, there is a chance some amount of 
reflection on the part of the observer will unearth a deviant justification of 
the observed behaviour, but I submit that in most cases the 'this was not 
what I expected'-reaction will suffice to disallow the wholehearted attribution 
of some concept. 
 
This reaction, this (embodied) feeling, is the basis of being entitled to being 
attributed certain concepts, both reflexive (interpreting oneself as acting in a 
way that validates the ascription of a specific concept) and attributive 
(having such properties and acting in such a way that others will be 
disposed towards describing an agent as having a particular concept). 
 
9.3 - Impredicative Loops 
 
I am fully aware of the fact that the way in which the concept 'concept' - and 
even cognition in general - has been treated throughout this book, smacks 
of circularity. There is repeated talk of mutual and/or holistic dependence of 
concepts on other concepts, co-constitution of properties and processes, 
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causal stories with no clear beginning or end. My claim in this section will be 
that this is necessarily so. 
 
Hofstadter (1979, 2007), discerns what he calls 'strange loops' in a wide 
variety of objects, processes and structures, most famously in the art of 
M.C. Escher, but also in DNA, and even 'the self' as such: 
 
"And yet when I say "strange loop", I have something else in mind - a less 
concrete, more elusive notion. What I mean by "strange loop" is - here goes 
a first stab, anyway - not a physical circuit but an abstract loop in which, in 
the series of stages that constitute the cycling-around, there is a shift from 
one level of abstraction (or structure) to another, which feels like an 
upwards movement in a hierarchy, and yet somehow the successive 
"upward" shifts turn out to give rise to a closed cycle. That is, despite one's 
sense of departing ever further from one's origin, one winds up, to one's 
shock, exactly where one had started out. In short, a strange loop is a 
paradoxical level-crossing feedback loop." (Hofstadter 2007) 
 
Another way he parses this insight is by describing processes in terms of 
tangled hierarchies, where different sub-processes at various levels 
influence and lock into eachother, in such a way that following the causal 
chain eventually puts one back at the starting point. (Part of) the problem 
resides in these processes' self-referential structure, resulting in cases in 
which it is unclear what causal story needs to be told to explain it. 
 
Chemero and Turvey (2007)NOTE 82 highlight Russell's Paradox as a 
scenario that contains such logically problematic references. Consider the 
following: the barber shaves all and only those who do not shave 
themselves; who shaves the barber? Attempting to answer this question 
results in a vicious circularity: if the barber shaves himself, he does not 
shave himself, and if he does not shave himself, he does shave himself. 
Russell introduced the Vicious Circle Principle to disqualify such sentences 
from being considered coherent. 
 
In a similar fashion, Poincaré (1906) banished socalled impredicative 
definitions from mathematics. Predicativity in mathematics and logic 
involves disallowing "(...) any set S that contains members m definable only 
in terms of S, or members m involving or presupposing S." (Chemero and 
Turvey 2007). 
 
That is, a definition is said to be impredicative if it references itself, e.g. 
when the properties of a given member of a set depend on the other 
members of a set. For example: whoever else is in the room does not 
change the fact that Paul is 1.86m tall, but it might have consequences for 
whether he is the tallest person in that room or not. When Steve, who is 
1.88m, enters, Paul is still 1.86m, but he is no longer tallest. This example 
(adapted from Chemero and Turvey 2007) demonstrates one of the 
complicating factors involving impredicative definitions, namely that what 
they pick out is highly context-dependent.  
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Despite the fact that Poincaré wanted mathematics to have nothing 
whatsoever to do with impredicativity - and mathematics is the basis of 
physics, our primary tool with which to describe and define the world -, there 
are reasons to believe that impredicativity is the norm, rather than the 
exception. Rosen (1991) believes that models of living systems are almost 
all impredicative. Due to space considerations, I cannot go into the formal 
reasons of this claim, but one argument Rosen uses is based on Gödel's 
incompleteness theorem: 
 
"(...) in any consistent system able to produce simple arithmetic there are 
formulae that cannot be proved within the system but which are seen to be 
true from outside the system" (Chemero and Turvey 2007) 
 
For Rosen, this suggests that it is impossible to remove all self-referring 
loops from formal systems, doubly so for the models we utilise to describe 
living beings. Hofstadter (1979, 2007) too picks out Gödel's Theorem to 
illustrate his 'strange loops'-idea. 
 
Rosen's thesis about the impredicativity of models of living systems aligns 
rather neatly with the notion autopoiesis, the self-sustaining, self-generating 
activity of living cells that was conceptualised by Maturana and Varela: 
 
"An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a 
network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of 
components which: (i) through their interactions and transformations 
continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) 
that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity 
in space in which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological 
domain of its realization as such a network." (Maturana and Varela, 
1972/1980)  
 
Autopoiesis is a central notion in quite a few E( i )C theories. It should come 
as no surprise that other notions inherent to E( i )C also show signs of 
impredicativity. After all, if E( i )C is anything, it is an attempt to provide an 
ontology of cognition as an aspect of the living organism as he acts in his 
environment. 
 
One of those impredicative notions, and an important one at that, is 
affordance (see also sections 4.5 and 8.2). Chemero and Turvey (2007) 
highlight two ways of explaining the notion 'affordance', one represented by 
Turvey's (1992) Dispositional View, the other represented by Chemero's 
(2003) Relational ViewNOTE 83. 
 
The dispositional view utilises the affordance/effectivity balance (see also 
note 26): 
 
"Affordances are dispositional properties of environmental objects. Although 
they have occurrent causal bases, they are definable only in terms of 
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complementing effectivities. Effectivities in turn are dispositional properties 
of animals that have, but are not identical to, causal bases and are 
definable only in terms of complementing affordances." (Chemero and 
Turvey 2007) 
 
The Relational View is subtly different: 
 
"(...) although effectivities are typically considered a technical term for 
abilities, Chemero (...) holds that abilities are not dispositions. Instead, 
abilities are a variety of functional property of animals, in that they are 
normative and can be exercised well or poorly. Despite this difference from 
effectivities, abilities are also defined in terms of affordances. An ability is a 
relation between an affordance and an activity; having the ability to catch a 
ball means actually being able to catch balls (an activity) when ballcatching 
affordances are present. We can understand Chemero’s model, then, as 
saying that token affordances are ordered pairs of particular abilities and 
particular situations, where those situations are very complex objects that 
include animals and physical features of the environment. Token abilities, 
then, are ordered pairs of particular affordances and particular actions." 
(Chemero and Turvey 2007) 
 
It is very interesting to note that both views of affordances require 
impredicative definitions: they both feature complex recurring relations 
between properties of agents and environment, and these properties (as 
well as the relations) can shift on a moment's notice, with possibilities for 
action suddenly appearing as the agent moves and interacts with a dynamic 
environment, and disappearing just as suddenly. 
 
These examples (Russell's Paradox, Gödel's Theorem, autopoiesis, 
affordance) suggest impredicativity is a highly complex and complicating, 
but also common feature. My suggestion is that the concept 'concept', as I 
have developed it throughout this book, is also defined via impredicative 
structures. The interrelatedness of the spaces of the RM involves complex 
mutual dependencies and definitions, and this contributes to the fact that 
the very definition of 'having a concept' contains several impredicative 
loops. 
 
To see this, consider the following definition, adapted from the one provided 
in section 6.3, and reiterated in section 9.2 above. 
 
Having a concept means: 
being disposed, in a particular context, to act in such a way that concept-
ascription by oneself and by others is justified. 
 
Taking this definition apart, we can see the following recurrent structures: 
being disposed, in a particular context : this means embodying and 
being embedded in a specific affordance-effectivity-dynamic; 
concept-ascription by oneself : requires the self-referential activity of self-
interpretation; 
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concept-ascription by others : this involves a very slippery dynamic of 
changes in another's behaviour in response to your own, which yield new 
social affordances, hence elicit new effectivities (and new dispositions), and 
influence self-interpretation (hence self-directed concept-ascription); 
concept-ascription is justified : this is the case when when concept-
ascription yields better explanations of an agent's actions. Here we see 
multiple loops: the first is that providing explanations requires concepts. The 
second loop is that these explanations are judged in terms of 
appropriateness, and this too is a concept-dependent notion: concepts are 
required to gauge an action's appropriateness. 
 
In addition to these circular structures, the following aspects of concepts 
also implicate loops: a specific set of dispositions (i.e. a disposition to act in 
a certain way if just action is required, or the disposition to provide a 
particular explanation of 'justice' - see section 6.7) depends on the 
associated concept's enslaver, which depends diachronically on earlier 
encounters with similar affordance-effectivity dynamics, including the proto-
conceptual disposition profile belonging to this specific conceptual ability 
(i.e. the neurophysiological yield and the categorization propensity founded 
on it), and it depends holistically on other concepts (i.e. some concepts can 
modulate the intensity or application domain of other concepts). 
 
I submit that the RM forms a contribution to illuminating the role of concepts 
in this impredicative tangle of properties and processes (namely, they serve 
to enable mental state ascription on the basis of embodied properties, and 
to explain behavioural profiles), and shows how concepts are related to the 
the agent's body as it is embedded in its environment, i.e. the 'organic 
substrate' (namely via dynamical dimensioned realisation), as well as how 
they are related to behaviour (as mentioned, they perform a specific 
explanatory role). 
 
9.4 - Concept Individuation 
 
RM is mainly a theory about the concept 'concept', but it does provide us 
with some tools to help us in individuating concepts, i.e. saying what a 
specific concept means. However, RM's similarity to empiricist theories of 
concepts (see also section 10.3) might throw a spanner in the works. 
 
After all, RM contains an empiricist streak in the sense that perceptual 
contingencies (for instance, the neurophysiologically defined response 
patterns to chromatic stimuli) are claimed to lie at the very foundation of 
conceptual ability (see chapters 4 and 5). An important line of criticism 
against empiricist theories of concepts involves the difficulty of getting from 
that basic perception-based preconceptual structure to the rich technicolour 
pandaemonium of homo sapiens' conceptual system. 
 
For instance, Laurence and Margolis (1999) criticise noted empiricist John 
Locke's conviction that basic Ideas can be extrapolated into full-blown 
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concepts. Locke (1690/1979) attempts to provide a reduction to perceptual 
primitives of the concept 'lie' like this: 
 
"1.Articulate Sounds. 2. Certain Ideas in the Mind of the Speaker. 3. Those 
words the signs of those Ideas. 4. Those signs put together by affirmation or 
negation, otherwise that the Ideas they stand for, are in the mind of the 
Speaker. I think I need not go any farther in the Analysis of that complex 
Idea, we call a Lye. What I have said is enough to shew, that it is made up 
of simple Ideas: And it could not but be an offensive tediousness to my 
Reader, to trouble him with more minute enumeration of every particular 
simple Idea, that goes into this complex one; which, from what has been 
said, he cannot but be able to make out to himself." 
 
Laurence and Margolis object that this still does not answer the question, 
even though Locke would hold it to be obvious from what he has already 
said: the tediousness of providing a more detailed explaination would not 
only fail to be offensive, but would in fact be quite welcome, not to mention 
absolutely material to the empiricist's argument. 
 
My suggestion is that the magic ingredient that is missing from this 
argument is embodied and embedded behaviour. To be a little bit more 
specific: what a concept is, according to RM, is locked in by the conflation of 
a number of different processes, chief amongst which is a specific 
behavioural profile, displayed by an embodied agent who is embedded in a 
particular environment. This behaviour is the agent's attempt to navigate the 
affordances he finds himself confronted with, given his own embodied 
abilities and limitations. Let's call this behaviour 'enacting a particular 
concept'. Someone who chops down a tree does not display behaviour that 
is congruent with that aspect of the concept 'tree' which describes a tree's 
role as a shadow-giver, but he might instead be focusing on the possible 
tree-roles 'fuel' or 'object blocking my path'. 
 
I think this brief description already provides the core of RM's idea with 
which to answer the question where a concept's meaning (some would say 
'content') comes from. That is: Locke's description above is too static, i.e. 
not nearly dynamic enough. RM, instead, can say that embodiment 
provides the basic perceptual structuredness that the empiricist refers to. 
Embeddedness instantiates many interaction opportunities ('enablings') as 
well as limitations ('constraints') for the embodied system's perception-
based dispositions to manifest themselves, and behaviour is the dynamic 
interplay of these two constellations of properties. This is not a linear 
exchange of information, but a multi-tracked, interlocking back and forth of 
influences and processes which collectively realize temporarily stable 
structures: the dynamic self-organization of behaviour. And of course, one 
of RM's central claims is that concepts (as belonging to specific behavioural 
profiles) arise from exactly these kinds of dynamics. 
 
A very basic principle of evolution is invoked when the dynamics arising 
from the mutual attunement of basic stimulus-response pairs clash with 
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environmental constraints. When a simple system's habitual response to 
some stimulus fails to achieve the habitual result, this generates pressure 
for the system to either adapt or go extinct. The very essence of behaviour 
is having options: exhibiting behaviour is paring down degrees of freedom 
(e.g. the way in which my environment and myself co-constitute a particular 
affordance-effectivity structure allows me to go both left and right, but I pick 
only one of the available options to actually do). Evolution is, at least in part, 
that these degrees of freedom change, creating new forms of self-
organization, new resources with which to capitalise upon newly evoked 
options. 
 
So, RM says that having a specific concept means standing in specific 
kinds of relations to the environment and all relevant objects and agents in 
it. That is, an agent, with an array of embodied properties and dispositions 
is embedded in a particular context, hence is constrained and enabled by 
properties of that context, in such a way that a specific kind of behaviour is 
elicited - behaviour which counts, to the agent's conspecifics, as expressing 
the possession of said concept. This is the general dynamic structure 
expressed in Dynamical Dimensioned Realisation: the mutual constraints 
and enablings of various processes at various scales (granularities) 
conspire to yield a particular kind of behaviour (agent-environment 
interaction) which can be described in terms of the agent having specific 
concepts.  
 
Now, there are different ways of going about the project of specifying the 
meaning of concepts, based on these considerations. For instance, perhaps 
it is possible to individuate a particular concept that an agent enacts by 
providing a list of propositional attitudes as they are implied by said agent's 
concept-informed behaviour - this would be akin to Peacocke's (1992) 
approach to concept individuation, which is defined in terms of possession 
conditions. Perhaps one might even get an above-chance performance if 
the agent is asked whether he agrees with the propositions implied by his 
behaviour 
 
However, there is an important problem with this approach: the locking-in of 
the significance of this behaviour (given that particular context) in most 
cases underdetermines the exact meaning of the concept that is being 
enacted. This, of course, is exactly the idea behind granularity (see section 
6.8). One could even claim that there is a two-way underdetermination: (1) 
two people enacting what they would describe as the same concept might 
result in two different behavioural profiles (but probably with the same 
[intended] result), and vice versa: (2) two people exhibiting the same or 
highly similar behaviour might not, if prompted to explain, justify that 
behaviour as enacting the same concept. 
 
Here are two examples, one to support either case: 
 
(1) Suppose two people are given the task to identify a sparrow. Both the 
concepts 'identification' and 'sparrow' can be understood at various 
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granularities, hence be associated with different kinds of behaviour. My own 
behaviour would probably consist of pointing when an appropriate (in my 
non-ornithologically-educated opinion) subject were to flutter by, whereas 
an expert might offer a detailed description and demonstration of features 
while picking out the creature in question. 
 
(2) Imagine two people running a marathon. They might run that distance in 
exactly the same time, following exactly the same route, but invoke different 
concepts while doing so: one might associate that marathon with 'winning', 
or 'getting the gold medal', whereas the other might associate running the 
marathon with 'getting really tired, because I enjoy that feeling'. Hence we 
have different motivations, different concepts of 'marathon' within the 
context of those motivations, but (purportedly) exactly the same behaviour. 
Here we see that this is once again a granularity issue: if we ask these two 
people why they ran that marathon the way they did, i.e. we try to dig 
deeper into the kinds of justifications they offer in defense of their behaviour 
involving this marathon, we might find out about these different motivations, 
but as long as we refrain from 'digging deeper' along the granularity 
gradient, we will not detect these differences. 
 
These remarks would suggest that concept individuation being a problem is 
necessarily the case, because the E( i )C-approach to concepts that RM is 
means that concepts, as are many embodied actions, are softly assembled 
from extant affordance-effectivity dynamics. In other words: most embodied 
and embedded action is not programmed, but in some sense opportunistic 
in nature, unfolding along the path of least resistance, given the particular 
interaction possibilities of the available objects and resources. The dynamic 
nature of this kind of process means that what this path is, is likely to be 
highly dependent on many different variables, hence subtly (or sometimes 
not-so-subtly) different every time. 
 
Still, RM offers a few tools with which to make some progress towards 
individuating concepts, even in these difficult impredicative circumstances. 
For instance, a descriptive tool is listing contributing processes, as 
affordance-effectivity pairs (functional clusters), defined in terms of their 
contributions to the agent's behaviour (the ontological core - see section 
7.8). These descriptions can be formulated in terms of constraints and 
enablings of certain processes or properties on other processes or 
properties, collectively sketching a kind of state space within which certain 
behavioural profiles are available for the agent to enact: see section 8.5. 
 
For instance, the meaning of the concept 'mountain' can, according to RM, 
be individuated in terms of, amongst other things, body-based features (e.g. 
my experience of the visual parallax between horizon and the mountain's 
summit; the strain in my muscles as I overcome gravity to climb the 
mountain; the sense of movement and the frosty breeze in my face as I ski 
down a snowy mountain slope) plus other concept-informing experiences 
(e.g. high-school lectures about the geographical features of the Andes 
mountain range; hearing someone use mountain-related metaphors ["When 
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we rob that bank, we'll make a mountain of cash!"]); and/or memories I 
might have of all these things. These are not so much features of the 
concept itself as they are features which collectively constrain and/or enable 
(i.e. realize) a particular concept-expressing behavioural profile - exactly 
according to the RM model's Dynamical Dimensioned Realization 
(expressed in figure 24). All these properties and features can be described 
as depending on other experiences and bits of knowledge that I can extract 
from this concept's jurisprudence (see section 6.6), each of them 
constrained in meaning and relevance by other experiences and 
knowledge. And this concept, in turn, enables and constrains the meaning 
of other concepts. Suppose that I once barely survived an avalanche. My 
concept 'mountain' might, because of this experience, be associated with a 
phobia of heights or unsteady-looking mountain slopes, hence disallow any 
form of enjoyment occurring on or near mountains. 
 
A much lower-grained version of such an account is invoked in the 
attribution of concepts as a strategy for explaining behaviour. Recall from 
sections 8.4 and 9.2 that describing someone else as having a particular set 
of concepts, and you yourself behaving as being entitled to receive certain 
concept-ascriptions, is all part of the social game of explaining eachother's 
behaviour as fitting into a collectively specified normative structure (e.g. a 
particular ethical system). What is needed for this to occur is to infer, based 
on observed behaviour, some of the ideas mentioned above (e.g. "he acts 
scared when on the slope of a mountain, so that must mean that he 
intensely dislikes being on a mountain, possibly due to some traumatic 
experience."). Whether or not these inferences are correct down to the very 
last detail is, in many cases, of lesser importance. What matters is that 
those inferences provide a sufficient explanation and/or prediction of the 
other agent's behaviour, analysed at the granularity that is warranted by the 
situation. Whether I dislike being on a mountain because I once survived 
being in an avalanche, because I get nauseous due to some deficiency of 
my equilibrium apparatus or because I simply dislike the smell of fern trees 
is not that important when the net result is that my friends do not ask or 
force me to come to the mountains with them. The British say that the proof 
of the pudding is in the eating; in this case RM can claim that the meaning 
of the concept is defined in the doing. 
 
9.5 - Epistemological Implications 
 
The ideas about what concepts are expressed in RM, i.e. how we acquire 
and 'enact' concepts, has certain epistemological implications. In this 
section, I will say a few things about the nature of knowledge and 
explanation that flows from the claims of RM. 
 
Marchionni (2008) makes a distinction between two ways in which pairs of 
explanations - of the same phenomenon or process, but at different levels, 
say the macro- and micro-level - can complement eachother. If two such 
explanations are weakly complementary, each offers a complete story that 
contains at least some information that the other does not. For instance: if 
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certain conditions are met (e.g. mental states are multiply realizable, the 
hard problem is accepted), a microphysical account of brain activity tells us 
things that cannot be captured in psychological terms, and vice versa. 
When two explanations are strongly complementary, this means that both 
stories mutually complement eachother, their integration resulting in a more 
complete, better explanation. 
 
RM hopes to achieve strong complementarity, as Marchionni envisions it. 
That is, RM states that contributions from various disciplines and 
explanations that are focused on various levels (e.g. macro- and micro-
levels) of the process in need of explanation should be integrated to yield a 
better explanation. The explanations from the various approaches, possibly 
relevant to aspects of the process at various granularity levels, can 
therefore only be partial explanations: they are contextually appropriate, but 
here this also means that they are likely to be merely aspectually 
appropriate, i.e. relevant to part of the process, not the entirety. 
 
In RM, the granularity gradient (see section 6.8) defines a hierarchy of 
descriptions and explanations of levels of constituent processes - e.g. a 
physical description of a tree (i.e. in M-space) might be given in terms of 
concepts associated with ecology, biochemistry, microphysics and so on. 
The word 'hierarchy' is not meant to imply a value judgment pertaining to 
which level is ontologically most important or most basic (see also section 
8.3.2): which explanatory level is relevant is context- and question-
dependent. This does not mean that a description of the tree at the 
biochemical level (e.g. how the leaves' chlorophyl yields energy under the 
influence of sunlight) is necessarily more detailed than a description at the 
ecological level (e.g. how the tree as an organism functions in its 
environment) - either account might be very complex and expansive -, but 
that there is a difference in the scope of the description, and the operational 
scale of the kinds of entities that are invoked. 
 
Given all these sub-accounts at different granularities, RM offers an 
explanatory model that involves context-dependent centripetal 
complementarity: the various partial explanations are composed with an 
explicit focus on the aforementioned ontological core (the embodied agent 
as he is embedded in his environment). That is, the kind of explanatory 
pluralism to be found in the RM model involves multiple explanations that 
cover different aspects of the same complex agent-environment interaction 
dynamic. In the end, they are about the same 'thing' (namely the agent in 
his context), but they describe parts, roles or properties of this thing in 
different ways and possibly at different levels of granularity. The goal is to 
have all thse different partial explanations complement eachother, and for 
that to be possible there is likely to be some need for translation, sometimes 
even for disciplines which pertain to similar phenomena: a psychological 
account of 'experience' is likely to be different than a neurophysiological 
account. My suggestion is that we try and redescribe all relevant processes 
in terms of their contributions to (i.e. the constraints and enablings they 
generate for) the properties and processes of the embodied, embedded 
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agent. In other words, the claims of the disciplinary tributaries are to be 
defined in terms of their contributions to the description of the ontological 
core. 
 
To reiterate, RM claims that the integrative force of discipline-specific 
explanations is due to them all being related to an explanatory anchour, in 
the form of the agentive conceptual description. Recall figure 24, which 
expresses this idea most compactly: the properties and processes involved 
in the agent-environment interaction dynamic are collectively characterised 
in terms of a concept-based description. 
 
This is why RM would be at odds with the kind of neurophysiological lay-talk 
that surfaces rather too often in popularising publications (of the kind that is 
heavily criticised by Bennett and Hacker, 2003): the notion that (a specific 
region of) 'the brain' perceives, feels, decides, hears and so on. Such 
descriptions limit the applicability range of these notions (perceiving, feeling, 
etc.) to such an extent that their intended meaning dissolves. The 
descriptive and explanatory power of these notions is greatly increased if 
they are applied to the agentive level rather than the neurophysiological, so 
the argument to explain at least mental terms at this level can be 
understood as a form of the principle of charity: they do their best work at 
that level. The fortifying argument to have the agentive level - the context of 
the person - be the ontological core, i.e. the primary explanatory nexus, is 
the contention that this is the Archimedian point on which all knowledge-
gathering hinges: we attempt to understand - not our brains nor our 
constituting atoms, but we as persons, interacting with other thinking, 
perceiving and feeling persons. The context of the person is the context of 
our phenomenology: it is the inescapable viewpoint from which we attempt 
to understand ourselves and the world. 
 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
 
[SUMMARY of chapter 9 AND PREVIEW] 
 
In chapter 9, I suggested that very basic bodily syntax can help establish 
practices of participatory sense-making: the embodied interactivity of agents 
is an example of the social co-construction of meaningful interaction 
profiles. Recognizing such patterns lies at the root of concept-ascription, our 
social game of being entitled to being attributed certain concepts, both 
reflexive (interpreting oneself as acting in a way that validates the ascription 
of a specific concept) and attributive (having such properties and acting in 
such a way that others will be disposed towards describing an agent as 
having a particular concept). 
 
There is a fundamental circularity involved in using concepts, for instance in 
understanding oneself as using concepts as measured against the socially 
defined criteria of concept-possession, which we ourselves help establish. 
In this chapter, I described such circularity in terms of a broader 
phenomenon, which involves understanding living, autopoietic systems as 
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implementing so-called impredicative loops. The Radicality Manifold as an 
E( i )C-appropriate theory of concepts fits in with this idea. 
 
RM suggests that it should be possible to individuate concepts in terms of 
the various constraints and enablings that are posed by the experiences 
and bits of knowledge contained within a concept's narrative jurisprudence. 
While explaining the behaviour of others, we can attribute concepts to them 
which we might individuate (in a practical sense) by making inferences 
about such experiences and knowledge at a coarse-grained level. 
 
One of the epistemological implications of the RM-model is that the 
explanatory focus is placed squarely on the agent as a whole: the various 
partial explanations associated with the separate spaces of the RM are 
composed with an explicit focus on the embodied agent as he is embedded 
in his environment, so these explanations all cover different aspects of the 
same complex agent-environment interaction dynamic. 
 
In the tenth and final chapter, the RM-model will be evaluated. There will be 
an attack on the very basis of the model, phenomenal colour space, and the 
model will be compared to two similar approaches: Peter Gärdenfors' 
conceptual spaces and Jesse Prinz' concept empiricism. The RM-model will 
be applied to a concrete case - concept-based early childhood education - 
where it will help offer some structuring suggestions. In chapter 10 it will 
also be determined to what extent the RM-model meets the desiderata on a 
theory of concepts as formulated at the end of chapter 2. 
 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
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[10 - Evaluation, Application and Conclusion] 
 
In this chapter, I will evaluate the RM-model. First, I will discuss a line of 
reasoning that attacks the very basis of the SToCC/RM-framework, 
phenomenal colour space (section 10.1). I will also include a discussion of 
Peter Gärdenfors’ 'conceptual spaces'-account (section 10.2) and Jesse 
Prinz' 'proxytype theory' (section 10.3), two theories that are similar in some 
ways to SToCC/RM, and explain why SToCC/RM is different. Then, section 
10.4 contains a description of the application of the RM model to a concrete 
case - a concept-based curriculum for early childhood education. The 
sections that wrap up this chapter - and the book as a whole - concern the 
ways in which RM meets the criteria Prinz' imposes on a theory of concepts 
(section 10.5), and some concluding remarks (section 10.6). 
 
10.1 - Eliminating Internal Geometric Spaces 
 
First, a potentially serious counter-argument. DeCock (2006) suggests we 
should adopt an eliminativistic position regarding internal (phenomenal) 
metric spaces, where the structure of this space is supposed to characterise 
a perceiver's internal representational content. He perceives the metric 
aspect in particular to be problematic: it is terribly difficult to define the 
supposedly metric properties and values of such spaces in a rigorous 
manner, based on introspection of phenomenal experience. An argument in 
favour of this claim is the fact that there are many incompatible ways of 
modeling the supposed metric of colour phenomenology: various kinds of 
spindles, spheres, cones and pyramids, in addition to irregularly shaped 
forms. Furthermore, this metrical structure is not reflected in the perceiver's 
neural activity. 
 
Because of these problems, DeCock feels justified in claiming that these 
internal space constructs might be (or might have been, in a historic sense) 
heuristically useful, but - like aether and phlogiston - they are ultimately 
redundant in light of much better theories. That is, physical or 
psychophysical spaces, defined in terms of objectively measurable 
variables, can do all the work these internal phenomenal spaces are 
supposed to do. If any philosopher or psychologist remains steadfast in his 
desire to use phenomenological spaces, DeCock's advice would be to have 
these spaces be topological rather than metric, and leave the 'metrics' to 
psychophysical theories (which could, if needed, mould their models in 
terms of spaces). 
 
In his paper, DeCock affords explicit attention to phenomenal colour space, 
and to Gärdenfors' 'conceptual spaces'-account. RM implies a view that is 
related to both of these examples: in chapter 6, I explained the notion of a 
conceptual space as an extension of phenomenal colour space, and some 
aspects of the RM-project as a whole align with elements from Gärdenfors 
(2000)NOTE 84. 
 
 216 
Psychophysical spaces as such (like the CIE chromaticity diagram) - in the 
case of colour recording the properties and interrelations of the perceived 
object's surface, of the light and its source, and of the perceiver's retina and 
visual processing areas in the brain - need not rely on introspection data. 
However, regarding phenomenal colour space, the orthodoxy amongst 
supporters appears to be that these externally measurable colour spaces 
possess the structure they do because they are derived from the structure 
of internal phenomenal colour space. As noted, DeCock's criticism now 
focuses on the impossibility of assigning metric properties to this internally 
'perceived' structure; for one, it is nigh-impossible to provide an accurate 
appraisal of 'distances' between colours in this internal space. 
 
Despite the parallels between aspects of these examples and certain claims 
contained within the RM-model, I believe that RM is not in danger of falling 
prey to DeCock's arguments. His chief worry is that internal spaces are 
usually awarded a particular metric structure, which suggests an accuracy 
that introspection is simply unable to yield. Obviously, the 'represented' 
properties, relations, values and processes 'encoded' in P-, S-, M- and B-
space are all physically/objectively specifiable, either in terms of the 
properties of the agent's physical or social environment (P- and S-space, 
respectively), his body (M-space), or the dynamics inherent in his actions 
(B-space), so there should not be a problem there. Rather, the quarrel 
would have to involve the status of C-space, the closest thing to an 'internal 
space' in the RM-model. However, in that case the crux of RM's defence 
should be that the structure of C-space is inferred in narrative/justificatory 
terms from the agent's cognitive, locutionary and bodily behaviour. In other 
words, the relations in an agent's conceptual space can be reconstructed by 
charting said agent's actions, with as an important subset the kinds of 
justificatory accounts he provides when pressed to explain his use of a 
particular concept. 
 
The claim that there is some phenomenal experience involved in the 
process of generating perceptual judgments (which is a claim that I do wish 
to endorse) need not imply that the structure of phenomenal space is metric 
in character. That is, I would say the phenomenal aspects of sensory 
concepts are indeed functional, in the sense that they play a role in the 
distinction tasks that can be used to determine the structure of C-space: the 
concept 'apple' includes the notions 'ripe apple' and 'unripe apple', and this 
division is based, at least in part, on the phenomenal 'charge' of the colours 
associated with ripeness and unripeness. However, I feel the relations 
between these 'phenomenal charges' are not specifiable in terms of a 
rigorous metric, mainly because any and all knowledge we have of these 
relations (i.e. the structure of phenomenal 'space') can only be aquired by 
way of an interpretation of our own sensorimotor responses - that is, an a 
posteriori reconstruction of a sensation that simply does not occur in a 
neatly measureable form, namely awareness of agency. Hence, this 
interpretatory process will not and can not result in the kind of rigorous 
internal metric which DeCock qualifies as unattainable. 
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Surely, the hue-cancellation experiments carried out by Hurvich and 
Jameson (1957; see note 16 for a description of these experiments), and 
similar enterprises, can lay bare some of the regularities of colour 
perception. However, I would tend to agree with DeCock that these 
experiments say little about the metrics of inner experience. Rather, I would 
wish to hypothesize that they say something about the dynamics of 
environmentally embedded behaviour, i.e. about the kinds of judgments 
agents of a particular kind make when placed in specific circumstances.  
 
DeCock has fewer qualms with Gärdenfors' 'conceptual spaces' approach - 
that is, under a non-realistic interpretation of such spaces. In note 51 of his 
(2006) paper, DeCock states: 
 
"51. Gärdenfors’s central claim is not related to any part of the discussion of 
this paper; he tries to bridge the gap between symbolic and connectionist 
approaches by means of geometrical structures. With respect to the 
philosophical status of his conceptual spaces; he is cautious: “my 
instrumentalist standing means that I eschew philosophical discussions of 
how “real” conceptual spaces are. The important thing is that we can do 
things with them.” (2000, p. 31) In this paper, it has been argued that 
realism about ‘conceptual’ spaces is untenable." 
 
More about how Gärdenfors’ theory and SToCC/RM compare can be found 
below. For now, I can state that the SToCC/RM-approach is not at all 
incompatible with DeCock's comments, but not for a lack of realism. My 
claim would be that concepts are real, but not because they are internally 
tokened in the classical sense (i.e. as an internal, symbolic representation); 
they are real because concept-involving behaviour is real. And as a result, 
C-space, on the SToCC/RM-approach, is real: it is a dispositional array. C-
space is not exclusively internal, and does not rely solely on representations 
for its constitution, hence it is as such perfectly specifiable in terms of 
properties and relations in a way that does not contradict DeCock's 
argumentation, as explained above. 
 
10.2 - Gärdenfors’ 'Conceptual Spaces' 
 
In his 'Conceptual Spaces: The Geometry of Thought' (2000), Peter 
Gärdenfors develops an intriguing and conceptually fertile contribution to 
cognitive science. His explicit intent with the 'conceptual spaces'-model 
(CS) is to bridge the gap between descriptions of cognitive phenomena in 
terms of, on the one hand, symbolic representations, and, on the other 
hand, associationistic representations. The former level of modeling 
representations involves viewing cognitive systems in terms of 
computational processes (symbol manipulation), the latter level involves the 
way in which different informational streams are connected - an example is 
the subconceptual activity of neural networks propounded by 
connectionistic theories (i.e. mental content is represented in the activation 
of a large number of neuronal units). 
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Gärdenfors suggests his conceptual space should be inserted as an 
intermediate layer, yielding the following three-tiered model: 
 
 [Figure 26: Gärdenfors' 'Conceptual Spaces' account: three levels of 
representation (in modeling cognitive systems)] 
 
In short, CS is introduced as a 'medium scale' theory to link neurology 
(involving the activation of large numbers of neuronal units) and psychology 
(involving language or language-like structures) (Gärdenfors, 2000, p. 50). 
 
Just like SToCC, CS is intended as an extrapolation of accounts involving 
quality dimensions (e.g. the hue, brightness and saturation of perceptual 
colour space, but also weight, temperature, height and so on). Defining 
such a quality along an axis means assigning some ordering relation of the 
stimuli associated with this quality: 'this appears brighter than that'. A 
conceptual space (in Gärdenfors' sense) emerges when several such axes 
are aligned to yield a description of the way in which specific qualities are 
related for some object (or object-observer-pair, if a quality is perceiver-
dependent), and the kinds of combinations of values of these qualities that 
are possible. A property of an object can now be defined as corresponding 
to a region in this conceptual space: a constellation of linked or related 
qualities, within a particular bandwidth of values for each of these qualities. 
So, for example, the property of 'being sea-green' corresponds to a tightly 
clustered collection of values for the qualities hue, saturation and brightness 
in perceptual colour space. 
 
As an account of the structure of conceptual space, Gärdenfors suggests 
that Prototype Theory (see sections 2.3 and 6.11.2) fits the bill, or at least 
tells an important part of the story with its claim that most concepts have a 
graded structure: some exemplars are more prototypical of a particular 
concept than others. The kinds of categorizations predicted by Prototype 
Theory align with Gärdenfors' characterisation of natural properties as 
convex regionsNOTE 85 in conceptual space. Gärdenfors claims that this, the 
'CS' way of characterising properties (quality dimensions define a space in 
which convex regions, possibly with a prototype structure, represent 
properties), has a number of important advantages, amongst which is the 
virtue of making many properties perceptually grounded. 
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Properties are a special class of concepts, the difference being that a 
property is based on one domain, and a concept on several domains. 
Gärdenfors claims this distinction has become muddled due to the advent of 
accounts of both symbolic (e.g. computational functionalism) and 
associationistic (connectionism) persuasion, because of their use of (first-
order) logic. In natural language, properties and concepts usually 
correspond to different categories of things, namely adjectives (or verbs, for 
dynamic properties) and nouns, respectively, but in first-order logic, these 
are all represented as predicates. The CS-account can easily accomodate 
the difference between the two by taking a very literal approach to the idea 
mentioned above, i.e. that properties correspond to single domains and 
concepts to multiple (possibly correlated) domains: they can be represented 
accordingly in conceptual space. 
 
An example of this multi-domain correspondence for a concept is easy to 
generate: consider the concept 'goldfish', which is linked to different kinds of 
properties and specific 'values' thereof (for instance a particular colour, 
shape and size) and to specific characteristic features (like having fins and 
gills, or being a water-dweller). Some of these properties and features are 
linked: possessing gills or having a particular aquadynamic shape have a lot 
to do with the fact that this animal lives in the water. Taking a cue from 
Prototype theory, Gärdenfors uses weighted representation to model the 
extent to which certain properties and features are characteristic for a 
concept. 
 
This yields the following 'general definition of concept representation' 
according to CS: 
 
"CRITERION C: A natural concept is represented as a set of regions in a 
number of domains together with an assignment of salience weights to the 
domains and information about how the regions in different domains are 
correlated." (Gärdenfors 2000, p. 105) 
 
This is the basis of Gärdenfors' CS-model. Some of it is quite similar to RM 
(although RM was developed independently, mostly as an extrapolation of 
claims by Jameson and Maund, and as such founded on the same 'quality 
space'-accounts that Gärdenfors uses - see chapter 5), but there are also 
significant differences. 
 
The most obvious, and seemingly inconsequential difference lies in the fact 
that CS describes a structure of three layers with the conceptual level in 
between - CS performs a mediating role between the symbolic and 
associationistic levels, in some sense similar to Churchland's 'vector 
spaces' (Churchland 1995) - whereas the RM describes a more complex 
web-like structure. 
 
This difference might appear inconsequential, but it is not: in Gärdenfors' 
theory, a conceptual space constitutes a (vector-based) suite of 
representations of properties and categories, and as such one of three 
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possible resolutions at which the representations that play a role in 
cognition can be modeled (see figure 26 above). The RM, rather, includes 
C-space as a partial description of a dispositional field regarding the 
possible and probable actions of an embodied, embedded (and so on) 
agent. That is, RM supports a different claim, the deviant nature of which is 
fleshed out below, when the attitudes of CS and RM to meaning 
(semantics) are discussed. 
 
Furthermore, RM is not about representations as such, but about the agent 
as a whole (although representations can occur). This includes, as a 
corollary perhaps, the claim that 'cognition' or 'mind' cannot be depicted 
exclusively in one or more spaces; cognition is an aspect of the agent-
world-dynamic in its totality, and that is what the RM describes. 
 
Gärdenfors does note that he intends to link CS to the body: 
 
"Conceptual structures are embodied (meaning is not independent of 
perception or bodily experience)" (Gärdenfors 2000, p. 160) 
 
However, this (plus Gärdenfors' subsequent explanation of this claim: 
Gärdenfors 2000, p. 161) constitutes a rather limited notion of E( i )C, namely 
E( B )C, and little more: CS includes embodiment as perceptual grounding, 
and as the claim that conceptual structures are somehow linked to bodily 
experiences and emotions. RM, on the other hand, is, in principle, intended 
to be applicable to all flavours of E( i )C. 
 
This subtle difference between RM and CS becomes clearer, and intensifies 
markedly, when Gärdenfors' ideas about semantics are considered. 
Gärdenfors makes it explicit that he views the meanings of expressions and 
locutionary acts emerge from elements of a cognitive structure (this, of 
course, is his 'conceptual space' ) to be found in the heads of language 
users, plus sociolinguistic power structures. In his conceptual space, basic 
lexical expressions in a language are represented semantically as natural 
concepts, basic adjectives as natural properties, basic verbs as dynamic 
natural concepts, and basic nouns as multidomain, nondynamic natural 
concepts. 
 
So, language users are to synchronise their individual conceptual structures 
(and these imply possibly idiosyncratic meanings, that are quite definitely in 
the head, needing no reference to anything external) to attain optimum 
communicative efficiency. As such, he argues against Hilary Putnam's 
(1975) meaning externalismNOTE 86, claiming that conceptual structures plus 
the aforementioned sociolinguistic power structures suffice for the existence 
of meaningful expressions, and no reference to an outside world (beyond 
that power structure, I would say) is needed. 
 
The claim to be defended on the basis of the RM-account is that if 'meaning' 
is to be found anywhere, it is in the system as a whole - that is, including the 
body and relevant, choice aspects of the environment. The same goes for 
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concepts or conceptual structures, which, on RM, are not things to be found 
anywhere, but rather dispositions towards action, locution and cognition. 
This latter corollary helps clarify that even despite CS's sociolinguistic 
aspect, RM simply defends a very different kind of idea of what a 'concept' 
is (i.e. a disposition-aspect of an agent-world interaction dynamic, rather 
than a mental entity in the classical sense). 
 
Only part of the explanation for the above-mentioned difference with 
Gärdenfors' view is that in the RM-approach, whatever processes contribute 
to mental processing are (or can be) distributed across the system, and 
whatever meaning is, it involves the entirety of the substrate of the agent's 
mental processing. To ask for an actual location of a meaning, a mental 
state or a concept (each of these conceived of as an object of some kind) 
seems to be the wrong thing to do, simply because it confuses a traditional 
conception of what 'mind' is with an explanatory approach (namely, RM) 
that takes as its core objective to get away from exactly that obsolete 
conception. Still, it should be obvious that an important, and positively 
indispensible part of the processes that account for the existence of 
meaning occurs in the head: brain activity. The other reading of 'in the 
head', namely as an aspect of an agent's consciousness, can also apply. 
The point I wish to make cuts both ways in the sense that these processes 
'internal to the head' might be important, but still they fail to tell the whole 
story, and that it is impossible that they are what they are and do what they 
do in isolation from that broader context of the system as a wholeNOTE 87. 
 
To drive the point home, consider the tools which CS and RM, respectively, 
utilise to define semantics. In CS, the cognitive approach to semantics 
entails mapping linguistic expressions (which might be modulated via 
sociolinguistic power structures) onto a conceptual structure, which is then 
applied to the semantic content's target object. Hence, the expression's 
meaning is constructed internally - that is, prior to application, and 
independent from any (externally definable) truth conditions. Semantic 
content comes first, and then syntax is chosen as a shape to pour that 
content into. 
 
In RM, these two cannot be pulled apart: semantics and syntax form an 
embodied and socially mediated, dynamic whole. If semantics is to be 
isolated for descriptive purposes, it can be defined as a dynamic, reciprocal 
mapping of the RM onto itself. That is, to repeat a remark made earlier (in 
section 7.6), the relevance of these basic-level (embodied/embedded) 
processes should be described in personal terms, i.e. the embodied agent 
as a whole, acting in (and interacting with) a particular physical and social 
environment. This reciprocal mapping as a characterisation of meaningful, 
concept-involving behaviour is another example of an impredicative loop, as 
described in section 9.3. 
 
In conclusion, I wish to claim that although I respect and admire Gärdenfors' 
achievement, his CS retains too many cognitivist rudiments to be applicable 
to theories in the E( i )C realm. It supports only a fairly weak form of E( B )C, 
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and advocates a somewhat unstable compromise of an internally based 
semantics modulated by sociolinguistic forces. I believe RM offers a more 
versatile and complete account of concepts and cognition. 
 
10.3 - Prinz' Concept Empiricism 
 
One of the most interesting studies on concepts published in recent years is 
Jesse Prinz' 'Furnishing the Mind' (2002), briefly referenced in section 2.5, 
where I introduced his list of desiderata on a theory of concepts. His core 
concern is to connect the mind - at least inasmuch as it involves concepts - 
firmly to a bodily basis. As an expansion of this approach - which he calls 
concept empiricism - he presents a theory about how these embodied 
concepts contribute to cognition, called proxytype theory.  
 
Because Prinz' main goal - to explain concepts in embodied terms - aligns 
(at least in part) with my own, his theory deserves a closer look. In this 
section, I will first discuss Prinz' theory, with an explicit focus on his use of 
representations, followed by two sections about the main differences of RM 
with both main components of Prinz' theory - concept empiricism and 
proxytype theory. 
 
10.3.1 - Modal Representations 
 
Concept empiricism is, in essence, a reworking of the classical empiricist 
claim that all ideas in the mind derive from information provided by the 
senses. Concept empiricism is defined as follows: 'all (human) concepts are 
copies or combinations of copies of perceptual representations' (Prinz 
2002). This is mostly a claim about causality, which Prinz calles the 
'Perceptual Priority Hypothesis': mental states are caused by states external 
to the brain, and the causal chain runs through the senses. Mental states 
being 'copies or combinations of copies of perceptual representations' adds 
a claim which Prinz calls the 'Modal-Specificity Hypothesis': 'concepts are 
couched in representational codes that are specific to our perceptual 
systems' (Prinz 2002). The upshot of this is that the content of concepts is 
not merely delivered via the senses, but is also specified in terms of the 
kinds of information specific to the various modalities. 
 
What is interesting about Prinz' suggestion, at least from an E( i )C-
perspective, is the fact that it combines a body-based account of concepts 
with a rather 'classical' use of representational mechanisms. In this sense 
Prinz offers a neo-empiricist account which aligns with the fairly 
conservative brand of embodiment and embeddedness as it is also 
supported by Damasio, in that nowhere the very notion of a 'representation', 
and its role in concept-involving processes, is called into question. Where 
Hutto would have us remove as much content as possible from concepts 
(see section 7.2), in Prinz' story they are filled to the brim with modality-
specific content, being internal representations of a rather unapologetically 
cognitivist kind. 
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In Prinz' story, these representations are correlated with selective neural 
responses to stimuli: it is possible to isolate neurons or groups of neurons 
which become most active when confronted with lines or edges of a 
particular orientation, specific chromatic properties of objects, specific 
surface textures or auditory properties, and so on. When a person is 
confronted with an object, specific distributions of neurons become active 
whose response preferences collectively align with the set of perceptually 
accessible properties of the object in question. Such response patterns are 
hierarchical affairs, with neurons or collections of neurons collating 
information from more basic levels of processing, eventually resulting in 
activation patterns which respond to more comprehensive representations 
of the external object or scene as a whole instead of disparate pockets of 
neuronal activity caused by specific object features. These representations 
of complete objects or scenes, not necessarily 'images' but more schematic 
constellations of information about the properties of the object in question, 
are then stored in long-term memory. This schematic nature of this complex 
representation allows the representation's owner to abstract away from the 
particulars of the object token he perceived, and generalise. 
 
One suggestion mentioned by Prinz would be to identify a concept with the 
entirety of stored information, particular to the object the concept is of, in 
long-term memory. Because we, generally, are not conscious of each and 
every bit of knowledge about a particular object when we can still be said to 
use its associated concept, Prinz judges this suggestion to be unworkable. 
Instead, he suggests that a concept is a mental representation that is or can 
be (temporarily) active in working memory. That is, concepts are what Prinz 
calls 'proxytypes', which might be simple images or highly complex 
multimodal representations and anything in between, and which can be 
used in working memory to represent a particular category of objects in the 
world. In essence, having a proxytype is generating an internal simulation 
that is similar to the perception one would have if the actual object were in 
front of you. 
 
These proxytypes are aggregates of more basic representations, 
corresponding to the various components and features of the object, based 
on actually experienced images and sensations stored in long-term 
memory. As such, proxytypes differ from the symbolic representations of 
computationalist functionalism: they are explicitly modal and concrete, 
rather than amodal and abstract. 
 
Prinz' theory is interesting and promising, and similar to RM in several 
ways. However, there is an important difference: the way in which 
'representation' is understood and used. In the next two sections I will 
examine the two main components of Prinz' account - concept empiricism 
and proxytype theory - in order to highlight that difference. 
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10.3.2 - RM and Concept Empiricism 
 
Recall that the main idea behind concept empiricism is the classical 
empiricist notion that whatever ideas are in the mind, will have gotten there 
via the senses. Hence, according to Prinz, all concepts, even the abstract 
ones, are somehow recombinations or reworkings of perceptual 
representations.  
 
RM aligns with concept empiricism in a specific way. That is, RM describes 
concepts as emerging out of a developmental interdependence of 
biomechanical and affordance-based dynamics: properties of the body co-
evolving with properties and influences from the environment. In the case of 
concepts and concept-based cognition, an important portion of those 
influences is indeed absorbed via the senses and results in mental 
representations. This does not mean that any concept's origins can easily 
be traced back to straightforward recombinations of perceptual 
representations. I do not expect Prinz to disagree: he allows extant 
concepts as recombinations to be, in a sense, metaphorical. In that light  
Prinz refers to work done by 'cognitive grammarians' such as Lakoff and 
Johnson (see section 6.9), who, for instance, explain the emergence of an 
understanding of causation as abstractions of perceived cause-effect pairs. 
 
However, RM allows another kind of influence of 'the world' on the 
emergence of an agent's concepts, mainly due to the fact the notion 
'representation' as used in RM is different from the kind that Prinz insists on 
subscribing to. RM offers room for agent-environment interaction on many 
different timescales - including the evolutionary timescale! - to shape 
embodied predilections and dispositions, hence conceptual abilities. The 
proposed mechanism is dynamical dimensioned realisation (see section 
7.8), and at least some influences on the dynamics of conceptual or 
cognitive processes were then indeed first in the senses, but in a very 
indirect fashion. 
 
Prinz's point is that whatever we can think, whatever concept we might 
have, is highly likely to be an amalgamation of sensations and bits of 
knowledge we have gathered throughout our life, or variations upon the 
themes set out by those perceptions. My point is that many influences can 
still be highly significant, despite not being processed to become 'internal 
perceptual representations'. Even so, such influences do still count as as 
contributing to the dynamical dimensioned realisation process, and this is 
where an important distinction between RM and Prinz' theory lies. 
 
I have an example, describing a rather roundabout process that is not 
entirely uncontroversial, but which does show how cognition (and, 
putitatively, concepts) can be influenced by many different properties and 
processes, in non-obvious ways and over long timescales. I do not suppose 
Prinz would argue against this indirectness-argument, but it deserves 
stressing nonetheless. 
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Here it is: in his (1996), Steven Mithen describes how he believes human 
cognition evolved. An important step in the evolution of a larger brain, he 
says, came with the Australopethicus Afarensis ('Lucy'), starting roughly 3.5 
million years ago. There are indications to support the hypothesis of a 
climatological change resulting in more arid and open environments in 
Africa 2.8 million years ago, and changes in the early humans' posture (i.e. 
starting to walk upright) allowed them to adapt to those changes. The 
erection of the posture of man to a bipedal form required a larger, 
substantially more energy-draining brain for muscle control and balance, but 
resulted in a significant reduction of incident light on the body which 
enabled longer foraging periods without food or water (hence allowing them 
to function in that increasingly dry and savannah-like environment). A 
redistribution of functional space in the brain, reducing processing power 
needed for the feet (signifying the shift from graspers to weight bearers, 
which are less demanding in terms of brain processing capacity) might have 
accomodated the evolution of the hands as specialised appendages (to be 
utilised for carrying and handling tools, for instance). Other changes of note 
due to the assumption of the new posture would be an increased frequency 
of face-to-face encounters, sowing the seeds for an expansion of social and 
communicatory prowess, and the colonisation of a scavenging niche. That 
is, the disadvantages from spending time in the sun had been reduced, 
making it possible for the bipedal proto-human to prey on carcasses at 
times his rival predators needed to dwell in the shade - a greater amount of 
meat in the diet allowed the digestive tract to grow smaller, allocating more 
energy to the upkeep (and evolutionary expansion) of the brain while 
maintaining a similar base metabolism. 
 
Many of these physiological changes, brought about by environmental 
factors (dryness and less vegetation), influenced the cognitive capacities of 
early man: increased use of the hands (subtle and precise manipulation of 
objects), more frequent face-to-face contact (opening up a world of complex 
social interaction possibilities), and a general increase in brain size in all 
likelihood allowed more elaborate cognitive processes to take place, with 
the appropriate associated conceptual abilities. 
 
For instance, quite a bit of social interaction depends on more or less 
consciously observed changes in facial expression. Watching a painful 
facial expression, especially of someone you care about, tends to evoke - in 
some sense - painful or pain-related sensations in you, and tends to elicit 
caring behaviour: this is an example of the kind of largely automatic 
processes which play an important role in how you interact with other 
people. Children who are denied frequent face-to-face contact at crucial 
periods of their development (for instance in the case of 'feral children'), or 
who have deficiencies in the autistic spectrum tend to have severe 
difficulties in acquiring an effective facility for facial-expression 
interpretation, and their social skills usually suffer because of itNOTE 88. 
 
If this is right, it stands to reason that 'theory of mind'-related abilities and 
concepts might not have become nearly as advanced as they are in modern 
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humans if such an apparently simple development as starting to walk 
upright had not occurred, and this might not have occurred if the 
climatological changes mentioned above had not taken place. 
 
Now, this example is controversial because anthropologists do not agree on 
the factors that contributed to the increase of brain size in early humans, 
and I do not intend to either endorse or denounce Mithen's suggestion. 
However, what this example does show is that conceptual changes (or the 
possession of certain conceptual abilities at all, in this case abilities 
involving particular social concepts) might have to do with a wide variety of 
interlocking processes, some of them linked to eachother in decidedly non-
obvious ways, or via complex causal chains with many degrees of 
separation. 
 
Obviously, this example highlights how the environment's influence on 
evolutionary processes creates the preconditions for particular kinds of 
concepts appearing, which does not rule out the possibility that any concept 
that one might possess is, in one way or the other, directly related to some 
occurrent process. 'Theory of mind'-related capabilities might have 
convoluted evolutionary origins, but if I have an emotional reaction to some 
facial expression right now, that has everything to do with the fact that I am 
faced (quite literally) with another person right now. Still, in that case being 
confronted with another person is the trigger or enabler for being in a 
particular mental state, an enabler furthermore which presents a number of 
constraints on my own behaviour (e.g. the face is happy, so a sad reaction 
on my part is less appropriate - unless the happy person is my arch 
nemesis, of course). However, other highly important sets of constraints are 
offered by my conceptual and neurophysiologial properties, and the 
evolutionary history which made those properties what they are - i.e. my C-
space and M-space properties. For a complete explanation of my mental 
state, hence my conceptual behaviour, we cannot limit ourselves to any all-
too-straightforward variation upon the explanatory theme 'external event --> 
perceptual processing --> concept' - that is the point of RM. 
 
The above also means that, in some way, the representational nature of 
concepts as Prinz wishes to defend it is called into question. What brand of 
representation (if any) is in play when many of a concept's properties are 
diachronically realized in the way described above (or something in that 
vein), instead of synchronically? Obviously this question hinges on the 
difference between the causal origin of a concept and the external entity a 
concept would be taken to represent - my point is that both these processes 
might be called representational, but the former in particular is not of the 
standard 'external event --> perceptual processing --> concept'-kind, for 
reasons explained above. In my opinion, the Dimensioned Dynamical 
Realization-account offered in section 7.8 does a better job of 
characterising the active interplay of actions and impressions within a 
context of constraints and enablings that occurs in the evolution, over long 
timescales, of concept-involving agent-environment interaction. 
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There is another issue here. The argument above is about the indirectness 
involved in the creation of concepts - concepts might be modal, but not 
necessarily as a result of straightforward perceptual processing. Presently, I 
intend to tackle the question of the emergence of abstract, non-modal 
concepts. Now, to reiterate, Prinz's concept empiricism means that all 
concepts are specifically linked to information as provided by the perceptual 
system. Prinz does have a story about how certain abstract concepts 
emerge - part of that story is recounted in section 6.9, for some of the 
mechanisms he proposes (sign tracking in particular) are mechanisms that 
RM can also utilise. 
 
The main difference between Prinz' idea about the emergence of abstract 
concepts and the position to I wish to defend, is that according to RM, 
certain abstract concepts might be modal by heritage, but need no longer 
be tied to or couched in terms of the phenomenology associated with a 
particular modality, or any modality whatsoever. Basic concepts (usually 
expressed in terms of more or less intuitive behavioural dispositions, only 
experienced or justifiable after the fact) are modal by definition, because 
they are an (explanatory) link in an action-reaction chain that is sparked by 
stimuli of one or more modalities. In that case too it might be unclear from 
which modality the concept hails, exactly because the behaviour in which 
the concept is expressed is not a reasoned and planned action. Based on 
these considerations, I would claim that Prinz' modality claim is only easily 
supportable for concepts in the 'vulgar centre' bookended by the basic and 
abstract concept types described above: everyday concepts such as 
'redness', or 'chair', or 'horse', that are comparably easy to indicate or 
perhaps even define - which is why the vast majority of examples in 
philosophical texts about concepts involve exactly these kinds of concepts. 
 
But of course there are many other concepts. Now, Fodor (1981) famously 
argued against prototype theory by providing examples of concepts without 
prototypes (see also section 6.11.2). However, these examples were 
notions of the kind 'all teal-coloured objects heavier than ten kilos west of 
the Mississippi' and these might, under some sets of criteria, need to be 
counted as a concept, but it is somewhat unlikely that anyone has ever had 
this particular concept (except perhaps Fodor). Of course part of Fodor's 
point can be that philosophical theories need to be precise enough to 
disqualify obviously ridiculous implications, but I would wish to suggest that 
the interpreting party has a responsibility too. As a variant of the principle of 
charity, I feel philosophical theories should be subject to a 'fair use'-policy: if 
it takes a really far-fetched example to discount a particular theory, this 
might indicate a failure of the theory's designer to plug one or more difficult-
to-reach holes (and the designer should be held accountable for that), but it 
might just as likely indicate the weakness of the attack. 
 
However, 'justice', on the other hand, is a concept that many people have, 
in one way or the other, but this is one of a kind of concepts that many 
theories of concepts have problems explaining. I provided an account for 
'justice' in terms of SToCC/RM in section 6.6. Based on that discussion it 
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becomes clear that the main difference of RM with Prinz' theory, and 
probably the feature that allows it to provide a better account of such 
abstracts concepts, is that RM does not understand a concept exclusively 
as an internal representation. Rather, RM describes concepts as 
descriptions of structural properties of an embodied and embedded agent's 
behavioural dispositions. According to RM, having the concept 'justice' does 
not mean having a perceptually based proxytype-representation of 'justice' - 
I find it difficult to grasp what this even means. Rather, it means being able 
to act in a just manner, or being able to recognize just behaviour in others, 
or being able to provide arguments about the concept, all in contextually 
appropriate ways: RM defines concepts behaviourally (with a possible 
representational correlate), rather than purely or mostly in cognitivistic 
representational terms. These arguments about the concept can be 
couched in exemplar terms: the enslaver of the concept, which functions as 
a mnemonic anchour, with its associated narrative jurisprudence. Now, 
these enslavers are somewhat similar to Prinz' proxytypes, but RM 
ultimately defines these tendencies to use specific examples in a way that is 
quite different from the representation-based definition of Prinz' proxytype. 
That is, RM says that attributing concepts is to provide descriptions of the 
structural regularities that emerge in detector-mediated agent-world 
interaction. Or, put another way, concept-use is what happens when 
sufficiently sophisticated constellations of detectors (sensory organs) are 
linked in the appropriate ways with effector systems (e.g. limbs) - where this 
sensor-effector-linkage does not necessarily require a cognitivistic 
representational intermediary, but rather functions using the kind of E( i )C-
appropriate representation descibed in section 7.8 (i.e. DDR). 
 
RM's focus on the behavioural aspect in defining concepts rather than the 
'representationally convenient property'-aspect selected by Prinz explains 
RM's smoother fit to abstract concepts, or concepts that somehow require a 
relation- or role-based explanation. RM is not committed to properties as 
comprising sets of individuating features of concepts, but differential 
behavioural profiles. It is perfectly acceptable to count amongst those 
behavioural profiles the acts of providing role- or relation-based 
explanations, and/or performing acts that express an understanding of such 
roles or relations, or even to provide explanations in terms of examples 
derived from a concept's enslavers. But usually, you express some level of 
understanding of what the concept 'game' is by joining in and actually 
playing a game the way it is supposed to be played. 
 
10.3.3 - RM and Proxytypes 
 
Prinz' proxytype theory suggests that using a particular concept involves re-
presentation, a kind of simulation, of (parts of) the object that concept is 
about, and this proxytype representation is composed of (variations on) 
formerly gathered perceptual representations of the object in question (or of 
something sufficiently similar). Hence, when using the concept 'dog', the 
associated proxytype can contain experience-based images, sounds, 
smells and the like of dogs or parts of dogs: bodily features such as the dog 
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having claws, teeth and fur, behavioural features such as the dog being 
prone to running, licking hands, or rolling over, or other features such as the 
dog barking, and so on. Depending on the way in which the 'dog'-concept is 
utilised, different amalgamations of 'dog-features' retrieved from memory 
might come to form a proxytype as it is 'active' at a particular moment. As 
such, Prinz' theory of concepts is a profoundly representational theory, in a 
fairly straightforward cognitivistic sense: a proxytype is a mental object, 
active in consciousness at a particular time. That is, proxytypes are 
representations that contain subconcepts of properties, and the real 
properties in the world these are subconcepts of are used to track natural 
kinds in the real world, and that tracking relation is the anchour to which the 
internal-to-external correspondence is moored. According to Prinz, a 
proxytype (or a concept as such) is a reliable category-detector, its features 
corresponding to properties of real-world objects, hence serving to pick out 
those objects as belonging to a certain class or category. 
 
My alternate suggestion is that in the vast majority of cases of concept-
involving behaviour, we have no images or other imagined perceptual 
representations of the concepts we are using. When I see a dog bearing its 
teeth and running towards me, I run away while seeing and/or hearing that 
very real dog. I do not really see what purpose the intervention of a 
conglomerate of mental perceptual representations - concepts-as-images of 
'dog', 'danger' and 'evasive action', perhaps - would have to serve. If my 
instincts do the job they are supposed to, I will have jumped up and started 
running before having had the chance to form a fully realised image-like 
mental representation of the dog that is chasing me. At that point, most 
representations that I do have will probably be of fences in the distance that 
I have to jump over - forcing me to plan my pacing for a good leap - and 
similar objects. 
 
That is not to say that it is impossible that in some cases, you actually do 
imagine a dog as Prinz suggests his proxytype works, i.e. with an image-
like awareness of the dog's appearance, a sound-like awareness of the 
dog's bark and so on, in the absence of an actual dog in your proximity. 
Indeed, those imagined bits of perceptual mental content are perceptually 
based, and they do belong to the concept they are evoked in reference to. 
In such a case, those 'images' might be used as mnemonic support when 
asked to explain what a particular concept means to you - this would be a 
representation-hungry problem of the kind Clark discusses (see section 
7.4). However, my claim would be that those instances in which there would 
be talk of a fully realised 'proxytype' are the exceptions, rather than cases 
which specify the norm. 
 
Now, what to think of the similarity of Prinz' proxytype to RM's 'enslaver'? 
Each of these two functions as a stand-in, during a particular instance of 
concept-use, for a much more elaborate cache of standing knowledge that 
need not (and in all likelihood cannot possibly) be 'active' every time that 
specific concept is used. 
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The main difference is that an enslaver is not (necessarily) a representation 
that guides or structures occurrent processes, but rather a collection of 
features that contributed formative influences ('programmed' expresses 
what I mean, although the computationalistic connotation is awkward) to an 
agent's behavioural dynamics, and a description or recollection of which can 
be reconstructed (usually only in part) to be used in a justification of 
behaviour ('concept use') during or after the execution of the act in question. 
 
In RM, a concept can indeed be described by referring to a list of properties, 
in justifying one's concept-based behaviour when pressed to do so, and 
perhaps (some of) these properties can even be represented. However, the 
main individuating aspect of a concept is the associated behaviour, which is 
judged in terms of appropriateness relative to the demands of the situation 
in which the concept is wielded, as well as the aptitude in defending this 
behavioural choice, either in word or in act. 
 
Hence, in RM a concept is not a thing inside the head or a representation in 
the mindNOTE 89, but a way of describing certain structural features of 
behaviour (including cognition and locution), either that of oneself or of 
another. That is, having a concept means being disposed to act in such a 
way that concept-attribution as an explanatory strategy (again, by oneself 
about oneself, by oneself about another or vice versa) is justified (i.e. 
produces an acceptable explanation). 
 
So in terms of structure, proxytypes are similar to enslavers, but in terms of 
what they actually are (i.e. what the concept 'concept' denotes), there are 
significant differences. To the heart of this difference goes the claim that 
RM has a different story to tell about what a representation is, and what it 
does, than Prinz - see section 7.8 for RM's account of representation as 
dynamical dimensioned realisation. 
 
In contrast with Prinz' account, RM does not suggest there to be an actual 
one-on-one reference relation between an internal representation (the 
concept, or proxytype, or whatever) and the external object, but an 
interaction dynamic between agent and environment, which can be 
described or explained in part by referring to concept-possession. It should 
be obvious that Prinz defends a kind of mental realism; the above means 
RM can maintain a realism of concepts as behavioural dispositions 
(including the possibility of cognitive behaviour) and explanatory tools, and 
that might be defined as mental realism - if one would wish to do so - under 
the E( i )C-redefinition of what the notion 'mental state' is supposed to denote 
(namely, an agentive, multimodal disposition). That does not, however, 
mean that RM is committed to the idea of real internal representations-as-
images that refer to extramental entities. 
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10.3.4 - Dealing with Problems 
 
This difference in the use and definition of 'representation' allows RM to 
deal with problems that Prinz, according to Markman and Stillwell (2004), 
has difficulties solving.  
 
For instance, Markman and Stillwell state that Prinz aligns with most 
theories about concepts in defending a property-based view: concepts are 
defined in terms of their properties. The problem there, they say, is that 
many concepts as we actually use them are understood in terms of their 
roles (such as 'game' or 'job': playing a game or having a job means playing 
a particular role in a specific context) or are relational ('sister', 'uncle'). The 
problem is that Prinz' perception-based concept theory is not particularly 
appropriate in defining these aberrant concept types, because these 
concept types are not characterised in terms of perception-based, internally 
represented properties. 
  
RM is not harmed by this objection, because it is not representational in the 
cognitivistic sense. In RM, behavioural profiles associated with concepts are 
individuated in terms of their roles in the agent-environment interaction 
dynamic: exactly the kind of meaningful, situated role-based coherence 
Markman and Stilwell accuse Prinz of not being able to provide. 
 
Another remark made by Markman and Stillwell concerns the fact that Prinz 
defends a strong realism about intentionality. They suggest that it would be 
much more convenient to replace Prinz' realist position about concepts' 
reference to external entities with a coherence-based view: in such a case 
the defining feature is not the correctness of the relation between the 
conceptual representation and the external object, but the consistency of 
one conceptual representation with other representations. 
 
RM offers a suggestion that is somewhat different from the one made by 
Markman and Stillwell. The main difference concerns - again - the non-
orthodox use of representation: RM does not require a representation as an 
internal stand-in to establish the intentionality of concepts. Rather, RM 
speaks of appropriateness-of-use of concepts - not truth -, and defines that 
appropriateness in terms of justification that a concept-user is required to 
provide, in one way or another, within the social context of using concepts. 
As such, there is, at least in part, a collective social construction of the 
reference of concepts, constrained and enabled by non-socially established 
facts of the matter (physical environmental, and biomechanical/body-based 
properties) about the world, and the persons that dwell in it. This is exactly 
the interplay of properties that can be expressed in S-space, P-space and 
M-space, and the effect that interactional dynamic has, in terms of 
dynamical dimensioned realization, on the properties of C-space, as 
explained in section 7.8 and chapter 8. This mechanism creates the 
meaning-providing coherence desired by Markman and Stillwell, without 
requiring the kind of representations Prinz uses. In RM, a strong realist 
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position about (representational) concept reference is traded in for a 
dynamic, social practice-based pragmatism about the meaning of concepts. 
 
10.3.5 - RM vs. Prinz: Conclusions 
 
In conclusion: Prinz' project is intriguingly daring, and in my opinion very 
correct in its wish to find an embodied foundation for concept use and 
possession. At first glance, it might appear to be the case that there is a 
match between some of his ideas and some of the components of RMNOTE 
90
. I have shown that that match is indeed appearance, for RM's underlying 
theory - the notion of representation and the very idea of what a concept is 
in particular - is quite different from Prinz' bold account. My criticism of 
Prinz' approach is rather mild, because I like his theory very much. The 
most important difference between his idea and mine is the way that 
'representation' is understood, with his account being entirely too cognitivist, 
and my account offering a redefinition that is E( i )C-appropriate. 
 
10.4 - Applying RM: Concept-based Early Childhood Education 
 
In this section, I will highlight a concrete application of RM: the ideas 
encapsulated in RM about what a concept is can fortify or modify some 
recommendations made by Birbili (2007) about a concept-based curriculum 
for young schoolchildren. That is, RM's contribution here is an explanation 
of why certain aspects of such a concept-based educational program need 
to be the way they are: the properties of concepts themselves suggest the 
appropriateness of particular educational strategies. These are the main 
conclusions to be reached in this section: the necessarily embedded nature 
of concept-wielding agents implies a connectedness of their concepts to 
many other concepts (the 'embedded manifolds'-idea - see section 6.6); the 
embodied nature of concept-wielding agents suggests the success of a 
multi-modal approach to the acquisition of knowledge and abilities (which is 
most compactly expressed in figure 24; see also section 9.1); and the social 
dimension of concept use necessitates a critical attitude focused on 
justification of choices (see section 9.2) 
 
In her (2007), Maria Birbili advocates a concept-based rather than fact-
based curriculum for early childhood education. The epistemological upshot 
of this approach is that truly practically applicable knowledge is not 
characterised by or composed of constants ('facts'). Rather, it is much more 
useful to train children in the ability to see patterns and connections, 
compounded by the aptitude to utilise those insights to adapt to constantly 
changing viewpoints and factual claims - a concept-based approach. 
 
One of the problems with fact-based education, says Birbili, is that there is a 
danger of presenting children with a collection of disjointed and abstract bits 
of information. Focusing on facts is an approach to information, furthermore, 
which suggests a certainty and solidity of knowledge claims which is 
increasingly difficult to support, given the speed with which ideas and 
theories shift in modern society. Also, a fact-based curriculum mostly trains 
 233 
children's mnemonic abilities - important to be sure, but limited in scope and 
applicability compared to other useful abilities such as pattern-recognition 
and problem-solving. 
 
To avoid these problems associated with fact-based education - 
fragmentation and petrification of knowledge, and an excessive focus on the 
lowest level of cognitive ability, namely memorisation -, Birbili supports the 
development of concept-based curricula. The core of this approach is to 
shift educational attention from offering information about specific topics to 
helping children understand the ideas and generalisations behind those 
topics. 
 
A telling difference betwen the two approaches is this: in the fact-based 
approach, a greater depth of instruction means providing more detail, hence 
teaching more facts pertaining to a particular topic; in the concept-based 
approach, a greater depth of instruction means stimulating a new level of 
understanding, which includes being able to see interdisciplinary links, 
similarities and generalisations, and having the capacity to create new 
insights based on that knowledge. 
 
For example (following Birbili 2007), when teaching young children about 
the weather, fact-based education might focus on the different kinds of 
weather there are and the associated descriptors (sunny, cloudy, rainy, 
cold, wet, dry, and so on), and that people wear different kinds of clothes in 
these different conditions. A concept-based approach, rather, might see 
acquiring such factual information not as an end, but as a jumping-off point 
to have these children consider concepts such as 'change' (the weather can 
go from sunny to cloudy), cause and effect (people wear winter coats 
because it is cold, not the other way around), as well as deeper connections 
such as 'changes can be observed and recorded' or '(seasonal) changes 
affect people's activities'. 
 
Birbili stresses that using a concept-based educational strategy does not 
mean that facts are completely unimportant: rather, she notes that concepts 
emerge from the classification of factual knowledge, and that teaching facts 
provides 'supporting detail'. I agree that fact-based educational strategies 
should continue to be used, as factual knowledge forms an indispensible 
foundation of many cognitive abilities: all cognition needs Archimedean 
points. However, I wish to make an additional, somewhat stronger claim: 
teaching even (moderately) outdated knowledge can be useful. This might 
appear to be in conflict with a key argument in favour of concept-based 
education, namely the fluidity of information: what is accepted scientific fact 
today, might be refuted and outdated tomorrow. However, despite potential 
interpretational difficulties between paradigms (if one follows Kuhn, 1950), I 
would wish to claim that even soon-to-be-outdated or already obsolete facts 
can help sketch a background against which to interpret new 
informationNOTE 91. However, these fact-based strategies can be effective 
only when combined with the flexibility fostered by a concept-based 
program, in which the pattern-recognition-abilities to see connections 
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between facts and to apply factual knowledge to novel situations are 
trained. 
 
Recall that the RM-model highlights the interconnectivity of concepts, and 
that it claims that having a concept entails knowing (having, in some sense, 
knowledge of) what kind of behaviour, in a particular context, is required to 
achieve a particular goal. In that sense this knowledge might either consist 
of consciously accessible insight or exist in terms of behavioural 
dispositions. Often, these two are conflated in some way: the appropriate 
kinds of behaviour are often shaped by the knowledge (e.g. extracted from 
past experiences in similar situations) an agent has of the objects and/or 
context in question. 
 
This means that acquiring some concept means acquiring the ability to put 
the knowledge one has to good use in a particular context, even if some 
aspects of the situation in which the concept is applied are novel. Therefore, 
concept-based education can and should train children in applying concepts 
in a contexually appropriate manner. This includes the ability to use a 
concept at the appropriate granularity (e.g. when picking objects to sit on, 
categorising solely on a more coarse-grained level ['furniture'] will result in 
impractical selections - a table is in the same general category as a chair, 
but that coarse-grained similarity judgment will not help us pick a 
comfortable place to sit), but also at least some acuity at moving 'up' and 
'down' the granularity gradient. This will help grasp the ways in which the 
concept is embedded at different taxonomic scales, i.e. what the concept 
'means' due to its interconnectedness with other concepts: the meaning of 
the concept 'store' can be understood in virtue of an understanding the 
connected concepts 'buying', 'selling', 'customer' and so on. At first glance, 
increasing granularity towards, say, the level of physics will not help in 
understanding this concept any better, but I would claim that, with the 
advent of Internet-based stores, understanding the contrast with socalled 
'brick and mortar stores' benefits from a grasp of the concept 'physical' as 
opposed to 'virtual'. 
 
In this sense, it is important to make sure that any educational program 
latches on to the appropriate granularity of the concepts already present in 
the child's 'conceptual vocabulary'. Birbili states that young children tend to 
have difficulties understanding the place of a given object's position within a 
taxonomic hierarchy, so she feels it is probably best to start teaching at the 
basic level (everyday objects, conceived of in fairly broad categories: chair, 
table, dog, cat, tree, and so on), and move upwards (furniture, animals, 
plants) and downwards (folding chair, lounge chair, stool, etcetera) from 
there. However, here some of Mandler's (2007) findings are important: early 
on in their category-development, children might have ideas of how the 
world should be partitioned that differ from what a scientifically appropriate 
categorization would suggest. For instance, Mandler reports that certain 
experimental findings indicate that children under 11 months of age do not 
differentiate between tables, chairs, beds or even kitchen utensils, grouping 
all of that together in a 'furniture'-like class. My claim here is that connecting 
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to the child's conceptual structure can help speed up the child's education, 
but educators need to be certain beforehand what that structure is, because 
it might not be what they expect. 
 
If the structure inherent to the Radicality Manifold (as a model that 
integrates constraints and enablings from many different domains, to 
express the holistic dependence of the meaning of concepts) is in any way 
correct, it stands to reason that the best way to teach children the concepts 
and concept-related abilities is to pick teaching tools (both the methods and 
the materials used in class) that are child-activating and multi-modal: 
children should be allowed to touch, taste, feel and listen in an active 
interaction with the objects and processes they are learning about, in 
addition to being presented with more reasoning-and-fact-based ways of 
approaching the topics. In this way, both the dynamical dimensioned 
realization base (physical, social and body-based properties) as well as the 
conceptual dynamic that emerges from that base are stimulated in a 
structured fashion in the child's educational program. Obviously, this 
multimodal presentation should be controlled and composed in accordance 
with the processing ability of the child to avoid impression-overload: in a 
play-like context, most children will be able to manage quite substantial 
information streams, as long as those streams are of the right kind (see 
below for some caveats). 
 
The suggestion is that if children are allowed to find out for themselves what 
the information in their (text-)books means, as such activating their bodies 
in experiencing the object of study in different modalities, this will result in 
well-rounded, multi-faceted concepts: they will already have had 
multimodal, experiential access to concepts that a fact-based curriculum 
would have only given them abstract, descriptive access to. 
 
Even much more abstract matters such as learning how to spell can benefit 
from such an embodied approach. Bosman and Schraven (2008) and 
Bosman (2008), for instance, report that, with the proper methodology, even 
supposedly dyslexic children can learn how to spell just as effectively and 
quickly as 'normal' children. It might not, at this point, come as a surprise 
that this method, developed by Schraven and dubbed 'ZLKLS' (Zo Leer je 
Kinderen Lezen en Spellen - in English: this is how you teach children how 
to read and spell), is profoundly sensitive to the constraints and enablings of 
the child's ways of being embodied and embedded. 
 
The ZLKLS-program is geared towards preventing the child from making 
mistakes, as these erroneous spelling methods can be much more difficult 
to unlearn than to acquire. The method contains four basic components: 
 
(1) - multi-sensorial basis: learning the letter 'o', for instance, is not just 
about saying 'o' and drawing little circles. Each letter is acted out, linked to a 
sound-gesture that is in some way similar to the shape of the letter - for 'o', 
this is making a loop with thumb and index finger, and moving it away from 
the eye (eye in Dutch is 'oog', which is a word with a pronounced 'o'-sound) 
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while making an exaggerated 'o'-sound. This might sound silly, and perhaps 
it even looks silly, but together with actually writing the letter often and from 
a very early stage in the educational process, these excercises result in a 
deep absorption of multimodal embodied 'knowledge' of and experience 
with that particular letter, making the somewhat abstract task of spelling a 
word much easier. 
 
(2) - direct group instruction: the teacher functions as the example, acting 
out a required task. This is a way of capitalising upon the resonance effects 
inherent to bodily syntax, as discussed in section 9.1. A profoundly 
important aspect of the environment of a child consists of his teacher, and 
the other children in his class. When these people are collectively involved 
in executing a particular behavioural pattern, the biological imperative 
towards socio-behavioural resonance means that each individual's actions 
tend to gravitate towards the dominant pattern in that group: the example 
set by the teacher. 
 
(3) - orientation basis: there is a common, clearly delineated goal for the 
day. At all points throughout the learning process, children are aware of the 
goal that they are working towards - for instance: learning all about the letter 
'p' -, and how particular input (an assignment) fits into that process. This 
clarity is essential, because it is so often lacking. Case in point: an 
important constraining/enabling aspect of the way in which the child is 
embedded in his environment involves information availability. Sadly, in 
many classrooms this aspect is such that it impedes the development of the 
more easily distracted students, such rooms often being littered with 
spelling charts, posters, crafts areas and all manner of other distracting 
things to look at. Of course, making learning 'fun' is important, especially for 
children, and hanging posters on the wall can help do that, but 'fun' should 
not equal 'sensory overload' (at least for some of the purportedly 'weaker' 
students). 
 
(4) - repetition and examination: repetition of practice assignments every 
day (including daily examinations as an additional practice moment). As 
anyone who has tried to learn how to play an instrument (say, a guitar) can 
tell you: the mantra is practice, practice, and then practice some more, until 
at some point that formerly impossible to master arpeggio has become 
'embodied': it now feels natural to execute it, and you no longer need to 
make conscious decisions about where to place your fingers on the 
fretboard. It is not that different for more abstract tasks such as spelling: 
practice it via the 'embodied method' described above enough times, and 
after a while all these mnemonic tools are no longer necessary, the correct 
answer becoming available almost automatically as soon as the problem 
presents itself. This is not to say you do not use these behavioural tools any 
longer, but they are now subdued or at least non-conscious. 
 
The ZLKLS-method has had some remarkable success, allowing seven-
year-old children that were placed in special needs schools to learn reading 
and spelling at a speed comparable to that of 'normal' children, clearly 
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outperforming comparable children in special needs schools that did not 
use the method - and all this in the same amount of time, i.e. without the 
need for additional teaching programs (Bosman and Schraven 2008). 
 
When Birbili (2007) states that it is important to offer children many different 
kinds of experiences, i.e. to have them learn in a multi-modal or multi-
sensorial fashion, I would tend to agree, but with the important caveat 
(based on the remarks above) that these varied impressions should be 
rationed, and (obviously) attuned to the developmental level of the children 
as well as the educational task at hand, to help retain the children's focus 
during assignments. 
 
Adapting this caveat, as well as the other components of the ZLKLS-
method, to a concept-based teaching program, one of the main goals of 
education becomes teaching children to understand the mutual 
connectedness of concepts, but in a rationed and embodied fashion. RM 
suggests that the important role of concepts as epistemic anchours (an 
enslaver as a compact placeholder for more elaborate suite of knowledge 
and abilities associated with the concept) should inherently be able to 
accomodate a teaching program in which the exploration of connections 
between ideas, of the desire to look for and understand the coherence of 
concepts in their broader contexts, is stimulated. The aforementioned 
definitional interdependence of concepts at various taxonomic scales is 
reflected in the fact that RM models the justification of concept use in terms 
of embedded manifolds. The idea of an enslaver as an epistemic anchour at 
the core of an embedded manifold suggests that it should also be possible 
to unpack this compact core. That is, it should be possible to construct, on 
the basis of that enslaver - that general idea of what a particular concept 
means -, contextually appropriate assertions that might serve as 
justification/explanation of one's use of that concept. 
 
What is needed to generate the claims that are implied by the 'enslaver'-
shorthand successfully is a sense of awareness: a fair, usable evaluation of 
one's own position within the grid of occurrent constraints and enablings. 
That is, the correct use and/or justification of use of a particular concept 
requires careful observation and experimentation. Given the wide variety of 
contexts and modalities in which many concepts might express themselves, 
a student's tendency to tinker with parameters is very useful: the drive to 
ask questions about the properties of concepts in situations that are unlike 
the context in which the concept was learned. This tinkering might, in many 
cases, take the form of thought experiments: simply wondering 'what would 
happen if...?', and as such a foundation of factual knowledge wil most 
definitely be helpful in constraining the child's imagination, but I would 
suggest that the best way to learn the basics of this tendency towards 
experimentation is - again - a curriculum in which children can have the 
hands-on, multimodal, embodied experience described above, but rationed 
and implemented in a way that is sensitive to the constraints and enablings 
inherent to the embodiment and embeddedness of these children. 
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More in general, I believe that a concept-based curriculum will stimulate the 
child's critical, analytic abilities, stimulating it to assess the validity of 
arguments against a backdrop of practical insight acquired via first-hand 
experience. An important byproduct might be that this approach could also 
foster, in the child, notions of knowledge and truth as dependent on context 
and shaped by argumentation rather than derived from dogma or extant 
social power structures. That is, the child will acquire an analytic outlook on 
life and knowledge, with sufficient hands-on experience to implement a 
constructively critical curiosity when confronted by other people's ideas and 
assertions. 
 
I would (once more - see sections 9.1 and 9.2) like to stress the importance 
of the social dimension, which returns in the description above ("(...) 
knowledge (...) derived from (...) extant social power structures."). 
 
If you recall figure 24 from section 8.4, focusing on conceptual ability allows 
for a more natural explanation of behaviour based on a contextually 
appropriate (embedded) ascription of reasons for action. A consideration of 
a behavioural profile's embeddedness in its diachronic and synchronic 
context - the conceptual approach - is needed for a deeper explanation and 
socially appropriate interpretation of that behaviour. This social 
appropriateness is key. After all, RM claims that concepts cannot be 
characterised just in terms of a classification of the world (as in prototype 
theory) or definitions (in various guises both in classical theory and theory 
theory), but in terms of dynamic, contextually dependent arguments. In this 
way, having concepts (or more in general: knowledge) becomes a social 
matter, because such arguments need to be accepted, in some sense, by 
one's conspecifics in a dynamic of providing and assessing justification, as 
such attributing and being attributed the possession of concepts. 
 
This was the lesson to take away from the discussion of the ideas of 
Brandom (see section 9.2): having concepts, i.e. being disposed to (re-)act 
in a certain way in a specific context, is the structured answer to normative 
evocations by the physical and social environment. This means that part of 
instructing children in a concept-based fashion means training children in 
the practices of attributing commitments (being committed to playing the 
social game, with all it entails), acknowledging endorsements (accepting the 
behaviour of others as expressing a particular understanding of the world) 
and undertaking entitlements (underscoring one's own actions as being 
correct). 
 
Hence, in essence, one of the main educational goals to be reached for 
children is the evolving realisation of what it means to have concepts, i.e. 
what it is like  to be a functioning, constructively contributing part of an 
evolving, dynamical physical and social interactional structure. The use of 
the phrase 'what it is like' is not accidental here: I intend to use 'knowing 
what it is like' in the cognitive sense, i.e. being able to produce arguments in 
support of why such and such is or should be the case, but also - and not 
unimportantly - in the phenomenal sense, i.e. of having actual embodied, 
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lived-through experiences of being a part of that social and physical 
interactional structure. 
 
A good way to encapsulate such lessons is to encouch them in narrative 
structures (see section 6.6). This is not only because such structures most 
closely resemble the way in which children (and, obviously, people of all 
other ages) acquire experiences (usually we have one experience [or batch 
of experiences and attitudes] after the other, organised in a somewhat 
systematic fashion as one situation leads to the next), but also because 
such structures most closely align with the ways in which we are usually 
asked to account for our concept use: by telling a justification-providing 
story of how certain circumstances conspired to necessitate certain actions. 
Luckily, we have been teaching our children useful knowledge and abilities 
by telling them stories for thousands of years, and those children have in 
turn been practicing those abilities by acting out stories for as long as 
humanity has been around, so in that sense with concept-based education 
it would be business as usual.  
 
To recap, RM can strengthen suggestions, such as the one by Birbili 
(2007), to implement a conceptual approach in early childhood education, 
by appealing to the very properties of concepts (as understood in an E( i )C-
appropriate way). The recommendations that can be made, based on RM, 
involve the following claims: 
 
-fact-based education provides children with a comparatively deficient 
foundation in life, focusing on a low-level cognitive ability (memorisation and 
recall); 
 
-concept-based education, on the other hand, trains the contextually 
appropriate apprehension of objects and their situatedness, as well as the 
child's own situatedness (embeddedness); 
 
-an epistemic implication of the concept-based approach is that many 
definitions and explanations tend to be interdependent; a multimodal 
presentation of learning materials highlights such (possibly 
transdisciplinary) connections; 
 
-RM, then, contributes ideas about how how concepts/enslavers function as 
epistemic anchours in the extrapolation of knowledge (see section 6.7), the 
direction of such extrapolation guided by those conceptual interdependence 
linkages; 
 
-having concepts, or having the ability to attribute concepts to others, is a 
social property, hence concept-based education should pay special 
attention to the child's ability to justify his concept use; as such, concept-
based education fosters a critical, analytic attitude. 
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10.5 - The Final Evaluation: RM and Prinz' Desiderata 
 
I suggest that the case described above, about a concept-based curriculum 
in early childhood education, shows that RM can be useful as an 
explanatory tool. In this section, I will support that idea in a more general 
sense: I will revisit the list of concept desiderata specified by Prinz (2002) 
and originally introduced in section 2.5, as a final test of RM as a theory of 
concepts. Recall that Prinz claims (a claim to which I agreed) that a theory 
of concepts should meet certain criteria involving scope, intentional content, 
cognitive content, acquisition, categorization, compositionality and publicity. 
 
The criteria involving scope and compositionality are linked, in RM. As a 
descriptive tool to account for concept compositionality, RM suggests the 
conceptual spaces account (see chapter 6 and on): the interrelatedness of 
concepts and the emergence of new concept-compositions can be depicted 
in terms of embedded manifolds that are characterised by an enslavement 
structure, linked to social, biomechanical and physical properties in 
dynamically structured ways. Combining and adapting concepts in ways 
that are most appropriate to the increasing complexity of the evolving 
agent's interaction with his environment will result in a spectrum of concepts 
ranging from modal simplicity to amodal complexity; sections 6.9 and 6.10 
go into a bit more detail about the mechanisms and strategies involved in 
this concept acquisition process. To reiterate: the foundation of concept 
formation is formed by the sensorimotor apprehension of motion; the 
expansion and refinement of the catalogue of concepts occurs through the 
correlation of sensorimotor knowledge and linguistic encoding, followed by 
embodied and embedded (body- and motion-based) crossmodal mapping 
(analogies), and finally the linkage of embodiment and abstraction 
(extrapolated interpretation and implementation of phenomenal awareness, 
and the exploitation of signs) 
 
These ideas also provides RM with the initial explanatory tools to account 
for concept acquisition. An additional tool is this: the metaphysical 
structure underlying the connection between agent and environment, i.e. 
the structure within which such acquisition processes can take place, can 
be specified in terms of Dynamical Dimensioned Realization, in which 
social, biomechanical and physical properties collectively and dynamically 
specify an interaction process of constraints and enablings, giving rise to 
concept-evolving behaviour (see section 7.8). 
 
Given this representational structure ('representational' in its alternative 
definition, provided in section 7.8), categorization as a concept feature can 
be explained to depend on the constraints and enablings inherent to said 
structure. Several important examples of such constraints and enablings - 
the initial impulses to establish a category structure - derive from evolved 
perceptual response patterns, such as the structure of an embodied and 
embedded agent's categorization propensities that can be expressed in 
phenomenal colour space (see chapter 4). 
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Several components of RM provide details about how the publicity of 
concepts can be established: the granularity of concepts (see section 6.8) 
explains how people can come to believe they are using the same 
concepts, despite differences in use at more detailed levels; the practice of 
justification (see section 6.6) establishes a mutual attunement mechanism, 
in which discussion partners are required to account for their concept use 
and reach some sort of agreement or compromise about the meaning of 
concepts; justification helps establish a narrative 'jurisprudence' of concept 
use, a socio-cultural practice within which the appropriateness of concept 
use defines an important part of concept meaning (see once more section 
6.6). 
 
In opposition to Prinz' theory (see section 10.3), RM does not define the 
intentionality of concepts so narrowly as to require a representational 
stand-in. Instead, I suggest that the intentionality involved in conceptual 
abilities takes the form of an intimate qualitative interactivity between agent 
and environment. The concept 'dog', for instance, has particular properties 
(because of which it can be or is customarily used in a particular way) 
because actual dogs have the kinds of properties and stand in the kinds of 
relations to the rest of the world in ways which constrain and enable 
appropriate 'dog'-concept-use. Furthermore, there is a kind of social co-
construction of conceptual content and reference because of an agent's 
interaction with other agents, with their own understanding of that particular 
concept, resulting in the above-mentioned narrative jurisprudence of 
concept use. This multi-layered constraining-and-enabling dynamic 
instantiated in the interaction of agent and environment involves what I have 
called dynamical dimensioned realisation (in section 7.8). 
 
RM allows a greater flexibility of relative 'truth'-preserving concept use, first 
by relinquishing the use of the term 'truth' and instead using 
'appropriateness of use', which denotes a contextually defined pragmatic 
approach to conceptual meaning (see section 6.11.5). An additional remark 
is that RM allows for the fact that in many cases, concept use does not 
involve an intentionally (in the sense of consciously intended) focused 
referential relationship, but an attempt to adhere to a learned social, 
cultural, behavioural or linguistic convention, which might not be clearly 
defined - an attempt, furthermore, which might fail to some extent (e.g. it 
might not reach the kind of precision that would be required for scientific 
use) and still cause other people to understand what concept the agent in 
question intended to use. In such cases, we will notice that our discussion 
partner is not using a particular word/concept correctly (or at least differently 
from what we would do or say), but we think we know what it is that he 
means to say or what he is referring to, and we respond as if he had really 
said what we think he was supposed to say. One might call this approach to 
truth and concepts 'pragmatic realism': this is what often really happens, 
and in such cases appears to work. In many non-scientific cases, that is 
good enough. 
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Finally, Prinz claims that a concept should be individuated in terms of its 
relations to external entities as well as its interrelatedness with other 
concepts: a concept should have cognitive content as well as intentional 
content. RM satisfies both components of this requirement, but in rather 
specific ways, especially where it concerns the notion 'content' (see chapter 
7). That is, according to RM, a concept is a contentful mental state, but this 
state is defined in E( i )C-terms as an ability to act and react in an agent-
environment interaction dynamic - the structure required for this aspect on 
its own is described in terms of the aforementioned Dynamical Dimensioned 
Realization, which concerns the intentional connection between concept 
and world. The second part of the requirement is met in the sense that 
concept use is justified by referring to myriad other concepts. That is, any 
concept is always linked to many other concepts, in terms of conceptual 
abilities being composed of higher-grained conceptual behavioural profiles, 
and conceptual abilities depending on the implementation of other 
conceptual abilities to complete a sustained meaningful interaction of agent 
and environment. 
 
10.6 - In Conclusion 
 
If the RM-model is correct, even if only in principle (e.g. the details of the 
respective spaces' internal structure are errant to some degree, but the idea 
of an interaction structure of descriptive domains is on the right track), this 
can help determine what form empirical data within a particular domain 
(say, behavioural phenomena) needs to have to be applicable to domain-
transgressing cases. In other words, experimenters should attempt to 
translate the data found during some experiment into a description in terms 
of the contribution of that subdomain to the activities of the agent as a 
whole, and as embedded in his environment. This could, in principle, 
constrain or guide the way in which experiments are set up. Furthermore, if 
the RM would be adopted as a framework describing some structural 
aspects of the agent's behaviour, hence if the RM was used to inform the 
presuppositions from which hypotheses are drawn up, this could determine 
what kinds of methodologies and experiments are acceptable at all as 
proper explorations of cognition. Obviously, scientists working in a particular 
sub-domain - say, behavioural psychology - would still be free to carry on 
doing research whichever way they would deem empirically appropriate, but 
if they wanted their conjectures to be applicable to concepts and cognition 
in embodied and embedded terms, they might need to redesign their 
experiments. The case described in section 10.4 demonstrates that RM has 
suggestions to make about the way in which a concept-based curriculum 
needs to be designed. 
 
For the RM to have such an influence, it needs to be subjected to extensive 
refinement. The most important task to be carried out concerns the 
interpretation of data: how do we 'translate' empirical results in such a way 
that they can be encoded in terms of one of the RM's spaces, hence be 
related to other kinds of data, encoded in the RM's other spaces? Important 
work in interpreting phenomenal data for use in (neuro-)dynamical models 
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(Thompson, 2006) might offer some clues regarding how to go about such a 
task. Another area of the RM-model where there is still a lot of room for 
improvement involves phenomenology: some suggestions in that direction 
were made (e.g. about the role of phenomenal experience in the structure 
of the narratives that lie at the basis of SToCC's inferred accounts, in 
section 6.6), but the RM-model could use a clearer account of the status it 
affords to 'what it is like'-judgments. 
 
In the end, the RM is intended to provide a new metaphor for an E( i )C-
appropriate relate important data-domains (i.e. involving concepts, 
behaviour, biomechanical properties and environmental physical and social 
affordances) to eachother. Obviously, this book is merely a sketch, a 
provisional and hypothetical framework resulting from philosophical 
analysis, that might have empirical consequences. A lot of work still remains 
to be done, but I hope the RM helps us gain some headway on the difficult 
road towards a comprehensive E( i )C theory of concepts and cognition. 
 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
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[Notes] 
 
Note 1: I agree with Bennett and Hacker's Wittgensteinian inclination (i.e 
the campaign against hidden Cartesianism) in principle, but I feel their 
project overshoots its target on two counts: (1) their representation of the 
way neuroscientists talk, which they use to make their deconstructivist 
point, is too often sampled from popularizing literature, and in such cases 
fails to provide an accurate, unbiased portrayal of the scientific opinions of 
these neuroscientists. The kinds of metaphors they criticise do turn up 
rather often, but this is not always as debilitating as they might claim; (2) 
they leave very little room for the explanatory or expository use of 
metaphor, and when dealing with something as conceptually slippery as the 
mind, sometimes metaphor is all we can use. We should be careful not to 
discard the good along with all the bad. 
 
Note 2: In this notation, 's' stands for 'situated'; the 'b' - for embedded - was 
already taken by embodied. 
 
Note 3: See section 7.2 for a more thorough look at enactivism, and the 
criticism Dan Hutto uses to introduce his adaptation, Radical Enactivism. 
Prior to that, section 3.2 will feature a description and critique of an 
exemplar of the dynamicist variant of E( a )C. 
 
Note 4: Dan Hutto suggests 'enculturedness' should be a separate element 
of the broad 'embodied, embedded, etcetera'-approach. Thompson (2007) 
defends a similar claim. 
 
Note 5: It is possible to speculate that this kind of negative heuristic - i.e. 
the development of a multi-tracked, multidisciplinary view with as its main 
uniting feature the opposition to some other view, namely cognitivism - 
might contribute to the fragmentation and definitional inprecision of the 
embodied/embedded 'paradigm'. Let's put it this way: when you are 
constantly busy cutting off the heads of the Hydra with a sword, there is little 
time left for research and development of higher-tech weaponry - say, tanks 
and fighter jets. However, the origin of this fragmentation is not an issue 
that I wish to investigate here; rather, I hope to offer a small contribution 
towards finding an antidote. 
 
Note 6: See section 3.2 for a more thorough (but still brief) discussion of 
Thelen et al.'s model, and the way their findings are used to construct the 
'Radicality Manifold' model. For a lengthier discussion of this model, and the 
hopes for a dynamicist philosophy of cognition in general, see Van 
Leeuwen (2005). 
 
Note 7: In classical set theory, an element either is or is not part of a set 
according to some criterium (or list thereof); this binary conception of 
category membership yields 0 and 1 as the only possible membership 
values. Fuzzy set theory, on the other hand, allows for graded category 
membership: the set of permitted membership values includes, in principle, 
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0 and 1 plus all real numbers in between. Fuzzy set theory helps provide a 
formal depiction of the characteristic properties of concepts (as defined by 
prototype theory) by attributing higher values (i.e. closer to 1) to exemplars 
that possess more features defined to be typical of some category. 
 
Note 8: Parts of this section were published previously in Van Leeuwen 
(2005). 
 
Note 9: Dynamical Systems Theory (DST) is concerned with finding 
mathematical descriptions of the way systems (or aspects thereof) change 
over time, using differential or difference equations. A dynamical model 
consists of a state space, which is defined in terms of dynamical variables 
representing the relevant properties of the system, a time set, and an 
equation or set of equations transforming an initial state of the system at 
some moment in time into another state at a later time. In case of a 
continuous time set, this yields a curve in state space expressing the 
evolution of the variable(s); this curve, consisting of the points the system 
passes through as it evolves, is called the trajectory of the system. 
 
A classical example of a dynamical system is the pendulum, and this 
system’s two-dimensional dynamics (the system’s behaviour being 
described by the pendulum’s angle of elevation and its rate of rotation) were 
already explored by Newton. In another example, in describing Newton’s 
famous falling apple, the relevant dynamical variables would be the apple’s 
velocity and its position. 
 
Dynamical variables that help specify the state of the system in some 
crucial sense are order parameters. Their role can be compared to the 
parameter ‘density’ in a model describing the behaviour of a gas: such a 
parameter represents the macroscopic behaviour of the many individual gas 
molecules in a compact and efficient manner. Likewise, in DST models 
order parameters can capture the dynamics of (some aspect of) a complex, 
inherently high-dimensional system in a low-dimensional fashion. Influential 
parameters that are somehow external to the system itself are called control 
parameters. In the falling object example, the strength of the gravitational 
field would be a control parameter. 
 
Depicting behaviour of some system in abstracta, models are often 
idealised versions of reality and, for instance, ignore friction – a pendulum 
swinging in a vacuum, without any friction at the hinge point, will retain its 
amplitude indefinitely. Such systems are called conservative, but many real 
systems are dissipative, meaning they lose energy, slow down or otherwise 
tend towards some end state in an asymptotic manner. The point in state 
space a system starting at some other point A evolves towards eventually is 
called the limit point of the trajectory through point A. In higher-dimensional 
systems, a cycle or a torus can also be a limit set of some trajectory. The 
equilibrium state of the system, i.e. the point or set of points a trajectory 
tends towards over time, is an attractor of the system. The collection of 
points in state space that a trajectory can start out in to eventually arrive at 
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(or immeasurably close to) the attractor is the attractor’s inset, or basin of 
attraction. The opposite of an attractor - a point (or cycle, and so on) 
trajectories ‘flee’ from -  is called a repeller. A system often has more than 
one attractor; separating attractor basins are the separatrices. Two possible 
initial states might be very close together, but if they lie on opposite sides of 
a separatrix they could end up at very different positions in state space after 
a while. 
 
Limit sets, in some cases, can be much more complex than points or 
cycles. Strange attractors are those limit sets that have a very complex 
geometric shape, and a system exhibiting the behaviour associated with 
such attractors is said to be chaotic (yet still deterministic, because they are 
still described by differential equations). It is in these cases that systems 
exhibit an extreme sensitivity to initial conditions: a minute change in the 
system’s initial state could result in wildly divergent behaviour. Thus, 
despite the deterministic character of the behaviour of these systems, 
accurate long-term prediction is often practically impossible because there 
is always a nonzero measuring inaccuracy that, over time, might throw a 
spanner of substantial size in the works. 
 
The attractor topology of a system is not necessarily constant over time - in 
keeping with the sensitivity of chaotic systems to the specifics of initial 
conditions, small changes in control parameters can cause large shifts in 
the way a system behaves. Such changes, involving changes in attractor 
properties or even the sudden disappearance of an attractor (or the 
emergence of one where there previously was none), are called phase 
transitions or bifurcations. 
 
Recapitulating, systems described in DST are fully deterministic, but 
seemingly random phenomena might occur. Non-linear, chaotic dynamical 
systems are highly sensitive to changes in initial conditions: a system may 
exhibit fundamentally different behaviour if the initial conditions are modified 
only slightly. Weather systems, or the eddies, flows and vortices in 
streaming water are examples of chaotic systems in this sense, and the use 
of DST to generate models to describe the behaviour of such systems has 
greatly increased our understanding of such processes. This chaotic 
behaviour generates special problems regarding the description of such 
systems using mathematical equations: in systems susceptible to chaotic 
behaviour, even a miniscule error in the specification of initial conditions 
while modeling actual systems might render the model inapplicable. 
 
Note 10: The way Thelen et al. construct their model, i.e. in terms of a 
mathematically defined field, is inspired by several older accounts, amongst 
them Köhler’s field theory and Lewin’s topological psychology, [b] 
interpreted in line with Gestalt theory and behaviourism, and [c] recast in 
terms of DST. 
 
Note 11: In terms of the 'Radicality Manifold'-model to be developed in this 
book, Thelen et al.'s model describes how P-space and M-space 
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collectively constitute B-space - that is, how particular shapes of 
behavioural dynamics emerge from the interaction of the properties of an 
agent's body and his environment. 
 
Note 12: A description detailed enough to do justice to the ingenuity of this 
model is beyond the scope of the current discussion - my objective here is 
merely to provide a general overview of the model and the successes its 
creators claim it is capable of achieving, enough to determine its 
philosophical relevance. For readers desiring a more detailed look, Thelen 
et al.'s 2001 article is very thorough in its description of the particulars of the 
model. 
 
Note 13: Note how elements four and five in particular already presuppose 
the embodiment thesis. 
 
Note 14: The dots above the X intend to denote the order of the temporal 
derivative. X is a variable expressing distance; an X with one dot is the first-
order derivative of X, meaning a certain distance traveled per unit of time, 
i.e. velocity; an X with two dots is the second-order derivative of X, meaning 
the change, per unit of time, of the velocity, i.e. acceleration.  
 
Note 15: This generates all kinds of problems involving 'time's arrow', i.e. 
why time does appear to have a distinct direction, despite the lack of 
support from the mathematical formalism. See Sklar (1977). 
 
Note 16: These hue-cancellation experiments were set up as follows. First, 
the phenomenally unique hues (that is, say, a yellow devoid of traces of any 
other hue) would be determined - the corresponding wavelength in 
nanometres would be recorded. Then, it proved possible to remove the 
yellowness from a reddish-yellow light (orange) by a light that, seen in 
isolation, would appear unique blue. The cancellation would consist in all 
traces of yellowness being gone from the resultant light without there being 
a hint of blue, i.e. the resultant light would be reddish. After that, the 
reddishness of the same orange light would be cancelled by a light of 
unique green. Progressing through the visible spectrum at 10 nm 
increments and recording all relevant energy levels of cancelling hues, the 
performances of the red vs. green and yellow vs. blue responses could be 
determined. 
 
Note 17: I will discuss more ideas by Kimberly Jameson in section 5.2, 
where her Interpoint Distance Model - an extrapolation of the suggestions 
put forth in her 1997 article together with D'Andrade - will prove to contain 
important notions and concepts, to be used in my own account. 
 
Note 18: The 'World Color Survey' is a massive research project intended 
to improve upon the findings of Berlin and Kay (1969), by charting the ways 
in which colour phenomenology and colour language are related for many 
different languages and cultures worldwide. 
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Note 19: Surface Spectral Reflectance (SSR) is a function specifying what 
proportion of light an object’s surface reflects for every wavelength. 
 
Note 20: The main objectivist theory about colour is physicalism, which 
holds that colour is some kind of physical property. An important argument 
in support of physicalism about colour involves the natural way in which it 
allows alliances with physics. For public relations purposes amongst most 
analytically oriented philosophers, at the very least, that is a great 
advantage. More importantly, with physics in the explanatory toolbox, it is 
possible to attribute to colours a proper causal role (e.g. it is some type of 
microphysical structure that causes the reflected light to have a particular 
wavelength), and to do so with an ontological commitment to relatively few 
properties. This way, physicalism can accommodate that most basic of 
intuitions about colour, namely that colour is some property of the object. 
Hence, on such an account, colour perception can be veridical: an object 
can actually possess the colour that we perceive it as having. 
 
The main argument against physicalism about colour is the problem of 
metamerism: any one perceived colour can be caused by any one out of a 
disjunct set of Surface Spectral Reflectance profiles. This means that the 
set of microphysical structures we group together as, say, 'blue-causing' 
microphysical structures, has nothing in common other than the fact that 
we, perceivers, subjectively perceive them as being the same in some way 
(namely in terms of apparent colour). An additional problem for physicalism 
is that the phenomenal properties of colour - for instance, opponency, or the 
primacy of particular hues (see section 3.2 and chapter 4) - cannot be 
accounted for in physicalistic terms. There is nothing in the microphysical 
structures (which cause colour according to physicalism) that stands in the 
kinds of relations to eachother in the way that, for instance, red and green 
are opponent colours in perception. 
 
Dispositionalism, involving the claim that colour is the disposition of an 
object to cause a particular colour sensation, is often classified as an 
objectivist theory, and technically this is correct. However, this position 
includes an ontologically puzzling infusion of subjectivism. Consider that 
dispositionalism says a particular object is green just in case said object has 
the tendency to appear green to normal observers, under normal 
circumstances. A first glance, this appears to be a clever way of maintaining 
objectivism (colour is a specific power of an object to appear as such and 
such), while sidestepping the danger of metamerism that plagues standard 
physicalism: the definition of a particular colour explicitly includes the 
perceiver-centric criterion of appearing to be that colour, regardless of the 
disjunctivity of its physical base. 
 
These apparent advantages come at considerable cost. The first item on 
the list of disadvantages is that the dispositionalist definition of colour runs 
the risk of being circular: an intended explanation in terms of a colour being 
the power of some object to be perceived as possessing a particular colour, 
does not explain much in an obvious manner. Or if it explains anything at 
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all, then it does so merely in an indirect manner, because a disposition 
would need to have a physicalistic base that would provide the actual 
explanatory power. Furthermore, dispositionalism encounters severe 
difficulties in defining what 'normal' is in the case of observers as well as 
perception conditions. In fact, in defining colours at least partly in terms of  
properties of (the perceptual abilities of) human observers, the vast array of 
non-human colour-observers is almost automatically disqualified from 
having worthwhile colour vision under said definition. That is, unless 
extensive qualifiers are added, which usually do not serve to elucidate the 
definition. An additional implication would be that a colour would not exist if 
it went unobserved, and that once again clashes with our intuition that a 
colour is a property of an object. 
 
Subjectivism about colour, the claim that colour is a mentally efficacious 
property, most naturally accommodates explanations of the phenomenal 
properties involved in colour perception mentioned above. The main 
argument against subjectivist theories about colour is that on such 
accounts, colour perception commits a global error: objects are perceived 
as being coloured, while they are not, because subjectivism states that 
colour is 'in the head', rather than 'on the object'. In everyday perception 
(i.e. discounting exceptional phenomena such as afterimages), we quite 
clearly perceive objects (or at least phenomena for which a satisfactory 
physicalistic description is available, e.g. the sky) as being coloured, and it 
seems highly counterintuitive to say that what we see as object colours are 
somehow mental phenomena. Now, as we shall see in sections to come, 
there are certainly aspects of colour perception that are not in any obvious 
way linked to objective phenomena, but are instead generated 'internally' - 
some phenomenal properties of colour experiences (such as the exact 
specifications of the primary hues) depend quite heavily on the properties of 
the perceiver's visual system. However, we can quite comfortably say that 
subjectivism-on-its-own about colour does not do justice to one of our most 
deep-seated intuitions about colour (apparently supported by findings from 
phenomenology), namely, that it is usually the object that is (or appears to 
be) coloured. 
 
Note 21: Section 8.2 contains a closer look at the notion 'affordance'. 
 
Note 22: The following is a cursory description of some of the LMF-model’s 
technical aspects, based on (Wandell 1989). Readers eager to explore the 
details of this model are encouraged to seek out that article, and the papers 
mentioned in its bibliography. 
 
The spectral power distribution of the illuminant can be expressed as the 
sum of the weighted contributions of each basis function: 
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( n) = spectral power distibution measured directly; Ein) = the most 
efficient basis functions; 0i = weights of basis functions. 
 
The surface reflectance function at a point can likewise be expressed as the 
sum of the weighted contributions of each basis function at a specific 
location on the object’s surface:
 
 
Sjn) = basis functions; 1xj = weight of the j-th basis function at spatial 
position x. 
 
The resultant equation shows the interrelatedness of the ambient light, 
surface reflectance and receptor sensitivities by defining retinal activity in 
terms of lighting, reflectance and spectral sensitivity of chromatic receptors:
 
 
Rkn) = spectral sensitivity (fraction of light absorbed for each wavelength) 
of photoreceptor of type k; !xk = number of quantal absorptions of the 
receptor of type k at retinal location x. 
 
The perceiving subject’s receptor sensitivity is assumed to be constant. 
Humans have three cone types, with maximum sensitivities at the following 
wavelengths: 
 
445 nm – ‘blue’ cone – 'S' (short wave), 
535 nm – ‘green’ cone – 'M' (middle wave) 
570 nm –  ‘red’ cone – 'L' (long wave). 
 
The resultant above can be expressed in matrix form, and then simplified: 
 E = matrix expressing ambient lighting and receptor sensitivity. 
 
E is constant. In the case of ambient lighting, this is an assumption; 
therefore, the model is a simplification. If we know the quantum catch at 
retinal location x, we can compute 1x, which expresses the reflectance at 
object location x – the distal chromatic/physical invariant the visual system 
was supposed to extract from the stimulus. 
 
:KHQWKHOLJKWLQJFRQGLWLRQVDUHXQNQRZQE specifies the linear mapping 
of an (x)-dimensional surface reflectance representation onto an (x+1)-
dimensional receptor response. Properties of the specified plane in (x+1)-
dimensional space enable predictions regarding properties of the lighting 
conditions; the position of a point within that plane enables an estimate of 
some surface reflectance function. 
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Note 23: Wachtler et al. (2001) use Independent Component Analysis 
(ICA). ICA is a decorrelation algorithm for complex data sets: it can find a 
linear transformation of a vector representation of some signal (for instance, 
a spectral distribution vector expressing some image) that yields basis 
functions of the compound signal that are as statistically independent as 
possible. ICA has no orthogonality constraints (unlike a related 
decorrelation method, Principal Component Analysis) - this rules out the 
possibility any orthogonality of basis functions is an artefact of the method 
rather than a proper representation of the analysed signal. 
 
A useful idea to come out of the computational vision project is that sensory 
processing serves to reduce redundancy in the information of a scene, thus 
increasing coding efficiency by decorrelating the component functions 
encapsulated in the scene's light array. In the case of the inverse optics 
process (recovering information about an object's surface properties from 
retinal stimuli), some of the ICA basis functions rather closely resemble 
natural spectra, raising the possibility that these models might generate 
hypotheses regarding how biological vision systems might achieve the 
uncoupling of information about the chromatic aspects of the illuminant from 
information about the object's surface spectral reflectance (SSR), which 
would enable colour constancy judgments. The strategy utilised is 
opponency, which is a rather efficient way of encoding the information both 
at the retinal and cortical levels. The opponency axes at these two levels do 
not line up, however, and it remains to be seen how this will affect the 
phenomenological story of red vs. green and blue vs. yellow. The 
suggestion by Wachtler et al. (both in their 2001, and in Lee et al. 2002) is 
that retinal and immediately post-retinal (dLGN) coding along orthogonal 
opponency axes serves to achieve a reliable transmission of signals from 
the three chromatic photoreceptor types (decorrelating because of the 
significant overlap of sensitivity curves of the three cone types), whereas 
cortical recoding along non-orthogonal opponency axes results in a signal 
that more accurately reflects the statistical structure of the light coming from 
the environment. 
 
In Lee et al. (2002), the findings from Wachtler et al. (2001) are 
extrapolated and fine-tuned. The mechanism of opponency has been 
claimed to embody an efficient encoding strategy of retinal stimuli. 
However, Lee et al (2002) suggest opponency arose not merely due to 
encoding efficiency per se, but also as a reflection of properties of natural 
spectra: the phenomenon arises as an optimum solution not only in ICA 
models simulating the sensitivity range overlap of the three human 
photoreceptor types (which, in an initial hypothesis, would necessitate 
opponency to decorrelate the signals), but also in hypothetical models 
where the sensitivity ranges of the receptors show no overlap at all. 
 
Lee et al.'s ICA model yields three main types of basis functions: 
homogeneous chromatic, oriented achromatic (expressing luminance 
edges) and colour-opponent (expressing colour edges) basis functions. The 
chromatic basis functions with the highest contribution represented a light 
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blue - dark yellow opponency; other components of lesser weight included 
blue - orange and bluish green - orange opponencies.  
 
The discrepancy between axis orientation between the encoding at the 
retinal/dLGN level and the cortical level, suggests that the axes of efficient 
coding don't necessarily align with the cardinal axes of dLGN cells at all 
levels. At that initial (retinal+dLGN) stage, PCA-type orthogonality emerges 
as an efficient encoding strategy of the signals received from the three 
chromatic photoreceptor types, which exhibit significant sensitivity range 
overlap, but at the cortical level a recoding takes place that results in a 
much more economical code, that more accurately represents the 
properties of the light coming from the environment. 
 
It should be noted the ICA basis functions do not show the double 
opponency of the cells assumed to do much of the coding work in the 
cortex. Other differences include that the basis functions encoding the red-
green opponency mix in contributions from S cones along with the L and M 
ones. Lee et al. explicitly note the abstractness of their model, and stress 
the need to take ecological factors (including the relevance of the visual 
signals to the perceivers) into account. 
 
Note 24: Van Hateren and Van der Schaaf mention that the properties, as 
derived with an ICA model, for which this is the case, are spatial frequency 
bandwidth, orientation tuning bandwidth, aspect ratio of the receptive field 
and receptive field length. For the location of the peak of the spatial 
frequency response, simple cells are much more flexible than the model's 
predictions would suggest. 
 
Note 25: There is a conflict here between Thompson's enactivism and 
Shepard's representationalism. Later, in chapter 7, I will have more to say 
about how I intend to fit the notion representation into an E( i )C-appropriate 
account. 
 
Note 26: Effectivity is the animal-centered counterpart of the object-
centered affordance. Turvey, Shaw, Reed and Mace (1981) say: ‘the 
dispositions of an organism-free world and the dispositions of an organism-
populated world (...) are not of the same order. The latter are ontologically 
condensed out of the former, so to speak, by the presence of living things.’ 
 
Note 27: See later, in section 5.2 and note 31, when I will define this as the 
'Neurophysiological Yield' 
 
Note 28: A possible counter-argument can revolve around the rejection of 
the Sapir-Whorf-thesis: if the structure of language has no significant effect 
on the structure of perception (and cognition), these linkages the other way 
around, namely between perceptual space and concepts, might also be less 
secure. But all this does is remove the necessity-aspect: in that case, 
certain perceptual (or, dare I say it, phenomenal) features are no longer 
necessarily linked to certain non-perceptual content, or content from a 
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different modality. But the idea that percepts have no isolated existence, but 
rather appear in context, remains: a colour is always a colour of something 
(say, an object), and we often use that colour as an indicator of some other 
property (redness of an apple means it is ripe, redness of a traffic light 
means crossing the street at that very moment is dangerous, and so on). In 
other words, the integration of perceptual space into the lowest reaches of 
conceptual space does not result in one-on-one mappings of percepts and 
concepts, but there are definite correlations and co-occurrences. What co-
occurs with what can be left to be determined by context and creativity. 
 
Note 29: This method of expanding perceptual space into a conceptual 
space resembles Gärdenfors' (2000) project, so obviously I am quite 
sympathetic to some of his claims, but I feel his account misses the mark in 
some nontrivial spots. See section 10.2 for a more thorough discussion of 
the similarities of and differences between SToCC (plus its expansion, the 
Radicality Manifold, to be developed later in this book) and Gärdenfors' 
theory. 
 
Note 30: Retinal tetrachromats might have four kinds of chromatic 
receptors ('cones', of which normal humans have three kinds) on their 
retinas, but lack the fully developed neural processing capacity to actually 
see colours in a way that captures this extra information. Perceptual 
tetrachromats do have the capacity to see additional hues and hue 
mixtures. 
 
Note 31: I define the 'neurophysiological yield' as the prestructured space 
of hue / brightness / saturation saliencies that is the result of the workings of 
the receptors on the retina and the subsequent neural processing of the 
stimuli, in accordance with their physical specifications. Put in the kinds of 
pastoral and nostalgic terms that the E( i )C-programmes would have us 
rescind (and hence, that my project is supposed to offer an alternative to), 
the neurophysiological yield can be thought of as a pre-cognitive 
presentation of the neuro-physiological processing of colour signals. So: the 
neurophysiological yield defines a structure of hue foci in terms of salience 
gradients, but this physiologically determined structure need not coincide 
exactly with the properties of some individual's perceptual colour space. 
 
Note 32: Bernard Harrison (1973) suggests that colour should be defined 
operationally: "(...) 'colour' corresponds not to a thing (an object of 
reference) but to an operation. (...) (T)he individuation of the fundamental 
modalities of perception depends upon the fact that the items falling under 
these modalities exhibit continuous systems of internal relationships." 
(Harrison 1973, pg. 87) 
 
These internal relationships are not due to the properties of a priori colour 
experience in isolation, but rather emerge in the learning and using of 
colour language, in the person's operating within the constraints set by the 
way colour names are used in his language community. In other words, 
Harrison claims, calling an object 'yellow' is not to say that it somehow 
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coincides with some pregiven point in perceptual space, but rather that it fits 
somewhere within this language-based constellation of relationships. A 
colour, being a relational entity, cannot exist divorced from this 
embeddedness in its relational web. 
 
Note 33: This involves a syntactic conception of information (i.e. the way 
information is defined in communications technology, namely as a structural 
feature of signals, e.g. Wiener 1961), combined with an agnosticism about 
the origin of this information. 
 
Note 34: This involves a semantic conception of information (a red traffic 
light means 'stop'), with pragmatic implications. 
 
Note 35: This claim is somewhat similar to the one professed by Maund 
(1981, 1995), and in fact inspired by it. See section 6.10 for more on 
Maund's ideas, and the way in which my suggestion differs. 
 
Note 36: This remark demonstrates that, for the moment, I wish to put aside 
one of the most important problems of the philosophy of cognition, namely 
the problem of accounting for the 'what-it-is-like'-ness of phenomenal 
experience: obviously, the chemical properties of H2O-molecules do not 
explain what it is like for me to feel wetness. This issue is not wholly 
irrelevant to the topic at hand: phenomenology was listed above as one of 
several disciplines that co-inform the complex concept 'colour', and it will be 
mentioned again. For instance, the 'Radicality Manifold' model to be 
developed later in this book is intended to be phenomenally appropriate. 
However, I would like to submit that the relevance of phenomenology to 
some concept's explanation is not sufficient for that concept to be complex: 
true complexity requires the array of incompatible descriptive strategies to 
be broader and more textured. If this condition were to be dropped, the 
concept 'water', claimed to be non-complex above, would also be complex 
(it would not be possible to capture the phenomenal experience associated 
with drinking cool water on a hot day in physical or chemical terms, for 
instance), and so would many, many others. This would hollow out the 
notion of conceptual complexity. So, to recap: the relevance of phenomenal 
content as a partial description of some concept's meaning does contribute 
towards that concept being complex, but it is not in itself a sufficient 
condition. 
 
Note 37: This claim implies a notion of normativity. The connection between 
concepts and normativity will be addressed later, in section 9.2. 
 
Note 38: For a while, I toyed with the idea of relinquishing the use of the 
term 'concepts', and instead use either 'cogcepts', because concepts in the 
account to be developed here form interlocking and co-dependent 'cogs' in 
a larger structure, or 'defcons', which is short for 'deflationary concepts'. I 
decided to go with the old and trusted term 'concepts' anyway, but with the 
cautionary note about the deflationary character reproduced above, and 
forget about 'cogcepts' (too awkward) and 'defcons' (too cute). Another 
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(important) reason to retain the familiar word is because concepts in the 
classical meaning really are merely limit cases of a much broader spectrum, 
which is a hypothesis that - I hope - will appear acceptable to the reader 
once he has finished this book. 
 
Note 39: This should also be taken to mean that the claims expressed in 
SToCC are at odds with those of, for instance, Bermudez (1998), who 
draws a clear boundary between conceptual and nonconceptual content, 
the former requiring linguistic abilities. It is my belief that the use of such a 
criterium denies too many exceedingly clever, but nonlinguistic animals the 
possession of concepts, which appears a highly anthropocentric thing to do. 
That in itself is not an argument, but a good case can be made for the claim 
that the abilities of (for instance) New Caledonian crows, chimpanzees and 
bottlenose dolphins show nontrivial overlap with humans exactly in those 
areas where some form of concept-use would be in play, i.e. social and/or 
tool-involving abilities. I hope the remainder of this book will make it clear 
how the broadening and diversification of the 'concept' concept provides us 
with a better way of relating conceptual action and knowledge to other kinds 
of action and cognition, also as it is displayed by non-human animals. 
 
Note 40: All the claims made so far might raise questions about the status 
of concepts in SToCC: are they real, and are they even representations of 
any kind, as they are in many other theories of concepts? The answer is 
that in SToCC, concepts are real, but they don't need to be representations 
for that to be the case. They can certainly be represented or 
representations in some cases, for instance when they perform a role in a 
'representation-hungry problem' (Clark 1997). This will happen when we 
utilise a concept (or meaningful constellation of concepts) to formulate a 
hypothesis or prediction in the absence of the conceptualised entities. 
However, in most cases, concepts, understood as dispositions towards 
acting in such and a such a way in a particular kind of situation, will not be 
representations of the classic kind. But even in that latter class of cases, 
concepts are real because behaviour (be it cognition, action or locution) is 
real. Perhaps it helps if we borrow a bit of vernacular from Varela and 
colleagues (see for instance Noë, 2004) by saying that we don't use 
concepts - for that would mean they are, in essence, entities with specific 
properties, things that we can grab hold of or process in some way -, but 
that we enact concepts. A concept is a structural aspect of what we do and 
say and think, rather than an independent entity. In that sense, concepts 
are as real as it gets, despite also being quite ephemeral. 
 
Note 41: As a preliminary warning, I should stress that SToCC does not 
claim that the formation of a specific colour concept consists of 'mental 
coordinate calculations' in said space, except as a most abstract description 
of the process of concept formation - so abstract, in fact, to be positively 
misleading. 
 
Note 42: It is important to realise that following this trail towards the 
explanatory definitions of a concept's associated theory (theories) is not 
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necessarily the same as moving towards the non-conceptual basis of 
conceptual space - see section 6.9 for more on this. 
 
Note 43: Although, of course, the difference with real fractals is that the 
structures at a 'lower' level of conceptual space need not be similar to any 
structure at the 'higher' levels. 
 
Note 44: A more in-depth discussion of the differences between SToCC 
and Theory theory follows in section 6.11.3. 
 
Note 45: See sections 6.7 and 6.8 for more on being able to use the same 
concepts, despite minute differences in inferred accounts. 
 
Note 46: Please note that this move takes us away from the science-centric 
explication of the 'colour'-concept as featured in chapter 4, as well as 
sections 6.1 and 6.2. The introduction of the 'inferred account' as a way to 
specify the meaning of a concept is the main component that helps 
transform this earlier discussion into an account about concepts in general, 
namely SToCC. 
 
Note 47: There is a relatively innocuous sense in which mental phenomena 
should be regarded as being diachronic. This sense concerns the fact the 
formation of mental states (sensations, thoughts, and so on) is a process 
that requires a certain timespan to take place. For instance, given a 
particular modality as activated in a specific way (e.g. the sensation of 
feeling as evoked by a stimulus of a particular intensity at a specific location 
of the skin, having certain sensitivity properties), stimuli need to persist for a 
minimum amount of time for a conscious sensation of the stimulus to be 
formed (time is needed, partly for the associated activity in various relevant 
brain regions to achieve neural integration; see Tononi, 2004). However, 
the diachronicity of mental states in a semantic sense is at least partly 
independent from this point, for it depends on causally efficacious 
connections that are discontinuous in time. For instance, a memory of a 
past event, and therefore at least some aspects of the past event itself, can 
exert significant influence on an occurrent decision (Slors 2001). 
 
Note 48: For instance: in the perceptual colour space example, there is a 
structure of focal colours - the best examples of various hues - which is, to a 
large extent, determined by the properties and relations established in the 
neurophysiological processing of colour stimuli. 
 
Note 49: This description implies that an enslaver is, in some sense, similar 
to Jesse Prinz' (2002) proxytype. The latter is a representation in working 
memory (a simulation process - be it uni- or multimodal - of the kind 
involved in actually encountering the entity that is tokened by the concept) 
that stands in for a more elaborate account of what a concept is supposed 
to denote. However, the most important difference is that an enslaver is not 
a mental representation. Rather, it is a constituent of conceptual space, 
which offers a descriptive account of E( i )C-behaviour rather than of an 
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agent's internal (mental) content (but see chapter 7 for ideas about how 
representation can fit into an E( i )C-apropriate theory of concepts, and 
section 10.3 for a more detailed discussion of Prinz' Proxytype theory). 
 
Note 50: Suppose, for the sake of argument, that 'divine retribution' 
constitutes a complete description of the explanation used at the time, and 
that this argument did not involve further reference to bacterial infection as 
a mechanism utilised by whatever divine power was invoked. 
 
Note 51: See section 6.11.1 for additional examples of such 'same 
concept/different inferred account'-cases, and a description of the role of 
enslavers in solving the inherent instability of the 'concept'-concept. 
 
Note 52: Minor integer-substitution is mine: '(25)' became '(1)', '(26)' 
became '(2)'. 
 
Note 53: The example above, of sickness at different granularities resulting 
in two distinctly different kinds of descriptions, might be like this. 
 
Note 54: The idea, developed in the philosophical tradition of e.g. Henri 
Bergson, is that in experiencing or remembering events from the past, 
meaningful occurrences are differently indexed than periods that are light 
on personally significant events. In experience, eventful periods seem to 
progress quickly ('time flies when you're having fun'), whereas boring 
periods can appear to last much longer than they actually do. In memory, 
the reverse appears to be the case: more is retained from high-density 
periods than from empty, eventless time. 
 
Note 55: The activity of the sensorimotor system (e.g. premotor area F4 in 
the macaque brain) serves to integrate stimuli from different sensory 
modalities, and this integrative effect consists of action simulation - an 
immediate reaction of simulating (with the purpose of planning for) a 
potential (re)action when some sensory stimulus(-cluster) is present. 
Understanding a meaningful action (presumably in conceptual terms) 
involves using the same neuronal regions that are activated in imagining, 
and imagining such an action is closely linked to the kind of brain activity 
that occurs while actually performing that action, or seeing some other 
human doing so. These processes require the kind of multimodal integration 
offered by the sensorimotor system, so claim Gallese and Lakoff. This way 
of using the sensorimotor system combines Lakoff's earlier theory on the 
way higher cognition involves a metaphorical transformation of lower-
cognitive processes and activities (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999), and 
the work on mirror neurons pioneered by Rizzolatti, Gallese and their 
colleagues (Gallese et al. 1996, Rizzolatti et al. 1996). 
 
Note 56: The kinds of schemata invoked by Gallese and Lakoff describe 
the occurrent neural activity associated with actually performing the relevant 
bodily act, seeing someone else perform such an act (i.e. involving the 
activation of the so-called ‘mirror neurons’), and during acts of mentally 
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simulating (some aspect of) performing the act (e.g. thinking about doing 
so). This last kind of schema activation is important for the link of 
sensorimotor schemata with cognitive concepts that are not (or not in an 
immediately obvious way) connected to concrete bodily acts.
 
 
Note 57: I probably need to implement an explication of vernaculars here: 
earlier (section 6.2) the shift from the superposed concept to a conception 
was characterised as a reduction with remainder. However, this is clearly 
not a reduction of complexity, but rather a reduction of a more generally 
applicable concept to a conception that is higher in detail, but more 
constrained in terms of its domain of application, and using notions and 
explanatory accounts relevant to 'a more basic level of reality' in 
mereological terms, e.g. microphysics. 
 
Note 58: See section 7.2 for qualifications of the notion 'content' in this 
context. 
 
Note 59: In Vantage Theory, category construction (i.e. establishing a 
structure, upon which inclusion decisions can be made) involves a push-
pull-system of similarity and difference judgments (for these are 
reciprocals), relative to the fixed coordinate of a hue focus: the balance of 
similarity and distinctiveness judgments defines internal structure of 
category. The process occurs in multiple stages: for example, the initial 
fixed coordinate R (‘R’ for perfect red, i.e. the hue focus which forms a 
reference point) and an initial emphasis on Similarity (mobile coordinate S) 
define the range surrounding the focus that might still be sufficiently similar 
to be called by the colour term associated with the focal point. In the second 
stage the inherently mobile S is treated as a fixed coordinate, and D, a 
difference judgment, is introduced as a mobile coordinate; this level-shift is 
called ‘zooming in’. MacLaury constructs Vantage Theory as metaphorically 
similar to utilising space-time coordinates, so this ‘zooming in’ might be akin 
to picking S as some characteristic point in a new inertial frame. The job of 
D is to stop the S operator from extending the range indefinitely, and this 
occurs at those locations in colour space which exhibit sufficient difference 
from the hue focus to be categorised in a different category. Thus, D 
defines the width of the category associated with the hue focus R. This way, 
a subset of colour space is defined as a category with a specific internal 
structure, with values of category membership (relative to the focus) that 
might be attributed to locations within that category. 
 
 
[Figure 27: model of the 'red' category in Vantage Theory; adapted from 
MacLaury 2002] 
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The account is named Vantage Theory because MacLaury intends the 
categorization mechanism described by this account as involving the 
subject occupying a specific ‘location’ within colour space and establishing 
a category from there, analogous to the vantage point - say, a specific spot 
at a certain distance from various landmarks, spatially as wel as temporally 
(as a function of motion) – from which a person constructs space-time (i.e. 
an apprehension of the contents of the spatio-temporal array surrounding 
him). The construction of colour-categories in this way is unconscious, says 
MacLaury. The construction of a category then involves shifting attention 
around past various aspects of the frame of R, S and D; only one vantage 
can thus be occupied at a time, hence a focus on S as the fixed point and 
its relation to the mobile coordinate D precludes attributing attention to the 
similarity relation for a given coordinate and the hue focus. Still, in attending 
to one aspect, the rest of the structure (the ‘zooming hierarchy’) is already 
present, at least implicitly.  
 
There can be dominant and recessive vantages, for instance in the case of 
the Hungarian piros and vörös, both denoting a kind of red, the former being 
more general, much like the regular ‘red’ in English, the latter a less often 
used, but much more specific (namely with a connotation of intensity and/or 
passion) and semantically versatile term, often found in poetry. The 
dominant vantage exhibits a greater emphasis on similarity between stimuli, 
hence contracting the distance between reference point and outlying 
coordinates, and in general being a more coarse-grained process. A 
recessive vantage, on the other hand, exhibits a tighter focus on difference, 
fosters a widening of the distance between the viewpoint and coordinates, 
and allows for a greater specificity, objectivity and analiticity in judgments. 
This way, Vantage Theory offers a model to predict both the broader scope 
of 'piros' and the greater semantic depth of 'vörös'. 
 
Note 60: However, two major differences with Vantage Theory lie in the 
claims that (1) the similarity-difference push-pull-system in SToCC is not 
exclusively cognitive in origin or effectivity range, and that (2) the 
categories, concepts and enslavers posited by SToCC are not necessarily 
representations. What all the theoretical notions from SToCC do, is provide 
a framework for describing behaviour (cognition, action and locution), and 
this postulate explains both differences. That is, developments and 
processes in not just conceptual space, but the agent as a whole and his 
environment contribute to the ongoing process of categorization and 
concept formation. This is not to say that concept formation, in SToCC, has 
nothing to do with cognition; quite the opposite, in fact. However, in SToCC, 
even cognitive phenomena cannot ultimately be thought separate from the 
interaction dynamic involving all four spaces described by the 'Radicality 
Manifold'-model to be introduced in chapter 8. Furthermore, only a 
subsection of the kind of dispositions 'encoded' in conceptual space 
involves representations, and this representational zone is firmly embedded 
in a broader dynamic (i.e. of an agent in a world). 
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Note 61: In the 'Phaedrus' (265d-266a), Plato describes Socrates as having 
said the following: "The second principle is that of division into species 
according to the natural formation, where the joint is, not breaking any part 
as a bad carver might." 
 
Note 62: In section 6.7, the example given deals specifically with the 
concept 'justice'. The arguments provided there serve as a justification of 
the claim made here, about the power of enslavers to sidestep the 'missing 
prototypes'-problem. 
 
Note 63: Richard Dawkins (1976; 1982) (in-)famously posited the meme as 
a cultural replicator, analogous to the gene as a genetic replicator. Daniel 
Dennett (1991; 1995), almost as famously, picked up on this idea. He 
describes memes as 'complex ideas that form themselves into distinct 
memorable units' (Dennett 1995, pg. 344, emphasis his). 
 
Note 64: An important aspect of colour can be characterised in these terms: 
one of the roles that colour performs is an ecologically an evolutionarily 
significant way of 'quick 'n dirty' information transfer. That is, colour can 
serve as an indicator of a complexly realized, less visible property, such as 
the ripeness of fruit or the toxicity of an insect. 
 
Note 65: Given the suggestion that the contents of a concept, and the ways 
in which the concept are intended to apply, are so fundamentally context-
dependent (e.g. applicable at a particular granularity, and dependent on a 
potentially idiosyncratic narrative account - see section 6.7), speaking of 
truth-conditions is unwarranted. This is because doing so would burden 
even casually utilised, disposable or time-and-place-locked (sub-)concepts 
with a responsibility to meet rigid formal rules. Instead, we can speak of 
appropriateness-conditions or appropriateness-of-use-conditions, 
incorporating the following two aspects: (1) the explanatory potential of the 
best available version of the justificatory account associated with the 
concept, which would include the measure of fit with the data, generativity 
of novel predictions, and so on; and (2) the sophistication of the concept as 
compared to said account, in terms of completeness and measure of 
adherence to the implications of the account. 
 
Note 66: However, see chapter 7 for a closer look at the role of 
representation in StoCC in preparation for the extrapolation of SToCC, the 
'Radicality Manifold'-model. 
 
Note 67: See section 9.1 for more on SToCC's role in the emergence of 
meaning: several pieces of this puzzle, the 'Radicality Manifold'-model and 
its implications for the notion 'content' in particular, have yet to be provided. 
 
Note 68: Biosemiotics is biosemantics without the semantics: the 'states' 
involved have no truthvalues. 
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Note 69: Parts of this section were published previously in Van Leeuwen 
(2005). 
 
Note 70: A Fregean Thought can be characterized as the sense (Sinn) of a 
sentence (e.g. the sense of 'The Eiffel Tower is in Paris'). 
 
Note 71: Thanks to Tjeerd van de Laar, whose use of Gillett's theory in his 
dissertation helped me realise its virtues. 
 
Note 72: Note that these different kinds of properties ('properties of the [1] 
physical and [2] social environmental processes that the agent is immersed 
in, as well as [3] the biomechanical properties of his own body') align neatly 
with the different kinds of properties as expressed in figures 6 and 7, which 
depict the various factors that influence colour perception. 
 
Note 73: Taking into account a purported distinction between intentional 
behaviour and mere bodily movement, consider this additional scenario: do 
we respond differently to an adult and cognitively fully functional human 
who inadvertantly walks into a vase, thus knocking it over, than to the same 
person when he shoves the vase in a premeditated fashion? I would say 
yes. When called upon to account for what happened, the explanation the 
culprit gives in the former case might something like 'It wasn't me, I did not 
do this'. 
 
Note 74: At one time during the writing of this book I was working in my 
back yard, which had not been tended to for a while, removing patches of 
ground-elder, also known as Bishop's weed (Aegopodium Podagraria). This 
plant is extraordinarily difficult to eradicate, because it produces vast and 
intricate root systems, and can re-grow quickly from even the smallest 
leftover root fragment. The weed was annoyingly difficult to get rid of, but its 
underground interconnectedness did serve as an inspirational metaphor for 
the kind of structure I suggest is also present in conceptual space: concepts 
and components of concepts depending on other concepts and concept-
components via vast networks of inferential 'roots'. Hence the name 
'Radicality Manifold': 'radix' is Latin for 'root', and conceptual space is 
described in terms of a mathematical space (manifold) with particular 'root-
network-like' properties. It is this conceptual space that will be expanded 
into a broader framework about embodied/embedded cognition in general. 
 
Note 75: See section 9.1 for more on what SToCC/RM has to say about the 
role of concepts in establishing meaning. 
 
Note 76: An oft-mentioned example of this occurs in Rayleigh-Bénard 
systems: convection rolls are large-scale dynamic structures that constrain 
the movements of the liquid's constituting molecules. See Kelso (1995). 
 
Note 77: Thanks to Marc Slors for forcing me to be more explicit about this. 
 
 263 
Note 78: Note that this is a different use of the term 'functional cluster' than 
found in Gallese and Lakoff (2005), a paper referenced in section 6.9. 
 
Note 79: This is not (or at least not necessarily) the arena where the classic 
problem of mental causation arises. C-space is not the mind, but rather the 
dispositional space showing the structure of possible dispositions towards 
exhibiting behaviour (including cognitive behaviour), and B-space is not just 
the movement of bodyparts, but also includes locution and cognition. This is 
to express the notion that the notion of 'mind' is utterly useless without 
taking into account what kind of action is possible because of this mind, and 
especially that the body is essential in determining what these actions are. 
A disembodied mind is quite literally nothing, and nothing is explained by 
invoking it. 
 
Note 80: As such, Gallagher offers a non-cognitivistic alternative to the two 
standard approaches in the 'theory of mind'-debate, namely simulation 
theory and theory theory (the latter being a theory that is distinct from the 
Theory Theory of Concepts, discussed in section 6.3.3 above). 
 
Note 81: Besides affect attunement, Stern also uses the elegant notion 
affect contagion. 
 
Note 82: Many thanks to Fred Hasselman for introducing me to this 
discussion. 
 
Note 83: Chemero and Turvey (2007) also discuss Vera and Simon (1993), 
which offers a computational, representational variant of the affordance-
concept, defining an affordance as a representation which enables an 
efficient mapping between a representation of what the world is like, and a 
representation of the kinds of action the agent should or could perform. I 
would have to agree with what Chemero and Turvey imply, namely that this 
view is not very E( i )C-compatible. 
 
Note 84: See section 8.7.2 below for a closer look at the similarities, but 
especially the differences between Gärdenfors' theory and my ideas. 
 
Note 85: Natural properties are properties that are most significant to an 
evolved animal's survival, and are - parallel with Quine's (1969) definition of 
the notion 'natural kind' - projectible, which means that they support 
inductive reasoning. 'Convexity' means that if points x and y are elements of 
some subset of conceptual space, all points lying between x and y also 
belong to that subset. Gärdenfors now claims that considerations of 
cognitive economy suggest that natural properties, if defined in terms of 
regions of conceptual space, should be convex regions: it would make little 
evolutionary sense to suppose that such important properties would 
correspond to irregularly-shaped regions, for in that case understanding the 
coherence of different tokens of the property (to be expressed as different 
locations in such an irregularly shaped region) and memorising these 
properties would require a lot of mental processing. This does not appear to 
 264 
be what is suggested by experimental results involving the understanding of 
natural properties. 
 
Note 86: Putnam's (1975) Twin Earth thought experiment served to pump 
the intuition that two identical agents with identical (down to the very last 
sub-atomic particle) internal states, might still be in different mental states, 
because those internal states refer to different external states: when the 
resident of Earth thinks of the substance 'water' (a clear potable liquid 
which, under specific atmospheric conditions, freezes at 0°C and boils at 
100°C), he is referring to a substance with molecular formula 'H2O', 
whereas when the resident of Twin Earth thinks of the substance 'water' (a 
clear potable liquid which, under specific atmospheric conditions, freezes at 
0°C and boils at 100°C), he is referring to a substance with molecular 
formula 'XYZ'. 
 
Note 87: This second argument is basically the claim that a brain in a vat is 
impossible. 
 
Note 88: There is a sizeable subset of philosophy of cognition and 
psychology that is engaged in finding proper descriptions of our use of 
these 'theory of mind' abilities (Goldman 2006, Gallagher 2005). 
 
Note 89: Or perhaps this means that what we mean when we talk about 
'the mind' is what needs to be reconsidered. That, of course, is the very 
core of the E( i )C-project. 
 
Note 90: Of course, if there had been a proper match, RM would have been 
the derivative theory, because Prinz' book came first. However, RM was 
developed on the basis of an extrapolation of a theory of 
embodied/embedded colour perception and 'colour cognition'; the 
comparison with Prinz' theory was made after I came up with 'enslavers' 
and such. 
 
Note 91: For instance: Latin is, purportedly, a dead language. Still, many 
thousands of young people enroll in grammar school (or comparable 
programs) each year all throughout the world. The justification is that 
studying Latin trains highly useful cognitive abilities, and introduces the 
student to many ideas, texts and works of art that have had a strong 
influence upon the formation of Western thought and culture. In that sense, 
Latin being obsolete as a language does not necessarily make it obsolete 
as a subject of study. For another example, consider studying substance or 
property dualism as positions in the philosophy of mind, to understand what 
is new and different about E( i )C. In this sense, studying outdated ideas can 
help one get a better grip on the ideas that were developed as alternatives 
to those now-rejected theories. 
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[Nederlandstalige Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)] 
 
-(Hoofdstuk 1) 
 
De klassieke, 'Cartesiaanse' manier van denken over cognitie - waarin 
wordt gezegd dat de menselijke geest eigenschappen heeft die 
fundamenteel anders zijn dan de mogelijke eigenschappen van fysieke 
objecten - wordt gaandeweg minder populair onder filosofen en 
psychologen. Een belangrijke verwante theoretische positie is 
'cognitivisme', welke onder andere inhoudt dat cognitie gedefinieerd dient te 
worden in termen van interne, vaak representationele processen. 
 
En alternatieve manier om te denken over 'denken' is belichaamde, 
gesitueerde cognitie, waarin wordt gesteld dat een mentale toestand 
gedefinieerd dient te worden in relatie tot vele buiten het mentale liggende 
kenmerken - eigenschappen van het lichaam of de handelingsopties die het 
individu geboden worden door zijn omgeving in het bijzonder. Er zijn 
verschillende zienswijzen die, in verschillende samenstellingen, in de 
literatuur aangetroffen kunnen worden als passend onder de brede 
'belichaamde, gesitueerde cognitie'-paraplu: 
 
*Belichaamd (cognitie heeft te maken met of wordt deels geïnstantieerd 
door lichamelijke processen; gebruikte notatie: E( B )C); 
*Gesitueerd (cognitie betreft interageren met de omgeving; gebruikte 
notatie: E( S )C); 
*Enactief (cognitie is een actief, dynamisch, gedragsgebaseerd proces; 
gebruikte notatie: E( A )C); 
*Uitgebreid (processen uit de ongeving van het individu maken deel uit van 
het cognitie-proces; gebruikte notatie: E( X )C); 
*Geëncultureerd (cognitie steunt deels op sociaal-culturele processen; 
gebruikte notatie: E( C )C) 
 
Algemene notatie voor niet nader gespecificeerde theorieën van het 
'belichaamde, gesitueerde, enzovoort' soort: E( i )C 
 
Veel theorieën over cognitie bevatten, als een belangrijke component, een 
theorie over concepten. Het is de bedoeling in dit boek een theorie over 
concepten te ontwikkelen die past bij theorieën over belichaamde, 
gesitueerde, enactieve, uitgebreide en/of geëncultureerde cognitie. De 
centrale vraag van dit boek is dan ook als volgt: Hoe kunnen we het 
concept 'concept' begrijpen op een manier die compatibel is met  
E( i )C? Dit is een filosofisch interessante vraag omdat 'concepten' als 
bouwstenen van gedachten op een verhoudingsgewijs eenvoudige manier 
in te passen zijn in een cognitivistisch verhaal over cognitie - bijvoorbeeld, 
als gedachten symbolische structuren zijn, kunnen concepten gezien 
worden als meer basale versies van dat soort symbolen -, maar het is niet 
direct duidelijk hoe concepten gedefiniëerd dienen te worden binnen E( i )C. 
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De theorie zoals die ontwikkeld wordt in dit boek is vooral enactief (E( A )C) 
van karakter. Een belangrijk probleem is dan dat veel E( A )C- theorieën 
redelijk succesvol zijn in het verklaren van sensorimotor interacties van 
organisme en omgeving, maar minder goed toepasbaar zijn op gevallen 
waarin er daadwerkelijk sprake is van 'denken' op de manier zoals die term 
in de alledaagse taal gebruikt wordt - juist het domein waar veel 
cognitivistische theorieën (en de bijbehorende ideeën over concepten) het 
meest effectief zijn. Een belangrijk doel van dit boek is dit gemis verhelpen. 
 
De globale structuur van de rest van het boek is als volgt: in hoofdstuk 2 
worden enkele standaardtheorieën van concepten behandeld, alsmede hun 
zwakke plekken. Hoofdstuk 3 introduceert een nuttige E( A )C-theorie 
waarmee basaal cognitie-gestuurd gedrag beschreven kan worden: het 
dynamisch bewegings-planningsveld van Thelen, Schöner, Scheier en 
Smith (2001). Hoofdstuk 4 gaat over kleurwaarneming, omdat er voor dat 
verschijnsel in de loop der tijd verschillende modellen ontwikkeld zijn die 
een verband suggereren tussen de basale sensorimotor disposities van een 
organisme (bijvoorbeeld de wijze waarop de eigenschappen van zijn 
netvlies en de daarop volgende neurale verwerking het waarnemen van 
kleuronderscheid mogelijk maken) en meer geavanceerd kleurgerelateerd 
gedrag (bijvoorbeeld aangaande de cultuurspecifieke betekenis van 
bepaalde kleurtinten, of zelfs wetenschappelijke concepten van wat 'kleur' 
nu eigenlijk is). Een doel van dit boek zal zijn dit verband - dus tussen 
basale sensorimotor processen enerzijds en hoger ontwikkeld 
kleurgerelateerd gedrag anderzijds - aan te passen op een zodanige manier 
dat er een werkbare, voor E( i )C geschikte theorie van concepten in het 
algemeen ontstaat. 
 
-(Hoofdstuk 2) 
 
Het blijkt bijzonder lastig te zijn een goede definitie te geven van wat een 
concept nu eigenlijk is: kandidaten zijn, onder andere, mentale 
representaties en vaardigheden. De E( A )C-insteek impliceert die laatste 
optie: het omschrijven van het hebben van concepten in termen van het 
hebben van bepaalde vaardigheden. 
 
De standaardtheorieën over concepten die worden besproken in dit 
hoofdstuk zijn: 
 
*de Klassieke Theorie (een concept is een representatie die noodzakelijke 
en voldoende eigenschappen van een object codeert); 
*Prototypetheorie (een concept is een representatie die eigenschappen van 
een object op een gerangschikte manier codeert); 
*de Theorie-Theorie (conceptuele structuur wordt bepaald door een 
mentale theorie). 
 
Elk van deze theorieën heeft niet-triviale nadelen. Naast het kunnen 
oplossen van dit soort problemen zal een goede theorie van concepten 
moeten voldoen aan een serie eisen: een dergelijke theorie zal voldoende 
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verklarende reikwijdte moeten hebben, zal moeten kunnen verklaren hoe 
concepten intentionele inhoud en cognitieve inhoud kunnen hebben, hoe 
conceptverwerving plaatsvindt, hoe concepten categorisatie mogelijk 
maken, hoe eenvoudige concepten tot meer complexe concepten 
geombineerd kunnen worden (compositionaliteit), en hoe verschillende 
mensen in staat kunnen zijn hetzelfde concept te hebben (publiciteit). In het 
laatste hoofdstuk, hoofdstuk 10, wordt uitgelegd hoe de theorie, ontwikkeld 
in dit boek, aan deze eisen voldoet. 
 
-(Hoofdstuk 3) 
 
Thelen et al. (2001) hebben, gebruikmakend van dynamische 
systeemtheorie, een dynamisch bewegingsplanningsveld ontwikkeld, een 
model dat activiteit laat zien die congruent is met de fundamentele 
gedragskeuzes van jonge kinderen als ze de 'A-niet-B-fout' maken. Dit 
model is enactief van karakter, en maakt dus geen gebruik van interne 
representaties om dit cognitieve gedrag te verklaren. Eén van de 
belangrijkste tekortkomingen van dit model is dat het weinig aandacht 
besteedt aan meer geavanceerde cognitie: het model biedt een globale 
beschrijving van E( i )C gedrag in termen van een veldmodel; een belangrijke 
taak die in dit boek uitgevoerd wordt is het uitbreiden en aanpassen van dit 
model op zo'n manier dat conceptgerelateerd gedrag in het algemeen 
beschreven kan worden - dit zal voornamelijk gebeuren in hoofdstuk 8. Op 
deze manier kan er eveneens een antwoord gevonden worden op Newton's 
vloek: de neiging tot het negeren van contextuele effecten in het 
extrapoleren van kwantitatieve methodologie naar kwalitatieve ontologie. 
Het 'Radicality Manifold'-model dat zal worden ontwikkeld in dit boek zal 
een uitgebreider beschouwing bieden van de interactie van organisme, 
fysieke omgeving, sociale omgeving en concepten, als beschrijving van 
gedrag. 
 
In in de volgende hoofdstukken wordt het model van Thelen en collega's in 
stadia uitgebreid: de eerste aanwijzing over het precieze karakter van 
sensorimotor gesitueerdheid (de basale interactie van individu met zijn 
omgeving) en sociale gesitueerdheid volgen in hoofdstuk 4, waar deze 
interactievormen worden bediscussieerd voor zover ze betrekking hebben 
op kleurwaarneming. Het idee hierachter is dat verschillende theorieën over 
kleurwaarneming veel informatie verschaffen over de manier waarop 
sensorimotor disposities een bijdrage leveren aan de eigenschappen van 
complexer gedrag. Deze ideeën zullen leiden tot een complexere, hoger-
dimensionale versie van het veld van Thelen et al.; de eigenschappen van 
deze modelmatige ruimte, zoals deze geëxtrapoleerd worden uit het 
kleurvoorbeeld, volgen in hoofdstukken 5 en 6. 
 
-(Hoofdstuk 4) 
 
In de meest gangbare theorie over kleurwaarneming is er sprake van een 
fenomenale structuur die in drie dimensies is ingedeeld (helderheid, 
verzadiging en tint). Deze structuur is afgeleid van gedragsresponsen als 
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reactie op chromatische stimuli afkomstig uit de omgeving, en gevormd 
door de eigenschappen van het netvlies en de daaropvolgende neurale 
verwerking van die stimuli. Deze neurale verwerkingsmechanismen en de 
daarop gebaseerde perceptuele categorisatie zijn volgens voorstanders van 
deze theorie universeel, ondanks dat niet alle talen hetzelfde aantal 
basiskleurtermen hebben. 
 
Critici van deze gangbare, universalistisch georiënteerde theorie, vaak 
voorstanders van linguïstisch relativisme, stellen dat bovenstaand verhaal 
zich schuldig maakt aan decontextualisatie: in sommige 'primitieve' culturen 
zijn de basiskleurwoorden die kleurcategorieën benoemen geen neutrale 
labels, maar woorden die veel meer semantische inhoud bezitten. Dat 
betekent dat kleurgerelateerd gedrag niet slechts verklaard kan worden op 
basis van een neuraal verwerkingsmechanisme, maar ook een hele 
belangrijke socioculturele component kent. 
 
In dit boek wordt daarom een tussenpositie ontwikkeld, die het belang 
erkent van zowel een soortspecifieke, neurofysiologisch gefundeerde 
dispositie tot bepaalde kleurcategorisaties, als socioculturele invloeden. Dit 
betekent dat er een verband zou moeten bestaan tussen die basale 
sensorimotor disposities en hogere-orde socioculturele regelmatigheden. 
Met andere woorden: om recht te kunnen doen aan kleurgerelateerd gedrag 
zal de eerdergenoemde driedimensionale fenomenale structuur (die 
gedragsresponsen beschrijft zoals die gevormd worden door 
neurofysiologische eigenschappen) uitgebreid moeten worden om 
complexer gedrag (zoals gevormd door socio-culturele eigenschappen) te 
kunnen omvatten. 
 
Dit idee, gekoppeld aan het dynamische bewegingsplanningsveld als 
beschrijving van basaal enactief gedrag uit hoofdstuk 3, biedt een eerste 
glimp van een complexer gedragsruimte-model. In de komende 
hoofdstukken zal een uitgebreidere beschrijving gegeven worden van dit 
model, en zal het veranderd worden in een conceptuele ruimte. 
 
Er is echter een derde klasse eigenschappen, naast de neurofysiologische 
(het lichaam) en socio-culturele (sociale omgeving) eigenschappen die 
hierboven genoemd worden: fysieke omgevingseigenschappen. In 
hoofdstuk 4 wordt beschreven hoe een enactieve kleurwaarnemingstheorie 
(van Evan Thompson) aangevuld kan worden met een ecologische theorie 
van kleurwaarneming die het idee verdedigt dat er een congruentie bestaat 
van netvlieseigenschappen en eigenschappen van de omgeving, namelijk 
de chromatische structuur van het omgevingslicht (de theorie van Roger 
Shepard). Gecombineerd bieden deze theorieën een verhaal over 
kleurwaarneming dat stelt dat er een wederzijdse afstemming is van 
organisme en fysieke omgeving, waardoor de perceptuele en 
gedragsmatige mogelijkheden van dat organisme bepaald worden. Dit idee 
van interactie van organisme en fysieke omgeving kan gecombineerd 
worden met de eerder ontwikkelde ideeën over de interactie van en 
organisme met zijn sociale omgeving (waarbij beide in belangrijke mate 
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bepaald worden door zijn belichaamde eigenschappen), om collectief een 
redelijk complete omschrijving te beiden van het E( i )C-gerelateerde gedrag 
van het organisme. 
 
Samenvattend: de enactieve opvatting van 'gesitueerdheid' impliceert zelf al 
de relevantie van sociale handelingsmogelijkheden (als complement van 
fysieke/ecologische handelingsmogelijkheden) bij het verklaren van het 
gedrag van een organisme; de gebruikelijke universalistische theorie over 
de linguïstische aspecten van 'kleurcognitie' schetst een 
gedecontextualiseerd beeld van dat verschijnsel, dus een zekere mate van 
relativisme (socioculturele factoren die de lichaamsgebaseerde 
eigenschappen van het organisme aanvullen) is gewenst. Deze beide 
benaderingen gecombineerd bieden een min of meer compleet beeld van 
de organisme-omgeving-interactiedynamiek. In hoofdstuk 5 wordt nog het 
één en ander gezegd over de eigenschappen van de eerdergenoemde 
fenomenale kleurruimte, waarna in hoofdstuk 6 de conceptuele ruimte 
geïntroduceerd kan worden. 
 
-(Hoofdstuk 5) 
 
In dit hoofdstuk wordt, voortbouwend op ideeën van Kimberly Jameson, 
meer detail verschaft over de progressieve fragmentatie van de fenomenale 
kleurruimte. Beginnend met de meest eenvoudige categorisatie (donker vs. 
licht), bepalen de neurofysiologisch bepaalde kleurtintgevoeligheden 
interagerend met ecologische en socio-culturele factoren welke 
opeenvolging van kleurruimtesegmentaties het meest informatief is. Dus: de 
manier waarop kleuren benoemd en geconceptualiseerd worden, wordt 
beïnvloed door ecologische/omgevingsgerelateerde en socio-culturele 
factoren (i.e. de rol die objecten van specifieke kleuren spelen in, 
respectievelijk, de ecologische niche en de socio-culturele praktijk van het 
organisme). 
 
Het in dit hoofdstuk gegeven voorbeeld van de Hanunóo (Filippijnen) - hun 
kleurwoorden hebben complexe correlaties die in het Nederlands of Engels 
niet direct met kleur te maken hebben - suggereert dat de driedimensionale 
fenomenale kleurruimte uitgebreid zou moeten worden met semantische 
connecties (waarin een kleurconcept niet slechts een tint, maar bijvoorbeeld 
ook een bepaald object of ritueel aanwijst, waaraan uiteraard weer andere 
betekenissen gerelateerd zijn); dit is de eerste stap op weg naar een model 
van een daadwerkelijke conceptuele ruimte als een hoger-dimensionale 
versie van perceptuele ruimte. 
 
Het 'Interpoint Distance Model' van Jameson maakt als zodanig de weg vrij 
voor een theorie over de segmentatie van conceptuele ruimte, waarin 
complexere structuren gekoppeld worden aan meer basale structuren via 
mechanismen als 'cross-dimensional mapping' (zie ook sectie 6.9, waarin 
dit idee in verband gebracht wordt met de theorie van George Lakoff over 
metaforische conceptontwikkeling), alsmede aan de interactie van de 
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lichamelijke eigenschappen van het organisme met de eigenschappen van 
zijn sociale en fysieke omgeving. 
 
In hoofdstuk 6 zal een gedetailleerder beschrijving geboden worden van 
concepten als gedragsdisposities, dat past bij dit idee van een 'conceptuele 
ruimte'; in hoofdstuk 7 en verder zal er uitgelegd worden hoe conceptuele 
ruimte (C-ruimte) samenhangt met M-, S- en P-ruimte (respectievelijk: 
lichamelijke eigenschappen; socio-culturele omgevingseigenschappen en 
fysieke omgevingseigenschappen). 
 
-(Hoofdstuk 6) 
 
In dit hoofdstuk wordt het idee gepresenteerd dat het concept 'kleur' een 
complex concept is, dat toepassingen heeft in verschillende contexten die 
niet zondermeer gereduceerd kunnen worden tot een enkelvoudige 
definitie: het overkoepelende concept 'kleur', gekarakteriseerd als een 
'superpositie', omvat meerdere elkaar uitsluitende subconcepten. Op basis 
van dit inzicht kan gezegd worden dat de inhoud van een concept 
afhankelijk is van de (gebruiks-)context. Een bij E( i )C passende 
conceptdefinitie luidt dan als volgt: een concept is een gestructureerde 
gedragsdispositie van een belichaamd en gesitueerd organisme, waarbij 
gedrag in dit geval eveneens cognitie en spraak omvat. 'Conceptuele 
ruimte' is dan een modelmatige uitdrukking van de structuur die bestaat in 
de inferentiële verbindingen tussen verschillende gedragspatronen die een 
individu kan vertonen als verantwoording van zijn gebruik van een bepaald 
concept: het vertonen van bepaald gedrag in bepaalde omstandigheden 
door een individu impliceert het hebben van een concept, en dit vermoeden 
kan door anderen getest worden (bijvoorbeeld door vragen te stellen). De 
inhoud van concepten wordt verschaft door narratieven, die opgebouwd zijn 
uit de ervaringen, herinneringen en ideeën van het individu. 
 
Conceptual enslavement is het fenomeen dat zo'n narratief, die een 
concept inhoud verschaft, een bepaald zwaartepunt kan hebben - 
ervaringen enzovoort die een verhoudingsgewijs grote bijdrage leveren aan 
de betekenis van het betreffende concept, en die vaker dan gemiddeld 
genoemd zullen worden als het individu zijn conceptgebruik uitlegt. Het 
detailniveau ('granularity') waarop een concept gebruikt of uitgelegd wordt 
kan van situatie tot situatie verschillen, en kan ertoe bijdragen dat twee 
individuën er achter komen dat ze een concept gemeen hebben, ondanks 
dat de één wellicht tot een veel dieper begrip van dat concept in staat is. In 
de meeste alledaagse omstandigheden, echter, is het verkennen van een 
concept tot dergelijke dieptes niet nodig, en volstaat het erkennen van het 
conceptgebruik van de ander op een laag detailniveau. Dit belicht een 
belangrijk aspect van concepten: een concept is wat je doet/zegt/denkt in 
een bepaalde context, een praktijk die deels afhangt van de wijze waarop 
een soortgenoot jou als conceptgebruiker beoordeelt. Het hebben van 
concepten is, in ieder geval deels, het ontvangen van de bevestiging van 
anderen dat je die concepten op een acceptabele manier gebruikt (zie 
sectie 9.2 voor meer hierover). Deze ideeën tezamen resulteren in de 
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SuperpositieTheorie van Complexe Concepten (SToCC), waarbinnen 
complexe concepten begrepen worden als speciale gevallen van een 
algemene conceptentheorie. 
 
Op basis van het idee van een conceptuele ruimte (als modelmatige 
uitdrukking van de concepten van een individu) als spectrum dat reikt van 
de meest basale sensorimotor vermogens tot complexe, abstracte ideeën, 
is het mogelijk de ontwikkeling van een conceptueel systeem te schetsen. 
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt een proces beschreven dat uit de volgende vier fasen 
bestaat: 
[Fase 1]: sensorimotor bewegingsbegrip; 
[Fase 2]: correlatie van sensorimotor kennis en linguïstische codering; 
[Fase 3]: belichaamde en gesitueerde modaliteitstransformaties; 
[Fase 4]: correlatie van belichaming en abstractie. 
 
Het hoofdstuk bevat eveneens een beschrijving van de daaropvolgende 
ontwikkeling van conceptuele ruimte, gebaseerd op de suggesties uit 
hoofdstuk 5 (waar het gaat over de segmentatie van perceptuele ruimte). 
Veel gedetailleerde en soms zelfs nieuwe concepten kunnen ontstaan op 
basis van splitsing van conceptuele ruimte, waarin er sprake is van de 
segmentatie van conceptuele ruimte als een meervoudig ingebed manifold. 
Conceptuele ruimte begrijpen als een ingebed manifold betekent zeggen 
dat conceptuele ruimte opgebouwd is uit in elkaar passende regio's die 
subconcepten en de daartussen bestaande inferentiële verbindingen 
voorstellen, 'orthogonaal' daarop georganiseerd langs 
granulariteitsgradiënten. Sommige van de meest fundamentele 
onderverdelingen van conceptuele ruimte hangen af van de categorisaties 
die afgedwongen worden door de de eigenschappen van ons lichaam en 
onze zintuigen. 
 
Dit hoofdstuk bevat een tussentijdse evaluatie van SToCC, waarin deze 
theorie vergeleken wordt met de prototypetheorie, theorie-theorie, de 
theorie van Jerry Fodor en 'Conceptual Role Semantics', en deze 
suggereert dat SToCC positief afsteekt tegen deze andere theorieën. Een 
belangrijk punt betreft het verschil tussen prototypes (uit de 
prototypetheorie) en 'enslavers': prototypes leggen gezamenlijk de definitie 
van een concept vast, terwijl een 'enslaver' nu juist inferentie richting ideeën 
en gedrag mogelijk maakt die als passend gezien kunnen worden voor 
iemand die meent een bepaald concept te hebben. 
 
Het is echter duidelijk dat een gedetailleerdere beschrijving van de relaties 
tussen conceptuele ruimte ('C-ruimte') en lichamelijke eigenschappen, 
socio-culturele omgevingseigenschappen en fysieke 
omgevingseigenschappen (respectievelijk: M-, S- en P-ruimte) nodig is: hoe 
komt het dat een conceptuele ruimte een specifieke structuur heeft? Hoe 
kunnen we meer zeggen over de wijze waarop een belichaamd individu 
ingebed is in zijn omgeving, en welke weerslag is hiervan te zien in zijn 
concepten? 
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-(Hoofdstuk 7) 
 
In hoofdstuk 7 wordt de eerste stap gezet op weg naar een antwoord op de 
hierboven genoemde vragen: er wordt een theorie over representatie 
ontwikkeld die past bij E( i )C. Dit is een belangrijke stap omdat er in dit boek 
tot nu toe een belangrijke kloof zichtbaar is: tussen de enactieve (E( A )C) 
benaderingen van Thelen et al.'s dynamische bewegingsplanningsveld, 
Thompson's kleurwaarnemingstheorie en de gedragsgeoriënteerde 
conceptdefinitie uit hoofdstuk 6 enerzijds, en de op interne representatie 
gebaseerde standaard concepttheorieën anderzijds. In dit hoofdstuk 
gebruik ik het 'Radicale Enactivisme' van Dan Hutto om een helderder 
beeld te krijgen van de rol van representatie in SToCC. Radicaal 
Enactivisme verdedigt het idee dat er geen sprake is van representationele 
inhoud (begrepen als 'dingen' die zich 'in het hoofd' bevinden), in ieder 
geval niet in beschrijvingen van meer basale vormen van enactie. 
 
SToCC, hiermee contrasterend, stelt dat het mogelijk is een sluitend 
verhaal over representatie te ontwikkelen waarbinnen het mogelijk is de 
functie van een representatie te laten vervullen (namelijk: het instantiëren 
van een betekenisvolle relatie tussen individu en omgeving) zonder dat er 
sprake zou hoeven zijn van het ontologisch problematische 'verdinglijken' 
van interne mentale processen. Allereerst kan er gezegd worden dat Andy 
Clark, met zijn notie 'representation-hungry problems', laat zien dat er 
cognitieve taken zijn die soms de re-presentatie, in het geheugen 
bijvoorbeeld, nodig maken van objecten die niet op betrouwbare wijze 
aanwezig zijn in de onmiddelijke omgeving. Gebaseerd op distincties van 
Fred Dretske tussen verschillende soorten representatie kan SToCC stellen 
dat we interne toestanden kunnen hebben die geen representaties van het 
klassieke soort zijn (dus interne representaties van externe objecten), maar 
desalniettemin representaties zijn omdat ze een bijdrage leveren aan de 
dynamische organisme-omgeving-interactie vanwege een specifieke relatie 
met externe toestanden die ze uitdrukken; deze interactie betreft eveneens 
bijdragen van lichamelijke en omgevingsgerelateerde krachten ('enablings' 
['mogelijkmakingen'] en 'constraints' ['inperkingen']). Deze 'representaties' 
zijn geen mentale entiteiten, maar mogelijkmakende of inperkende factoren 
in die organisme-omgeving interactiedynamiek. 
 
Deze dynamiek betreft wederzijdse mogelijkmakingen en inperkingen: de 
lichamelijke eigenschappen van het individu, zijn sociale en fysieke 
omgeving in collectieve interactie realiseren een specifiek gedragsprofiel 
met nieuwe eigenschappen, waarvan de belangrijkste is de eigenschap 
conceptgerelateerd gedrag te vertonen: het individu zelf, belichaamd en 
ingebed in een bepaalde omgeving, heeft concepten. De metafysische 
structuur waarvan hier sprake is, is 'dynamical dimensioned realization'. De 
fluïditeit van deze dynamische interacties suggereert bovendien dat 
concepten niet onderhevig zijn aan rigide waarheidsvoorwaarden, maar aan 
gebruikstoepasselijkheidsvoorwaarden. 
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-(Hoofdstuk 8) 
 
De wederzijdse gerelateerdheid van de lichamelijke eigenschappen van het 
individu, de sociale en fysieke eigenschappen van zijn omgeving en het 
conceptgerelateerde gedrag dat ontstaat uit deze dynamische interactie kan 
weergegeven worden in een model dat gebruik maakt van afzonderlijke 
maar gerelateerde ruimtes; dit model wordt uitgelegd in hoofdstuk 8. In dit 
model worden het dynamische bewegingsplanningsveld uit hoofdstuk 3, 
fenomenale kleurruimte uit hoofdstukken 4 en 5 en de conceptuele ruimte 
uit hoofdstuk 6 aangepast en samengevoegd tot een nieuw model, het 
'Radicality Manifold' (RM). 
 
Dit model beschrijft eigenschappen van de gedragsmatige ('B-ruimte'), 
biomechanische ('M-ruimte'), fysieke ('P-ruimte'), sociale ('S-ruimte') en 
conceptuele ('C-space') domeinen. Elk van deze domeinen kan uitgedrukt 
worden als een dispositionele ruimte, en de interactie van deze ruimtes 
wordt gedefinieerd in termen van 'affordances' (handelingsmogelijkheden): 
elk eigenschapstype roept mogelijkmakingen of juist inperkingen op voor 
andere eigenschapstypen. 
 
Dit model laat zien hoe conceptuele vermogens ontstaan, via 'dynamical 
dimensioned realization', uit de interactie van fysieke, sociale en 
biomechanische processen. De beschikbaarheid van een conceptuele 
beschrijving maakt een verklaring mogelijk (als onderscheiden van slechts 
een beschrijving) van een specifiek gedragspatroon. Anders gezegd: de 
eigenschappen van de fysieke omgeving, sociale omgeving en lichamelijke 
biomechanica interageren op zo'n wijze dat er in het gedrag een structurele 
regelmatigheid ontstaat, namelijk een conceptuele dispositie. In dit 
hoofdstuk worden verschillende interactievormen tussen de ruimtes 
besproken: 'Semiogenetic Engine', 'Social Preconceptual Processing', 
'Affordance-Effectivity Balance' en 'Distal Ecological Dynamics'. 
 
-(Hoofdstuk 9) 
 
Hoofdstuk 9 behandelt een aantal implicaties van het RM-model: het 
onstaan van betekenis en normativiteit, het inherent circulaire karakter van 
het model, de mogelijkheid binnen RM tot conceptindividuatie, en de 
epistemologische ideeën die in RM verstopt zitten. 
 
Zeer basale lichamelijke syntax kan een bijdrage leveren aan het onstaan 
van een praktijk van participatoire betekenisgeving: het belichaamd 
interageren van individuën is een voorbeeld van het sociaal co-construeren 
van betekenisvolle interactieprofielen. Het kunnen herkennen van dat soort 
profielen is de basis van inhoud-toeschrijving, ons sociale spel waarin we 
zo handelen dat we voldoen aan de eisen van conceptbezit, zowel reflexief 
(jezelf interpreteren als handelend op zo'n manier dat het toeschrijven van 
concepten gerechtvaardigd is) en attributief (het hebben van 
eigenschappen en het vertonen van gedrag waardoor anderen geneigd zijn 
concepten aan dat individu toe te schrijven). 
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Het gebruiken van concepten in de uitleg van RM is een fundamenteel 
circulair proces, onder andere omdat iemand zichzelf interpreteert als 
conceptbezitter tegen een achtergrond van sociaal geaccepteerde 
omgangsvormen die door die persoon zelf in interactie met anderen uit zijn 
sociale niche geïnstantieerd worden. Een dergelijke circulariteit sluit goed 
aan bij een breder fenomeen: levende, autopoietische systemen moeten 
begrepen worden als systemen die zogenaamde impredicatieve lussen 
implementeren. RM als een binnen E( i )C passend model van 
conceptgerelateerd handelen vormt een uitdrukking hiervan. 
 
Het individueren van concepten is in RM in principe mogelijk in termen van 
de verschillende mogelijkmakingen en inperkingen afkomstig van de 
ervaringen en ideeën zoals die vervat zijn in de narratieve jurisprudentie 
van een concept. Als we proberen het gedrag van anderen te verklaren 
kunnen we ze concepten toeschrijven, welke geïndividueerd kunnen 
worden door inferenties te plegen over de genoemde ervaringen en kennis 
op een grofkorrelig detailniveau. 
 
Eén van de epistemologische consequenties van het RM-model is dat de 
verklarende focus nadrukkelijk op het individu als geheel gericht is: de 
verschillende deelverklaringen die gerelateerd zijn aan de afzonderlijke 
ruimtes van het RM-model worden opgesteld met expliciete aandacht voor 
het belichaamde, in zijn omgeving ingebedde individu. De deelverklaringen 
betreffen dus verschillende aspecten van één en dezelfde complexe 
organisme-omgeving-interactiedynamiek. 
 
-(Hoofdstuk 10) 
 
In het afsluitende hoofdstuk worden een aantal losse eindjes aan elkaar 
geknoopt. Een aanval op één van de belangrijke inspiratietheorieën van het 
RM-model, fenomenale kleurruimte, blijkt in het geval van RM minder 
effectief. De tegenwerping is dat de metrische structuur die door 
voorstanders in de perceptuele ruimte wordt aangebracht een empirische 
precisie veronderstelt die eenvoudigweg niet door introspectie (het 
'meetinstrument' waarmee die structuur wordt vastgesteld) verschaft kan 
worden. De ruimtes uit het RM-model, echter, worden niet opgebouwd op 
basis van introspectie; bovendien wordt expliciet gesteld dat deze ruimtes 
nergens in het individu, zijn geest of waar dan ook aanwezig zijn, in 
tegenstelling tot de perceptuele ruimte in sommige interpretaties van die 
theorie - het gaat in het geval van RM om een model dat congruent geacht 
wordt te zijn met gedrag van een individu. 
 
De theorie aangaande conceptuele ruimtes van Peter Gärdenfors vertoont 
enkele overeenkomsten met het RM-model, net als (maar dan op een 
andere manier) het concept-empirisme van Jesse Prinz. Elk van beide 
theorieën schiet echter tekort ten aanzien van E( i )C-eisen, omdat ze - kort 
gezegd - representatie te klassiek-cognitivistisch opvatten: de specifieke 
interpretatie van representatie zoals die in hoofdstuk 7 ontwikkeld wordt (en 
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waarvan de implicaties in hoofdstukken 8 en 9 aan bod komen) is wél in 
staat die E( i )C-eisen in te willigen. 
 
In hoofdstuk 10 wordt RM toegepast op een concreet voorbeeld, namelijk 
conceptgebaseerd voor- en vroegschools onderwijs. Enkele van de 
aanbevelingen, op basis van RM, zijn: conceptgebaseerd onderwijs (als 
onderscheiden van onderwijs gericht op feitenkennis) kan kinderen helpen 
in het trainen van het contextafhankelijk interpreteren van gebeurtenissen, 
alsmede in het trainen van het begrip dat het kind van zijn eigen fysieke en 
sociale gesitueerdheid heeft; een multimodale presentatie van 
leermaterialen benadrukt de wederzijdse afhankelijkheid van veel 
begripsdefinities; en het hebben van concepten is in belangrijke mate een 
sociale eigenschap - in conceptgebaseerd onderwijs zou daarom extra 
aandacht besteed moeten worden aan het verantwoorden, door kinderen, 
van hun conceptgebruik, en aan het trainen van de analytische instelling die 
daarbij hoort. 
 
Tenslotte wordt in hoofdstuk 10 samengevat hoe RM voldoet aan de eisen 
voor een conceptentheorie zoals die in hoofdstuk 2 werden geformuleerd. 
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